TALIBAN TO BAN OPIUM IN AFGHANISTAN??

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000504

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: SNAR PREL NATO PTER AF UN
SUBJECT: TALIBAN TO BAN OPIUM IN AFGHANISTAN??

REF: A. STATE 97065

B. STATE 97395

C. STATE 96741

D. UNVIE 478

E. USNATO 321

F. SMITH-NEVILLE EMAIL SEPTEMBER 2

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory Schulte, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


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Summary
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1. (C) Ambassador delivered Ref A talking points on
eradication to UNODC Executive Director Antonio Costa on
September 11. He urged Costa to clarify publicly UNODC's
continuing support for a balanced, comprehensive eradication
policy in Afghanistan. Ambassador also highlighted USG
support to amend the ISAF operating plan to interdict
narcotics production and trafficking facilities (Refs B and
C),a step that would coincide with Costa's recent advocacy
for such action by NATO (Refs E and F). Costa also indicated
privately that aerial spraying would be the most effective
method to eradicate poppy fields that run for "miles and
miles" in the south of Afghanistan, although he emphasized
that he could not speak out on such support, as long as the
Afghan government opposes it. He expressed great concern
about the rumored Taliban plan to ban opium in the regions it
controls, fearing that such a ban, if successful, would
increase Taliban prestige, as well as the value of their
opium stockpile, while encouraging the poppy-free north to
return to opium cultivation. Costa expressed support for the
informal Friends of Afghanistan group which will have its
first meeting in Vienna on September 17 (Ref D),where Costa
has been invited to speak. End Summary.

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Demarche
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2. (C) Ambassador met with Costa on September 11 to deliver
Ref A points. Ambassador urged him to find an opportunity to
clarify publicly that, contrary to press reports, the UNODC
had not changed its eradication policy and it continues to
pursue a comprehensive and balanced strategy that includes
manual eradication. Costa described the Financial Times
article on this issue as containing a number of factual
errors, misquoting the numbers he used, and including
statements he did not make. He emphasized that he was merely
pointing out the high financial and human cost of manual
eradication. He said that a CNN interview (and also an El
Pais interview) with him also cited him as supporting aerial
eradication, when in fact he only compared Afghanistan's
large, concentrated poppy fields today, covering "miles and
miles," to Colombia's situation in 2001. While he privately
believed aerial eradication was the most effective tool under
such circumstances, he could not speak out publicly to
support aerial spraying in Afghanistan. He said that he was
being criticized from both sides, admitting that a European
government had complained about his implicit support for
aerial eradication in the two recent interviews.


3. (C) In a subsequent conversation, UNODC spokesperson
Walter Kemp, who was at the meeting between Ambassador and
Costa, told Counselor that Costa was quite explicit on aerial
spraying in his CNN interview, which Kemp was still trying to
track down. He said that two or three countries are also
seeking to have Costa clarify his position publicly. Kemp
believed that Costa could do this at the September 17 Friends
of Afghanistan meeting. Counselor pointed out to him that
that is a small, informal venue, and Costa's clarification
should have as a wide, public reach as the Financial Times or
the CNN and El Pais reports. Kemp took Counselor's point and
agreed to talk to Costa about it.

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UNAMA, Karzai, UNODC
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4. (C) Referring to his late August trip to Kabul, Costa
mentioned his meetings with UNAMA chief Kai Eide and
President Karzai. He was very pleased with Eide, who "got it
right" on drugs. According to him, Eide has a very good
relationship with Karzai who is sufficiently comfortable with
him to seek his views on Afghan officials. He said UNODC was
upgrading its presence in Afghanistan, and hoped that its
future chief there could become a de facto advisor to Karzai
on counternarcotics.

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ISAF and Counternarcotics
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5. (C) Costa told Ambassador that his September 3 briefing
to NATO in Brussels was the same as the one he gave
ambassadors in Vienna on September 2 (Refs E and F). At both
he proposed six steps for NATO engagement on
counternarcotics, i.e., destroying labs, markets and convoys,
seizing precursor chemicals, listing major traffickers under
UNSCR 1735/1822, supporting ANA and ANP's CN efforts,
regaining the west (Nimroz, Zabul and Day Kundi),and
enhancing border security. Ambassador explained to Costa
that the USG supports greater ISAF involvement in
interdicting narcotics production and trafficking facilities,
and that we understand that such efforts for a more active
counternarcotics role for ISAF were being stymied by
opposition from NATO's Military Committee, and from a number
of member countries (Refs B and C). Referring to a
conversation with the NATO SecGen, Costa insisted that the UK
was supportive, and that the main opponents in NATO were
Germany, Netherlands and France. He described France as a
"surprise" to him, saying that he would take up this issue in
Paris when he goes there next week for a EU-Central Asia
conference.


6. (SBU) NOTE: Counselor earlier learned that Lt. General
Karl Eikenberry, Deputy Chairman of NATO's Military
Committee, met Costa for the first time during the latter's
late August visit to Kabul. On September 9, General
Eikenberry visited UNODC in Vienna where he was briefed by
UNODC staff on their Afghanistan activities. According to
our UNODC contacts, General Eikenberry expressed specific
interest in the location of the drug labs, the trafficking
routes, the opium markets, and the entry and exit points of
the drug traffic. END NOTE.


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A Taliban Ban on Opium?
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7. (C) Costa repeated the concern he expressed in Brussels,
and earlier in Vienna (Refs E and F),about a rumored Taliban
ban on opium. He insisted on the reliability of his "rumors,"
saying that the information came from UNODC-affiliated
sources, who saw flyers posted in Helmand and Nangarhar
warning farmers against poppy cultivation. He speculated on
the real motive behind such a ban, noting that it could be a
way for the Taliban to increase the value of their existing
opium stockpile, free up land for much needed wheat
cultivation in the face of rising wheat prices and food
shortage, and to win hearts and minds. In any case, he
believed that the ban, if successful, would be a public
relations coup for the Taliban and legitimize their status as
a political power. The high price for opium a result of the
ban could also tempt the now poppy-free north of Afghanistan
to plant poppy again. He noted that whether the ban was
rumor or truth would be known in the next six weeks, when
farmers would have to make planting decisions for the next
season. If it turned out to be the truth, he would have to
involve UNAMA and Eide for the next steps. He said he had
already discussed this with Eide in Kabul, who had heard the
"rumor," but had not formed any ideas for next steps. Costa,
mentioning his conversation with the World Bank, underscored
the importance of "solidifying" the poppy-free gains in the
north, i.e., through "very evident," "massive" development
assistance to the region.

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Comment
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8. (C) Part provocateur, part visionary, and part showman,
Costa manages frequently to draw ire from member states on
one issue or another. However, we are impressed by the
information UNODC gathers in Afghanistan, including in areas
that the USG would find hard to penetrate. Once he is in
possession of any information, such as this "rumor" on the
Taliban opium ban, he is already thinking of the next steps
to be undertaken, if the "rumor" proves true. Neither the
man nor his office is perfect, but he provides good value,
and he shares our strategic objective for a stable, drug-free
Afghanistan. We urge Washington and Kabul to think through
the implications of a Taliban opium ban, and provide us any
thoughts that we can share with Costa. End Comment.

SCHULTE