IAEA: DG DISCUSSES SYRIA AND IRAN WITH ACTING U/S

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000648

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2018
TAGS: PARM MNUC KNNP IAEA AORC IR SY
SUBJECT: IAEA: DG DISCUSSES SYRIA AND IRAN WITH ACTING U/S
ROOD

REF: UNVIE 640 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b, d, e

Summary
--------------


1. (C) IAEA Director General ElBaradei advised Acting U/S for
Arms Control and International Security John Rood in a
November 20 meeting that the IAEA had received "the maximum
it could get" from Iran absent a political opening, and
encouraged P5 1 engagement with Iran on a freeze-for-a-freeze
to slow down the Iranian program. With respect to the Syria
investigation, the DG sought to confront Syria with strong
arguments, and noted the need for inspector access to the
debris at Al Kibar. He was circumspect about Syria allowing
visits to the other locations, and also did not expect a
response from Israel on uranium munitions. The DG took a
firm stance in support of the Syrian feasibility study
project, advising the U.S. to "forget about" dropping it from
the 2009-2011 Technical Cooperation (TC) program. He
deflected any nonproliferation concerns about the Syrian
project as a matter of "due process," given that there had
been no finding of noncompliance by the Board or UNSC, and
cautioned against politicizing TC. Flanked by Secretariat
officials, ElBaradei also rebutted technical arguments on the
Syrian project. He was dismissive about the prospect of
Congressional reaction to its inclusion in the TC program.
End Summary.

All We Can Get From Iran
--------------


2. (C) Regarding Iranian cooperation with the IAEA
investigation, DG ElBaradei assessed that the IAEA had gotten
the "maximum it would get" absent a political opening. Iran
made a decision a couple months ago to await the next U.S.
administration, and he expected that a political opening
would take more time given June elections in Iran. The DG's
report made it clear that the issue was not moving, a concern
also shared by the Europeans. Asked by Ambassador Schulte if
the investigation was getting "too close," ElBaradei reverted
to his usual position that any "confession" would have to be
grandfathered as part of a political package or "grand
bargain." Iran would not get anything out of confessing now,
and with no prospect of further UNSC sanctions, would seek to
maintain the status quo until a better deal is offered.

3.(C) Acting U/S Rood advised that the U.S. would continue to
seek to apply additional sanctions even outside the UNSC, and
noted efforts to breathe life into the P5 1-proposed "freeze
for a freeze." The DG still believed the "freeze" was a good
idea but argued for "fudging" the time limit, possibly
reviewing it at the end of the six weeks. Rood noted that
without a time limit Iran could protract the freeze, placing
the onus on the P5 1 to end the agreement. The DG also
proposed that a "freeze" could be defined in such a way as to
prohibit further introduction of nuclear material (again
without a time limit),if the concern is perfecting
enrichment technology. If there were any such indication of
Iranian engagement, Rood advised, the U.S. would not be "hard
over."


4. (C) The DG welcomed any effort to engage Iran and slow
down its enrichment process. For its part, the IAEA had lost
contact with Iranian (political-level) interlocutors.
ElBaradei further suggested that P5 1 discussions be held at
the level of Solana (i.e. as opposed to Cooper). He also
noted that however well-intentioned Turkey's mediation offer
is, it could not be a substitute for direct talks with the
U.S.

Still Questioning Syria
--------------


5. (S) Turning to the Syria investigation, the DG observed at
the outset that he did not expect answers from Israel
regarding uranium munitions, and noted that the inspectors
sought to examine debris from the Al Kibar site and take
further samples. He advised that the IAEA needed strong
arguments to counter Syrian claims, and complained about
delays in sharing imagery taken immediately after the
bombing. ElBaradei expected that this imagery and the
uranium samples could get Syria to open up, and noted that
Safeguards DDG Heinonen would meet with the Syrians (he did
not specify when). However, he thought Syria would continue
to refuse access to additional sites, sticking by its claim
they were not nuclear-related. The DG still questioned
evidence of the suspected reactor at Al Kibar. He observed
that Syria lacked nuclear-trained personnel, i.e. "Did they
completely outsource the reactor to the DPRK ?", and noted
the absence of fuel and reprocessing facilities. Acting U/S
Rood remarked that the reactor would have likely been used
for military purposes.


6. (S) ElBaradei asserted that as the Syrian program was
driven by the military, SRG Atomic Energy Commission Director
General Ibrahim Othman was not fully informed, and the IAEA
was at a disadvantage after its main Syrian interlocutor,
General Suleiman, was assassinated. ElBaradei recommended
giving some assurances in order to get Syria to come clean,
and still hoped that the issue could be resolved as part of
broader Syrian-Israeli talks.

Forget About the TC Project
--------------


7. (C) Acting U/S Rood relayed U.S. concerns about the
inclusion of the Syrian nuclear reactor feasibility study
project. Ambassador Schulte reviewed technical arguments on
the project design as being out of step with Milestones and
other feasibility studies, including questionable
procurements. Advised that the U.S. would not join consensus
on the TC program and would ask the Board Chair to extract
this project, ElBaradei responded tartly, "forget about it."
He said there was no way short of Syria withdrawing the
project that the IAEA Secretariat would drop it, and insisted
vehemently on this position.


8. (C) With respect to non-proliferation concerns related to
the ongoing investigation in Syria, the DG retorted "due
process, due process," arguing that suspicion was not a
"verdict of guilt" and that under the IAEA Statute, TC could
not be restricted absent a finding of non-compliance by the
Board of Governors or General Conference, or unless
sanctioned by the UNSC, as with previous cases in Iran, Iraq,
DPRK and Israel. In his view, every country is "under
investigation" one way or another and he did not share our
judgment that Syria had violated its safeguards agreement.
The DG took a principled position that TC must be based only
on technical criteria laid out in INFCIRC-267, and that the
Board could not stop the project without amending those
criteria. He warned that "politicizing" TC would lead
countries to walk out of the NPT bargain. Rood countered by
saying that controversial projects like the proposed Syria
project were the best way to spark a "political" debate on TC.


9. (C) ElBaradei, flanked by Special Advisor Graham Andrew
and EXPO Director Vilmos Cserveny, also countered several of
our technical arguments (Note: DDG Heinonen was present but
remained silent. End note.) ElBaradei affirmed that Syria's
interest in nuclear power was not "out of the blue," citing
its prior in participation in 13 national and regional
projects dating back to 1979. With respect to Syria's lack
of technical capacity, the DG noted U.S. support for nuclear
power in countries such as the UAE, which also lack technical
capacity. The site selection aspect of the Syrian project
was nothing more than an evaluation of whether there might be
a site appropriate for a nuclear reactor, and the
procurements associated with the project were "innocuous,"
including a gamma ray spectrometer, which "any university may
own," and earthquake monitoring equipment. ElBaradei and his
deputies rejected any argument that the Syrian feasibility
study is more generous than other similar studies, and
claimed to the contrary that Syria was getting less than 20
to 30 other countries undertaking such studies. As to
consistency with the Milestones document, Andrew noted these
phases were flexible guidelines, and every country was
different. Cserveny further downplayed the Syria project as
just a feasibility study before making a decision to invest
millions in nuclear power. When Ambassador Schulte noted
that this project could have been done or presented
differently, the DG and Secretariat officials insisted the
process was driven by technical considerations and the member
state request.


10. (C) Acting U/S Rood cautioned that inclusion of the
project would lead to politicization of TC and could prompt
further Congressional scrutiny of the TC program, which
already did not have a good track record. The U.S. Congress
may question authorizing a generous reactor-feasibility study
to a country that has pursued a covert nuclear program. The
U.S. wanted to continue funding the TC program, Rood advised,
and asked the DG not to put us in this position. If Congress
did not understand that this was a question of "due process,"
ElBaradei acknowledged its prerogative to cut funding to this
particular project. Rood further cautioned that the response
may not be proportionate or limited to this program.


11. (C) Note: We learned the French Ambassador subsequently

raised many of the same points in a follow-on discussion with
the ElBaradei on November 21, eliciting the same response.
The DG then directed his staff to devise a point-by-point
rebuttal to our technical points, which was distributed
immediately following the U.S. intervention and the DG's
response in the TACC on November 24 (reftel)


12. (U) Acting U/S Rood has cleared this message.

PYATT