Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA477
2008-08-27 14:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

FOLLOW-UP ON IAEA-NORWAY SAFETY TRAINING PROJECT

Tags:  IAEA MNUC PARM PREL TRGY KNPP UNSC IR NO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0477/01 2401413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271413Z AUG 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8351
INFO RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 0080
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 0093
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0039
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0061
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0061
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 0051
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1311
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000477 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2018
TAGS: IAEA MNUC PARM PREL TRGY KNPP UNSC IR NO
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON IAEA-NORWAY SAFETY TRAINING PROJECT
FOR IRAN'S BUSHEHR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

REF: A) UNVIE 377 B) UNVIE 274 C) STATE 57469 D)
STATE 84938

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoff Pyatt for reasons
1.4(c) and (e)

-----------
Summary
-----------

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000477

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2018
TAGS: IAEA MNUC PARM PREL TRGY KNPP UNSC IR NO
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON IAEA-NORWAY SAFETY TRAINING PROJECT
FOR IRAN'S BUSHEHR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

REF: A) UNVIE 377 B) UNVIE 274 C) STATE 57469 D)
STATE 84938

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoff Pyatt for reasons
1.4(c) and (e)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (U) Mission rep spoke to IAEA and delivered ref D talking
points regarding safety concerns at Iran's Bushehr reactor on
August 13. Norway has agreed to the training plan and IAEA
is moving forward with plans. The IAEA recommends that the
United States demarche Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the
Ukraine, encouraging them to support this project. Iran has
formally asked the IAEA to perform an Integrated Regulatory
Review Service (IRRS) mission, which is scheduled for
November 2009. Iran is also planning to host an
international conference on nuclear development to be held on
November 30, 2008; we will discourage senior-level IAEA
participation. End summary.

--------------
Training plan moving forward
--------------


2. (U) Mission rep delivered to IAEA's Christer Viktorsson
the talking points contained in reftel D. Viktorsson
indicated he was very pleased with U.S. support and that the
project is moving forward. Norway has agreed to the draft
training plan and is asking IAEA to submit the request to the
GON formally. Viktorsson said this would occur in the next
two weeks. Based on Norway's tentative approval, he is
planning another trip to Iran to further discuss the plan,
probably sometime in the next two months.

--------------
CZ says no
--------------


3. (U) So far Viktorsson has approached Finland and the Czech
Republic to assist in the on-the-job portions of the training
program. Finland has agreed. However, the Czech Republic
has declined and stated that it is legally not allowed to
grant Iranians access to Czech nuclear facilities. The
Czechs indicated they would be willing to send instructors or
trainers to Vienna and/or Oslo to support class room
training, however. Viktorsson is concerned that other

countries will respond similarly, thus leaving the IAEA short
of sites at which to implement on-the-job training under the
IAEA plan.

--------------
Encouraging others to support the project
--------------


4. (C) The IAEA has yet to approach formally Hungary,
Bulgaria, Slovakia or the Ukraine. However, these countries
are aware of the program and Viktorsson lobbied for the U.S.
to encourage these countries to support the project.
Viktorsson suggested it would be helpful if the U.S. could
tell these states that the safe operation of nuclear plants
worldwide is important to the United States and therefore the
U.S. supports the IAEA's safety program, including in Iran.
In particular, the U.S. supports the IAEA's program to train
the nuclear regulators in Iran and would not object to these
states participating in a project that will provide much
needed training and support to the Iranian regulatory body;
training that will help improve the safety knowledge of the
regulatory staff. MsnOff told Viktorsson that she would
report his request to Washington.


5. (C) Mission Comment: Mission recognizes there are
additional points the U.S. might want to present should we
agree to signal our support for this safety program. Mission
assumes we would want also to explain our willingness to
support this training despite our paramount desire to isolate
Iran so long as it is not meeting its nonproliferation and
Security Council obligations. For example, in addition to
noting the fact that these safety activities are exempt from
UN Security Council sanctions, U.S. points might also note
that such assistance will tangibly demonstrate that Iran
cannot really have a fully "independent" civil nuclear
program if it wants that program to be safe, as Iran cannot

create the safety/regulatory approach it needs without the
guidance and support of the IAEA and others. Should the
above states choose to help provide safety training, their
participation might provide an opportunity to underline again
to Tehran why it should respond favorably to the P5 1 offer.
Such training would also provide an occassion for EU states
to raise again their desire for Iran to join in the
international nuclear safety convention, a step Iran has
continued to reject. End comment.

--------------
Fellowships
--------------


6. (U) With regard to the fellowships mentioned in the IAEA
training plan, Viktorsson clarified this as a request to
expand a current program. There is an existing TC project to
help the Iranian regulator review the Safety Analysis Report
(SAR) written by the Russian operators. Through this
project, the IAEA is assisting in the review of specific
portions of the report, as well as providing some fellowship
training opportunities to help the Iranians review the SAR in
more detail. There are currently Iranian fellows working
with Bulgaria and Italy. In the proposed Norwegian training
program, the Iranians asked to expand this fellowship program
to allow more people to be trained in safety assessments.

--------------
Regulatory Review
--------------


7. (U) Iran has formally submitted, via e-mail, a request for
IAEA to perform an Integrated Regulatory Review Service
(IRRS) mission in Iran. An IRRS is a peer review mission
focused on the county's regulatory body. It is organized by
the IAEA and consists of a group of approximately 20
high-ranking regulators from around the world. The mission
has two parts. The first part is a self assessment, where
the country itself answers a set of written questions to
determine how well the country meets the IAEA safety
standards. This is followed by the peer review mission
during which the team of 20 experts visits the regulatory
body for approximately two weeks to review the program. The
result is a list of recommendations and areas of improvement.
Iran has asked for the IRRS mission to occur in November

2009. IAEA is setting up an IRRS planning meeting in Iran
set tenatively for November 22-26 2008.

--------------
Conference on Nuclear Development
--------------


8. (C) Viktorsson also stated that Iran is organizing an
international conference on nuclear development which is set
for November 30, 2008, presumably in Tehran. IAEA Deputy
Director General Taniguchi and Deputy Director General
Sokolov were both invited. However, Viktorson indicated that
Director General ElBaradei has told them not to go. DDG
Taniguchi is appealing this decision and, if he cannot
attend, would like one of his staff to attend. Viktorsson
did not have any information about other possible attendees
or topics for discussion at the planned Iranian conference.
Comment: Mission strongly supports the DG's decision against
senior IAEA participation at the Iranian conference and will
monitor Taniguchi's appeal with an eye to minimizing the risk
that the IAEA lend credence to a likely Iranian propaganda
event. End comment.

--------------
Action Request
--------------


9. (U) Request Washington guidance on responding to the
IAEA regarding possible U.S. approaches to the
above-mentioned states to encourage them to take part in the
IAEA-sponsored safety training of Iranians, which ideally
could occur parallel in Vienna and capitals.
PYATT