IAEA/BOARD: PAKISTAN WILL NOT BLOCK INDIA

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000430

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, T, ISN, SCA,
DOE FOR NA-24 - SCHEINMAN; NA-243 GOOREVICH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS: ENRG IAEA KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY ETTC IN PK
SUBJECT: IAEA/BOARD: PAKISTAN WILL NOT BLOCK INDIA
AGREEMENT

REF: UNVIE 425

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: Speaking on instructions, Pakistani
Ambassador Shahbaz advised Ambassador Schulte on July 30 that
Pakistan would not call for a vote or block Board approval of
the India agreement. Ambassador Schulte repeatedly pressed
him to withdraw his letter on the India agreement but Shahbaz
insisted that this was not necessary, "a deal is a deal."
Shahbaz had informed China and the U.S. of Pakistan's
position and planned to advise the Board Chair. Pakistan's
statement to the Board would focus on the issue of the India
safeguards agreement setting a "precedent" (i.e. for
Pakistan) and Ambassador Schulte rebutted his expectation
that the U.S. also could say something to this effect. End
Summary.


2. (S) Pakistani Ambassador Shahbaz advised Ambassador
Schulte on July 30 that he had received instructions to not
call for a vote or block passage of the India safeguards
agreement in the August 1 Board of Governors meeting. He
understood that this had also been conveyed to Washington.
Pakistan would, however make a statement in the Board
conveying its views of the agreement. He was further asked
to relay that there had been no record of any understanding
between former U/S Nicholas Burns and the previous Pakistani
government in any meeting notes. Shahbaz confirmed there was
an understanding now and while "we cannot be expected to sing
Hosanna, we will not block" the India agreement.


3. (S) Thus far, Pakistan had shared its position with only
China and the U.S. but Shahbaz also intended to inform the
Board Chair. Ambassador Schulte asked him to do so promptly,
and to also make Pakistan's position clear to other Board
members in order to end speculation. Shahbaz expected that
word would get out and promised to inform the Board Chair the
same day. Ambassador Schulte repeatedly pressed Shahbaz to
withdraw his letter to Board members, but Shahbaz insisted
that this was not necessary and "would not amount to
anything." He retorted that a "deal was a deal" and asked
whether his word was not good enough? Shabaz further
promised there would be no "mischief."


4. (S) Asked specifically about China's position, Shahbaz
indicated that the Chinese Ambassador was awaiting
instructions but was also not expected to block Board
approval. He anticipated China would be more vocal in the
NSG and wished he could be a "fly on the wall" to hear what
justification the NSG could give for exempting India.
Shahbaz noted that other delegations still have concerns
about the safeguards agreement but would make their own
decisions on how to proceed in the Board; Pakistan denied any
coordination among them. In view of U.S.-Pakistan
understandings, envoys Pakistan had planned to dispatch to
other capitals in advance of the Board had stayed home.


5. (S) Although he did not know the specifics of what had
been agreed with the U.S., Shahbaz expected that Pakistan
would get a deal similar to India. His statement to the
Board would focus on the issue of "precedent" as Pakistan's
intervention at the Secretariat's July 25 technical briefing
had done (reftel). He hoped that the U.S. statement would
include something similar, i.e. that this could also apply to
Pakistan. Ambassador Schulte noted that the agreement was
with India and that the U.S. view of this as an
India-specific arrangement is well known.


6. (S) Shahbaz acknowledged that the Secretariat's briefing
had been helpful and that there would "have been hiccups
without it," though he complained that the Secretariat had
been initially reluctant to provide a briefing. However, he
expressed continued personal concerns about the India
agreement. In response to Ambassador Schulte's observation
that it would be a net benefit to bring India's civil
reactors under safeguards, Shahbaz commented, "Big deal, look
at what remains outside of safeguards" and noted that India
had diverted nuclear material from its civilian to its
military program prior to its 1974 nuclear test.
SCHULTE