IAEA/DG RACE: MINTY,S CAMPAIGN PITCH TO WEOG

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000643

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS: AORC PREL PARM IAEA KNPP JA AR SF
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: MINTY,S CAMPAIGN PITCH TO WEOG

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) Meeting with Western European and Others Group (WEOG)
Ambassadors, at his request, on December 1, South African
Governor Abdul Minty fielded a wide range of pointed
questions on Agency priorities as a prospective candidate for
IAEA Director General. Minty informed WEOG members that his
Minister officially delivered his nomination on the margins
of the November 27-28 Board of Governors meeting, and he was
now consulting with regional groups on his candidacy. He
acknowledged that, in addition to managing the Agency, the
Director General operated in a "political context" and that
DG ElBaradei was leaving a "strong foundation" in this
regard. In response to WEOG member concerns, Minty stressed
the importance of nuclear security and safeguards, though he
was short on specifics as to the Agency's role in the former
and hedged on the question of regular budget funding for
nuclear security. Minty presented himself as a consensus
builder on Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF) who could
bridge the North-South divide, though he admitted to having
"no easy answers." As to the "political" role of the DG,
Minty envisioned a "good offices" function on issues such as
Middle East safeguards and RANF, and recalled his
constructive role as General Conference President in 2006.
He expressed commitment to the "One-UN" approach and better
coordination across IAEA departments and with other UN
agencies on technical cooperation (TC). Minty acknowledged
the role of Member States in setting policy for TC but
cautioned against second-guessing particular projects, when
asked about the TACC debates on Iran and Syria. He was
similarly cautious in speaking about the Agency's role in
assisting with disarmament tasks, and noted that the IAEA
cannot be an advocate for disarmament.


2. (C) Overall, Minty did better than expected in this
90-minute job interview with WEOG, and offered well-reasoned
and persuasive answers on Western priorities. It is not
clear that he won any converts, but he left the impression
that he was not beholden to the G-77/NAM, in particular, on
safeguards and security issues, and demonstrated an ability
to think on his feet that other candidates will find hard to
match. Japanese Ambassador Amano will make himself available
for a similar Q&A session with WEOG in January. In our
capacity as Co-Chairs of the Geneva Group, the U.S. and UK
are also planning to invite Minty and Amano to meet with the
group in the near future. Mission welcomes Department input
on management issues, including DG term limits, to raise with
both DG candidates in the Geneva Group. End Summary and
Comment.

Nuclear Security
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Schulte solicited Minty's views on
integrating nuclear security in the Agency's core mission and
budget, as well as promotion of UNSCR 1540 implementation and
HEU minimization. Germany and Norway also stressed the
importance of regularizing funding for nuclear security.
Minty did not offer a strategic vision for the Agency on
nuclear security. Although nuclear terrorism is a collective
problem, he said, it was the role of member states to
implement and enforce nuclear security guidelines. He noted
that the SAG had undertaken a program to downblend HEU, but
added that HEU has legitimate uses for radioisotopes, and
exclusive focus on HEU minimization overlooks the greater
proliferation risk of plutonium. The SAG saw safety and
security as paramount, and explicitly disagreed with
developing countries that predicate regular budget funding
for nuclear security on "balance" with technical cooperation
(TC). Minty recommended greater coordination among DDGs to
"mainstream" nuclear security in core functions; noted the
unique capabilities of the Agency, e.g. to conduct
inspections; and sought to make the IAEA's work on nuclear
security better known.


4. (SBU) Pressed further by Norway on regular budget funding
for nuclear security, Minty opined that it was not healthy
for an international body to rely on voluntary contributions
for a core program, as was also the case for the Safeguards
Analytical Lab (SAL). He hedged on the question, claiming
that the advisors to President-elect Obama acknowledged
doubts, in light of the financial crisis, about being able to
follow through on campaign pledges to double the IAEA budget.
He suggested cost savings through use of new technology, and
proposed regional coordination on safety and security issues
at the expert level. This would not mean delegating national
responsibility to the region, but such cooperation would be
better than "purchasing" nuclear safety and security as, he
noted, the UAE was doing.

Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel
--------------


5. (SBU) Germany raised the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle,
and the difficulty of moving forward Reliable Access to
Nuclear Fuel (RANF) given continued anxiety among the G-77
about Article IV rights. Minty acknowledged the increased
risks brought by the nuclear renaissance, and attributed the
polarization of the debate on RANF to an early proposal that
would have required states to "forgo" enrichment, which still
clouds perceptions. South Africa had advised that rather
than set such conditions, the focus should be on making
enrichment the inefficient choice, and RANF proposals have
since taken this on board. Yet suspicion remains and last
spring at a Berlin conference Minty heard concerns from
developing world technical experts about whether there was "a
plan" to disrupt commercial supply. The lack of an effective
dialogue between recipients and suppliers continues to
frustrate the RANF debate. In view of Minty's nomination,
the SAG is taking more of a leadership role on this issue,
and has proposed consultations among countries of the "South"
and outreach to countries like Thailand and Argentina to try
to get at "real concerns." Erosion of Article IV rights
remains a concern in the developing world, as evidenced in
the NPT Prepcom. Minty had "no easy answer" as to how to
structure the RANF debate in Vienna but recommended the focus
be on specific proposals. He noted that there may not be
unanimity of G-77 views on the specific proposals.


6. (SBU) The UK noted the role of the DG and Secretariat with
respect to a RANF mechanism was to serve as the supranational
guarantor or custodian, and as such, the DG's focus in
getting the message out should be forward-, not
backward-looking. Minty acknowledged the role of the Agency
in promoting RANF but cautioned that no DG can get too far
ahead of Member States. Much of this was a matter of timing
and political sense as well as interaction with capitals.
Getting at "real concerns" would help forge consensus, he
added. This political role of the DG should be clearly
separate, however, from the technical work of the Agency on
RANF.


7. (C) Advising that the EU was seriously considering a
financial contribution to the proposed IAEA-administered
International Fuel Bank (INFB),France asked about specific
eligibility criteria for accessing this mechanism, and
whether access should extend to non-NPT members. Minty
returned to his point that a fundamental consensus was needed
on RANF before conditions about eligibility criteria can be
set. He noted that non-NPT members are IAEA members but also
acknowledged the views of suppliers and their sovereign
decisions, citing the Russian proposal. We do not want to
"perpetuate discrimination" but there were "real concerns" on
both sides and "no easy answers," he repeated, as to how to
break this logjam. (Comment: In short, he punted. End
Comment.)

Strengthening Safeguards
--------------


8. (SBU) Finland expressed concern about the "politicized
atmosphere" that threatened to undermine safeguards, citing
the reluctance of some countries to accord the IAEA greater
legal authority through universalization of the Additional
Protocol (AP). The deficiencies of SAL also put in question
the credibility and integrity of Agency safeguards. Minty
deeply regretted the polarization of safeguards issues and
underlined the SAG's commitment to strengthening the
safeguards regime. Safeguards need not be a logjam, he said,
recalling the SAG's role in helping to secure indefinite
extension of the NPT at the 1995 Prepcom. Minty stressed the
need for the 30 NPT members that have not done so to conclude
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) and South Africa's
full support of the AP, though he noted it would be
problematic to make the latter a condition of fuel supply.
Interestingly, Minty argued that universalization of the AP
was a symbolic and secondary goal, and that the main target
should be the conclusion of APs by countries that have the
capacity to proliferate. Furthermore, he added in response
to Australia, the AP may not be adequate and making it the
end-all and be-all could be dangerous, noting that the SAG
has proposed that Iran undertake additional transparency
measures. The objective was to increase the reach of the
Agency in sovereign countries. Rather than "pressure," Minty
concluded, speaking in generalities, that the DG should use
his "good offices" to ensure the credibility and authority of
Agency safeguards.


9. (SBU) Switzerland also asked about the perspective of
bringing non-NPT countries under Agency safeguards in light
of the India agreement. Minty said the SAG thought of the
India agreement more as a step forward for nuclear power,
albeit one that had serious implications for the NPT, and
noted that the NSG exception was not intended as a precedent,
though we should "wait and see" what other countries do.

DG "Good Offices" on Middle East
--------------


10. (SBU) Minty reminded WEOG Ambassadors of his handling of
Middle East issues as President of the 2006 General
Conference (GC). He regretted the disproportionate focus in
the GC on the Middle East at the expense of other Agency
priorities. Asked by the UK to elaborate on how he would
deal with unproductive GC discussions on disarmament and the
Middle East, Minty proposed that what may be needed is a
clearly defined mechanism for the DG's "good offices"
function, as in other international organizations. Such a
"good offices" role would provide more transparency than ad
hoc mediation or intervention. He noted that he had received
positive feedback from several governments on this proposal.
Minty envisioned that the DG could use his "good offices" on
issues ranging from the Middle East to RANF, which would
include direct interaction with capitals.


11. (C) In the highly charged atmosphere of the 2006 GC,
following the Israeli-Lebanese conflict, Minty recalled how
he had sought to bring all the parties and groups together
and came very close to agreement on a Presidential Statement,
were it not for the fact that the Arab Group was constrained
by Arab League Ministerial-level decisions. He was not sure
if the DG could in such a case contact the Arab League
directly. The GC President also need to be firm, as he had
been during his tenure, in making clear to the parties that
the discussion would not go beyond the last day of the
Conference, so as to conclude in a "dignified manner." He
also recommended early high-level interaction among concerned
parties. Minty further recalled the SAG's reluctance to
participate in the DG-sponsored Middle East Forum, counseling
that a discussion of regional security should precede
"frontal" engagement on nuclear weapons. Such a frontal
approach would not work, whether it was in the Middle East or
with regard to India-Pakistan. (Comment: Minty was clearly
playing to this audience of WEOG Ambassadors on Middle East
issues. End Comment.)

Technical Cooperation: "One UN" and "One-IAEA"
--------------


12. (SBU) Norway asked about better integration of the IAEA
in the UN family, for example, on implementation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Minty expressed the
SAG's disappointment in this regard, and underlined the need
for more synergy between the IAEA and other UN organizations,
and not just on MDG goals. This was particularly true in
Technical Cooperation (TC),where he cited the IAEA-WHO and
FAO Joint Divisions. The IAEA has an important technical
capacity but cannot become a development agency, he asserted,
and suggested tapping into development funding through UNDP
country programs and the like.


13. (SBU) France observed that with regard to TC, there was
hardly a "One-Agency" much less a "One-UN" approach, and
noted the need for greater coordination among departments and
guidelines on non-proliferation for TC projects. Minty
acknowledged the need to take account of technical capacity,
safety and security in the implementation of TC projects. He
also saw the need for more coordination, and not just at the
DDG level but also base-level interaction among departments.


14. (SBU) Pressing the issue further, Finland noted TACC
debates on TC projects in Iran and Syria and G-77 insistence
on old understandings about TC not being touched. "Should
member states have more of say on the TC program, or is it a
holy cow?," Finnish Ambassador Kauppi inquired. Minty noted
that the Agency Secretariat was the servant of Member States
who set policy, citing the question of whether TC should fund
projects in the EU. However, Member State second-guessing on
individual TC projects can be a "slippery slope," he
cautioned obliquely, and can set the dangerous precedent of
"questioning" Agency documents, including verification
reports.

Disarmament
--------------


15. (SBU) Finland also raised the issue of the Agency's
Statutory role and tasks with respect to disarmament. Minty
underscored South Africa's commitment to disarmament, and saw
a role for Agency assistance with disarmament tasks,
disputing those who claim the IAEA has no Statutory mandate
or lacks expertise in this domain. He was careful to note
that the IAEA cannot be an advocate for disarmament, but it
also cannot work in a vacuum as it fulfills its primary
mission of "atoms only for peace." Minty also took note of
U.S. and UK efforts on disarmament and discussions in other
fora. (Note: In a November 27 press conference on the margins
of the Board of Governors meeting, Minty highlighted his work
on disarmament and non-proliferation throughout his adult
life. End Note.)

Comment
--------------


16. (C) Speaking to a consciously skeptical audience, many of
whom are publicly wary of Minty's past role as a NAM
cheerleader, the South African Governor delivered a strong
performance. He came across as well-prepared and adept at
thinking on his feet. His Japanese competition will be
challenged to meet the same bar.
SCHULTE