Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08USEUBRUSSELS960
2008-06-25 05:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:
THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: BOLD INITIATIVE,
how-toVZCZCXRO2499 RR RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHBS #0960/01 1770509 ZNY CCCCC ZZH(TAO) R 250509Z JUN 08 FM USEU BRUSSELS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USEU BRUSSELS 000960
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2018
TAGS: EUN PREL
SUBJECT: THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: BOLD INITIATIVE,
YET MANY HURDLES REMAIN.
BRUSSELS 00000960 001.3 OF 004
Classified By: Deputy Political Minister Counselor Alyce Tidball for re
asons 1.4 (B) and (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USEU BRUSSELS 000960
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2018
TAGS: EUN PREL
SUBJECT: THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: BOLD INITIATIVE,
YET MANY HURDLES REMAIN.
BRUSSELS 00000960 001.3 OF 004
Classified By: Deputy Political Minister Counselor Alyce Tidball for re
asons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (U) Summary: The EU's Union for the Mediterranean,
originally proposed by French President Sarkozy, will launch
on July 13 with an official summit in Paris. The project has
been diluted to address other EU Member States' concerns, and
many details about the endeavor remain unclear. It also faces
several challenges, including Arab state participation,
future Presidencies' focus toward the East, and how it will
attract private investment. Given its ambitious agenda, the
French Presidency will have to devote substantial resources
to the project if it is to succeed. END SUMMARY
Background
--------------
2. (U) Nicholas Sarkozy announced his proposal for the
"Mediterranean Union" during his presidential campaign in
Spring 2007. His original plan was to bring all countries
with a Mediterranean coastline into a political, economic,
and cultural union founded on the notion of strict equality.
Sarkozy said he hoped this Mediterranean Union would create a
"space" for the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) to move
forward. Opposing Turkey's accession to the EU, he also
offered this as an alternative option for Turkey's future
relationship with Europe.
3. (C) However, Sarkozy's vision met with staunch criticism
from other EU Member States (MS),notably Germany. Johannes
Schlicht, Political Officer at the German Permanent
Representation to the EU, reiterated to PolOff German
conviction that all EU MS must be included in the project.
Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel reached a
compromise in March, 2008 calling for the inclusion of all MS
and changing the name from "Mediterranean Union" to "Union
for the Mediterranean," (UM). Sarkozy's grand scheme for a
new Mediterranean political body was reduced to an evolution
of the "Barcelona Process," (BP) the ongoing process of
EU-Mediterranean dialogue. Colin Scicluna, Principal EuroMed
desk officer in the Middle East/Mediterranean/Gulf Task Force
the Council Secretariat, said that, although France is
treating the UM as a brand new initiative, most other
participants and observers emphasize its continuity with the
BP.
4. (U) Since its creation in 1995, the EU considers the BP
the "central instrument" for European-Mediterranean
relations. However, due to its lack of visibility and
disruptions caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict, most experts
declared the BP static. Although the BP focused more on
achieving political and democratic reforms in the region, the
UM will now focus on concrete projects such as illegal
immigration or de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea. By
concentrating on specific projects that also increase
visibility, the EU hopes the UM will give new momentum to the
BP and enhance the political and institutional dimensions of
European-Mediterranean relations.
Structure
--------------
5. (C) On May 20, the European Commission (EC) released an
outline of the proposed structure of the UM. According to
European Commission Desk Officer for the EuroMed Amir
Motahari, the BP had lost its original momentum; the new
structures proposed by the EC are an attempt to revitalize
that process and ensure its continuation. The Commission
communication lists three levels of governance: a
Co-Presidency, a Joint Permanent Committee, and a
$ecretariat.
6. (C) The Co-Presidency will be held by one EU member and
one non-EU member. The Commission proposes a two year
BRUSSELS 00000960 002.4 OF 004
presidency for the non-EU member; the presidency of the EU
side should be the rotating EU presidency for now, and if and
when the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force, would be jointly
held by the President of the Council, the President of the
Commission, and the High Representative. According to Raja
Rabia, Counselor for the Mediterranean and Near East at the
French Permanent Representation to the EU, France had wanted
to hold its co-presidency for two years, but was willing to
accept the Commission's compromise. Schlicht from the
German Perm Rep said the co-presidency was key to deflecting
charges of paternalism by the Mediterranean states, another
cause of the current lack of interest in the BP.
7. (U) According to the Commission proposal, the Joint
Permanent Committee will be made up of Brussels-based
officials from all 39 participating countries. Its stated
function is to support the work of the Senior Officials and
prepare for Summits and Ministerials. The communication
leaves open other possibilities such as a crisis response
team or a substitute for frequent meetings of the Euro-Med
ambassadors.
8. (C) The Secretariat's principle responsibility will be the
management of various projects undertaken by the UM. The
exact size, location and role of the Secretariat are not
suggested in the EC communication, and will likely be a
subject of debate during both the summit and the November
Ministerial in Marseilles, France. Scicluna from the Council
$ecretariat said that Tunis has asked France for its support
to host the secretariat, to which France agreed. Since all
39 members will have to assent for this to occur, there is no
guarantee this arrangement will be put into place.
9. (U) Projects are a central focus of the UM and will most
likely be in the areas of energy security, environment, civil
protection and transport. Specific ideas include new sea
routes, de-pollution of Mediterranean waters, improvements to
maritime security, exploitation of solar power in North
Africa, and SME stimulus center, according to Scicluna and
the Commission communication.
Challenges
--------------
10. (U) As noted above and in multiple press sources, Sarkozy
accepted a diluted version of his original grand scheme in
order to overcome other MS's objections to the project.
However, many interlocutors in Brussels question the
potential success of even this less ambitious project. Many
questions remain regarding its eventual structure, its
viability and its potential impact on the Mediterranean area.
11. (C) The EC communication gives only the barest outline of
the UM infrastructure, leaving many details to be worked out
at the summit, the November ministerial, and other working
level meetings over the next six months. There is already
disagreement among MS as to the exact role of the
$ecretariat, and the promise of lengthy clashes among all
parties over its location. Schlicht suggested the Germans
would support a minor role for the secretariat, providing
essentially administrative support, while Rabia said the
French envisioned a more activist role. Commission Rep
Motahari said Brussels was the logical choice for the home of
the secretariat, while MS interlocutors expected non-EU
states to argue for a location outside of EU control.
Political Officer Yaprack Alp at the Embassy of Turkey said
that while her state might be a good candidate for hosting
the secretariat, given that it has good relations with
Israel, the EU and Arab states, Turkey will not take any
leadership role within the UM. The GoT fears that accepting
either the non-EU presidency of the UM or acting as the home
of the Secretariat would send the wrong message regarding
Turkey's essential European identity and work against its
aspiration of accession. The role of the Joint Permanent
Committee is similarly only suggested at this point with
ample room for lengthy debate.
BRUSSELS 00000960 003.2 OF 004
12. (C) There are serious doubts among participants regarding
the feasibility of the co-presidency scheme as it now stands.
Sagi Karni, Counselor for Political Affairs and Press at the
Israeli Mission to the EU, noted the strain a six month EU
presidency can place on a foreign ministry, and argued it is
unrealistic to think North African and Eastern Mediterranean
States can effectively run a 39 member union for two full
years. He also said a major reason the EC had proposed a
two-year presidency for the Mediterranean side was the small
supply of candidates who would allow Israel to participate
fully under their presidency. This also makes the GoI
skeptical about the feasibility of the UM.
13. (U) Another challenge is how the UM will survive the
French presidency. Both Israeli PolOff Karni and Turkish
PolOff Alp emphasized that the Czech Republic and Sweden, who
will hold the two 2009 EU presidencies, have promised to
focus on the EU's eastern neighbors, and wondered if the UM
will lose momentum even faster that the BP did.
14. (C) It is also questionable how Mediterranean states will
address the project. Although Sarkozy is quoted in press
reports saying the UM could aid the Middle East Peace
Process, as Johannes Schlicht conceded, "The UM having
positive effects on the Middle East Peace Process is a
totally philosophical question" -- interesting to think
about, but not well connected to reality. On June 10, Libyan
leader Muammar Qadhafi publicly called on Arab leaders to
reject offers to join the UM, saying it threatened Arab
unity. Scicluna from the Council Secretariat said that
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco have all agreed to
participate, although not all may send their Heads of State.
Karni from the Israeli mission said the PM of Israel would
attend, but that the GoI was not planning on playing a
significant role in this UM. Turkish PolOff said that if
Turkey and its neighbors were interested in regional
infrastructure or environmental projects, they would likely
organize it on their own, and not under the auspices of the
UM. Because of the perceived anti-Turkish nature of the UM's
origins, officially the GoT is taking a "wait and see"
attitude, but Alp said Turkey would likely participate in the
summit.
15. (C) Another test will be attracting private investment.
According to the EC's communication, the UM's "added value
will very much depend on its capacity to attract more
financial resources for regional projects." Commission Desk
Officer Motahari noted that one of the initial goals of the
UM was to promote public-private partnerships. However
Scicluna and Alexandre Zafiriou, Principal Administrator,
Middle East/Mediterranean/Gulf Task Force in the Council
Secretariat conceded that there has not been much contact
with the private sector and that MS's are divided as to
whether or not private investment will come forward as it
sees more development in the region. Commission, Council
Secretariat and MS interlocutors, when asked about what form
private funding might take -- DFI, grants, loans, etc. -- all
agreed that this detail needed to be worked out in the months
ahead, and that raising private funds a task that would most
likely fall to the secretariat.
16. (U) COMMENT: The UM will need to have stable
institutions in place before the end of the French presidency
to ensure its long term credibility. Given the long list of
internal and external EU priorities the French will face
during their presidency, there is no assurance the French
will meet this dadline. The French presidency agenda
alreadyincluded the reformation of immigration and asylum
policies, development of defense structres, energy, and
climate change. The Irish rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon
has added a crucial extra layer to their workload. The
combination of competing priorities among MS, apathy or
antipathy from non-EU states, and a lack of attention to
detail in the planning and organization so far, may lead the
BRUSSELS 00000960 004.3 OF 004
UM to the same inert status as the BP. END COMMENT.
CHASE
.
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2018
TAGS: EUN PREL
SUBJECT: THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: BOLD INITIATIVE,
YET MANY HURDLES REMAIN.
BRUSSELS 00000960 001.3 OF 004
Classified By: Deputy Political Minister Counselor Alyce Tidball for re
asons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (U) Summary: The EU's Union for the Mediterranean,
originally proposed by French President Sarkozy, will launch
on July 13 with an official summit in Paris. The project has
been diluted to address other EU Member States' concerns, and
many details about the endeavor remain unclear. It also faces
several challenges, including Arab state participation,
future Presidencies' focus toward the East, and how it will
attract private investment. Given its ambitious agenda, the
French Presidency will have to devote substantial resources
to the project if it is to succeed. END SUMMARY
Background
--------------
2. (U) Nicholas Sarkozy announced his proposal for the
"Mediterranean Union" during his presidential campaign in
Spring 2007. His original plan was to bring all countries
with a Mediterranean coastline into a political, economic,
and cultural union founded on the notion of strict equality.
Sarkozy said he hoped this Mediterranean Union would create a
"space" for the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) to move
forward. Opposing Turkey's accession to the EU, he also
offered this as an alternative option for Turkey's future
relationship with Europe.
3. (C) However, Sarkozy's vision met with staunch criticism
from other EU Member States (MS),notably Germany. Johannes
Schlicht, Political Officer at the German Permanent
Representation to the EU, reiterated to PolOff German
conviction that all EU MS must be included in the project.
Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel reached a
compromise in March, 2008 calling for the inclusion of all MS
and changing the name from "Mediterranean Union" to "Union
for the Mediterranean," (UM). Sarkozy's grand scheme for a
new Mediterranean political body was reduced to an evolution
of the "Barcelona Process," (BP) the ongoing process of
EU-Mediterranean dialogue. Colin Scicluna, Principal EuroMed
desk officer in the Middle East/Mediterranean/Gulf Task Force
the Council Secretariat, said that, although France is
treating the UM as a brand new initiative, most other
participants and observers emphasize its continuity with the
BP.
4. (U) Since its creation in 1995, the EU considers the BP
the "central instrument" for European-Mediterranean
relations. However, due to its lack of visibility and
disruptions caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict, most experts
declared the BP static. Although the BP focused more on
achieving political and democratic reforms in the region, the
UM will now focus on concrete projects such as illegal
immigration or de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea. By
concentrating on specific projects that also increase
visibility, the EU hopes the UM will give new momentum to the
BP and enhance the political and institutional dimensions of
European-Mediterranean relations.
Structure
--------------
5. (C) On May 20, the European Commission (EC) released an
outline of the proposed structure of the UM. According to
European Commission Desk Officer for the EuroMed Amir
Motahari, the BP had lost its original momentum; the new
structures proposed by the EC are an attempt to revitalize
that process and ensure its continuation. The Commission
communication lists three levels of governance: a
Co-Presidency, a Joint Permanent Committee, and a
$ecretariat.
6. (C) The Co-Presidency will be held by one EU member and
one non-EU member. The Commission proposes a two year
BRUSSELS 00000960 002.4 OF 004
presidency for the non-EU member; the presidency of the EU
side should be the rotating EU presidency for now, and if and
when the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force, would be jointly
held by the President of the Council, the President of the
Commission, and the High Representative. According to Raja
Rabia, Counselor for the Mediterranean and Near East at the
French Permanent Representation to the EU, France had wanted
to hold its co-presidency for two years, but was willing to
accept the Commission's compromise. Schlicht from the
German Perm Rep said the co-presidency was key to deflecting
charges of paternalism by the Mediterranean states, another
cause of the current lack of interest in the BP.
7. (U) According to the Commission proposal, the Joint
Permanent Committee will be made up of Brussels-based
officials from all 39 participating countries. Its stated
function is to support the work of the Senior Officials and
prepare for Summits and Ministerials. The communication
leaves open other possibilities such as a crisis response
team or a substitute for frequent meetings of the Euro-Med
ambassadors.
8. (C) The Secretariat's principle responsibility will be the
management of various projects undertaken by the UM. The
exact size, location and role of the Secretariat are not
suggested in the EC communication, and will likely be a
subject of debate during both the summit and the November
Ministerial in Marseilles, France. Scicluna from the Council
$ecretariat said that Tunis has asked France for its support
to host the secretariat, to which France agreed. Since all
39 members will have to assent for this to occur, there is no
guarantee this arrangement will be put into place.
9. (U) Projects are a central focus of the UM and will most
likely be in the areas of energy security, environment, civil
protection and transport. Specific ideas include new sea
routes, de-pollution of Mediterranean waters, improvements to
maritime security, exploitation of solar power in North
Africa, and SME stimulus center, according to Scicluna and
the Commission communication.
Challenges
--------------
10. (U) As noted above and in multiple press sources, Sarkozy
accepted a diluted version of his original grand scheme in
order to overcome other MS's objections to the project.
However, many interlocutors in Brussels question the
potential success of even this less ambitious project. Many
questions remain regarding its eventual structure, its
viability and its potential impact on the Mediterranean area.
11. (C) The EC communication gives only the barest outline of
the UM infrastructure, leaving many details to be worked out
at the summit, the November ministerial, and other working
level meetings over the next six months. There is already
disagreement among MS as to the exact role of the
$ecretariat, and the promise of lengthy clashes among all
parties over its location. Schlicht suggested the Germans
would support a minor role for the secretariat, providing
essentially administrative support, while Rabia said the
French envisioned a more activist role. Commission Rep
Motahari said Brussels was the logical choice for the home of
the secretariat, while MS interlocutors expected non-EU
states to argue for a location outside of EU control.
Political Officer Yaprack Alp at the Embassy of Turkey said
that while her state might be a good candidate for hosting
the secretariat, given that it has good relations with
Israel, the EU and Arab states, Turkey will not take any
leadership role within the UM. The GoT fears that accepting
either the non-EU presidency of the UM or acting as the home
of the Secretariat would send the wrong message regarding
Turkey's essential European identity and work against its
aspiration of accession. The role of the Joint Permanent
Committee is similarly only suggested at this point with
ample room for lengthy debate.
BRUSSELS 00000960 003.2 OF 004
12. (C) There are serious doubts among participants regarding
the feasibility of the co-presidency scheme as it now stands.
Sagi Karni, Counselor for Political Affairs and Press at the
Israeli Mission to the EU, noted the strain a six month EU
presidency can place on a foreign ministry, and argued it is
unrealistic to think North African and Eastern Mediterranean
States can effectively run a 39 member union for two full
years. He also said a major reason the EC had proposed a
two-year presidency for the Mediterranean side was the small
supply of candidates who would allow Israel to participate
fully under their presidency. This also makes the GoI
skeptical about the feasibility of the UM.
13. (U) Another challenge is how the UM will survive the
French presidency. Both Israeli PolOff Karni and Turkish
PolOff Alp emphasized that the Czech Republic and Sweden, who
will hold the two 2009 EU presidencies, have promised to
focus on the EU's eastern neighbors, and wondered if the UM
will lose momentum even faster that the BP did.
14. (C) It is also questionable how Mediterranean states will
address the project. Although Sarkozy is quoted in press
reports saying the UM could aid the Middle East Peace
Process, as Johannes Schlicht conceded, "The UM having
positive effects on the Middle East Peace Process is a
totally philosophical question" -- interesting to think
about, but not well connected to reality. On June 10, Libyan
leader Muammar Qadhafi publicly called on Arab leaders to
reject offers to join the UM, saying it threatened Arab
unity. Scicluna from the Council Secretariat said that
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco have all agreed to
participate, although not all may send their Heads of State.
Karni from the Israeli mission said the PM of Israel would
attend, but that the GoI was not planning on playing a
significant role in this UM. Turkish PolOff said that if
Turkey and its neighbors were interested in regional
infrastructure or environmental projects, they would likely
organize it on their own, and not under the auspices of the
UM. Because of the perceived anti-Turkish nature of the UM's
origins, officially the GoT is taking a "wait and see"
attitude, but Alp said Turkey would likely participate in the
summit.
15. (C) Another test will be attracting private investment.
According to the EC's communication, the UM's "added value
will very much depend on its capacity to attract more
financial resources for regional projects." Commission Desk
Officer Motahari noted that one of the initial goals of the
UM was to promote public-private partnerships. However
Scicluna and Alexandre Zafiriou, Principal Administrator,
Middle East/Mediterranean/Gulf Task Force in the Council
Secretariat conceded that there has not been much contact
with the private sector and that MS's are divided as to
whether or not private investment will come forward as it
sees more development in the region. Commission, Council
Secretariat and MS interlocutors, when asked about what form
private funding might take -- DFI, grants, loans, etc. -- all
agreed that this detail needed to be worked out in the months
ahead, and that raising private funds a task that would most
likely fall to the secretariat.
16. (U) COMMENT: The UM will need to have stable
institutions in place before the end of the French presidency
to ensure its long term credibility. Given the long list of
internal and external EU priorities the French will face
during their presidency, there is no assurance the French
will meet this dadline. The French presidency agenda
alreadyincluded the reformation of immigration and asylum
policies, development of defense structres, energy, and
climate change. The Irish rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon
has added a crucial extra layer to their workload. The
combination of competing priorities among MS, apathy or
antipathy from non-EU states, and a lack of attention to
detail in the planning and organization so far, may lead the
BRUSSELS 00000960 004.3 OF 004
UM to the same inert status as the BP. END COMMENT.
CHASE
.