Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA37
2008-01-18 15:56:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: DG TELLS STEINMEIER IRAN NOT READY TO

Tags:  PARM KNPP AORC IAEA IR 
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DE RUEHUNV #0037/01 0181556
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O 181556Z JAN 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7422
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0653
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0576
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0867
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0628
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0717
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1067
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000037 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: PARM KNPP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DG TELLS STEINMEIER IRAN NOT READY TO
ENGAGE P5+1

REF: UNVIE 31 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for
Reasons 1.4 b, d, h

Summary
-------

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000037

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: PARM KNPP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DG TELLS STEINMEIER IRAN NOT READY TO
ENGAGE P5+1

REF: UNVIE 31 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for
Reasons 1.4 b, d, h

Summary
--------------


1. (S) Summary: DG ElBaradei did most of the talking in his
January 17 meeting with German FM Steinmeier and made a hard
sell against passage of a punitive UNSCR, which he argued
would empower hardliners in Iran. Steinmeier pushed back and
also made strong public comments underscoring the
international community's resolve. ElBaradei told the
Germans that his audience with Khamenei was the main
accomplishment of his Tehran trip. He assessed that Iran was
not prepared to consider the P5 1 offer and saw engagement
with the Agency as an alternative. The work plan was "at the
finish line," and the Secretariat is prepared to discuss
weaponization issues. ElBaradei also reiterated his claim
that Iran is willing to widen the scope and raise the level
of trilateral talks on Iraq. The Germans expect that UNSCR
elements will be the first order of business at the Berlin
Ministerial and also anticipate discussion of overall Iran
strategy. End Summary.

Meeting the Supreme Leader
--------------


2. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald provided Ambassador Schulte
a readout of FM Steinmeier's January 17 meeting with DG
ElBaradei. Steinmeier had communicated his expectations to
ElBaradei prior to the DG's Tehran trip and decided to come
to Vienna in advance of the January 22 P5 1 Berlin
Ministerial. In comments to the press before meeting
ElBaradei, Steinmeier underscored the need for Iran to
"resurrect international confidence" and the international
community's resolve to prevent the development of nuclear
weapons technology in the region.


3. (S) During their one-hour meeting, ElBaradei underlined
his dissatisfaction with the current situation, which he
believed was heading in the "wrong direction." He saw his
audience with the Supreme Leader as the main accomplishment
of his trip and the reason for going. The Iranians had
offered the meeting with Khamenei, and ElBaradei could not
refuse. Up until now, he could not be sure that Secretariat

views were transmitted to the Supreme Leader. This was also
the DG's first meeting with Ahmadinejad, who was notably
unlike his public persona, well-prepared, reasonable and
well-behaved.

P5 1 Offer Not Tempting Enough
--------------


4. (S) ElBaradei assessed that the Iranian leadership was not
prepared to "take the hand of the devil" and take advantage
of the P5 1's offer. Iran continues to view suspension with
suspicion and as a codeword for dismantlement. National
pride remains an impediment, and Iran has all but withdrawn
from engagement with the P5 1. The DG admitted, however,
that the Iranians find the offer attractive on its merits,
"an apple in paradise," but are unwilling to partake of the
forbidden fruit. Gottwald did not get the impression that
the DG had made a particularly strong presentation to the
Iranians.


5. (S) According to ElBaradei, Iran viewed engagement with
the Agency as a better alternative and a means to sidestep
the P5 1. At the same time, the Iranians understood that
they needed to address present, not just past, issues with
the IAEA. ElBaradei characterized the work plan as at the
"finish line" with most issues more or less completed. He
was confident the Secretariat had assembled a good dossier on
weaponization issues and would soon endeavor to get answers
from Iran. The DG also recounted his visit to the advanced
centrifuge facility with Safeguards DDG Heinonen (septel).
He reported that Iran was prepared to test prototypes of the
advanced centrifuge at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)
at Natanz sometime in the near future but downplayed the
program as at an early stage of development in a process that
would take two to three years. (Note: More details to follow
in septel). Iran was continuing research but was not close
to the enrichment capacity needed for a bomb, he noted.


UNSCR Will Empower Hardliners
--------------


6. (S) The DG made a strong pitch against seeking a third
Security Council resolution at this juncture. He argued that
hardliners within the Iranian leadership would use it as a
pretext to withdraw any cooperation or make any admissions,
and that passage of a UNSCR would empower them in the run up
to the March parliamentary elections in Iran. Steinmeier
pressed the DG on this point, asking whether just the
opposite could be true, i.e. that failure to pass a
resolution would hand hardliners a victory. ElBaradei
changed his tone saying that if there were a Security Council
resolution, it should stress engagement and return to the
negotiating table, rather than sanctions.


7. (S) Steinmeier also asked the DG's assessment of
trilateral U.S.-Iran-Iraq talks. The DG claimed that Iran
was keen to widen the scope and raise the level of these
talks, and felt it had something to offer, including its
influence over Sadr. ElBaradei observed that countries in
the region were making friendlier noises and were coming to
the realization that they must live with Iran. U.S.
engagement with Iran would also reap regional benefits, he
noted.

Expectations for the Ministerial
--------------


8. (S) The Germans expect that the first order of business at
the Berlin Ministerial will be finalizing UNSC resolution
elements since PolDirs have not come to agreement. Ministers
had also agreed to discuss overall strategy, and Berlin hoped
to jump start the process at this difficult moment.






SCHULTE