IAEA/BOARD: KAZAKHS NERVOUS ABOUT CONTESTING SYRIA

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000385

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/RA, IO/T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL AORC IAEA KZ SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/BOARD: KAZAKHS NERVOUS ABOUT CONTESTING SYRIA
FOR MESA SEAT

REF: UNVIE 314 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L.Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (S) Summary: Kazakh Ambassador Abdrakhmanov expressed
some reluctance in a discussion with Ambassador Schulte on
July 7 to contest the Syrian candidacy for the open MESA seat
at the Board of Governors. He reported that Syria was
adamant about its candidacy, and claimed Arab/MESA support,
including Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon.
Kazakhstan wanted 100 percent assurance of success if it is
to put itself forward as a candidate but would make a final
decision by July 20. Ambassador Schulte encouraged
Kazakhstan to submit its candidacy and call Syria's bluff
even if it came to a GC vote, though convincing Syria to back
down and settling the issue within MESA would be optimal.
Ambassador Schulte agreed to approach Arab counterparts to
underline U.S. opposition to Syria's candidacy. However,
Abdrakhmanov indicated that Kazakhstan did not want direct
U.S. lobbying on its behalf. In follow-up discussions,
Algerian Ambassador advised that the U.S. could influence
Arab states in MESA despite an Arab League decision earlier
in the year to support Syria. When approached on July 7, UAE
and Qatar Ambassadors were non-committal the Kuwaiti
Ambassador was inclined toward Syria. Mission recommends
demarches in key MESA/Arab group capitals to influence Syria
to withdraw or support an alternative. End Summary.


2. (S) Kazakh Ambassador Abdrakhmanov expressed some
reluctance to contest Syria's Board candidacy for the MESA
group in a discussion with Ambassador Schulte on July 7. He
had just returned from consultations in Astana. Abdrakhmanov
related that in a June 25 meeting Syrian Ambassador Khattab
had been adamant about Syria's Board candidacy. Given this,
he feared Kazakhstan was not in a position to fight if Syria
continues to pursue a Board seat. Khattab was surprised by
Kazakhstan's approach, insisted that Syria had put forward
its candidacy first, and would fight for a Board seat. Syria
claimed to have the support of the UAE, Afghanistan, Iraq,
Kuwait, Qatar and Lebanon, as well as that of the Arab
League. Other MESA members were neutral, including MESA
Chair India and Pakistan. Central Asian support was assured
but not sufficient, and the MESA group could be split in two.
Abdrakhmanov also assessed that the final decision may lie
not with the MESA group but with the GC, where a Plenary vote
would require broader support.


3. (S) If Kazakhstan puts its candidacy forward, it wants to
be confident of success, he explained. Abdrakhmanov gave an
informal deadline of July 20 for a decision, stipulating that
a Kazakh candidacy should be announced at least two months
prior to the General Conference. However, Kazakhstan would
not do so unless 100 percent sure of success. He cited
Kazakhstan's positive record of achievement in the nuclear
field, including recent joint ventures with French and
Japanese firms. In light of this record, Kazakhstan "cannot
allow itself to be defeated." Abdrakhmanov also mentioned
that Kazakhstan reserved the option of running for the Board
in 2009-2010, presumably when it would be easier.


4. (S) Abdrakhmanov sought Ambassador Schulte's advice on
tactics, particularly if a message could be sent to Damascus.
Ambassador Schulte agreed that the best outcome would be for
Syria to step aside. If Syria insisted, there would be a
vote in the General Conference. Syria's clandestine nuclear
activities would be an agenda item in the September Board and
the U.S. and others think it would be inappropriate to have a
country under investigation sitting on the Board.
Abdrakhmanov asked about the results of the safeguards
investigation, which Ambassador Schulte noted would take
time. Ambassador Schulte further advised that Syria had to
understand its candidacy would draw more negative attention
while it was under investigation, and that it would lose a GC
vote. He added that Syria could save face, having recently
served on the Board, by stepping aside to give another MESA
group member a chance.


5. (S) Ambassador Schulte encouraged Kazakhstan to soon put
forward its candidacy in MESA and to call Syria's potential
bluff. He offered to assist with individual MESA group
members, and noted that the French EU Presidency and Japan
could also be helpful in this regard. Abdrakhmanov

acknowledged that he could not accept Syrian claims of Arab
support on face value and planned to consult with Algerian
Ambassador Feroukhi (who is expected to become Board Chair)
and the Moroccan Ambassador as chairman of the Arab Group.
However, Abdrakhmanov underlined the fact that Kazakhstan did
not want to appear unduly influenced by external powers (i.e.
the U.S.) and noted unhelpful rumors that the U.S. had
approached two MESA group members to encourage their
candidacy for the Board. Ambassador Schulte agreed that any
approach to MESA and Arab Group members would focus on
Syria's candidacy (rather than U.S. advocacy of Kazakhstan).
Abdrakhmanov still hoped that Syria could be persuaded to
withdraw, and would indicate to Khattab that Kazakhstan was
preparing to put forward its candidacy.


6. (C) In follow-up discussions with Ambassador Schulte on
July 7, MESA/Arab Group Ambassadors were non-committal on
support for Syria. Feroukhi acknowledged U.S. concerns and
said she had tried unsuccessfully to talk Khattab out of
running, but he was adamant. The Kazak Ambassador had also
told her on July 7 that Kazakhstan would present its
candidacy. Feroukhi confirmed to Ambassador Schulte that the
Arab League had endorsed Syria's candidacy earlier in the
year. However, she suggested the U.S. could influence the
positions of MESA countries like UAE, Kuwait and Iraq and
advised resolving this issue within the MESA group rather
than at the GC, where Arab countries would be more likely to
back Syria as a block. In a separate discussion, the
Moroccan Ambassador and current Arab Group Chair denied that
Syria had Arab group support. Ambassador Schulte also spoke
with counterparts from Kuwait, UAE and Qatar on July 7. The
Kuwaiti Ambassador insisted that "nothing was proven" against
Syria and it would be hard to object to Syria's candidacy,
but would report U.S. views to capital. The UAE Ambassador
said he was not aware of his country's support for Syria.
Qatar also would check with capital.


7. (S) Ambassador Schulte subsequently consulted with the
Russian Charge, who agreed that Kazakhstan would be a good
candidate but wanted to keep out of MESA deliberations.


8. (S) Comment: Although there is no formal deadline within
MESA, and the Indian Chair has no immediate plans to call a
meeting, time is not on our side. All other regional groups
have announced their Board candidates, and the longer Syria
remains unopposed, the more entrenched their position.
Kazakhstan is nervous and is consulting with everyone under
the sun, including the Secretariat which counseled them to go
ahead. We will continue to urge Kazakhstan to announce their
candidacy and to advise the Arab Group against blind support
for Syria. We cannot give Kazakhstan 100 percent assurance,
but MESA group members should welcome this alternative.
Mission recommends demarches to MESA group/ Arab capitals to
underline U.S. opposition to Syria's candidacy and to
encourage Damascus to withdraw its MESA candidacy (without
mentioning or advocating the Kazakh alternative.) Convincing
Syria that it is not in its interest to pursue a Board
candidacy would be the best outcome. We can also enlist
like-minded countries, particularly the UK and French EU
Presidency, in this effort. End Comment.
SCHULTE