IAEA/IRAN: LIKE-MINDED READY TO DRAFT A BOARD

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000098

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NOT BY CIB: "DO NOT/NOT PROCESS, GIVE TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE."

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DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS: PARM KNPP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: LIKE-MINDED READY TO DRAFT A BOARD
RESOLUTION

REF: REF A) UNVIE 64 B) UNVIE 74 C) UNVIE 94

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons
1.4 b, d and h


1. (S) Summary: At a Canadian-hosted meeting February 14
like-minded COMs (P3 1, Canada, Australia, Japan) agreed to
work discretely on a Board resolution on Iran, with experts
scheduled to meet February 20. Canadian Ambassador
Gervais-Vidricaire made a strong case for the Board to
reassert its authority two years since its last resolution on
Iran and argued that the window of opportunity for Board
action would close after the March Board. Australia, Germany
and the UK seconded Canada's initiative, and only the
Japanese had some reservations. Canada and Australia
preferred a resolution that was non-critical of the
Secretariat and put the onus on Iran, but UK Ambassador Smith

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warned that an unhelpful DG report could prompt a more
critical resolution. Canada also insisted on absolute
confidentiality to avoid any perception the like-minded were

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prejudging the report. The like-minded expect that the DG
report will remove all issues from this of outstanding
questions except for the key issue of weaponization, and are
also concerned about how much emphasis the DG would give
suspension and the AP. Ambassador Schulte warned that the DG
would be inclined to report progress at any cost and agreed
that the Board needed to reassert its authority. None of the
like-minded Ambassadors raised previous concerns about Board
action interfering with the UNSC process.


2. (S) In a separate meeting the same day, Chinese Ambassador
Tang told Ambassador Schulte that he expects a report showing
substantial progress and that the Board should welcome the
progress. Tang, who had met with Iranian Ambassador Soltineh
earlier the same day, repeatedly asked if the IAEA had been
provided the evidence it needed. Tang also suggested that
Iran and the IAEA be brought into P5 1 negotiations.
Ambassador Schulte advised that the IAEA had a verification,
not a negotiation, role. End Summary

Expectations for the DG Report
--------------


3. (S) At a Canadian-hosted meeting February 14, like-minded
COMs (P3 1, Canada, Australia, Japan) discussed expectations
for the DG's report on Iran and the need for Board action.
The like-minded agreed to work quietly at the expert level on
Board resolution elements pending the release of the DG
report, now expected on February 25. Canadian Ambassador
Gervais-Vidricaire opened by noting that neither the date nor
the content of the report were firm. She expected that the
work plan would not be "finished" but that the DG would
report progress on issues adjudged no longer be outstanding,
with the sole exception of the "alleged studies." She noted
press reports of disagreement in the Secretariat over closing
issues as well the sharp denial on the part of an unnamed
Secretariat official, dismissing such reports as "hype." She

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added there will certainly be no progress on confidence
building measures, including suspension and the AP, to the
contrary, Iran is moving ahead with advanced centrifuges.


4. (S) Canadian Msnoff assessed the basic outlines of the DG
report, which he expected would be "all things to all people"
or "nothing to no one." All that is missing, he said, are
the crucial adverbs and adjectives. He noted that the
Secretariat was not fully satisfied with Iran's responses on

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a number of issues, including the improbable story on
contamination. AEOI's role in Gachin mine from 1993-2000
also did not preclude military involvement. All of these
issues hint at military involvement, but the Secretariat had
made the tactical decision to close them in order to rely on
the "alleged studies" to get at the truth of the matter.
Clearly, inspectors believe the studies documents to be
credible. However, he cautioned that the Secretariat seemed
to lack a clear objective or approach and it is unclear how
the report would cast this issue. French Charge Gross noted
that the Secretariat should publicly acknowledge the
credibility of the information, but as an Australian Msnoff
observed, they have been "cagey" on this point. Ambassador
Schulte agreed that the use of the term "alleged studies" is
prejudicial.



5. (S) Ambassador Schulte reported that the inspectors still
have had no direct contact with the military and have not
interviewed the former PHRC Director, Fakrezadeh. He told
the group that the U.S. was supporting IAEA requests for
information and documentation, and encouraged others to do so
as well. German Ambassador Gottwald advised that German
missile experts were providing technical expertise to the
Agency.


6. (S) It is also unclear how much emphasis the DG report
would place on suspension or on implementation of the AP and
Code 3.1, Canadian Msnoff observed. The PIV at Natanz had
assessed that P-1 centrifuges were not working well and the
Secretariat is expected to report on IR-2 testing with UF-6,

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though development of the IR-2 would take time (ref c). He
expected the report to acknowledge some additional
transparency on the part of Iran, including the impromptu
site visit to Kalaye. Safeguards Director Nackertts has
assured Australian Msnoff these steps fall far short of AP
implementation. However, Gross noted that the in his remarks
at the February 9-10 Munich Security Conference, ElBaradei
referred to Iran's de jure if not de facto implementation of
the AP providing a good basis to understand its nuclear
program. After second-guessing UNSC requirements on
suspension, Gross feared the DG was now eroding the AP,
giving credit to Iran for piecemeal cooperation, and paving
the way for routinization of the
Iran file.

UNSC to Await the DG Report
--------------


7. (C) UK Ambassador Smith advised that UNSC deliberations
had not made much progress because South Africa, Indonesia
and Libya continue to slow-roll the UNSCR. Ambassador
Schulte reported that the P-3 and Russia are pushing for
prompt adoption of the UNSCR. The EU-3 planned to circulate
a slightly amended resolution next week. However, as the
date for the DG's report drew closer, Smith was resigned to
the fact that the UNSCR would be delayed until after the
report. Gottwald questioned to what degree the DG report
would keep the work plan "open" and whether that could
complicate action in New York. Gottwald remained hopeful,
however, that a report attributing a clear military intention
to Iran's nuclear program could "give a boost" to NY.


8. (S) Comment: Notably, like-minded COMs did not voice
reservations raised in previous meetings (and over the past
two years) that Board action is contingent on the UNSC
process (ref a). The discussion turned entirely to the
prospect of a Board resolution. End Comment.

Window of Opportunity for a Board Resolution
--------------


9. (S) Gervais-Vidricaire made a strong pitch for Board
action, which was secunded by Australia, Germany and the UK,
the latter "enthusiastically." Since the February DG report
is unlikely to close all issues, she argued the March Board
presented a window of opportunity for the Board to assert
itself, reaffirm suspension and render its judgment, putting
the onus on Iran without being critical of the Secretariat.
She expected that the February report would plead for more
time. By the time of the June Board, that window would have
closed as the Secretariat would likely have completed the
work plan and countering its assessment would be much more
difficult. The Board had not pronounced itself in two years
and the time to do so was now, she concluded. Canada's
priority was reasserting the credibility of the Board; it was
essential for the Board to say something. Iran would no
doubt spin the report and a Board resolution would be a
corrective to Iran and the NAM.


10. (S) Australian Charge Kruse envisaged a Board resolution
that welcomed "progress" and noted the Secretariat's
conclusions but also reasserted the need for answers to all
questions and a robust verification regime before closing the
Iran file. A resolution would make clear, Gervais-Vidricaire
concurred, that the work plan was "not the end of the story."
Neither Canada nor Australia were prepared to take the lead
on a Board resolution but suggested the like-minded move

forward as a group. Gottwald agreed that this was not the
end of the road, and the Board should "map the road ahead" on
all that remains to be done. He underlined the need for a
robust inspection regime given the Secretariat's admittedly
"diminishing knowledge" of Iran's ongoing program, though he
was more "flexible" on the AP.


11. (S) Smith advised that London was "enthusiastic" about
working on a resolution but cautioned that much depended on
the DG report. A report that acknowledged the impasse with
Iran would allow for a non-critical resolution, lauding the
Secretariat's efforts. However, a report that purported to

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"solve" the Iran file would result in a critical resolution
that would not get consensus. Smith cited "loose words" in
the press attributed to Secretariat officials, though
probably not the DG, concerning "hype" and countries with
agendas. He saw a clear possibility that the DG would report
Iran's "baseless allegations" response and asked whether the
like-minded should consider criteria for a satisfactory
report.


12. (S) Gervais-Vidricaire preferred to focus on a Board
resolution that need not get into the minutiae of the DG
report. Rather, a resolution could refer to previous Board
decisions; opine in general terms on insufficient progress in
the work plan and missed deadlines; and note the confidence
building measures that are still required. Getting into the
detail of the DG's report would lend the appearance of
second-guessing the Secretariat. She also advised against
developing criteria in advance of the report for the same
reason.


13. (S) Japanese Ambassador Amano was the only one to express
some reservation about the value added of a Board resolution,
though he remained open-minded. He felt the resolution two
years ago remained strong and attempts to recreate it could
weaken it. However, if a similar resolution could gain
consensus it would add value because the previous resolution
was voted on; he observed that the Board composition was the
best one could hope for, though South Africa could be
spoiler. The possibility of consensus depended on the DG
report. Amano also cautioned against re-opening previous
Board decisions on suspension and the AP in operative
language, so as to not give others an opportunity to
challenge these decisions. Nuclear Counselor noted that
seeking consensus could not be an end in itself and that the
threat of a vote was tactically necessary.

Reigning in the DG
--------------


14. (S) Ambassador Schulte worried that the DG was desperate
to report progress at any cost, even that of ignoring UNSCRs,
and was not ready to declare the work plan dead or pass
judgment on weaponization. The U.S. had advised the DG
privately that the Agency's credibility is at stake and the
report could not be a whitewash; Iran must fully disclose its
past weapons program and allow the IAEA to verify, including
through the AP, that it has stopped and will not restart.
Ambassador Schulte observed that the Board had not passed a
resolution in two years so as to not get in the way of the
UNSC, but in so doing, it had ceded authority to the DG. The
work plan had abetted Iran by drawing out the process and
delaying a UNSCR. He agreed it was time to reassert the
Board's authority. The added value of a resolution would be
to pronounce Iran's cooperation inadequate, reaffirm Board
decisions on suspension and the AP as well as Code 3.1, and
to lay down a marker that the Board would decide when the
Iran file was closed.

Next Steps
--------------


15. (S) Like-minded COMs agreed to reconvene following the
issuance of the DG report and that experts should meet on
February 20 to draft resolution elements. (Note: Mission
intends to participate and contribute the suggested elements
in ref b.) Gottwald noted that the resolution could be
divided into two parts, reaction to the results of the report
and expectations beyond the work plan, and suggested that the
like-minded begin engaging others on the idea of a Board

resolution. Canada insisted on the need for absolute
confidentiality as it would be damaging if the NAM knew we

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were working on a resolution prior to the DG's report. Japan
noted that the Secretariat could also delay issuance of the
report. The like-minded agreed that the Board Chair should
be advised of a resolution as soon as practicable after the
report. The French noted that EU3 3 Political Directors were
expected to meet soon after the report was issued and should
seek Russia and China's agreement on a Board resolution.

Consultations with China
--------------


16. (S) Ambassador Schulte met separately with Chinese
Ambassador Tang on February 14, and had also consulted with
Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky, who was in a listening mode, on
the NIE and the forthcoming DG report on Iran. Ambassador
Schulte advised Tang that the Secretariat was in the end game
on the critical issue of weaponization, information it
considers credible, authentic and worrisome. Tang who had
met with Iranian Ambassador Soltineh that morning repeatedly
asked whether the IAEA had been provided evidence. According
to Tang, Iran did not think the "alleged studies" were a
problem, and claimed not to have received the information the
IAEA had promised.


17. (S) Based on his discussions with ElBaradei and DDG
Heinonen, Tang expected a report positive for Iran noting
that progress had been made on three work plan issues and
that Iran was now addressing military issues. China had also
urged Iran to cooperate and restore confidence. If the
report is positive, Tang believed the Board should welcome
and encourage Iran's continued cooperation. Ambassador
Schulte underscored the need for full disclosure of the past
weapons program and assurance it is not re-started. He
cautioned that the DG is desperate to report progress and the
work plan has only served to delay a UNSCR.


18. (S) Tang stressed the need for a negotiated solution and
new framework for negotiation. He suggested that the P5 1
could be recast as P6 1 (i.e. including Iran) or P6 1 1,
adding Iran and the IAEA as negotiating partners. Ambassador
Schulte advised that including the IAEA would confuse the
Agency's role, which is verification, not negotiation, and
noted that the IAEA was not a part of the Six Party Talks on
the DPRK. The IAEA had a role in the outcome but not in the
talks. Tang believed the IAEA should be part of the Iran
talks at a certain stage.
SCHULTE