Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USNATO122
2008-04-08 17:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

NATO'S BUCHAREST SUMMIT DECLARATION, CABLE 2 OF 2

Tags:  MARR MOPS NATO PREL 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000122 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PREL
SUBJECT: NATO'S BUCHAREST SUMMIT DECLARATION, CABLE 2 OF 2

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000122

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PREL
SUBJECT: NATO'S BUCHAREST SUMMIT DECLARATION, CABLE 2 OF 2

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) Due to the length of the communique, this is cable 2
of 2.


2. (C) SUMMARY, repeated from Cable 1 of 2: As reflected in
the Bucharest Declaration (see para 3),the April 3-4 NATO
Summit in Bucharest advanced U.S. policy objectives on a
variety of fronts. NATO Heads of State and Government
reaffirmed their strong support for missions in Afghanistan
(para 6),Kosovo (para 7, 8, 9),and Iraq (para 17). On
missile defense (para 37, 38),Allies agreed the missile
threat to NATO territory and populations is increasing,
recognized the contribution to the protection of Allies the
U.S. third sites will play and tasked the Council to develop
options for a comprehensive missile defense architecture to
extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not
covered by the U.S. system (para 37, 38). They also agreed
to invite Albania and Croatia (para 2, 19) to begin NATO
accession talks, although Greece prevented a similar
invitation to Macedonia until their bilateral dispute over
Macedonia's name is resolved (para 20). While Allies delayed
a decision to move Ukraine and Georgia into the Membership
Action Plan (MAP) process, Allies more importantly agreed
that Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members (para 23).
The question is now "when," not "if" and MAP could come as
early as NATO's December Foreign Ministerial (para 23).
Bosnia and Montenegro were invited to begin an Intensified
Dialogue with the Alliance on membership questions and
relevant reforms (para 25) ) the first step on the
membership ladder ) while the door was also left open for
Serbia should it choose to move closer to NATO in the future
(para 26). On the partnership front, Allies welcomed Malta
back into Partnership for Peace (para 32),and NATO
eliminated the term "contact countries" in favor of "partners
across the globe" (para 35). The Alliance and ISAF nations
issued a separate Vision Statement on Afghanistan (septel).
END SUMMARY.


3. (U) BUCHAREST SUMMIT DECLARATION, continued:


25. We welcome Bosnia and Herzegovina's and Montenegro's

decisions to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan
(IPAP) with NATO. We look forward to ambitious and
substantive Action Plans which will further the Euro-Atlantic
aspirations of these countries and we pledge our assistance
to their respective reform efforts towards this goal. To help
foster and guide these efforts, we have decided to invite
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to begin an Intensified
Dialogue on the full range of political, military, financial,
and security issues relating to their aspirations to
membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance
decision.


26. We stand ready to further develop an ambitious and
substantive relationship with Serbia, making full use of its
Partnership for Peace membership, and with a view to making
more progress towards Serbia's integration into the
Euro-Atlantic community. We reiterate our willingness to
deepen our cooperation with Serbia, in particular through
developing an IPAP, and we will consider an Intensified
Dialogue following a request by Serbia.


27. We expect Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate
fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and will closely monitor their respective efforts
in this regard.


28. We recall that the NATO-Russia partnership was conceived
as a strategic element in fostering security in the
Euro-Atlantic area, based on core principles, values and
commitments, including democracy, civil liberties and
political pluralism. Looking back at a history of more than a
decade, we have developed a political dialogue as well as
concrete projects in a broad range of international security
issues where we have common goals and interests. While we are
concerned by recent Russian statements and actions on key
security issues of mutual concern, such as the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE),we stand ready to
continue working with Russia as equal partners in areas of
common concern, as envisaged by the Rome Declaration and the
Founding Act. We should continue our common efforts in the
fight against terrorism and in the area of non-proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery.
We urge Russia to engage actively in important cooperative
offers that have been extended. We believe that United
States-Russia bilateral discussions on missile defence and
CFE, among other issues, can make an important contribution
in this field. We believe the potential of the NATO-Russia
Council is not fully realised and we remain ready to identify
and pursue opportunities for joint actions at 27, while
recalling the principle of independence of decision-making
and actions by NATO or Russia. We reaffirm to Russia that
NATO's Open Door policy and current, as well as any future,
NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address
the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far
from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer
opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability.


29. We note Russia's ratification of the Partnership for
Peace Status of Forces Agreement, and hope that it will
facilitate further practical cooperation. We appreciate
Russia's readiness to support NATO's ISAF mission in
Afghanistan by facilitating transit through Russian
territory. We would welcome deepened NATO-Russia cooperation
in support of, and agreed by, the Government of Afghanistan,
and look forward to building on the solid work already
achieved in training Afghan and Central Asian
counter-narcotics officers. Our continued cooperation under
our Cooperative Airspace Initiative and Russia's support to
Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean contribute to
our common fight against terrorism. We also welcome our
cooperation on military interoperability, theatre missile
defence, search and rescue at sea, and civil emergency
planning.


30. We reaffirm that NATO's policy of outreach through
partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation is an essential part
of the Alliance's purpose and tasks. The Alliance's
partnerships across the globe have an enduring value,
contributing to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic
area and beyond. With this in mind, we welcome progress made
since our last Summit in Riga in strengthening NATO's policy
of partnerships and cooperation, and reaffirm our commitment
to undertake further efforts in this regard.


31. We value highly the contributions that our partners are
making to NATO's missions and operations. Seventeen nations
outside the Alliance are contributing forces to our
operations and missions and many others provide different
forms of support. We will continue to strive to promote
greater interoperability between our forces and those of
partner nations; to further enhance information-sharing and
consultations with nations contributing to NATO-led
operations; and to offer partner countries NATO's advice on,
and assistance with, the defence- and security-related
aspects of reform.


32. We welcome our Euro-Atlantic Partners at the Bucharest
Summit and reiterate the enduring value of the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) programme. We remain committed to substantive political
discussions and effective cooperation within these
frameworks. We welcome Malta's return to the PfP and look
forward to its active engagement in the EAPC. We welcome the
strengthening of political dialogue through the EAPC Security
Forum. We will give priority to several new practical
initiatives, which include building integrity in defence
institutions and the important role of women in conflict
resolution as outlined in UNSCR 1325. We value the
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre's
successes over the past ten years in coordinating NATO and
partner countries' contributions to disaster relief. We will
continue to make full use of the NATO/PfP Trust Funds and of
their opening to other partner countries. We welcome and will
continue to support the engagement of all interested Partners
across the Euro-Atlantic area in programmes to support
defence and broader reforms, including the Individual
Partnership Action Plan. Recalling our Istanbul Summit
decision, we are committed to engage our Partners in the
strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central
Asia, including by strengthening liaison arrangements in
these regions, and will continue dialogue with our Central
Asian Partners on Afghanistan. We appreciate the significant
contributions provided by our EAPC Partners to Alliance
operations and look forward to working with them to address
the security challenges of the 21st century.


33. We are pleased to note the significant progress achieved
in the framework of our Mediterranean Dialogue since the
Istanbul and Riga Summits. Political consultations with our
Mediterranean Dialogue partners have gained both in frequency
and substance, and the meeting held between our Foreign
Ministers and their seven Mediterranean Dialogue partners
last December contributed to a further deepening of our
partnership. We therefore plan to pursue this momentum
through deepening our liaison arrangements, on a voluntary
basis, with the region. Our practical cooperation has grown
in several areas, and new opportunities have been created
especially in training and education. We welcome the progress
made in the implementation activities of the NATO Training
Cooperation Initiative, in the spirit of joint ownership and
in the view of launching the NATO Regional Cooperation Course
at the NATO Defense College, where two pilot courses were
successfully conducted. We encourage our Mediterranean
Dialogue partners to work with us to develop this Initiative
further. The conclusion of Individual Cooperation Programmes
(ICP) with Egypt and Israel will help in establishing
long-term, structured and effective cooperation with those
countries. We encourage our other Mediterranean Dialogue
partners to develop their own ICP in the near future. We
welcome the implementation of the first ever Mediterranean
Dialogue Trust Fund project to assist Jordan with the
disposal of unexploded ordnance and ammunitions, and the
launching of the feasibility study for the Trust Fund project
to assist Mauritania with the disposal of ammunitions. We
thank our Mediterranean Dialogue partners for their various
contributions to our operations and missions.


34. We welcome the response of four countries in the Gulf
region to our offer of cooperation in the framework of the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and encourage other
countries of the region to take up that offer. To that end,
we plan to develop our liaison arrangements, on a voluntary
basis, with this region. We are pleased to see their
increased interest and participation in NATO training and
education activities, and stand ready to enhance our
cooperation in this and other fields. We welcome the progress
made in the implementation activities of the NATO Training
Cooperation Initiative, in the spirit of joint ownership and
in the view of launching the NATO Regional Cooperation Course
at the NATO Defense College, where two pilot courses were
successfully conducted. We encourage our ICI partners to work
with us to develop this Initiative further. We encourage our
ICI partners to develop an ICP with a view to better
structuring our cooperation. We very much appreciate the
support provided by our ICI partners to Alliance operations
and missions.


35. The Alliance places a high value on its expanding and
varied relationships with other partners across the globe.
Our objectives in these relationships include support for
operations, security cooperation, and enhanced common
understanding to advance shared security interests and
democratic values. We have made substantial progress in
building political dialogue and developing individual
Tailored Cooperation Packages with a number of these
countries. We particularly welcome the significant
contribution by Australa, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore
to NATO-led fforts in Afghanistan. We also welcome the
valuale contributions by the Republic of Korea to efforts
which support the NATO-led mission in Afghanistn.
Recognising that each of these countries wishs to pursue a
unique degree of relations with NAO, and that other
countries may wish to pursue dalogue and cooperation with
NATO as well, we reiterate our willingness to further develop
existing and openness to new, individual relationships,
ubject to the approval of the North Atlantic Councl, and at
a pace that respects mutual interests n so doing.


36. We reaffirm the continued importnce of the Black Sea
region for Euro-Atlantic seurity. In this regard, we welcome
the progress i consolidation of regional ownership, through
effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms. The
Alliance will continue to support, as appropriate, these
efforts guided by regional priorities and based on
transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness, in order to
develop dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states
and with the Alliance.


37. Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing
threat to Allies' forces, trritory and populations. Missile
defence forms prt of a broader response to counter this
threat.We therefore recognise the substantial contribution
to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic
missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of
European-based United States missile defence assets. We are
exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO
missile defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be
an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence
architecture. Bearing in mind the principle of the
indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity,
we task the Council in Permanent Session to develop options
for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend
coverage to all Allied territory and populations not
otherwise covered by the United States system for review at
our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision.


38. We also commend the work already underway to strengthen
NATO-Russia missile defence cooperation. We are committed to
maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence building
measures to allay any concerns. We encourage the Russian
Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence
cooperation proposals and we are ready to explore the
potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile
defence systems at an appropriate time.


39. We reaffirm that arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation will continue to make an important
contribution to peace, security, and stability and, in this
regard, to preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and their means of delivery. We took note of the
report prepared for us on raising NATO's profile in this
field. As part of a broader response to security issues, NATO
should continue contributing to international efforts in the
area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and
we task the Council in Permanent Session to keep these issues
under active review.


40. The Alliance has reduced both its conventional forces
significantly from Cold War levels and has reduced nuclear
weapons assigned to NATO by over 90 percent. Allies have also
reduced their nuclear arsenals. France has reduced the types
of its nuclear systems to two, the number of its nuclear
delivery vehicles by over half, and has announced it will
reduce the number of its nuclear warheads to fewer than 300,
with no other weapons beside those in its operational
stockpile. The United Kingdom has reduced to one nuclear
system, and has reduced the explosive power of its nuclear
stockpile by 75 percent, and its number of operationally
available nuclear warheads to fewer than 160. The United
States has reduced its nuclear weapon stockpile to less than
25 percent of its size at the height of the Cold War, and
decreased tactical nuclear weapons assigned to NATO by nearly
90 percent.


41. We remain deeply concerned about the proliferation risks
of the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. We
call on Iran to fully comply with UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747 and

1803. We are also deeply concerned by the proliferation
activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and
call on it to fully comply with UNSCR 1718. Allies reaffirm
their support for existing multi-lateral non-proliferation
agreements, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
call for universal compliance with the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and universal adherence to the
Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and full compliance with UNSCR

1540. Allies agree to redouble their efforts to fully
implement the non-proliferation agreements and relevant
UNSCRs to which Allies reaffirm their support and by which
they are bound.


42. We fully endorse the statement of the North Atlantic
Council of 28 March 2008 and reaffirm the Alliance's
commitment to the CFE Treaty Regime, as expressed in the
Alliance's position contained in paragraph 42 of the 2006
Riga Summit Declaration, the final statement by Allies at the
CFE Extraordinary Conference in Vienna and Alliance
statements reflecting subsequent developments. We place the
highest value on the CFE Treaty regime with all its elements
and underscore the strategic importance of the CFE Treaty,
including its flank regime, as a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic
Security. We are deeply concerned that the Russian Federation
has continued its unilateral "suspension" of its legal
obligations under the CFE Treaty. This action does not
contribute to our common objective of preserving the
long-term viability of the CFE regime and we urge the Russian
Federation to resume its implementation. The current
situation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treaty while
Russia does not, cannot last indefinitely. We have offered a
set of constructive and forward-looking proposals for
parallel actions on key issues, including steps by NATO
Allies on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty and by the
Russian Federation on outstanding commitments related to
Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. We believe these
proposals address all of Russia's stated concerns. We
encourage Russian authorities to work cooperatively with us
and other concerned CFE States Parties to reach agreement on
the basis of the parallel actions package so that together we
can preserve the benefits of this landmark regime.


43. We are concerned with the persistence of regional
conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova.
Our nations support the territorial integrity, independence
and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the
Republic of Moldova. We will continue to support efforts
towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts,
taking into account these principles.


44. We have already done much to transform our forces and
capabilities in line with our political objectives, in
particular the priorities laid out in the Comprehensive
Political Guidance, and our operational experience. We will
continue this process to ensure the Alliance remains able to
meet its operational commitments and perform the full range
of its missions. Our operations highlight the need to develop
and field modern, interoperable, flexible and sustainable
forces. These forces must be able to conduct, upon decision
by the Council, collective defence and crisis response
operations on and beyond Alliance territory, on its
periphery, and at strategic distance, with little or no host
nation support. We will also ensure that we have the right
kind of capabilities to meet the evolving security challenges
of the 21st century, and to do so, we will transform, adapt
and reform as necessary.


45. Transformation is a continual process and demands
constant and active attention. We therefore support our
Defence Ministers' efforts as they oversee the management of
the defence aspects of transformation to ensure NATO remains
effective and efficient, especially by pursuing ongoing
efforts in the following areas:

-- We must ensure that we provide the forces required for our
operations and other commitments. To that end we will
continue efforts to be able to deploy and sustain more
forces. We are committed to support the NATO Response Force
by providing the necessary forces, and to improving the
availability of operational and strategic reserve forces for
our operations. We will seek greater domestic support for our
operations, including through improved public diplomacy
efforts.

-- We will further develop the capabilities required to
conduct the full range of our missions and to remedy specific
shortfalls. We will work particularly at improving strategic
lift and intra-theatre airlift, especially mission-capable
helicopters and welcome national initiatives in support of
this work, as well as addressing multinational logistics. We
will further strengthen information superiority through
networked capabilities, including an integrated air command
and control system; increased maritime situational awareness;
and timely delivery of the Alliance Ground Surveillance
capability. We will continue to enhance the capability and
interoperability of our special operations forces. Supported
by the defence planning processes, we will enhance our
efforts to develop and field the right capabilities and
forces, with the greatest practicable interoperability and
standardisation. This will be furthered by improving
trans-Atlantic defence industrial cooperation.

-- We are committed to develop policies and capabilities to
deal with emerging challenges and threats. This includes the
development of a comprehensive policy for preventing the
proliferation of WMD and defending against chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.

-- We are pursuing the adaptation and reform of the
Alliance's structures and processes. In this context we are
reviewing the peacetime establishment of the NATO Command
Structure to make it leaner, more effective and efficient,
and reforming defence planning processes in order to promote
timely delivery of the capabilities sought by the
Comprehensive Political Guidance.


46. Transformation is not possible without sufficient,
properly prioritised resources. We are committed to
continuing to provide, individually and collectively, the
resources necessary for our Alliance to perform the tasks we
demand from it. Therefore we encourage nations whose defence
spending is declining to halt that decline and to aim to
increase defence spending in real terms.


47. NATO remains committed to strengthening key Alliance
information systems against cyber attacks. We have recently
adopted a Policy on Cyber Defence, and are developing the
structures and authorities to carry it out. Our Policy on
Cyber Defence emphasises the need for NATO and nations to
protect key information systems in accordance with their
respective responsibilities; share best practices; and
provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request,
to counter a cyber attack. We look forward to continuing the
development of NATO's cyber defence capabilities and
strengthening the linkages between NATO and national
authorities.


48. We have noted a report "NATO's Role in Energy Security",
prepared in response to the tasking of the Riga Summit.
Allies have identified principles which will govern NATO's
approach in this field, and outlined options and
recommendations for further activities. Based on these
principles, NATO will engage in the following fields:
information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting
stability; advancing international and regional cooperation;
supporting consequence management; and supporting the
protection of critical energy infrastructure. The Alliance
will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the
field of energy security. We will ensure that NATO's
endeavours add value and are fully coordinated and embedded
within those of the international community, which features a
number of organisations that are specialised in energy
security. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to
prepare a consolidated report on the progress achieved in the
area of energy security for our consideration at the 2009
Summit.


49. Demands on our Alliance have grown in complexity in the
last twenty years, as the security environment has changed
and both the scope of our missions and operations and our
membership have expanded. This requires continual adaptation
and reform of NATO Headquarters' structures and processes. We
note the progress that has been made in this field, as part
of NATO's overall transformation; but more remains to be
done, including to get full benefit from our move to a new
Headquarters building. In evaluating where we need to change,
we need to make fuller use of lessons drawn from our
experience in delivering our core functions, including
meeting operational, capability development, partnership and
strategic communications requirements. Building on our
Defence Ministers' work to take forward the defence aspects
of transformation, Allies will also need to consider how to
achieve the fastest and most coherent flow of sound
political, military and resource advice to support our
consensual decision-making, and to enhance our responsiveness
to time-sensitive operational needs, including those of NATO
Commanders. We have requested the Secretary General to chart
a path forward, in time for the 2009 Summit, on how to meet
these objectives.


50. We express our sincere appreciation for the gracious
hospitality extended to us by the Government of Romania. The
city of Bucharest has been the venue of NATO's largest ever
Summit meeting, highlighting the Alliance's determination to
work closely with the International Community as well as its
own unique contribution to promoting security and stability
in a fast-changing strategic environment. At our meeting we
have taken decisions and given further direction for NATO's
own ongoing adaptation to that environment, through its
missions and operations, the modernisation of its structures
and capabilities, closer engagement of other nations and
organisations, as well as its continuing openness to the
inclusion of additional member states. We have strengthened
our dialogue and cooperation with countries and organisations
vital to our security. We will meet again next year in
Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate NATO's 60th anniversary,
take stock of its adaptation, and give further direction for
the modernisation of our Alliance to meet the security
challenges of the 21st century.
NULAND