IAEA/TC: LIKE-MINDED MOVE TOWARD CONSENSUS ON

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000611

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018
TAGS: KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY AORC SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/TC: LIKE-MINDED MOVE TOWARD CONSENSUS ON
DELAYING SYRIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FEASIBILITY STUDY
PROJECT

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: On November 18, Mission met with
like-minded counterparts to discuss the Agency's request to
approve a Syrian technical cooperation (TC) project SYR/0/020
Conducting a Technical and Economic Feasibility Study and
Site Selection for a Nuclear Power Plant during the November
24-26 TACC. Mission reviewed technical concerns (per
technical paper sent to ISN/RA) about incoherent project
design, pre-determined positive outcomes of a study leading
to site development, lack of transparency on the procurement
component, inconsistent interpretation of IAEA Milestones,
possible proliferation concerns, and lack of Secretariat's
judgment during the project pre-qualification phase. Msnoffs
shared USG views that the project was ill timed and should
not be included in the TC Program Cycle 2009-20011. All
attendees, UK, Germany, France, Australia, Canada, and Japan,
noted their concerns about project design but expressed great
skepticism about any effort to kill the project outright.
Japan expressed the most concern noting the lack of legal
grounds to "single out" Syria and warned against politicizing
TC. Msnoffs pushed counterparts to speak with the Secretariat
about concerns prior to the TACC and include questions and
concerns about the project in their TACC interventions.
Msnoffs also noted other options to curb Syria's access to TC
in this area would be to delay the project to give the
Secretariat time to answer Member States questions resulting
in a review of the project at the 2010 TACC or a recasting of
the project to drop the procurement component and resolve
inconsistencies. In response to Mission's suggestion that the
like-minded should indicate at the TACC an unwillingness to
join consensus on the proposed TC cycle if it includes this
project, the group consensus seemed to be that there is
little possibility to kill the project, but that a delay in
approving the project might be feasible given all the
questions surrounding its scope. Germany observed, however,
that pushing for a delay would imply a willingness to approve
the project at some future date if/if the Secretariat
addresses our concerns about the project design. (Comment:
Germany's point is well-taken, but delay of even one year,
for example, might allow the safeguards investigation to
generate a heightened level of concern/evidence regarding
Syria's attempt to build a covert reactor at Al-Kibar. End
Comment) The U.S. also raised the prospect of a Board
resolution which elicited some reservations from the UK.
France and Australia are supportive, but Australia indicated
it was disinclined to take the lead. Ambassador has
re-engaged with the Australian PR on this. END SUMMARY

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FRANCE
--------------


2. (S) France expressed great concern about the
ill-designed project proposal noting that there are many
technical inconsistencies, including lack of transparency for
the procurement component and a mismatch between the project
and the IAEA "Milestones" for states considering nuclear
power. France shared that one of the first "actions" under
the project will be to send an Agency team to Syria to
explain the Milestones document, yet the project as it stands
now presumes the Syrians can move through multiple phases.
The French mission has not received final instructions,
however, mission rep believed they would raise many questions
during their TACC intervention. (Comment: France's position
is complicated by opposition to pressing this issue from some
in the EU. End Comment) French Mission rep also noted the
tension between technical and political considerations and
felt that some may perceive this as a targeted attack.

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CANADA
--------------

3. (S) Canada admitted that as they receive more
information about the project their concerns are growing and
promised that they too will ask questions during their TACC
intervention. Canada also sees the Secretariat as somewhat
"careless" in by putting this project forward. Canada did
not weigh in on killing the project, however, they joined the
group in noting that a delay may be possible.

--------------
United Kingdom


--------------


4. (S) The UK flatly stated that this is not the right time
for the project given the on-going investigation. The UK rep
noted that project denial by the TACC would be a hard fought
battle with little chance for a positive outcome. On tactics
to delay the project, UK rep anticipated a TACC intervention
raising concerns and many questions.

--------------
JAPAN
--------------


5. (S) Japan voiced the most reservations about attempts to
kill the TC project because it feels member states have no
legal basis to hold Syria to "different guidelines" than
other member states. Japan also observed that any action by
the like-minded group would be perceived in a negative light,
double standard, etc. Japanese Counselor was more amenable
to technical objections to the TC project but noted that
having Secretariat involvement in Syria's nuclear sector may
serve our interest in keeping tabs on the Syrian program.
Japan said they have received no instruction to raise Syria
at the TACC, but thanked msnoffss for bilateral USG efforts
with the Secretariat and for the paper distributed on
technical concerns.

--------------
GERMANY
--------------


6. (S) Germany shared like-minded concerns and was uneasy
about the project from a "political" perspective. However,
German DCM Kemmerling raised a salient point about objecting
to the Syrian project from a technical vice "political"
standpoint, and noted potential tradeoffs between the two
approaches. Technical objections could lead to a re-design
of the project, and he asked whether we were prepared to live
with that from a political perspective? Australia
acknowledged Germany's point and worried that the technical
arguments alone may not be sufficient for a delay. The "man
on the street test" (i.e. giving assistance for a nuclear
reactor to a country under investigation for a clandestine
reactor) is simpler, Australian DCM Kruse observed, and we
should not lose sight of the overall point that this was
politically inappropriate. He thought the Board could
exercise its discretion in this matter. Though others would
raise the Statutory prohibition on subjecting assistance to
"political considerations," he noted that the NPT does not
presume an unqualified right to nuclear energy. (Comment:
Article III C of the Statute speaks of political
considerations or conditions "incompatible with the
provisions of this Statute." A narrow legal reading of XII.C
would allow curtailment of assistance only in the case of
persistent noncompliance, and only after the Board has
reported that noncompliance to the UNSC and given the member
state a "reasonable" period of time to take corrective
action. End Comment)


7. (S) Germany reported that during a conversation with
Agency experts it was told that the whole project is
considered, by the Secretariat, to be within Milestone 1.
Germany also shared specifics on the procurement component
noting that a gamma spectroscope, micro earthquake monitoring
equipment, safety equipment for the MNSR, and the design of a
management system for MNSR use are anticipated procurement
expenditures. Mission noted in response that the Secretariat
had told us that the project spanned at least the first two
phases of Milestones and that the Syrians had already
informed the Agency of a national decision to pursue nuclear
energy. These statements conflicted with what Germany had
heard, a fact which served as a good microcosm of the
inconsistencies inherent in this "feasibility study" project.

--------------
AUSTRALIA
--------------


8. (S) Australia joined the group in expressing great
reservations about design of the project noting its many
inconsistencies. Australia acknowledged Japan's point that
it is good Syria is requesting TC, rather than building a
clandestine reactor. However, Australia said it would be


reluctant to only focus on technical concerns since Syria is
currently under investigation. Australia has no final
instructions for the TACC, but DCM Kruse anticipated they
would also raise questions. Looking ahead, he also felt a
delay may be possible.

--------------
Syrian Resolution at Board
--------------


9. (S) Nuclear Counselor presented the idea, pending the DG
report, of a Board resolution which would note the concerns
in the report, urge Syria to cooperate, and at a minimum
inscribe this as a regular verification item on the Board's
agenda. UK Msnoff noted some informal reluctance in London,
pending the DG report, including concern about whether a
resolution was premature at this stage of the investigation
and the potential for backlash. In essence, the UK was not
sure the DG report would be strong enough to warrant a
resolution. The UK also did not want to detract from the
Board's focus on Iran, to which the U.S. replied that the DG
report on Iran was expected to be short with little prospect
for Board action. Nevertheless, the UK had done a rough vote
count on a Syria resolution of 18 potentially in favor, 6
against and 11 on the fence. Germany did not want to set a
precedent of a "split" Board, which could affect Iran
discussions. While consensus was unrealistic, Kimmerling
stressed gaining the support of some of the more important
countries on the Board.


10. (S) Off-line French DCM Gross (not present) was
supportive of a Board resolution, though at the meeting
French Counselor suggested fall-back options such as
insisting on an agenda item in Chair's summary or in a
like-minded letter. Msnoff noted that such fall-backs were
technically not binding on the Secretariat.


11. (S) Australia saw logic in pursuing a resolution and
would support like-minded efforts, but Australian DCM
declined the suggestion that Australia could be the lead
sponsor. (Note: The Australian Ambassador, approached
earlier, had not ruled out doing so. New Zealand is another
option as a potential sponsor. End Note)

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COMMENT
--------------


12. (S) Mission will submit septel, after reviewing the
pending DG's report on Syria, an updated strategy for efforts
to disapprove the Syrian nuke power feasibility study and for
adopting a Board resolution on the ongoing safeguards
investigation in Syria.
SCHULTE