Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA494
2008-09-10 13:20:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

SUBJ: IAEA/BOG: SEEKING AN IRAN RESOLUTION IN

Tags:  AORC KNNP IAEA IR CA 
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DE RUEHUNV #0494/01 2541320
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 101320Z SEP 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8382
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0728
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0681
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0995
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0759
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0852
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1318
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000494 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2023
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA IR CA
SUBJECT: SUBJ: IAEA/BOG: SEEKING AN IRAN RESOLUTION IN
SEPTEMBER

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons
1.4 b,d,h


Summary
---------

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000494

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2023
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA IR CA
SUBJECT: SUBJ: IAEA/BOG: SEEKING AN IRAN RESOLUTION IN
SEPTEMBER

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons
1.4 b,d,h


Summary
--------------


1. (S) Another negative IAEA Director General's report on
Iran, as expected in advance of the September Board, will
strengthen the argument for further censure of Iran for its
failure to cooperate with the ongoing IAEA investigation, in
particular the IAEA effort to pursue evidence of
military/weaponization linkages to Iran's "peaceful" nuclear
program. Beyond soliciting strong Board member statements, a
new Board resolution is well-justified and if successful
could serve as springboard to further UNSC action. In
considering whether to pursue a Board resolution, however, we
must be prepared to countenance possible abstentions by
Russia and China, which would signal an end to P5 1 unity.
Especially if a resolution on Iran proves impossible in light
of Russian resistance, we should seek to use a prospective
Board resolution on Libya to highlight the stark contrast
between the "Libya Model," and Iran's (and Syria's) lack of
cooperation with the IAEA. While using a resolution closing
out the Libyan case as a
vehicle to draw contrasts with Iran would not be a substitute
for an Iran resolution in the longer-term, it would still
move our Iran objectives forward we cannot secure an Iran
resolution at this Board meeting. End summary.

Objectives
--------------


2. (S) The rationale for Board action has not changed since
the March and June Board sessions when we envisaged a
resolution, but will deepen in light of the DG's pending
report detailing Iran's continued stonewalling, which EXPO
Director Cserveny has characterized to us as "negative." A
Board resolution would maintain pressure on Iran and buttress
the Secretariat's investigation, while also reasserting the
Board's ultimate authority over the Iran file. It would
further reinforce Board/UNSC requirements for suspension and
the Additional Protocol and the application of revised Code
3.1 (early declaration of nuclear facilities). Finally,
Board action coming in the wake of the IAEA's August 2007
work plan would make clear again that the ultimate authority
for final disposition of the Iranian case lies with the

Board.


3. (C) This will also be our last opportunity to take
advantage of the most favorable Board membership we have seen
in recent years. As of October, the composition of the Board
will change and include unhelpful members such as Cuba, Egypt
and Malaysia. While the new Board composition is unlikely to
be a key factor in whether or not a resolution can be
adopted, additional abstentions will trend against the
message we seek to send.

No Backtracking This Time
--------------


4. (S) Soundings among the like-minded (EU3, Australia,
Canada, Japan and Italy) confirm low expectations for Iranian
cooperation and continued support in principle for the
objectives of a Board resolution. However, there is also
general agreement that any effort to pursue a Board
resolution must be seen through to its conclusion this time.
France, the UK, Australia and Canada all made the point in
August 29 likeminded deliberations that we should not waste
time, energy and political capital on a Board resolution
unless we are prepared to see the resolution through to
success. There was no indication, however, that the other
like-mindeds were prepared to countenance adopting a
resolution over unbending Russian and Chinese opposition.


5. (S) Even before the Georgian crisis, Russia prevented
consensus on a Chairman's statement at the June Board,
despite the DG's critical May report on Iran. We can now
rule out any possibility of a Chairman's Statement (on which
Russia would wield "veto" power) in lieu of a Board
resolution. In the like-minded meeting, Germany argued that
there would be "no worse outcome" for P5 1 unity than Russia
and China voting against a Board resolution on Iran. While
we do not expect Russia and China to vote against a
resolution, an abstention would similarly imply an end to
P5 1 unity.

The Risks
--------------


6. (S) Our strategy for Vienna must take into account the
longer term implications for the P5 1 as well as the broader
context in New York. A Board resolution could serve as
either a springboard for, or a fallback alternative to, a
UNSCR if P5 1 agreement on a new UNSCR is not practicable. In
considering a Board resolution, however, we will need to
avoid any perception that the issue has "returned" from the
UNSC to the IAEA Board and rather underline the fact that the
Board and UNSC are in lockstep. The timeframe for
considering the Board option is also very constricted.
Mission understands that P5 1 PolDirs may meet on September
18, just days before the September 22-26 Board of Governors
and that Ministers will meet during the UNGA the week of the
Board meeting. If there is any chance for a substantive P5 1
discussion of a resolution text, the EU3 should be prepared
to table a draft Board resolution at the September 18
discussion. Agreement at the Political Director level will
be essential as the Russian and Chinese Missions in Vienna
have demonstrated time and again that they have no margin for
independent action.

7.(S) Perhaps the most compelling reason to seek a Board
resolution is that inaction by the UNSC and the Board plays
into Iran's hands. As viewed from Vienna, Iran is counting
on preventing action on any "track" by both slow rolling the
Solana process and stonewalling the IAEA investigation with
impunity.

Symbolic Contrast with Libya
--------------


8. (S) If, an Iran-specific resolution is not possible,
another option would be to use a Board resolution endorsing
the Secretariat's decision to return routine safeguards
verification in Libya as a vehicle to draw contrasts with
Iran (and Syria). While not a long-term substitute for an
Iran resolution, a Board resolution endorsing the
Secretariat's decision on Libya would set a potential
precedent and server as a reminder of the Board's ultimate
authority-should it choose to exercise it--in "closing out"
cases of noncompliance. Explicit contrasts between Libya's
cooperation and transparency and Iran's stonewalling can be
drawn in national statements. Depending on what the market
will bear, we could also envisage a reference to the Iranian
case in preambular language of a Libya resolution. This
would be a symbolic victory and possibly embarrass Iran, and
at a minimum, the Board would be on record drawing these
contrasts.

PD Plan
--------------


9. (C) The anticipated tough DG report on Iran should serve
as springboard for our Public Diplomacy efforts. We have
already begun with a speech yesterday in Oslo. Target
audiences should include NAM and Board member capitals that
have been less than helpful in previous Board sessions, as
well as incoming Board members such as Egypt and Malaysia.
In addition to briefings in Vienna and suggested demarches in
capitals, Mission will use our public diplomacy outreach to
explain the implications of the DG's report and Iran's
continued stonewalling. We will also background local
international press on September 18. Our PD efforts can also
draw contrasts with Libyan compliance and the benefits such
compliance can accrue. In addition, Mission will be prepared
with a "defensive" PD plan in case deliberations on a Board
resolution or P5 1 disunity on this issue leaks.
SCHULTE