Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA343
2008-06-13 08:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/GC: ONE MIDDLE EAST, TWO RESOLUTIONS

Tags:  MNUC PARM AORC KNPP IS EG 
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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0138
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 UNVIE VIENNA 000343 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/RA AND IO/T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018
TAGS: MNUC PARM AORC KNPP IS EG
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: ONE MIDDLE EAST, TWO RESOLUTIONS

REF: UNVIE 232 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for Reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Request for Guidance
--------------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 UNVIE VIENNA 000343

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/RA AND IO/T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018
TAGS: MNUC PARM AORC KNPP IS EG
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: ONE MIDDLE EAST, TWO RESOLUTIONS

REF: UNVIE 232 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for Reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Request for Guidance
--------------


1. (C) Both Egypt and the Arab League have circulated their
respective draft IAEA General Conference resolutions (paras
27-28). The revised Egyptian text purports to be based on
consensus UNGA language and incorporates some of the
French-proposed amendments rejected last year, but is still
not acceptable to Israel in its current form. As predicted,
the Arab League has dropped the reference to the Israeli
Nuclear "Threat" in favor of the "Israeli Nuclear
Capabilities." The Arab Group has gone out of its way to
portray this as a matter-of-fact resolution that does not
condemn Israel. Thus far the U.S., EU and like-minded have
held strong in insisting on one agenda item/one resolution
that does not single out Israel. In an Egyptian hosted lunch
May 31, Egypt found itself isolated as the EU, including GC
President Italy, and other like-minded insisted on linkage
between the Egyptian and Arab League efforts. Finland urged
Egypt to return to its former role in brokering consensus.
Egypt insisted that it was
not "desperate" for consensus, would call a vote if
necessary, and would not be "held hostage" to the Arab League
resolution. Privately, Egyptian DCM admitted to Ambassador
Schulte that Egypt was losing influence over the Arab League
and could not hope to deliver any compromise unless we "offer
them something."


2. (C) The Arab League prefers a softer touch, probably in
the hopes of cleaving off EU support for their "Israeli
Nuclear Capabilities" resolution. In presenting the revised
text to Ambassador Schulte June 4, Arab Group Chair Morocco
insisted that the AL sought to avoid controversy or a vote.
The draft text no longer refers directly to an Israeli
"threat" though it infers as much. Israel assesses that
since the Arab League has taken the lead on this resolution
away from Syria, the tactics have shifted and the AL may be
seeking to recreate the UNGA dynamic where the "Israel
Nuclear Capabilities" resolution is adopted with the U.S. and

Israel isolated in opposition. We have indications that the
Arab League will ask for a new GC agenda item soon.


3. (C) Both Egypt and the Arab League have requested a formal
response to their draft resolutions. Mission requests
guidance on responding to their demarches. We do not yet
need guidance on strategy or tactics. When/if a new
provisional agenda is issued with "Israeli Nuclear
Capabilities" included, we will consult with our
EU/Like-minded colleagues on the possibility of removing it
from the agenda at the Conference. Portraying the Arabs as
uncompromising will help keep the EU and others on our side
as we continue to consult closely with the incoming French EU
Presidency. Ultimately, we must be prepared to play hardball
as well and lay out several options (paras 24-27),including
a General Committee challenge to a second agenda item,
amendments from the floor, and risking an up or down vote.
Mission also cautions, however, that whatever we do on Middle
East issues could affect other U.S. priorities in the General
Conference. End Summary and Request for Guidance.


Egypt Rolls Out Revised Draft
--------------


4. (C) Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi solicited support for a
revised draft GC resolution on Middle East Safeguards (para
28) at an Egyptian-hosted lunch May 30. A unified EU
(represented by Slovenia, UK, Germany, Ireland, Finland,
Italy, Greece) and other like-minded (Norway, New Zealand,
Japan) supported a "holistic" approach to Middle East issues
at the late September General Conference and pressed Egypt to
resume its formerly constructive role to broker a "package"
with the Arab League. Italian Ambassador Ghisi will be
President of the 2008 General Conference. Also among the
invitees were Israel, Russia, Turkey and NPT Prepcom Chair
Ukraine. (Note: According to Israel, Canada, Australia and
The Netherlands were intentionally not invited; the first two
have taken strong principled positions on Middle East GC
issues. France, which led the EU charge in the last GC
against the Egyptian text will preside over the EU in the
next GC, was also absent. End Note.)

UNVIE VIEN 00000343 002 OF 007




5. (C) Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi circulated the revised text
in para 28, which he noted was based on agreed UNGA First
Committee language with some amendments based on last year's
General Conference deliberations. The deletions from last
year may be aimed at placating France, which will hold the EU
Presidency during this GC. The current draft deletes two
references from the 2007 version that had raised French
objections: OP 4 text which called on states in the region to
not "permit the stationing on their territories or on
territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or
nuclear explosive devices" (Fawzy also suggested this was
meant to address Turkish concerns, as a NATO member); and OP
6 text which had urged "the nuclear weapons states and all
other states," (now just "all states") to assist in
establishing and not hinder a NWFZ. The revised Egyptian
text also deletes a paragraph which noted the importance of
bilateral Middle East Peace negotiations and the multilateral
working group on Arms Contro
l and Regional Security, which has not been active for some
time.


6. (C) Ambassador Schulte welcomed Egypt's effort to consult
early and to amend the text but underlined the need to treat
the Middle East as a whole. He reaffirmed that the U.S.
seeks consensus on one Middle East item in the GC and will
not accept a second agenda item singling out Israel while
other countries in the region violate their obligations.
Israeli Ambassador Michaeli agreed that without a "package"
on the Middle East no consensus could be achieved. If the
goal of was to isolate Israel, he argued, "then go ahead
we're used to it." For Israel "compliance" was the real
issue and should be reflected in the preamble. Some of the
amendments were welcome, Michaeli noted, and the text was a
step forward, "but only one step after ten steps backward
last year." Israel could not accept the revised Egyptian
text as written. He further observed that none of the NWFZs
in the world had been established through the Agency but
through direct negotiations; Fawzi challenged Israel to start
them.


8. (C) Separately, Michaeli explained to Ambassador Schulte
on June 10 that the revised Egyptian text deviates from UNGA
language, with OP 4 particularly problematic. (Note: The UNGA
text "invites" rather than "calls upon" states in the region
to develop, test, produce or acquire nuclear weapons. End
note.) Michaeli also noted the change in OP 5 from "invites"
to "further calls upon."

EU/Like-minded: There is Only One Middle East
-------------- -


9. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald agreed with the U.S. on
treating the ME as a whole under one agenda item in the GC,
as "there is only one Middle East." EU President Slovenia
also supported consensus and while the Egyptian amendments
addressed some concerns, the EU supports a single agenda item
on the Middle East. Italy, which will hold the GC
Presidency, sought consensus and to avoid a repeat of last
year. Even Ireland, which had broken EU consensus to vote in
favor of the Egyptian resolution last GC, did not want to
repeat this "traumatic" experience. Ireland hoped there
would be no second resolution and regretted the lack of
coordination with the Arab group.


10. (C) The UK, Norway and New Zealand also supported a
consensus package. The UK argued that it was best to address
the Middle East in a single context, under one GC agenda
item, and noted that language adopted by consensus in one
context (i.e. UNGA) does not necessarily translate to another
context. Norway cautioned that while the Egyptian effort was
a positive step, we could not lose sight of overall picture.
Sweden did not have issues with the Egyptian text but also
did not want "too many resolutions."


11. (C) Picking up on these points, Finland observed that the
EU was unified but there did not seem to a unified Arab
position. Finnish Ambassador Kauppi urged Egypt to resume
the important role it had played prior to 2006 in brokering
consensus. If Egypt wants success on their issue, she
insisted, it must take responsibility on a related GC issue.
She also supported one agenda item and one resolution. The
Agency has a particular value and controversial issues should
be minimized as it was all of our responsibility to keep the
Agency strong, Kaupi concluded. Significantly, Italy (GC

UNVIE VIEN 00000343 003 OF 007


President) endorsed the Finnish position.


12. (C) Russia, Japan and Turkey likewise supported a
consensus approach. (Note: Russia and Japan had voted in
favor of the Egyptian resolution last year, while Turkey
joined the EU in abstaining). Russia said it was willing to
consider any text and Japan expressed strong support for a
NWFZ. Turkey said it would study the text and asked if Egypt
was open to changes. Fawzi noted that this draft text was
based on consensus language and worried about opening it up
to too many changes.


Egypt Isolated
--------------


13. (C) Completely isolated at his own dining room table,
Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi warned that Cairo had wanted
tougher resolution language. He underscored that Egypt was
not "desperate" for consensus and would call a vote if
necessary and put the onus on those who oppose a Middle East
NWFZ to explain their position. The Egyptian effort would
"not be held hostage" to another resolution, he claimed.
Ambassador Schulte noted that everyone at the table wanted
consensus but others, not present, do not and Egypt needed to
help moderate them.


14. (C) Egyptian DCM took note of U.S. and EU positions, and
said he would report "both" back to Cairo. Ambassador
Schulte advised that he had not heard separate US and EU
positions. He expressed hope that the Egyptian mission would
report that the U.S., the EU, Norway, Japan (New Zealand
chimed in as well) all supported a single Middle East agenda
item. After the lunch, the Egyptians reiterated privately
their readiness to call for a vote. The Egyptian DCM also
noted that Egypt was losing influence over the Arab League
and asked that we "give them something"; Egypt could urge the
Arab Group to be more moderate if they knew that a deal would
be accepted. Ambassador Schulte recalled that the Arab group
could have had a deal last year.

Arab Group Rolls Out Its Text
--------------


15. (C) Following up on Ambassador Schulte's meeting with AL
SYG Moussa in April (reftel),Moroccan Ambassador Zniber, the
new Arab Group in Vienna Chair, AL Ambassador Wehbe and the
Saudi Ambassador shared the revised resolution on "Israeli
Nuclear Capabilities" (para 29) with the U.S. on the margins
of Board session June 4. Zniber had been mandated by the AL
to present the text to the U.S., EU, NAM and other regional
groups. In furtherance of the AL Summit and Ministerial
level decisions, Zniber cast this as an effort to deal with
the issue under the NPT umbrella, for the good of the NPT
regime and within the competence of the IAEA General
Conference. He underlined that it was not linked to the
Middle East conflict. The objective, Zniber explained, was
not to create "controversy or confrontation" nor to "blame,
denounce or condemn" Israel but to stick to facts and to call
upon Israel as the unique country in the region that has not
adhered to the NPT. To this end, the word "threat" was
dropped. He also
noted that the Arab Group wanted to avoid a vote. Through
this resolution, the AL hoped to start a "dialogue" with the
aim of convincing Israel to join the NPT. Arab countries
recognized U.S. efforts in the region, and the AL asked that
the U.S. understand their position on this issue.


16. (C) Ambassador Schulte reaffirmed U.S. support for a
Middle East WMD-free zone, universal adherence to the NPT as
well as universalization of the AP and highlighted
"compliance" with the NPT as the major issue facing the
region. He cited German Ambassador Gottwald's statement at
the Egyptian lunch that "there is only one Middle East" and
recounted EU and like-minded support for a single agenda
item. Ambassador Schulte previewed the U.S. statement to the
Board on the Provisional GC Agenda, which at this point
includes only the Middle East Safeguards item. The U.S.
statement supported a holistic and consensus based approach
to the Middle East and opposed a second resolution that
singled out any one country. Doing so, he argued, would
raise questions as to why we were not citing two other
countries in the region that were out of compliance. Nuclear
Counselor further observed that the omnibus GC Safeguards
resolution already calls on all countries to conclude a

UNVIE VIEN 00000343 004 OF 007


Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and, the
refore, to adhere to the NPT.


17. (C) Zniber acknowledged that the AL draft resolution may
be singling it out Israel, "bearing in mind the context," but
continued to deny any linkage to the Middle East conflict.
Ambassador Schulte noted that we share the common aim of a
WMD-free zone but support different tactics; without progress
on Middle East peace, establishment of a WMD-free zone would
be difficult. Furthermore, Iran and Syria's non-compliance
raise two immediate threats that are not addressed by the GC.
As he did later in the Board meeting, Zniber assured that
Syria would cooperate with the upcoming Safeguards visit. If
a GC resolution were presented on Iran, the Arab Group would
study it and would not be opposed in principle. Morocco
believed that Iran must also fully respect its NPT
obligations and answer UNSC and Board requests.


18. (C) Ambassador Schulte urged Zniber to coordinate with
Egypt, which was after all also an Arab Group member. He
welcomed the early dialogue with the Arab Group, and noted
that we were studying the Egyptian draft. The U.S. sees
Middle East issues as a totality, and both efforts must be
dealt with in tandem, he insisted. Wehbe agreed that there
was one Middle East but many questions and asked Ambassador
Schulte to relay final reaction from Washington. Ambassador
Schulte promised to do so and reiterated that the U.S. and EU
support one agenda item and one approach. Ambassador Schulte
also encouraged Zniber to consult with Israel Zniber was open
to dialogue with Israel in a personal capacity, if it would
help, though doing so officially on behalf of the Arab Group
would be difficult. (Note: USDEL passed the text to Israeli
Ambassador after the meeting. End note.)


19. (C) During the June 5 Board session, Algeria and Morocco
responded to the U.S. intervention in support of a single
agenda item on the GC Provisional Agenda. Algeria was open
to consultation and compromise but noted that
"conditionality" would be difficult to accept. Morocco
underlined that substantive discussion of the total
denuclearization of the Middle East would be a priority
objective for the General Conference. Notably, neither
insisted on a second agenda item. (Note: We have indications
that the Arab Group will soon ask for a second agenda item.
End Note). The second resolution could also be considered
under the existing Middle East Safeguards agenda item.


20. (C) Ambassador Schulte met June 11 with last year's GC
President Moin Hamze, who will represent Lebanon at this
year's GC. Noting that he saw no improvement in the
situation in the run-up to this September's BOG and GC, Hamze
confirmed that the Arab League will soon request a separate
agenda item on "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities," and that Egypt
has not accepted the merging of the two resolutions. He
noted also that AL SecGen Moussa will be in Vienna for a
donor conference on Lebanon June 23 and will use the
opportunity to seek meetings on the issue.

Comment / Tactics / Analysis
--------------


21. (C) The "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities" draft resolution
is not as anodyne as the Arab Group/AL would have us believe,
and appears to have been the subject of negotiation with
hard-liners in the group. Wehbe noted that the AL had tried
to take account of U.S. and EU concerns, which "was not easy
to do." It took two months for the AL to circulate the draft
text Moussa had promised in April. Israeli Ambassador
Michaeli agrees that Moussa seems to have taken ownership of
this effort away from Syria.


22. (C) Aside from dropping any reference to the Israeli
nuclear "threat," some of the language has been toughened,
probably to compensate. OP 1 refers to the "threat" posed by
the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
Taken in conjunction with OP 2 calling on Israel to accede to
the NPT, the inference is clear. The language in OP 1 was in
the preamble of last year's text. Other changes include
specific mention of UNSCR 487 in the preamble; OP2 "expresses
concern" rather than "serious concern" and OP3 "Urges" rather
than "Requests" the Director General to work with concerned
states.


23. (C) For the Arab Group, dropping "threat" is a major
concession, in the hopes of wooing the EU, but clearly

UNVIE VIEN 00000343 005 OF 007


doesn't make the resolution any more palatable to Israel.
For the time being, the EU seems to be holding strong,
insisting on one agenda item and not singling out Israel.


24. (C) One way of dealing with the AL resolution could be to
insist on deletion of any reference to Israel. Privately,
Michaeli was open to considering this as a resolution on
nuclear capabilities in the region which could apply to Iran.
Michaeli hoped that the two resolutions could be considered
under the Middle East Safeguards agenda item. Michaeli
assessed that the AL may be seeking to recreate the UNGA
First Committee dynamic whereby the Middle East Safeguards
resolution is adopted by consensus and the "Israeli Nuclear
Capabilities" resolution is voted upon with the U.S. and
Israel isolated in opposition. He attributed this shift to
the AL taking the lead away from Syria and believed the draft
text was "testing the waters."


25. (C) If there is any hope for a consensus "package"
linkage to the Egyptian text remains a key consideration. We
will need to consider what such a package may look like. For
two years now, the Arab Group has rejected the old package
(resolution plus Presidential Statement). Both we and the EU
have signaled clearly that we may challenge a second agenda
item. The success of such a challenge would depend on the
final composition of the General Committee, which includes
the GC Vice-Presidents, yet to be chosen. Even if
successful, the General Committee's recommendation could lead
to a floor fight in the Plenary. Israel is also signaling
that it may introduce floor amendments to both resolutions
which could get majority support, but would effectively
nullify the intent of the resolutions. In order to have any
hope of pushing the Arabs back into compromise, the prospect
of another disastrous (to the Arabs) vote on their issues
must remain real.


26. (C) Ultimately our success in once again defeating the
Arab League initiative will hinge on the EU. While we will
be in good hands under the French Presidency, which can be
expected to take a leadership role, we cannot afford to be
complacent. Michaeli will meet with the French in the near
future and we will also include this issue in our US-EU
Presidency consultations. As EU President, the French may
have to be more even-handed than in their national capacity.

Middle East Safeguards (Egyptian Draft)
--------------


27. (SBU) Begin text of "Application of IAEA safeguards in
the Middle East" draft resolution:

The General Conference,

(a) Recognizing the importance of the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons - both globally and regionally - in enhancing
international peace and security,

(b) Mindful of the usefulness of the Agency's safeguards
system as a reliable means of verification of the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy,

(c) Concerned by the grave consequences, endangering peace
and security, of the presence in the Middle East region of
nuclear activities not wholly devoted to peaceful purposes,

(d) Welcoming the initiatives regarding the establishment of
a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including
nuclear weapons, in the Middle East and earlier initiatives
regarding arms control in the region,

(e) Recognizing that full realization of these objectives
would be promoted by the participation of all States of the
region,

(f) Commending the efforts of the Agency concerning the
application of safeguards in the
Middle East and the positive response of most States in
concluding a full-scope safeguards agreement, and

(g) Recalling its resolution GC(51)/RES/17.


1. Takes note of the Director General's report in document
GC(52)/XX (to be updated);


2. Affirms the urgent need for all States in the Middle East

UNVIE VIEN 00000343 006 OF 007


to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency
safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important
confidence-building measure among all States in the region
and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context
of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- free zone (NWFZ);


3. Calls upon all parties directly concerned to consider
seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required
for the implementation of the proposal to establish a
mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region, and
invites the countries concerned which have not yet done so to
adhere to international non-proliferation regimes, including
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as a
means of complementing participation in a zone free of all
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and of
strengthening peace and security in the region;


4. Further calls upon all States of the region, pending the
establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons (Delete: or permit the
stationing on their territories or on territories under their
control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices),or
to pursue actions that would undermine the goal of
establishing the zone;


5. (Delete: Invites) Further calls upon all States in the
region to take measures, including confidence-building and
verification measures, aimed at establishing a NWFZ in the
Middle East;


6. Urges (Delete: the nuclear weapon States and all other
States) all States to render assistance in the establishment
of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action
that would hinder efforts aiming at its establishment;


7. (Delete para: Takes note of the importance of the
bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the multilateral
working group on Arms Control and Regional Security in
promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East,
including the establishment of a NWFZ;)


8. Requests the Director General to continue consultations
with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early
application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear
activities in the region as relevant to the preparation of
model agreements, as a necessary step towards the
establishment of a NWFZ in the region, referred to in
resolution GC(XXXVll)/RES/627;


9. Calls upon all States in the region to extend their
fullest cooperation to the Director General in the
fulfillment of the tasks entrusted to him in the preceding
paragraph;


10. Calls upon all other States, especially those with a
special responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, to render all assistance to the Director
General by facilitating the implementation of this
resolution; and


11. Requests the Director Genera1 to submit to the Board of
Governors and the General Conference at its fifty-third
(2009) regular session a report on the implementation of this
resolution and to include in the provisional agenda for that
session an item entitled "Application of IAEA safeguards in
the Middle East".

End Text

Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (Arab Group Draft)
-------------- --


28. (SBU) Begin text of Arab League draft resolution on
"Israeli Nuclear Capabilities":

a) Recal1ing the relevant resolutions of the General
Conference and the Presidential Statements endorsed by tile
General Conference on this issue.

b) Recalling also UN Security Council Resolution 487 (1981),
which inter alia, requested Israel to submit all its nuclear
installations to the agency's safeguards system.

(c) Bearing in mind the resolution on the Middle East adopted
by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to

UNVIE VIEN 00000343 007 OF 007


the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
in which the Conference noted with concern the continued
existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in the Middle
East.

d) Recalling the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which welcomed
the fact that all states in Middle East, with the exception
of Israel, are states parties to the NPT, and reaffirmed the
importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and the placement
of all its nuclear facilities under Comprehensive IAEA
Safeguards for realizing the universality of the Treaty in
the Middle East.

(e) Convinced of the significant contribution of the NPT to
Nonproliferation and Disarmament and to regional and
international
peace and security.

f) Recognizing that joining the NPT Treaty and submitting al1
nuclear facilities in the region to the IAEA Comprehensive
Safeguards is a prerequisite for establishing a Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East (NWFZME):


1. Expresses concern about the threat posed by the
proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and
stability of the Middle East,


2. Expresses concern about the Israeli nuclear capabilities,
and calls upon Israel to accede to the NPT and to place all
its nuclear facilities" under Comprehensive IAEA Safeguards.


3. Urges the Director General to work with the concernstates,
in particular States with the special responsibility
regarding nonproliferation as stated in article VI of the NPT
towards achieving that end


4. Decides to remain seized of this matter and requests the
Director General report on the implementation of this
resolution to the Board of Governors and the General
Conference at its fifty-third regular session under an agenda
item entitled "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities".
SCHULTE