IAEA/IRAN: MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON IRAN AT THE

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000064

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN/MNSA, PARIS FOR U/S ROOD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018
TAGS: IAEA KNPP AORC IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON IRAN AT THE
MARCH BOARD

REF: UNVIE 31

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for
reasons 1.4 b,d and h

Summary
--------------


1. (S) Our principal goal for the Iran agenda item at the
March 3-7 Board is, as it has been for the last two years, to
support dual-track strategy and, in particular, the Security
Council process. Since the Board passed a resolution on
February 4, 2006, referring the file to the UNSC, we have not
sought a new Board resolution because of concerns about
distracting attention from the New York process, worries
about divisive debates, and qualms about providing
opportunities for those who wish to bring the Iran issue back
to Vienna. The French have attempted to circulate elements
for a resolution prior to the last two Boards, but were
rebuffed by Russia. Now, however, with P5 1 agreement on
elements of a new UNSCR, and with the endgame approaching for
the DG's work plan to address weaponization issues, and with
a Board lacking clear anti-American or pro-Iranian members,
the time has come to seriously consider a new resolution.
Initial contacts indicate our P3 1 partners are supportive
but have a range of interests: the UK wants a strong
resolution, voted if necessary (even with opposition from
Russia and China),to exert authority over the DG; the French
are not interested in taking on the DG but would like a
consensus resolution focusing on Iran; and the Germans are
not opposed but say that "New York has priority" so if it
looks like the Vienna process will interfere with New York,
they would back off. Everybody understands the content of a
resolution will depend on the results of the work plan the
wording of the DG's report, and progress on a third UNSC
sanctions resolution in New York. Counselors will work on
elements for different scenarios in the next week and proceed
from there. If we are instructed to seek a resolution, the
UK is likely to take the pen. However it is couched, a
resolution would need to assert Board authority over the Iran
issue, reaffirm Board/UNSC requirements and reign in the DG.


2. (S) As we prepare for the Board our public and private
statements in the coming weeks must set high expectations for
the work plan, particularly on weaponization. We recommend a
P3 1 demarche prior to the DG report cautioning him that
anything that looks like a whitewash of Iran's weapons
activities would risk a rupture with the IAEA's largest
donors. Our public diplomacy efforts will also continue to
enlist the support of key countries to maintain international
pressure on Iran and the DG, making it clear that the litmus
test for the work plan is whether Iran has made full
disclosure of its past weapons work and allows the IAEA to
verify that it stopped. End Summary.

Board Objectives
--------------


3. (S) Our overarching goal for the March Board is to support
the UNSC process by reinforcing international pressure on
Iran and preventing Iran from using Vienna as a pressure
release valve. Iran has become adept at pitting Vienna
against New York, and playing us off against the Director
General. Our objectives for the Board and the work plan are
to:

-- diminish the value of the IAEA and the work plan as a
"pressure relief valve" for Iran;
-- reinforce Board requirements for suspension, AP and Code
3.1, bridging the "gap" with the UNSC;
-- make clear that the UNSC and the Board, not the DG, must
make a final decision on whether to return Iran to "routine"
verification;
-- reassert Board authority over the DG and dispense with the
work plan.

Pros and Cons of a Board Resolution
--------------


4. (S) We have pursued these goals with like-minded
counterparts during successive Boards in national and EU/EU-3

statements. However, the Board as a whole has not taken any
decisive action since referral of the Iran file to the UNSC
two years ago. For six months now, the work plan has
distracted from UNSC and Board requirements for suspension
and AP implementation, and sidetracked the UNSC process. The
most definitive means of reaffirming Board authority and
dispensing with the work plan is a Board resolution. A
resolution could also address important technical issues such
as Iran's unilateral abrogation of modified Code 3.1 of the
subsidiary arrangements, which the Board has not previously
addressed.


5. (S) Since the 2006 referral to the Security Council, the
P3 1 and other like-minded have been circumspect about
pursuing a Board resolution that would detract from the UNSC
process or allow the G-77/NAM to exploit the perception that
the Iran file has been returned to the Board. Passage of a
Board resolution absent a UNSCR would be an uphill battle and
a divisive Board debate could widen the gap with New York.
The last attempt by the French to float a resolution in the
November Board met with Russian opposition. Mitigating
against this now is the fact that we have P5 1 agreement in
the UNSC and we have arguably the best Board we have seen in
recent years due to the departure of several NAM standard
bearers. There is also little overlap, beyond the P5, in
Board and UNSC membership - only Italy, Croatia and South
Africa, the most problematic, are on both the Board and the
UNSC. Prompt passage of a UNSCR prior to the March Board
(even if it is just prior) would clearly facilitate Board
action. A Board resolution could reinforce the UNSCR and
demonstrate that New York and Vienna are in lockstep,
countering Iran's premise that Board and UNSC are at odds
with one another.


6. (S) Our P3 1 partners are now more open to the idea of a
Board resolution. In a February 4 P3 1 strategy session, UK
and French Ambassadors were supportive of Board action even
absent a UNSCR, though prior passage of a UNSCR is
preferable. German Charge Kimmerling was more insistent on
giving priority to the UNSC process. UK Ambassador Smith
indicated that London is much less nervous about the prospect
of a Board resolution and is soliciting his input. He
tentatively agreed in private to be the main drafter of such
a resolution. The impetus for this shift is growing UK and
French recognition that the Board needs to reign in Director
General and the work plan, which has detracted from the UNSC
effort to step up pressure on Iran.

Low Expectations of the DG Report
--------------


7. (S) We predict the DG will report one of three outcomes on
the work plan: Iran has come clean, Iran has given a
"plausible story" or Iran's cooperation has been
unsatisfactory. Since the Secretariat has more or less
closed the all other issues, P3 1 partners agree that
everything hinges on the DG's treatment of the "alleged
studies." French Ambassador Deniau reported that the
Secretariat has included one "nuance" on the contamination

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issue in its letter to Iran concerning procurement
information that could be linked to the alleged studies.
This, he said, was designed to prevent the Iranians from
releasing the letter. Kimmerling reported that the Iran has
provided significant new information allowing the Secretariat
to dispense with the Gachine mine and polonium-210 issues,
assessing that there was no military involvement in the
former and Iran had not gone beyond basic research on the
latter. Deniau also reported that Iran told the Belgian and
Croatian Missions in New York that the DG's next report would
close all outstanding issues except alleged studies, which
the Iranians continue to claim are baseless and politically
motivated.


8. (S) Mission's assessment is that Iran is unlikely to admit
its weaponization work. If Iran were to do so, both the UNSC
and the Board would be well-placed to reassert the need for
confidence building given Iran's clear violation of the NPT.
A Board resolution would be much more difficult if the DG
reports, prior to the passage of a UNSCR, that Iran has
offered a "plausible story." Conversely, if the DG reports

dissatisfaction with Iran's cooperation, a Board resolution
would be much easier, especially if a UNSCR is passed.


9. (S) The UK and the French are preparing for the worst.
Smith fully expected that the DG report would not be helpful,
and the best we could hope for would be that the DG convey
the Secretariat's efforts on the work plan in a neutral
manner, leaving it for the Board to pass judgment on Iran's
credulity. In the worst case scenario, the DG would report
that Iran's explanations of the alleged studies were "not
inconsistent." Deniau advised that such an outcome, leaving
it up to member states, while technically feasible, is
politically risky for the DG. The UK discounted any
possibility of a report negative for Iran, even if Safeguards
staff is dissatisfied with Iran's cooperation, since the DG
has vested so much in the success of the work plan. The
Germans envisage an indeterminate report that would leave the
issue of the alleged studies open. As in past reports,
Deniau and Kimmerling believed the DG would include something
for everyone, i.e. Iran is cooperating more than before and
some issues have been
removed from the list of outstanding questions but work
remains to be done on alleged studies. The Germans do not
think the DG would be bold enough to close this issue.

Next Steps: Pressuring the DG
--------------


10. (S) In the coming weeks we must continue to set a high
bar for the work plan and make clear in our public and
private comments that the work plan is meaningless unless
Iran admits weaponization activities and allows the IAEA to
verify they have stopped. We must also warn the DG in very
stark terms that the IAEA's integrity and his own credibility
are at stake and that any hint of whitewash of Iran's weapons
activities would cause irreparable harm to the Agency's
relationship with major donors.


11. (S) We recommend conveying these messages through a P3 1
demarche in Vienna, an appropriately-timed phone call from
the Secretary, ElBaradei's contacts in Paris and Munich in
mid-February, and a possible stop by U/S Burns in Vienna next
week. A P3 1 demarche should take place prior to the
issuance of the report, expected sometime between February
20-25. The French are not sure of joining such a demarche
just after the DG's February 14 trip to Paris where he would
have already heard a similar message from the GOF, but we
have asked them to reconsider. A demarche prior to the DG
report would also allow us to better assess where the DG
stands on the work plan, and how to frame a Board resolution.

Critical Vs. Consensual Resolution
--------------


12. (S) The P3 1 will also work quietly on preparing a
resolution, which could be tabled upon the issuance of the
report. As to the content of that resolution, P3 1
Ambassadors considered options for a more critical vice
consensual assessment of the Secretariat's efforts. If, as
expected, the DG is not prepared to say Iran's cooperation on
the work plan has been unsatisfactory, the UK is of the view
that the Board will have to do so for him. A resolution
would underline the Board/UNSC's basic requirements including
suspension. The UK argued for a more critical resolution to
"put an end to the work plan episode." Smith warned that in
the face of an uncritical DG report, we will need to
challenge the work plan, even if means a vote. He said his
vote counting gave us a bare majority in the Board even if
the Russians and Chinese vote against. The French are more
inclined to minimize or ignore the work plan and stress other
requirements. They also noted that the draft UNSCR language
on work plan "progress" would make it difficult to be too
tough. A more consensual approach would give the Secretariat
an "E" for effort and stress the failure of Iran to resolve
issues within and outside the scope of the work plan. The
Germans advised that if we want a broader based resolution,
we are limited in our ability to criticize the Secretariat.
The UK is open to either option, a more critical resolution
that wins a bare majority or a more consensual resolution.
Kimmerling cautioned that Iran would interpret a bare

majority as a victory and a consensual text is a safer bet.
Regardless of how assessment of the work plan is couched, our
P3 1 partners agree that the resolution must underline the
basic mandate of the Secretariat: verifying the "completeness
and correctness" of Iran's declarations, consistent with its
safeguards obligations.

Timing/Tactics
--------------


13. (S) We will continue to consult with P3 1 in Vienna and
aim to have resolution elements ready to be deployed, if
instructed, upon the release of the DG's report. Early
Department guidance on elements of such a resolution would be
appreciated. If the UNSC also waits for the DG's report our
timing in Vienna will be very restrictive, though not
impossible. The key will be enlisting Russia, China and
South Africa. An EU-3 sponsored resolution will have EU
support and we will also reach out quickly to friendly NAM
and GRULAC. Getting South African support will help
marginalize NAM opposition. Any effort to garner consensus
would take at least until the end of the Board week and
perhaps beyond. We may also need Washington support with
demarches in capitals, which depending on timing, may need to
be deconflicted with demarches on a UNSCR.


14. (SBU) We will continue our Public Diplomacy efforts to
enlist the support of key countries and keep international
pressure on Iran and the DG, while making it clear that the
litmus test for the work plan is whether Iran has made full
disclosure of its past weapons work and allows the IAEA to
verify that it stopped.. Ambassador Schulte will visit Egypt
next week where he will speak on the Iran nuclear issue and
hold a press roundtable, using points similar to those he
just made in Berlin and Saudi Arabia. We plan to approach
our Embassies in select Board member states, Croatia, Mexico,
Ecuador, Pakistan and South Africa about holding press
roundtables via DVC prior to the BOG. We will reach inside
Iran via Ambassador Schulte's Persian blog and Radio Farda,
emphasizing the Secretary's message that suspension provides
an exit ramp for Iran to normalize its relationship with the
U.S.
SCHULTE