IAEA/TC: STATUS UPDATE ON PROPOSED SYRIA NUCLEAR

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000604

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018
TAGS: KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY AORC SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/TC: STATUS UPDATE ON PROPOSED SYRIA NUCLEAR
POWER FEASIBILITY PROJECT

REF: A. STATE 118652

B. UNVIE VIENNA 000584

C. UNVIE VIENNA 000569

D. UNVIE VIENNA 000540

E. STATE 097067

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

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IAEA Safeguards Memo Raises Concerns
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1. (S) The IAEA Department of Safeguards recently circulated
a confidential internal memo (strictly protect) outlining
Safeguards Department concerns with the Syrian technical
cooperation (TC) project proposal entitled "Conducting a
Technical and Economic Feasibility Study and Site Selection
for a Nuclear Power Plant" (reftels). In a November 13
meeting with IAEA TC Program Coordination Section Head
Frederick Claps (please protect),Msnoff learned that a
confidential memo from the Safeguards Department, circulated
November 12 and addressed to the DDGs of both Safeguards and
TC, specifically outlines several concerns over the Syria
nuclear power feasibility project. Msnoff read the memo but
did not receive a copy. Concerns outlined in the memo
include the ambiguity and lack of clarity in the project's
proposed training and fellowships; the Safeguards
Department's determination that the procurement of a gamma
spectrometer was unnecessary for the project; and the high
level involvement of Ibrahim Othman, theDirector General of
the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission, as the Syrian point of
contact, which was described as "unusual" and
"inappropriate." The memo concluded that the Safeguards
Department could not exclude the possibility that aspects of
the project could be diverted to undeclared activities.

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Project of Concern
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2. (S) The new Safeguards Department memo should cause a
reconsideration within Secretariat as to whether the project
is entirely appropriate in substance and design. While it is
possible the Secretariat could choose to modify the project,
we do not anticipate the DG agreeing to remove it from the
proposed TC program entirely at this juncture, despite the
expressed Safeguards concerns.


3. (S) To buttress our arguments for disapproval in the
TACC/Board, therefore, Mission has initiated a comparative
analysis to previous Syrian projects that would provide basis
for technical arguments for setting this project aside, at
least for now. Unlike other similar feasibility studies,
only the Syrian project includes significant sums of money
for equipment procurement or includes aspects of nuclear
power plant site selection and development. Mission has
learned of four items earmarked by the Secretariat for
possible procurement over two years under the study:
equipment for safety of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor
(MNSR) (USD 25,000); items for improvement of the MNSR
facility (USD 25,000); a portable gamma spectrometer (USD
50,000); and micro earthquake monitoring equipment (USD
20,000). These items are not listed in the materials
provided to member states by the Secretariat for evaluation
of the proposed TC projects, nor are the types of fellowships
or scientific visits envisioned for the project described in
any detail in the project's supporting documents.


4. (S) The equipment planned for safety and improvement of
the MNSR research facility appears to be only vaguely
defined, but has been described by Nuclear Power Division
officials with direct oversight of the project as possibly
including a safety analysis report, instrumentation for
reactor management training, or computer programs and
simulations for human capacity development. Fellowships and
scientific visits funded under the project are similarly ill
defined, with Secretariat officials stating that details will
only be decided on once the project has received Board
approval. Nuclear Power Division officials conveyed that
Syria has already made a political decision to pursue nuclear
power, and defended the substance of the project as chiefly
focusing on safety. They stressed the aim of the study was
to help Syria make a knowledgeable decision on whether the
pursuit of nuclear power was within Syria's current
capabilities and interests.

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COMMENT
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5. (S) Despite the Safeguards objections, the project will
likely receive strong support from the G-77/NAM as

technically within the range of TC projects available to
Syria in the absence of a relevant Board resolution to
restrict such activities. At lunch hosted by Ambassador
Schulte November 13, the ambassadors of Malaysia, Egypt, and
to a lesser extent Spain, cautioned again "politicizing TC."
Egypt also raised the prospect of questioning the TC program
for Israel.


6. (S) Mission continues to coordinate with likeminded states
and will present arguments for disapproval of the project
during a planned likeminded experts meeting on November 18.
The basis for the arguments are the inconsistencies in the
project design versus other active feasibility studies, the
pre-determined positive outcome of the project by including
site selection and development, and the lack of convergence
between the project and the IAEA Milestones document. We
hope to demonstrate that this project appears to be an
inappropriately structured "umbrella" project that is not
consistent with the Secretariat's own guidelines for
formulating TC projects. All of these points will be
punctuated by a request of the Secretariat to tell member
states whether the Safeguards Department has had any
input/views on this project. We should have a better idea
after the planned experts-level discussion on November 18 of
whether we can present a strong multi-country front in the
TACC the following week to kill, defer, or delay this
project.
SCHULTE