IAEA/SYRIA: AS KAZAKHS DAWDLE, AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000445

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, IO, SCA, P AND T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL AORC IAEA KZ AF SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: AS KAZAKHS DAWDLE, AFGHANISTAN
ANNOUNCES CANDIDACY FOR MESA BOARD SEAT

REF: UNVIE 385 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) Kazakhstan is still not prepared to challenge Syria's
candidacy for the open MESA seat on the Board of Governors
(2008-2010) absent a "100 percent" guarantee of victory,
Kazakh Ambassador Abdrakhmanov told Ambassador Schulte August

6. He continued to stress Arab support for Syria, despite
assurances from Mission to the contrary. Ambassador Schulte
asked him to keep his options open, but Abdrakhmanov
indicated that Kazakhstan would prefer to wait until next
year to run for the Board. Also on August 6, Afghanistan
formally presented its candidacy for the MESA Seat to the
Indian Chair, who was less than enthusiastic. The Indian
Chair advised that Syria called daily to confirm there was no
other candidate. He also requested that the U.S. not
campaign openly against Syria during MESA deliberations.
India has now called a MESA meeting for August 14 to discuss
the open seat. While Afghanistan may not be an important
nuclear player, it is an alternative to Syria and is excited
about the prospect of serving on the Board. Mission
recommends approaches to sympathetic Arab states and other
MESA group members to exert their influence within MESA to
support Afghanistan and persuade Syria to withdraw.
Department may also wish to consider a call by Undersecretary
Burns to Foreign Secretary Menon to encourage more active
engagement by the Indian Chair, who is clearly reluctant to
play anything but a purely "neutral" role. It would be far
better to settle this matter within MESA rather than the
General Conference, where we already face a politically
charged debate on Middle East safeguards with the Arab
League. Director General ElBaradei downplayed the
significance of Syria serving on the Board and privately
warned Ambassador Schulte that the U.S. would lose a showdown
in the GC on this issue. End Summary and Comment.

Kazakhstan Still Dithering
--------------


2. (C) In an August 6 meeting with Ambassador Schulte Kazakh
Ambassador Abdrakhmanov reiterated essentially the same
stance he had relayed on a prospective Board candidacy in
their July 7 meeting (reftel). Syria was by all accounts not
prepared to withdraw and Kazakhstan would not compete with
Syria absent a "100 percent guarantee" that it would not
suffer an embarrassing defeat. Abdrakhmanov continued to
take for granted solid Arab League support for Syria, though
Ambassador Schulte assured him that this was not the case.
Ambassador Schulte noted that Kazakhstan would be "natural"
for the Board and its candidacy would unnerve Syria; Syria
would only potentially back down if another candidate
presented itself and there was no "loss of face" in doing so.
Sympathetic Arab states could persuade Syria to withdraw in
the face of Kazakh candidacy. There were no guarantees, but
Kazakhstan stood a good chance against Syria, he offered.


3. (C) Abdrakhmanov insisted that Kazakhstan could not risk
its important and sensitive relations with the Arab World and
OIC. He did not believe Kazakhstan had sufficient support in
MESA -- the Indian Chair was neutral; Afghanistan, he
mistakenly claimed, supported Syria; and even among the
Central Asians, Uzbekistan could be a problem. Abdrakhmanov
further cited Syria's engagement in the Euro-Med partnership
and indirect talks with Israel as reasons unnamed others
might not want to brook Syrian isolation by opposing its
Board candidacy. Syria was an important player in the
region, he concluded, and Kazakhstan was not inclined to take
them on.


4. (C) Several times during the discussion, Abdrakhmanov
noted that Kazakhstan would be in a much better starting
position if it were to hold off until next year (Note: Two
MESA Board seats will be vacated in 2009; one of which
Pakistan will undoubtedly seek. End note.) Abdrakhmanov was
discouraging but did not rule out a Kazakh bid this year, if
for example, there was any indication Syria would withdraw.
He noted that there was still time and no formal deadline in
MESA though the Indian Chair would like to conclude this
process. Ambassador Schulte urged Abdrakhmanov to keep his
options open and to talk to the Indian Chair. However,
Indian Chair Ambassador Kumar advised Ambassador Schulte on
August 7 that Abdrakhmanov had told him that Kazakhstan
decided against presenting its candidacy. (Note: The Indians
have also not been enthusiastic about the prospect of a
Kazakh candidacy. Separately, Indian DCM cautioned Acting
Counselor that Arab states could challenge Kazakhstan's bona
fides as a MESA group member. End note).

Afghanistan Throws Its Hat in the Ring
--------------


5. (C) Afghanistan formally submitted to the Indian MESA
Chairman its candidacy for the Board of Governors (2008-2010)
MESA seat sought by Syria on August 6. Afghan CDA Wahid
Manowar advised Ambassador Schulte on August 5 that he had
received instructions to do so after consulting with his
National Security Advisor. Manowar was excited about the
prospect of serving on the Board, which Afghanistan has not
done since 1963-1965. (Note: Afghanistan is not a major
player in the IAEA but participates in an array of national
and regional technical cooperation projects primarily on
human health and development. End note.) Manowar was
optimistic about Afghanistan's support in the MESA group and
planned to approach friendly Arab states including Lebanon,
Qatar and Saudi Arabia. He would also reach out to Central
Asians states and expected that only Pakistan and Iran not to
be supportive. (Note: We have also heard that Japan has
offered to help Afghanistan with its Board duties should it
secure a seat. End note.)


6. (C) Ambassador Schulte observed that the Arab League
decision to back Syria had been taken before Syria's
clandestine nuclear activities had come to light and a number
of Arab states had qualms about Syria's candidacy. He hoped
that they could influence Syria to withdraw now that there
would be an alternative. Ambassador Schulte also hoped that

the issue would be solved within the MESA group, in which the
Indian Chair would play a key role, but left open the
possibility of a GC vote if Syria persisted. Manowar asked
if he should meet with the Syrian Ambassador. Ambassador
Schulte advised that Afghanistan not portray its candidacy as
anti-Syrian but as a matter of equity since Syria had served
on the Board as recently as 2005-2007.

Indians Studiously Neutral
--------------


7. (C) Manowar called Acting Counselor on August 6 to provide
a readout of his meeting with the Indian Chair. He was
disappointed by Kumar's lukewarm reaction to Afghanistan's
candidacy. Kumar cautioned him that Syria was not prepared
to withdraw and had been calling every day to ensure that no
other country had put forward its candidacy. Kumar expected
that the MESA group would be unable to come to consensus and
anticipated a GC vote. Manowar saw Kumar as hiding behind
his mantle of neutrality as MESA Chair, and in that capacity,
not wanting to see the group torn in too many directions.
Manowar was riled by this reaction and affirmed that it was
Afghanistan's sovereign right to put itself forward.


8. (C) Kumar told Ambassador Schulte on August 7 that he
would call a MESA meeting next week (now confirmed for August
14) to discuss the Board seat. Kumar was not pleased that
the Afghan CDA "sprung" the Board candidacy on him while
meeting on other business. He also confirmed that the Syrian
Ambassador was calling every day for a status report. Kumar
asked that as long as the issue was before MESA that the U.S.
not openly campaign against Syria. He sought to maintain his
neutrality as Chair and did not want to seem as beholden to
the U.S. just after Board approval of the India Safeguards
Agreement. Ambassador Schulte noted that the U.S. would not
openly intervene in MESA matters, but urged Kumar to play a
more active role in getting Syria to withdraw and suggested
that he speak to the Saudis. Ambassador Schulte noted that
Kumar, as Chairman, could approach this as an equity issue
giving a MESA country that had not been on the Board for
decades a chance to serve.

DG Unhelpful
--------------

9.(C) Ambassador Schulte also raised Syria's MESA candidacy
in an August 1 meeting with DG ElBaradei. He advised that
having Syria on the Board while under investigation would
undermine the credibility of the IAEA. ElBaradei was
unreceptive and downplayed Syria's influence as one of 35
countries on the Board. He enjoined the U.S. to "forget this
issue" as it would lead to an embarrassing defeat in the
General Conference if we called a vote. ElBaradei agreed
that a country such as Kazakhstan, which had never served on
the Board, would be a better candidate, but rejected
Ambassador Schulte's suggestion that he privately encourage
Syria to step down. He warned that a public U.S. campaign
against Syria's Board candidacy would backfire.
SCHULTE