IAEA/GC: EGYPT AND ISRAEL AT LEAST TALKING ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000460

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA AND IO/T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2018
TAGS: MNUC PARM KNPP IS EG
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: EGYPT AND ISRAEL AT LEAST TALKING ABOUT
MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

REF: REF A) VIENNA 343 B) PAPPAS-DANIEL/VON BEHEREN
EMAIL 7/10

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Israeli and Egyptian Ambassadors made at least a first
attempt to discuss the Egyptian draft Middle East Safeguards
(MES) resolution in bi-lateral consultations in Vienna.
Neither had a "mandate" to negotiate, and they did not get
very far, Israeli Ambassador Michaeli reported to Ambassador
Schulte on August 12. The Egyptians still insist on no
linkage to the Arab League Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC)
resolution. Separately, Israel has consulted with Jordan,
which does not believe the Arab League resolution will
succeed. Israel has also responded to an IAEA request for
comments on the Middle East Forum, stating that its position
is unchanged but Michaeli sees little prospect for the Forum
to serve as a bridge to consensus in the General Conference.
However, Israel is considering breaking ranks with India and
Pakistan and changing its traditional "No" vote to an
abstention on NPT universality language in the omnibus
Safeguards resolution.


2. (C) Incoming GC President, Italian Ambassador Ghisi is
willing to play a mediating role on the MES resolution and
sees a Presidential Statement as the only reasonable outcome
for the INC agenda item. Michaeli has since received a
mandate to negotiate and Ghisi intends to encourage the
Egyptian Ambassador to also seek such a mandate.
Consultations will continue in early September. Separately,
French CDA assured Msnoff of France's position on linkage of
the two Middle East agenda items. France also did not find
the revised Egyptian text to be persuasive or much of a
change from last year. The EU is only beginning
consultations on the Middle East agenda items in the next
week. As the Israeli Ambassador has consistently pointed
out, the EU position will be key and he remains concerned
about "wobbliness" among some Europeans. End Summary.

Courting Egypt
--------------


3. (C) Israeli Ambassador Michaeli updated Ambassador Schulte
August 12 on recent consultations with his Egyptian
counterpart regarding the draft GC Middle East Safeguards
(MES) resolution. Neither Michaeli nor Egyptian Ambassador
Fawzi had a "mandate" to negotiate at that juncture, though
Michaeli has since received such a mandate. Italian
Ambassador Ghisi, the incoming GC President, will also
encourage Fawzi to do the same, which would be a significant
improvement over last year's GC when neither side had such a
mandate. Fawzi and Michaeli agreed to follow up in early
September. Michaeli would also meet with Moroccan Ambassador
Zniber in his national capacity, though not as Dean of the
Arab League to discuss the Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC)
resolution.


4. (C) In their initial consultations, Fawzi continued to
deny any linkage between the Egyptian draft MES resolution
and the Arab League INC resolution while Israel continues to
insist on a package. Nevertheless, Michaeli and Fawzi
engaged informally on the text of the Egyptian draft.
Michaeli outlined three main elements for the GOI, which he
has shared previously with Mission: deletion of para 4 which
"Further calls upon all States in the region, pending the
establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, or to pursue actions that
would undermine the goal of establishing such a zone";
second, restoration of a para on the Middle East peace
process; and lastly, insertion of a reference to "compliance"
with the NPT (Note: Full text of resolution in ref a. End
note.) Speaking in a personal capacity, Fawzi noted that
inclusion of the latter would require the addition of a
reference to the "universality" of the NPT. Fawzi also asked
whether Israel could accept par
a 4 if a reference to the Middle East Peace Process were
added. Israel still took objection to para 4 as "out of
balance" and importing "political" text from the UNGA First
Committee resolution on Middle East Safeguards.

5.(C) Fawzi told Michaeli that Cairo did not believe Israel
wanted consensus, to which Michaeli responded "try us,"
noting that Israel could see consensus on the basis of these
elements or the 2005 text. Fawzi claimed that Egypt had

UNVIE VIEN 00000460 002 OF 004


already intended a change in para 5 as a step toward Israel,
which Michaeli dismissed as insignificant, i.e. change from
"invites" to "further calls upon" the parties to take
confidence building measures aimed at a NWFZ. For his part,
Michaeli saw no hint that Egypt sought consensus at this
point but believed that the Egyptians could change tactics
and be willing to negotiate if they saw the possibility of a
repeat of last years' vote. He doubted Egypt would agree to
return to the 2005 consensus text. The EU position would be
essential, he assessed. Michaeli had also spoken with
Ireland, the only EU member to vote in favor of the Egyptian
resolution in the 2007 GC. Irish Ambassador Cogan noted that
the text was "better" than last year and saw no reason for
Ireland to change
its vote though he listened carefully to Israel's position.

Outreach to Jordan
--------------


6. (C) Michaeli also reported that Amman had asked for
Israel's position on the twin MES and INC resolutions.
Jordan did not believe the Arab League INC resolution would
"fly" but felt compelled to go along out of Arab solidarity.
The Jordanians would like to be helpful but have limited
influence. Israel cited the title as the most problematic
aspect of the Arab League text and provided the non-paper on
Israel's position in para 13 to Amman.


Middle East Forum
--------------


7. (C) Israel had replied to a July letter from the IAEA EXPO
Director soliciting comments on the Middle East Forum.
Although Michaeli admits that the GOI is "lukewarm" about the
Forum, the response states that Israel's position is
unchanged and supports a Forum based on the August 2004 terms
of reference. Fawzi insisted to Michaeli that Egypt wanted
to change the Forum agenda. Israel could be flexible on the
agenda if the terms of reference remained the same, Michaeli
advised. That said, Michaeli discounted all this discussion
of the Forum as a "storm in a glass of water" and believed
that Egypt would ultimately oppose the Forum.

Abstention Possible on NPT
--------------


8. (C) In what may be a significant development, Michaeli
shared that Israel is considering abstaining on the paragraph
vote in the omnibus Safeguards resolution regarding
universality of the NPT. Traditionally, Israel, India and
Pakistan vote against this paragraph in every General
Conference. In part, Israel is considering this step out of
"gratitude" for last year's mass abstention on the Egyptian
MES resolution. On a deeper level, there is some
appreciation in Israel of the utility of the NPT in dealing
with Iran and Syria. Israel would advise India of its
decision in advance. Michaeli believed that Egypt would
again push for Middle East language in the omnibus Safeguards
resolution but was not sure Egypt would call for a vote on
that resolution given that it could not marshal support among
even all the Arab states last year.

GC President
--------------


9. (C) In a separate meeting on August 13 Italian Ambassador
Ghisi, the incoming GC President told Ambassador Schulte that
he expected to start consultations on Middle East GC issues
the first week of September. Ghisi sees Egypt as key and
would encourage them to show flexibility and lead by example.
He is considering presenting Israel and Egypt with a package
of proposed changes to the MES draft resolution backed by an
Italian demarche in capitals. Ghisi shared that his only
guidance from Rome was to seek Middle East peace process
language in the MES resolution and to work closely with other
EU and Western states. Ambassador Schulte advised that it
would be necessary to engage Egyptian FM Aboul Gheit
directly. As to the Israeli Nuclear Capabilities agenda
item, Ghisi believed that the only possible outcome would be
a Presidential Statement to avoid another "extreme" outcome
such as the 2006 no-action motion. Michaeli was also open to
using the "services" of the GC President to negotiate a PRST.
(Comme
nt: To satisfy the Arab group, a PRST would have to include
some "substance" agreeable to Israel. End Comment.)


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EU to Begin Consultations
--------------


10. (C) French CDA Gross advised Msnoff on August 12 that the
EU would only begin consultations on the Middle East GC
agenda items the next week. The EU has not formulated a
position but Gross presumed that the starting point for any
EU position on the Egyptian text would be based on the
coordinated response to Egyptian FM Aboul Gheit's letter last
October, which had taken EU members to task for their massive
abstentions on the MES resolution in the 2007 General
Conference. The EU response had stressed that it was
inappropriate to import UNGA language into a technical forum
such as the IAEA, he recalled.


11. (C) For its part, France stood firm on the linkage
between the MES and INC agenda items. French experts that had
reviewed the revised Egyptian text were not satisfied, and
sought inclusion of language on compliance and a reference to
the Additional Protocol. It was still more or less the same
text as last year, Gross assessed, the only changes being
deletion of references to nuclear weapons states. He was
surprised that the Irish would see that as "progress" as
Michaeli had reported. Gross was already considering
possible tactics. He noted that the UNGA counterpart
resolution on the INC (which the EU supports in the UNGA) is
entitled "The Risk of Proliferation in the Middle East." The
EU could insist on this title, and deletion of references to
Israel in the text, something which the Arab states would
never agree to, so as to pave the way for a PRST. He also
did not rule out an agenda fight in the General Committee,
though he acknowledged this would infuriate the Arab group
which could introduce the
INC resolution under the MES agenda item. (Note: Michaeli had
expressed similar caution about a General Committee agenda
fight which would go to the Plenary for a vote. End note.)


12. (C) Comment: The French position is more reassuring than
Michaeli's informal assessments of EU member positioning.
Michaeli had early on expressed concern about "wobbliness"
among European Missions and divided the EU into two camps -
those that would stand by their abstention last year and
those who might be more receptive to Egypt's "positive step"
in their direction and the Arab League's "flexibility." An
unnamed friendly EU country had cautioned Michaeli that
Israel cannot appear inflexible. End comment.


Israel Non-Paper to Jordan
--------------


13. (C) Begin text of non-paper:

Israel is committed to the vision of the Middle East
developing into a zone free of chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles. Mutual
recognition, diplomatic relations and good neighborliness
should be a first step in this direction to be complimented
by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures.
These steps could eventually lead to a more ambitious goal
such as the establishment of a mutually verifiable Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone.

Israel therefore attaches great importance to a possible
consensus around the concept of a WMD Free Zone in the Middle
East, in the IAEA GC as well as in other multilateral fora.

In a period of regional instability caused by dangerous
developments in the area of nuclear proliferation in our
region, consensus on a Middle East "package" could have a
positive impact. Countries of the region have a
responsibility to do their utmost in this regard.

Consensus in the IAEA GC around the resolution entitled
"Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East" was in
place as part of a Middle East "package" for 14 years until

2006. Consensus was lost when the sponsors of the resolution
decided to introduce new elements into the text of the
resolution while refusing to negotiate.

Israel urges member states directly involved not to further
politicize the General Conference of the IAEA, to reconsider
their position and to reinstate a "package" on the Middle
East.

Elements of such a "package":


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-- Agreement on the text of the resolution titled
"Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East" is to be
negotiated among all directly concerned parties.

-- No resolution which singles out the State of Israel.

The support of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to this
approach would be highly appreciated.




SCHULTE