Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA583
2008-11-03 06:52:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR PRESSES ELBARADEI ON EARLY REPORT ON

Tags:  KNNP IAEA AORC IR SY KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 030652Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8629
INFO VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000583 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018
TAGS: KNNP IAEA AORC IR SY KN

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES ELBARADEI ON EARLY REPORT ON
SYRIA

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000583


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018
TAGS: KNNP IAEA AORC IR SY KN

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES ELBARADEI ON EARLY REPORT ON
SYRIA

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In an October 31 meeting with IAEA Director General
Mohammed ElBaradei, Ambassador Schulte reiterated the U.S.
request for a written report to the IAEA Board of Governors,
under a Syria-specific verification agenda item, detailing
the Agency's ongoing investigation into Syrian clandestine
nuclear activities. ElBaradei would not commit to a written
report or an agenda item, saying it depended on the substance
of a report. He pressed the USG to provide more information,
including imagery. On Iran, ElBaradei confirmed the Agency
will report again to the Board, noting the continuing lack of
Iranian cooperation, but stated that the report will contain
nothing new.


2. (S) On DPRK, ElBaradei expressed his appreciation for U.S.
efforts to maintain a significant IAEA role in verification
activities despite considerable DPRK reluctance, but
complained the Agency cannot "play second fiddle" to the six
parties in a pure consultancy role. He appreciated the
recent phone call from A/S Hill, and the Ambassador told him
that A A/S McNerney would be coming to Vienna to discuss the
IAEA's role in more detail. The Ambassador also emphasized
our goal for the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and discussed,
based on his recent visit, how to encourage Brazil and
Argentina to adopt the Additional Protocol. END SUMMARY.

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SYRIA
--------------


3. (S) Ambassador opened the meeting by saying that the case
of Syria was different than the case of Iran, and we want to
avoid driving Syria to adopt Iran's noncompliance policies.
This means that the IAEA must pursue its investigation and
make clear to Syria that it cannot avoid Board scrutiny by
continued delay. We want Syria to choose the path of Libya,
not Iran.


4. (S) Unfortunately, however, Syria seems to be adopting the
techniques of Iran, whether in the Board room or on the
ground with inspectors in order to prolong the investigation
and avoid the potential consequences of its actions.
Ambassador noted that Syria has followed Iran's lead in
challenging the mandate, authority, and integrity of the

Agency, and predicted that Syria --if it continues to adopt
Iranian techniques-- will likely agree at the last minute to
further (but limited) cooperation with the IAEA's
investigation in order to avoid a tough report. Ambassador
strongly urged the Director General to continue with the
Agency's investigation into clandestine Syrian activities,
and to provide a written report to the Board of Governors for
discussion under a Syria-specific agenda item at the Board's
November meeting.


5. (S) ElBaradei responded that the Agency is "doing what
we're supposed to do" regarding Syria, but once again
conveyed his serious displeasure that the IAEA was not
alerted to Syria's alleged activities earlier, and his severe
disapproval that force was relied on instead of the Agency's
verification process. ElBaradei conveyed that the Agency is
now in the process of blindly "picking up the pieces" after
the fact, and is still waiting for the lab results of the
environmental samples it obtained from Al Kibar. ElBaradei
stated the IAEA does not yet have a clear picture of the
nature of activity at Al Kibar and is not in a position to
make any determinations. The DG noted the further
complications arising from the assassination of the Agency's
main Syrian interlocutor, and complained that the IAEA lacks
the authority to request more information and access from
Syria. Noting that "I can only work with the tools I have,"
ElBaradei reiterated the Safeguard Department's request for
imagery of the Al Kibar site after the bombing.


6. (S) Ambassador noted our understanding that while no
commercial imagery of the site after the bombing was
available, the U.S. has provided a significant amount of
information to the Agency regarding activities at the
facility, including imagery of the exposed reactor vessel, as
well as information on the clean-up and remediation efforts
pursued by Syria following the bombing. Given the
information available to the Agency, Ambassador argued that
the onus should be on Syria to explain the nature of the
facility, to which ElBaradei responded that to the contrary
the obligation is on the "accusers" to make the case, and
that Syria is not "guilty until proven innocent." ElBaradei
again complained about a lack of information including
satellite imagery, to which Ambassador responded that when
information is provided it must be acted upon appropriately,
noting that in the past information on Syrian sites passed to
the Agency was provided back to Syria, allowing Syria to
remediate those facilities while still denying access.


7. (S) Returning to the matter of the Board, ElBaradei stated
that only once he had substance would he provide a report to
the Board. Ambassador argued that we considered this to be a
very substantive verification issue, as did the EU and other
countries that had requested a report to the November Board.
Our goal was to work with the IAEA Secretariat in conducting
this investigation in a professional manner. However, if the
DG did not respect Member State requests for a report and
agenda item, we could have on of two situations: either
Governors could put in writing their requests for a report
and agenda item, or there could be a repeat of the debate of
the last Board meeting on the agenda. Either would
politicize the discussion, when our common goal was a
thorough IAEA investigation.

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IRAN
--------------


8. (S) ElBaradei said that he would have little new to report
to the Board on Iran. He said that he did not expect any
movement from Iran at least until next June, after the
presidential elections in Iran.

--------------
DPRK
--------------


9. (S) On DPRK, ElBaradei expressed his appreciation for his
recent telephone conversation with A/S Hill and acknowledged
the DPRK's resistance to an IAEA verification role. He noted
the recent negative statements about the IAEA by the DPRK at
UNGA. He cautioned that it would not be good for the
nonproliferation regime if the Agency served only as a
consultant to the Six-Party process, noting that the IAEA can
only work under the authority of the Board of Governors, not
at the discretion of certain Member States. He suggested
that the Six-Parties report to the Secretariat so that it in
turn could report to the Board.


10. (S) Ambassador said that we appreciated his advice and
that of his team on the IAEA's role. As suggested by his
staff, perhaps the Six-Parties could agree to a monitoring
role that would allow the Agency to be prepared to take the
DPRK back under IAEA safeguards. Ambassador informed
ElBaradei that Acting A/S McNerney is coming to Vienna on
November 10 to discuss the IAEA role in detail with Mr.
Heinonen. DG ElBaradei expressed appreciation and said that
we seemed to be on the same track.

--------------
Additional Protocol
--------------


11. (S) The Ambassador briefed ElBaradei on our goal for the
upcoming meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. ElBaradei
said that our shift from an outright ban to a criteria based
approach for restricting sensitive technology transfer should
help in our quest for multilateral assurances of fuel supply.
Ambassador described our effort to secure the support of
Argentina and Brazil for the Additional Protocol as a
criterion for sensitive technology transfer in the short term
and, in the long term, the adoption of the AP. Based on his
recent trip to Argentina and Brazil, the Ambassador told
ElBaradei that Argentina was politically ready to conclude
the AP, but was not yet prepared to take on the technical
reporting requirements, while in Brazil the opposite was the
case. ElBaradei noted that the technical requirements should
not be a real hindrance for Argentina, and that he has
repeatedly heard from both countries in the past several
years that they are "very close" to concluding an AP.
ElBaradei noted that he has tried to reassure Brazil that the
IAEA will not "snoop" into activities conducted before the
conclusion of an AP, stating that "we all know they were
pursuing nukes." ElBaradei undertook to press Brazil to
adopt the AP, suggesting he would do so through Sergio Duarte
but also asking our advice on which government officials to
press.

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COMMENT
--------------


12. (S) ElBaradei did not commit to a written report or
agenda item for the November Board meeting, though this may
have reflected his unwillingness to be seen as succumbing to
pressure from the U.S. and EU. We hope, however, that he
will understand our argument that his putting it on the
agenda will be less politically charged than Member States
forcing it on.


13. (S) ElBaradei was much more relaxed on the DPRK. We
thank A/S Hill for his phone call and Acting A/S McNerney for
scheduling a visit here next month.
SCHULTE


NNNN




End Cable Text