VIENNA'S FRIENDS OF AFGHANISTAN ON COMPACT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000523

SIPDIS

ROME PASS TO FAO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2028
TAGS: AF AS AU CA EAID FR IT KCRM NL NO PREL
PTER, SNAR, TU, UK, UN, SW, NATO
SUBJECT: VIENNA'S FRIENDS OF AFGHANISTAN ON COMPACT AND
WAYS FORWARD

REF: A. STATE 99177

B. UNVIE 504

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory Schulte, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

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SUMMARY
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1.(SBU) The Friends of Afghanistan in Vienna had a first
meeting, chaired by Italian ambassador Gianni Ghisi, on
September 17. Afghan Charge Wahid Monawar gave an update on
the 2006 Afghanistan Compact. While citing progress, he
pointed out challenges in transportation, energy,
agriculture, rural development, counter-narcotics and
anti-corruption. UNODC Executive Director Antonio Costa
briefed the Group on the Afghanistan opium survey, noting the
overall rising trend of opium cultivation in the period
2002-2008, despite a 19 percent decline in hectares
cultivated in 2008. He pressed for a five-pillar strategy:
development assistance, better use of the PRTs,
implementation of UNSC resolutions 1735, and 1822 to list
drug traffickers (as well as Taliban and Al-Qaida supporters)
and UNSCR 1817 to target precursor, destruction of high-value
targets such as labs, markets and convoys, and strengthening
trilateral cooperation (Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan).
UNODC's Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) chief Backson
Sibanda briefed on the evaluation his office conducted of
UNODC's Afghanistan operations. In sum, the evaluation
called for better coordination within UNODC, between UNODC
and other UN agencies in Afghanistan, and for UNODC to find
niches for its programs there. France noted the importance of
implementing the precursor recommendation from the June 12
Paris Conference on Afghanistan. Turkey noted its
contributions to Afghanistan in the areas of security,
health, and education. Sweden emphasized the importance of
UNODC to coordinate with UN entities and with donor
countries, and the need to work in niche areas. A number of
countries echoed this view.


2. (U) Ambassador delivered Ref A points on the Compact and
on Costa's briefing. Ambassador offered to host the next
meeting in mid-November, and noted precursors and the UN
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC, also known as the
Merida Convention) had been mentioned as possible agenda
items. The USG also proposed that UNODC brief on the
implementation of the IEU evaluation. The Friends accepted
Ambassador's offer to host the next meeting. END SUMMARY.

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THE AFGHAN COMPACT: PLUSES, MINUSES AND THE FUTURE
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3. (C) Afghan Charge Wahid Monawar began his presentation by
saying that his government identified Pakistan as a problem
six years ago, but "nobody" paid attention to that then. He
described the dangers on the road from Kabul to Jalalabad,
and the "infestation" of Farah province with Iranian
elements. He highlighted the successes in meeting some of
the Compact benchmarks. The Afghan National Army has grown
to 63,397 men in March 2008 (against the benchmark of
80,000). Their operational capability has also risen, as 13
of the 36 battalions can perform operations with the support
of coalition forces. There has also been progress in
programs for the National Assembly, health, education, and
national solidarity. More specifically, he cited
reconstruction of targeted regional roads as being 52 percent
complete, school enrollment as having risen to 75 percent for

boys, and 46 percent for girls, basic health care coverage as
having "reached 85 percent." The Parliament passed more laws
(18) last year, the number of lawyers doubled to 400, and the
economy continued to grow at over 6 percent.


4. (SBU) Despite these successes, he listed factors
limiting implementation of the Compact. These include the
deteriorating security situation, the increasing dominance of
the opium economy, the fragility of the licit economy,
corruption and ineffective management of aid. He considered
poor transportation infrastructure, low level of electric
power, declining agriculture, ineffective alternative
development projects as all contributing to failures to curb
poppy cultivation. He underscored that 80% of the Afghan
population live in rural areas. Yet agriculture was on the
decline because of poor infrastructure and residual land
mines. He stated that 7 million Afghans are threatened by
hunger. He urged the international community to buy Afghan
agricultural products. He expressed outrage at a news report
that $9 million of potatoes were flown into Afghanistan, a
crop he was sure that Afghan farmers could grow. He
attributed the slow progress in eradication to "inadequate"
cooperation between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry
of Counter-narcotics, "inadequate" equipment and funding, and
"tentative" Afghan army protection of counter-narcotics
efforts. And although the first infantry unit of the Counter
Narcotics "Kandak" (battalion) was established in March 2008
under the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund, the battalion had not
accomplished more eradication.


5. (SBU) Monawar underscored corruption as a "significant
and growing problem" in Afghanistan, noting that the country
was ranked 172nd out of 179 countries by Transparency
International. He described progress in this area in the past
year as "little, if any." And despite GOA's recent
ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC),
Monawar seemed pessimistic about its implementation. He
noted "an unclear policy and legal framework," the lack of
political leadership, and the "lack of capacity and clarity
of functions in the different 'integrity promotion'
institutions." He pointed out that the five-year Afghan
National Development Strategy (ANDS),submitted to the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the spring,
and presented to the international community at the June 12
Paris Conference, includes an anti-corruption strategy.
However, he questioned how the Strategy would address issues
on institutional linkages, reporting lines, responsibilities
in corruption prevention, investigation, prosecution,
education and coordination. He said the $21 million in aid
the donors pledged in Paris would be used to implement the
Strategy, and that it would be done in collaboration with
UNAMA. He concluded his presentation by reaffirming the
GOA's commitment to "intensify actions to combat corruption."

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COSTA'S RECOMMENDATIONS
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6. (U) UNODC Executive Director Costa was invited to speak at
the second hour of the meeting. He mentioned his own efforts
to mobilize a large group of "Friends," the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank, as well as the media, to promote
development in Afghanistan. He expressed satisfaction that
the media now cite UNODC as a source on Afghanistan
counter-narcotics. He also referred to his immediate trip to
Paris to brief the French Senate on Afghanistan. He said it
was important for UNODC to reach beyond the executive branch
of countries. He briefed the Friends Group on the challenges

and priorities regarding the opium situation in Afghanistan
in 2008-2009. His presentation was based on his earlier
briefings to Vienna ambassadors and to NATO in Brussels. For
the Friends, he recommended a five-pillar strategy to fight
narcotics in Afghanistan:

(i) development assistance
(ii) better use of PRTs
(iii) implementing UN Security Council resolutions 1735 and
1822
(iv) destroying high-value targets such as labs, markets, and
convoys
(v) strengthening trilateral cooperation (Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iran)

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URGENT, VISIBLE, MASSIVE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
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7. (U) As he had previously told Ambassador (Ref B),Costa
repeated his call for "urgent, visible, and massive"
development assistance to poppy-free northern Afghanistan in
order to help farmers decide against poppy planting in the
current season that will last through November. He
underlined that offering the farmers one dollar of assistance
now would be more valuable than offering them hundreds of
dollars later (after the planting season),especially in the
three vulnerable provinces (one of them is Nangarhar). He
explained that development assistance to the countryside has
come from the CNTF (Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund),GPI (Good
Performers' Initiative),and the NSF (National Solidarity
Fund),the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and
bilaterally. He described the World Bank assistance, in
"hundreds of millions" of dollars, as "excellent." He also
advocated food assistance, from the World Food Program and
from bilateral aid, to Afghan cities, noting there were
extended food riots in March and April. He also said it was
important for the international community to buy wheat grown
in Afghanistan.

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BETTER USE OF THE PRTs
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8. (U) Costa proposed "embedding" counter-narcotics capacity
into the PRTs. He said that reconstruction should move away
from social activities, and the teams should work to develop
understanding of the narcotics situation in the provinces.
He stated that he had made the same recommendation in his
briefing to NATO.

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UNSCR 1735,1822, AND 1817
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9. (U) Costa urged the implementation of UNSCR 1735
(December 2006),UNSCR 1822 (June 2008) and UNSCR 1817 (June
2008). The first two resolutions encourage states to submit
for listing names of individuals and entities that support
Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and others who are associated with
them through the cultivation, production and trafficking of
narcotic drugs and their precursors. Costa lamented that not
a single name had been added to the list, and pointed out
that such names should not just be from Afghanistan, but also
from neighboring countries. Regarding UNSCR 1817 (June 2008)
targeting precursors in Afghanistan and the region, Costa
highlighted that Afghanistan is only seizing 20 to 25 percent
of the precursors entering the country. He showed

photographs of border truck stops through which, for lack of
government control, huge amounts of chemicals, fuel, and
other goods are smuggled into the country.

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DESTROYING HIGH-VALUE TARGETS
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10. (U) As he had done previously in Vienna and Brussels,
Costa pressed again for NATO forces to destroy high-value
targets such as labs, markets and convoys. He showed a photo
of a lab operating in Pakistan within 800 meters of the
Afghan border. He also pointed out weapons seizures in
border towns, implying that CN operations could help to
uncover weapons smuggling as well.

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TRILATERAL COOPERATION
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11. (U) Costa highlighted UNODC's Triangle Trilateral
Initiative which calls for CN cooperation among Afghanistan,
Iran, and Pakistan. He described the Initiative as a way to
strengthen cross-border cooperation in drug control, build
confidence and increase information exchange, and build
bridges with other relevant initiatives. He listed a number
of UNODC projects in the three countries, many of which are
on border control. (Note: The Afghan Ministry of the
Interior refused to participate in a trilateral meeting in
Tehran in early May. Earlier Afghan Charge Monawar had also
expressed reservation about working with Pakistan and Iran.
End Note.) In response to Afghan charge's question about how
to make the Initiative work, Costa claimed that the three
countries were in agreement on CN, but not necessarily on
cross-border cooperation for Iran-Afghanistan and
Pakistan-Afghanistan.

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EVALUATION OF UNODC'S AFGHANISTAN PROGRAM
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12. (U) UNODC'S Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU),headed by
Backson Sibanda, recently completed a detailed evaluation of
UNODC's activities in Afghanistan. Like Afghan Charge
Monawar, Sibanda's evaluation took note of weak government
capacity, widespread corruption, poor security as among the
challenges in Afghanistan. In addition, he pointed out the
lack of coordination between donors, UN agencies, and
government departments as a great challenge. His
presentation comprised specific recommendations in the areas
of alternative livelihood, rule of law, law enforcement, drug
demand reduction, and illicit crop monitoring. Overall, he
recommended that UNODC should partner strategically with
UNAMA in its CN efforts, should form complementary
partnerships with other UN entities (UN Delivering as ONE) in
order to avoid duplication, and should look for niches where
it can best leverage its limited resources. Sibanda urged
UNODC to play a greater role in research and advocacy,
because of its experience in these areas.

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HOW TO COORDINATE
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13. (C) Ambassador delivered Ref A points on the importance
of the Compact, the cross-cutting nature of
counter-narcotics, and the importance of incentives and
disincentives in implementing development strategy.

Referring to the IEU report, Swedish Ambassador Lundborg
spoke about the importance of coordination, which he found
lacking among UN entities and among the bilateral donors. He
also underscored the importance of coordinating with NATO,
which in his opinion, was doing "nothing" on
counter-narcotics. He described UNODC as a "small player" in
Afghanistan, and therefore it should find niches where it
could be most effective. He considered corruption a problem
to be tackled "in a global sense," criticized the lack of
political will, and announced that Sweden would increase its
forces in Afghanistan. He said he had proposed to his State
Secretary to send such forces to the south of Afghanistan.
Italian Ambassador Ghisi echoed this point about
coordination.


14. (SBU) Norwegian Ambassador Johansen asked how best to
pursue coordination. Costa expressed frustration that the
UNODC had been promoting coordination unsuccessfully for 40
years. He said members of the senior executive body of the
UN had never disagreed on coordination, but the operational
and field-levels had always fought. In his opinion, the
challenge is to transmit this need for coordination to the
junior level. He said that the Secretary General is working
hard on this issue. He also noted that the Afghan government
needs to coordinate. He referred to the monitoring board in
Kabul chaired by UNAMA chief Kai Eide and Afghanistan's
Deputy President. He described that as coordination "by
attitude." He highlighted the UNODC tool ADAM (Automated
Donor Assistance Mechanism) which tracks every UNODC project
in Afghanistan, as a practical way for donors to learn what
UNODC is doing in-country.

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DEVELOPMENT RATHER THAN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
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15. (U) French ambassador Deniau asked what role Vienna
could play in advancing alternative development in
Afghanistan, which he said was a key issue in the June Paris
conference. Costa replied that he wanted to promote
"development" rather than "alternative development," since
the root causes for Afghanistan's problems are poverty and
instability. He said that UNODC could play a "coordination
role," in raising awareness among aid institutions such as
the World Bank, in establishing development priorities, and
in convincing UNODC member states on the importance of
development.

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EXPANDING UNODC'S AFGHANISTAN OFFICE
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16. (SBU) Costa added his thoughts on expanding the UNODC
office in Kabul. He said that the office chief position
would be upgraded from a D-1 to a D-2. He had discussed this
with UNAMA chief Eide who, according to Costa, endorsed the
idea, and would be willing to have his home office in New
York, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),fund
the new D-2 position. Costa envisioned the incumbent as a
special advisor to Eide, as well as a special advisor on
counter-narcotics to President Karzai. In addition, Costa
plans to double the professional staff in Kabul from 6 to 12
to increase capacity building and to increase the number of
projects there. According to UNODC Operations Division
Director Francis Maertens, UNODC would move six positions
from other UNODC field office to Kabul. (Note: UNODC senior
staff told Counselor that the D-2 position would not happen
until summer of 2009 the earliest. There is also some

question if the existing 2008-2009 DPKO budget could
accommodate funding a D-2 for UNODC. End Note.) Australia
stressed the need to know the effectiveness of UNODC's
projects before donors could support such expansion. U.K.
expressed the desire to see progress in the south, and to
know how UNODC plans to tackle the IEU report


17. (U) Costa highlighted security as the major problem in
the south, and the risk to UNODC staff, referring to his
efforts to lobby for greater security for UNODC's small
office in Kandahar. He cited Samangan and another province
with respectively less than 2000 and 3000 hectares of poppy
cultivation, as prospective poppy-free provinces, if security
could be strengthened.

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UN HAS NO ERADICATION POLICY
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18. (SBU) In response to a question from the Netherlands on
the mention of aerial spraying in his "El Pais" interview,
Costa replied that UN had no eradication policy. He was
merely stating the facts in the interview: Colombia's success
in having 165,000 hectares eradicated (aerially) in 2007,
compared to 5,000 hectares (manually eradicated) in
Afghanistan. He reiterated the high financial and human
costs for manual eradication in Afghanistan ($36,000 per
hectare and one life lost). He noted that technically,
aerial spraying was more cost effective. However, as long as
the GOA opposes aerial spraying, he said, there would be no
aerial spraying there.

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NEXT MEETING ON NOVEMBER 14
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19. (U) Ambassador offered to host next Friends meeting on
November 14. French Ambassador Deniau suggested possible
topics: implementation of the June 2008 Paris Conference
decision on precursors, and the UN Convention against
Corruption (also known as the Merida Convention). He
emphasized that continuity is important for the Group.
Ambassador and his Canadian counterpart both agreed those
could be specific issues for the Friends Groups to consider
at the next or future meetings. Counselor also suggested
that UNODC could brief on its responses and actions to
address the recommendations in the evaluation report.

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Comment
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20. (SBU) This initial meeting offered an opportunity for a
fairly frank exchange of views on the situation in
Afghanistan, as was envisioned originally by the Afghan
Charge. He was explicit in criticizing the weaknesses of his
government (e.g., lack of cooperation between ministries,
corruption). The meeting also afforded the Friends a chance
to do some frank questioning of UNODC's operations in
Afghanistan. It was Norway's suggestion to invite the
outgoing IEU chief to brief on his evaluation of UNODC's
Afghanistan operations. His presentation stimulated some
interesting remarks, and could lead to better coordination
among the Friend's governments in their assistance to
Afghanistan. Our hope is that the Group could eventually
prod some concrete actions that would benefit UNODC,
Afghanistan, and the international donor community. We will
be soliciting ideas for future agenda items and would welcome

any input from Washington or Embassy Kabul. End Comment.
SCHULTE