Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA616
2008-11-20 17:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/SYRIA/IRAN: PRE-BOARD ENGAGEMENT WITH BOARD

Tags:  IAEA PREL KNNP TRGY SY IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHUNV #0616/01 3251727
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O 201727Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8717
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000616 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018
TAGS: IAEA PREL KNNP TRGY SY IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA/IRAN: PRE-BOARD ENGAGEMENT WITH BOARD
MEMBERS

REF: STATE 123074

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

Preliminary Views on a Syria Resolution
---------------------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000616

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018
TAGS: IAEA PREL KNNP TRGY SY IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA/IRAN: PRE-BOARD ENGAGEMENT WITH BOARD
MEMBERS

REF: STATE 123074

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

Preliminary Views on a Syria Resolution
--------------


1. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte hosted consultations with 16
Board members (Russia, China, Algeria, Albania, Brazil,
Ecuador, Finland, Germany, India, Iraq, Ireland, Lithuania,
Mexico, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland) on November
20 to solicit views on the Iran and Syria reports and next
steps in the Board/TACC. With respect to Syria, Ambassador
Schulte made it clear that the U.S. believed, based on the
DG's report, a Board resolution was in order. He also said
the U.S. was not in position to join consensus at the TACC on
the proposed TC program if it included the current proposed
project to provide to Syria a nuclear power feasibility
study. He noted the study raises both technical and
nonproliferation issues. None of the Missions present had
received instructions on either of the reports, released just
the evening before, and all spoke in a personal capacity.


2. (SBU) Reaction was lukewarm on the prospect of a Board
resolution on Syria, with Russia explicitly opposing. Even
Ireland, which shared our concerns, questioned whether a
resolution at this early stage would push Syria further down
the Iranian path, and was the best way to encourage Syria to
"do the right thing." Finland found the Syria report to be
"surprisingly clear," but also "drawing on the lesson of
Iran," was more inclined to send a clear message to Syria
early in the process. This need not be a confrontational
message, Finnish Ambassador Kaupi stressed. Describing both
reports as factual and telling, Germany observed that Syria
must cooperate to address the many open questions. Lithuania
too was open to exploring Board action in dealing with the
serious considerations raised by the report. Notably
Switzerland, which has taken an unhelpful stance in previous
Board statements on Syria, assessed that the DG report had
"exceeded expectations" and was considering how to proceed.


3. (SBU) The most outspoken opponent was Russian Ambasador
Zmeyevsky, who personally saw no necessity for Board action

and had a "different reading" of the Syria report, a reading
that coincided with the DG's views on the unilateral use of
force. The DG was "not asking for Board help" and the albeit
uneasy cooperation with Damascus should be allowed to
continue, he opined. China hoped that any Board
consideration would be conducive to a solution to the issue
and noted "contradictions" in the report which it hoped would
be addressed in the November 21 technical briefing. None of
the other Missions present offered any opinion on the
prospect of a resolution.

Tread Carefully on TC
--------------


4. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte advised that the U.S., though
committed to the TC program, could not join consensus in the
TACC if the Syrian feasibility study is included. His
description of the technical shortcomings of the project --
the Secretariat's assessment in project documentation that
Syria lacked the technical capacity for a nuclear power plant
and the project being out of step with the Agency's
Milestones document and other TC feasibility studies --
gained the most currency with Board members. However, even
like-minded countries such as Germany advised that we keep
the TACC discussion at a "technical level" and cautioned
against "politicizing" TC. Ireland could see technical
issues with the project and Switzerland appreciated the
technical analysis and considerations, though it supported
the right to nuclear power. Lithuania believed it important
to have consensus on TC but saw the discrepancy between the
DG report on Syria and the TC project. Finland also
acknowledged valid views on the TC project but was cautious
about any challenge to the "special place of TC in the Agency."
Furthermore, Ambassador Kaupi feared that focusing on the TC
project would divert attention from the "real" issues of
Syria's suspect nuclear activities.


5. (SBU) Among the G-77 members present, Brazil was
categoric about its belief that we should not create
political benchmarks or attaching strings to TC. China also
strongly supported adherence to the Statute and technical
criteria for TC. Again, Russia was the most opposed to
blocking the Syria TC project arguing that there were no
legal grounds to do so. Russia supported Syria's cooperation
with the Agency on nuclear power and cautioned against any
effort to block TC before anything "serious" had been
determined.


Iran
--------------


6. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte highlighted the DG report's
findings that Iran is continuing to build its enrichment
capacity; its violation of modified Code 3.1 and denial of
access to Arak, and most disturbingly, the lack of progress
on PMD due to Iran's intransigence. For the most part, the
reaction to the Iran report was "nothing new." Ireland noted
that the report was even clearer than previous reports that
Iran was to blame for blocking the investigation. Germany
questioned how the Board should react to now repeated DG
reports of Iran's lack of cooperation, which has gone from
"bad to worse." Russia emphasized that there was no need for
a Board resolution following the passage of UNSCR 1838 while
China predictably saw the window for P5 1 negotiations with
Iran as "still open." Finland expressed concern that there
was indeed "nothing new" while Iran pressed forward on the
ground at Natanz. Ambassador Kaupi did not envisage a
resolution but encouraged national statements calling for
full cooperation and resumption of talks. Ambassador Schulte
seconded the call for strong national statements placing the
onus on Iran. (Note: Subsequent to the meeting, the German
Ambassador told us that his political director would be
circulating the text of a draft Iran resolution to his
"EU3 3" colleagues. End note.)

DG Promises No Help On Syria TC
--------------


7. (C) In a subsequent meeting with Director General
ElBaradei (to be reported in detail septel),ElBaradei
defended the Syrian TC project on technical grounds and made
a "due process" argument for its approval. He said he would
tell the Board that he saw no basis in the IAEA Statute for
its disapproval.

Addressing Syria at the TACC and Board
--------------


8. (C) Comment: Per Refs, mission is continuing to press
the case on several fronts to avoid approval of the Syrian TC
project and adopt a supportive resolution at that Board on
the safeguards investigation. Next steps with regard to the
Board resolution include securing agreement from either
Australia or New Zealand to take the lead in sponsoring a
resolution; both have sought instructions and we hope to hear
their response on Friday, November 21. Specific
timing/tactics of circulating a draft resolution will need to
be formulated in partnership with the lead resolution
sponsor. We are also consulting with likeminded technical
experts in advance of the Secretariat's November 21 Technical
Briefing on the Syrian safeguards investigation in order to
coordinate helpful questions. Since any Board resolution
will not be by consensus (NAM Troika Egypt, Cuba, Malaysia
will certainly not support a resolution, at least a few
others are likely to join them) we suspect additional
demarches to targeted Board members may be
necessary at some point to help ease concerns over a "split
Board."


9. (C) Regarding efforts to disapprove the Syrian TC
project of concern, Ambassador Schulte, joined by Germany,
Australia, and perhaps Canada and France, will inform
TACC/Board Chair Ferouki tomorrow that the U.S. cannot
currently join consensus and appeal to her to help lead
consultations that would allow us to avoid setting the
precedent of a vote on the TC program. In various fora,
Mission will also insist the Secretariat share details of the
Safeguards Department review of this project. As the above
report from today's discussion with Board members shows, most
Board members are extremely wary of "politicizing" the TACC
discussion. It is extremely likely that we would lose a vote
if we forced one. Thus, Mission's strategy will be to stress
1) the technical problems with the scope and design of the
project; and 2) any concerns the Safeguards Department may
have expressed. In light of both, we intend to argue that
the TACC make no decision on this project at this time, while
perhaps giving the Secretariat the remit to reconsider the
project and resubmit as appropriate to a future TACC meeting.

SCHULTE