NORDICS SEEK DIRECTION FOR NATO-EU INITIATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 000930

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS PARM MARR EUN NATO
SUBJECT: NORDICS SEEK DIRECTION FOR NATO-EU INITIATIVE

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. CHRISTOPHER MURRAY FOR REASON 1.
4B/D


1. (C) BEGIN SUMMARY: Finnish PSC PermRep and Norwegian EU
Ambassador approached Charge on June 18 to seek U.S. views on
NATO-EU relations, which they are concerned could further
deteriorate if there are no organized efforts to improve the
present dynamic. Five Nordic countries -- some members of
the EU, some of NATO and some both -- have been meeting to
discuss how they might jointly work to advance NATO-EU
relations. The Norwegian Ambassador singled out the most
recent NAC-PSC meeting held on February 25, comprising only a
desultory discussion on Bosnia, as emblematic of the whole
problem. Both Ambassadors said that the fundamental question
in determining how to proceed is whether progress can be
made on NATO-EU relations without progress on the core issue
of Turkey-Cyprus. Finland's ambassador asked whether the
U.S. would be willing to play a role in reaching out to
Turkey on this issue. We told them that the U.S. works
closely with Turkey in Ankara and at NATO, but it is
important to remember that neither Turkey nor the United
States is a member of the EU and Turkey might need to hear
the right message from EU member states. END SUMMARY


2. (C) On June 18, Charge and political officer met with
Norwegian Ambassador to the EU Oda Sletnes and Finnish
Political and Security Committee Ambassador Anne Sipilainen
at their request to discuss NATO-EU relations. Sletnes
expressed her concern at the present state of NATO-EU
relations. She emphasized that this was not a new concern
for the Nordics, referring to a March 5 letter on this issue
that was jointly sent by the Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian
Foreign Ministers to EU HiRep Solana, but that no tangible
progress had been made. She said that given the importance
of NATO-EU cooperation in Kosovo and Afghanistan, this was an
issue that needed to be addressed. Although France initially
had hoped to make progress in this area during its EU
Presidency, French ambition was falling off due to
difficulties with Ankara and there were low expectations for
the July 7 NATO-EU Seminar in Paris. Sletnes invited a
free-flowing and informal conversation that signaled the
Nordics' objective at this time is to gather ideas rather
than define policy.


3. (C) Sletnes revealed that NATO and EU Ambassadors from
five Nordic countries: Norway, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and
Denmark had been engaged in an intense series of meetings to
determine how they could contribute to better NATO-EU
relations. The Nordic nations felt that they had a relevant
perspective to share, as these similar countries are in
different "constellations," with some Nordics members of NATO
and others belonging to the EU. Sletnes said the Nordics are
now ready to approach key countries such as the U.S., France,
Germany and the UK. If a Nordic role would be welcomed by
these key countries and they agree that that "conditions
exist to permit going forward" with the initiative, the
Nordics were ready to identify concrete steps that might be
taken to stimulate progress. She outlined a few these ideas:
working to ensure that Turkey would be offered the
opportunity to participate in the European Defense Agency;
creating additional opportunities for meaningful political
consultation and being more inclusive towards Turkey in
regards to EU exercises.


4. (C) Charge welcomed the effort to identify discrete areas
in which limited progress might be made. He noted that the
EU's Robert Cooper was fond of stating that no EU-NATO
problem exists, only a Turkey-Cyprus problem. Sletnes agreed
that Turkey-Cyprus problem needed to be resolved and would
not go away without the efforts of third parties. Finnish
Ambassador Sipilainen who had been content to let Sletnes do
most of the talking, inquired as to whether the U.S. was in a
dialogue with Turkey on this issue. She indicated that
"some" were very cautious about taking any steps that might
elicit blowback from Ankara. She said that after the Irish
rejection of the Lisbon Treaty there was limited appetite
among EU member states to move quickly to take on difficult
issues. Although France had good intentions, Sipilainen
described expectations for the upcoming EU Summit as low.


5. (C) Sipilainen noted that Helsinki had been hopeful that
the positive evolution of the situation in Cyprus might
translate into progress in NATO-EU relations. Unfortunately,
the new Cypriot leadership was not seized with PfP or NATO-EU
issues. They saw these issues merely as bargaining chips,
she commented. Sletnes acknowledged that Cyprus did have
clear motivations and justifications for the actions it took
against Turkish interests. The current Cypriot state of mind
thus raised the question of whether now is the right moment
to make progress on NATO-EU relations.


6. (C) COMMENT: The timing may not be ideal for this Nordic
effort, but the situation is likely to get worse if they
wait. Although the Nordic effort is more structured, the key
concern Sletnes and Sipilainen conveyed this afternoon is
similar to what we have recently heard at a lower level from
the French: the need to focus on the core Turkey-Cyprus
issue before broad and irreversible progress on NATO-EU can
be made. They also both expressed an exaggerated view of our
influence with Turkey and an implied optimism about our
willingness to carry the EU's water in dealing with the
Turks. END COMMENT
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