IAEA: U/S BURNS DISCUSSIONS WITH DG ELBARADEI

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000373

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/RA AND ISN/NESS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2018
TAGS: AORC PARM MNUC TGRY KNPP KN SY IR
SUBJECT: IAEA: U/S BURNS DISCUSSIONS WITH DG ELBARADEI

REF: PAPPAS-VONBEHREN EMAIL 6/19

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (S) Summary: IAEA DG ElBaradei told U/S Burns June 23
that he would encourage Iran to take advantage of the P5 1
offer. ElBaradei focused almost exclusively on the freeze
element of the P5 1 way forward paper, in the hope that it
would help re-start negotiations. U/S Burns cautioned that
the freeze was time limited and tied to suspension.
ElBaradei observed that Iran had been shocked by the May DG
report and said the onus is on Iran to come clean. ElBaradei
was not optimistic about inspector access in Syria and noted
that the IAEA lacked information related to nuclear material.
On DPRK, the DG sought to continue the Agency's verification
role on an ad hoc basis. He also raised Reliable Access to
Nuclear Fuel (RANF) as a priority issue and assessed that
Pakistan was the main hold-out among the G-77. He asked the
U.S. to help move the Russian proposal forward and agreed to
share a non-paper, provided to the EU, on the NTI-IAEA fuel
bank. The DG saw these proposals as complementary, including
the German proposal for a multi-lateral fuel center. End
Summary.

Iran
--------------


2. (S) U/S Burns noted that he was in Vienna to attend the
Nahr al-Barid reconstruction conference. ElBaradei observed
that many Arab countries are sitting on the fence with regard
to pledges to help rebuild the camp, and also in terms of
pressuring Iran. Turning to the P5 1 offer, he assessed it
was a good offer; recalling that he had advocated a freeze
for three years, he was pleased that the P5 1 are now
considering the option. U/S Burns clarified that the concept
of the freeze was time-limited to six weeks and intended to
lead directly to suspension. This point did not resonate
with the DG who considered that the freeze could provide
flexibility and a means for Iran to save face if negotiations
begin. ElBaradei advised that he had told Iran's Ambassador
to UN organizations in Vienna that Iran should accept the
freeze for freeze approach, which he estimated presented few
risks to Iran; he also anticipated relaying this message to
AEOI President Aqazadeh.


3. (S) U/S Burns mentioned that the P5 1 awaited Iran's
response and ElBaradei expressed the view that given the
upcoming domestic elections in the US, Iran may wait out the
Administration which he believed was not a good
idea.ElBaradei was uncertain that sanctions were having a
demonstrable effect in Iran because it was difficult to
attribute Iran's deteriorating economy to either directly to
sanctions or to the regime's economic mismanagement. U/S
Burns complimented ElBaradei on the professionalism of the
last report on Iran. ElBaradei stressed that the ball was in
Iran's court to resolve the outstanding questions, noting
that that the Agency had no hidden agenda. The Secretariat
had given Iran the benefit of the doubt and guided the
process along, he noted, but it was now Iran's turn to move
it forward. Asked whether the report had struck a chord in
Iran, the DG admitted that the Iranians had been a bit
shocked. He had made it clear that Iran cannot expect a
clean bill of health, which the Agency does not give in any
case, and cannot expect to be in the clear.


6. (S) ElBaradei further complained, as he has previously,
that with departure of Larijani from the nuclear file the
Iranian government lacked a focal point on nuclear issues.
He continues to communicate with Aqazadeh, who has direct
contact with Supreme Leader Khamenei, as a channel and
indicated that he would call him to get a better sense of the
Iranian reaction to the P5 1 offer.

Syria
--------------


7. (S) With the IAEA inspection team on the ground in Syria,
ElBaradei was expressed doubts about the inspection team's
access to additional sites beyond Al-Kibar. He fully
expected that they Syrians would continue to claim these were
military installations. The DG also noted that the Agency
was at a disadvantage sinceit lacked information about the
presence of nuclear material at these sites. ElBaradei
wondered whether the Syrian-Israeli talks would change the
dynamic in Damascus and encourage it to be more forthcoming.
He informed the group that had also encouraged UK Foreign
Secretary Miliband to speak to the Syrians on the margins of
an upcoming Euro-Med Ministerial. To get the Syrians to come
clean, he thought it was important to give them some
assurance that they would not be in the doghouse for too
long.

DPRK
--------------


9. (S) ElBaradei noted the recent developments on the
DPRKwhich could have implications for a renewed IAEA role.
He was surprised by the announcement of the public demolition
of the reactor cooling tower later this week The DG confided
that he agreed with the US position on the DPRK's withdrawal
from the NPT> He said that the European stance (i.e. that
DPRK had not withdrawn) as based on a political judgment
rather than legal views. (Comment: This is a welcome change
from the DG's oral remarks to the June Board in which he
asked for clarification of the DPRK's NPT status. End
comment).

Reliable Access
--------------


10. (S) The DG raised Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF)
as an important Agency priority. Without RANF, he feared
that more countries would pursue domestic enrichment. U/S
Burns cited U.S. 123 Agreement with Russia and with Gulf
countries. The DG sought to move the Russian proposal for an
IAEA fuel reserve at Angarsk forward as something "concrete"
on RANF. He believed DFM Kislyak was the sticking point on
this issue and asked the U.S. to intervene. U/S Burns noted
that RosAtom transitions also complicated matters.


11. (C) The DG mentioned that he was speaking to German FM
Steinmeier about the NTI fuel bank. Ambassador Schulte noted
that Berlin may be mistakenly concerned about the impact of
the NTI-IAEA fuel bank on the multilateral German proposal.
He encouraged the Agency to develop a concept for the fuel
bank. ElBaradei observed that all of these proposals were
complementary and the establishment of fuel bank only
addressed the first phase of assured supply. The Secretariat
had presented a non-paper laying out the concept of the NTI
fuel bank to the EU, and at Ambassador Schulte's request,
agreed to share it with the U.S. in strict confidence. The
DG is concerned about media leaks and G-77 reaction if these
proposals are made public.


12. (C) The DG claimed to have given the G-77 a "piece of his
mind" on RANF at a lunch the previous week. He stressed to
the G-77 that no state was being asked to forgo the right to
pursue peaceful nuclear energy and told the group that they
could not sit on the fence. The DG identified Pakistan as
the main hold-out among the G-77. Ambassador Schulte noted
that Pakistan is concerned about multi-lateral enrichment
mechanisms, even though the current proposals only discuss
establishing fuel reserves under Phase 1. EXPO official Rauf
added that even Phase 2 relates to multi-lateralizing
commercial enrichment, not military facilities that are
Pakistan's concern.

India
--------------


13. (C) The DG had nothing new on India. He did not believe
the Indian government was prepared to take on the risks to
advance the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement and
Safeguards agreement forward. The Communists seem to have
dug in their heels and made this a psychological standoff
over ties to the U.S. Rauf noted that the Indian Mission had
called the Secretariat a few days before to ask that they
start preparing paperwork to move forward. He also asked
about the days remaining in the legislative season. U/S
Burns responded that it would be hard but not impossible to
do before Congress recessed.


14. (U) This cable has been cleared by P staff.


SCHULTE