IAEA/IRAN: NO COOPERATION, NO PROGRESS, NO STOP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000613

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2023
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: NO COOPERATION, NO PROGRESS, NO STOP
TO ENRICHMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d


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Summary
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1. (SBU) The IAEA Director General's (DG) November 19
report on Iran-consisting of only four pages-provides updated
figures for centrifuge activities at Natanz, highlights
Iran's continued rejection of the IAEA's request to visit the
Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak (based on Iran's claimed
unilateral suspension of "Code 3.1" of its Subsidiary
Arrangement),and briefly references the lack of substantive
progress made on investigating possible military dimensions
to Iran's nuclear program. The report specifies that Iran
has: not suspended enrichment- and heavy water-related
activities, failed to provide the IAEA with necessary
information or access to people and facilities, and continued
to refuse the implementation of the Additional Protocol (AP).
It puts the onus on Tehran to break the impasse. End
Summary.

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Current Nuclear Activities
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2. (SBU) The DG's report states that Iran has not suspended
its enrichment and heavy water-related activities, as
required by UNSC and Board of Governors resolutions. Iran
continues to operate 3820 IR1 centrifuges on uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) gas at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at
Natanz and 13 centrifuges consisting of IR1, IR2, and IR3s on
UF6 gas at the pilot FEP at Natanz, all of which is the same
as was reported in September. Installation of centrifuges to
complete a second 3000-centrifuge unit has continued, and
Iran informed the IAEA that it plans to begin installation of
centrifuges in the third 3000-centrifuge unit in 2009. Iran
continues construction of the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
at Esfahan. It has not produces significantly more UF6 at
the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan due to the
shut down for routine maintanence.

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Iran's Failure to Meet Code 3.1
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3. (SBU) The DG's report calls attention to Iran's decision
to invoke its unilateral suspension of the implementation of
Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements by objecting to the
IAEA's request to conduct a design information verification
(DIV) at the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak and
not providing the IAEA with preliminary design information
for the nuclear power plant to be built at Darkhovin. The
report usefully notes that the IAEA reminded Iran that it
does not accept Iran's rejection of Code 3.1 and that "the
Agency's right to carry out DIV is a continuing right."

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Possible Military Dimensions
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4. (SBU) Regarding issues related to "possible military
dimensions" (PMD),the report indicates that the IAEA
continues to assess the information provided to it by Iran
and Member States, but notes that no substantive progress has
been made on the "alleged studies" issues because the lack of
Iran's cooperation. The report states that it is essential
that Iran "provide the information and access necessary to:
resolve questions related to the alleged studies; provide
more information on the circumstances of the acquisition of
the uranium metal document; clarify procurement R&D
activities of military related institutes and companies that
could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of
nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to
defense industries."

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Comment
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5. (C) Given the status quo nature of the DG's report on
Iran, Mission does not see it as a strong basis for
re-engaging the P5 1 on a further Board resolution on Iran.
On a positive note, Mission notes the absence of language in
the report similar to recent report and IAEA technical
brefings that emphasized a need for additional
information-sharing with Iran, such as sharing of "original"
documentation related to possible military dimensions. We
and other like-minded Member States should draw special

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attention to Iran's refusal to reject the IAEA's request to
conduct the Heavy Water Research Reactor DIV (based on Iran's
suspension of Code 3.1) and the fact that the IAEA is unable
to perform its duties with regard to PMD because of lack of
cooperation from Iran. Iran is likely to call attention to
the short, technical update nature of the report, citing the
Agency's continued ability to verify the non-diversion of
declared nuclear material. While some may characterize a de
facto "freeze" by Iran in the number of centrifuges operating
on UF6, the continuing installation of centrifuges undercuts
that argument.
SCHULTE