IAEA/IRAN: TIME TO KILL THE WORK PLAN?

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000031

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018
TAGS: IAEA KNPP PARM IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: TIME TO KILL THE WORK PLAN?

REF: A) UNVIE 20 B) UNVIE 006 AND PREVIOUS C) LONDON

103

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for
Reasons 1.4 b, d, h


1. (C) Summary: Like-minded Ambassadors and Charges (P3 1,
Australia, Canada, Japan) took stock of the DG's weekend trip
to Tehran and the status of the work plan in a January 15
Australian-hosted meeting. All agreed that the DG had not
made any breakthrough on key issues (disclosure of the past
weapons program, the Additional Protocol and suspension)
despite his one-off visit to the new generation centrifuge
facility (ref a). Given Supreme Leader Khamenei's continued
denial that Iran had a past nuclear weapons program, no one
expected a "confession" from Iran to be forthcoming within
the slippery IAEA-announced deadline of four weeks. Many
continued to complain about ElBaradei's "loose talk" to the
press. Missions also attested to disgruntlement among the
Secretariat staff on the way some work plan issues have been

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closed, and expressed concern that the February DG report
will be even vaguer than the November report. The UK and
Australia noted that too much emphasis had been placed on the
work plan while the French worried that DG could close all
the issues and declare the Iran file "normalized." Missions
raised the possibility of various activities (joint
demarches, coordinated press statements, etc.) to put the DG
on notice that absent a confession and implementation of
confidence-building measures nothing will be normalized.
Most thought that the work plan's usefulness would soon run
out and it may be time to reassert the Board's authority in
March. Depending on the tone of the DG's report and action
in New York, a Board resolution could lay down a marker that
the work plan has failed to restore Board and UNSC confidence
in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.
End Summary.

Whither the Work Plan?
--------------


2. (C) At our suggestion, Australian Ambassador Shannon
called a meeting of like-minded COMs (P3 1, Australia,
Canada, Japan) to take stock of the Iran file and
expectations for the March Board. Shannon had not received a
readout of the DG's Tehran trip, but noted that ElBaradei
seemed to have delivered familiar messages and set another in
a "long string" of work plan deadlines. Australian Msnoff
assessed that despite some limited cooperation on work plan
issues to date, it was clear that Iran was not being
proactive on remaining issues: there was no information
beyond press reports that Iran had provided an explanation of
contamination at the technical university; no access to the
former PHRC director; and there was not yet any substantive
discussion of the weaponization studies. He also reported
that the Iran PIV at Natanz in December resulted in
"unimpressive" enrichment amounts and levels, which the
Secretariat staff now attributes to technical problems rather

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than politically motivated self-restraint on Iran's part.


3. (C) Shannon expressed concern that in the same way that
P1/P2 issues were swept under the carpet, disgruntled
Safeguards staff expected the February report to use even
vaguer language than that deployed in November. Rather than
"consistent" or "not inconsistent," the February DG report
could resort to terms such as "plausible," "probable" or
"likely" in assessing Iran's explanations. German Charge
Kemmerling reported his understanding that Iran had provided
extensive documentation on the contamination issue, which may
give a "consistent" story but cannot be independently
corroborated. He also reported Berlin's understanding that
an IAEA team will go to Iran to discuss remaining issues
January 19.

DG Got Little and Talks Too Much
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Schulte provided a readout of his January
14 telcon with the DG on his Iran trip (ref a). The
Ambassador noted that the DG had not achieved any of the
three goals he had set at the outset: a "confession" of the
past nuclear program; implementation of the AP; and
suspension or a "freeze-for-a freeze" (ref b) and only
secured an apparently one-off visit to the new generation
centrifuge facility. UK Ambassador Smith reported that EXPO
Director Cserveny downplayed the trip's accomplishments as:
"if any, within the limited scope of the work plan." AccessQto the advance

d centrifuge facility indicated a bit more
transparency on Iran's part, according to Cserveny, but there
was no engagement on suspension. Iran was ready to talk but
with no preconditions on suspension or the AP and conditioned
AP implementation on returning the nuclear file from the UNSC
to the IAEA. Iran had made at least a minor concession in
granting access to the advanced centrifuges, Shannon noted,
and true to form, the DG achieved another prolongation of the
process.


5. (C) On next steps, Shannon reported unconfirmed rumors
that the NAM triumvirate would ask for a technical briefing
before the February report, but none of the like-minded COMs
expressed an interest in such a briefing at this point.
Shannon also took issue with the DG's continued "loose
language," noting in particular, misleading statements that
there is no evidence Iran has a nuclear weapons program. He
suggested that like-minded Missions raise this individually
with ElBaradei. (Note: Speaking to "Al-Hayat," ElBaradei
refers to DNI estimates on a timeframe for manufacturing
fissionable material, were Iran to pursue a weapons program.
In the same interview, the DG also cast himself as the
intermediary between the P5 1 and Iran, rather than as
Director General of the IAEA. End note.) Shannon was
pessimistic about the prospects for P5 1 agreement on a UNSCR
before the DG's report, which he cautioned could be a "dud."
Ambassador Schulte confirmed that the goal was to adopt a
UNSCR early in February before the report; it was a priority
for the Security Council to reaffirm its engagement and the
suspension requirement. The Germans also confirmed that FM
Steinmeier would meet with ElBaradei on January 17 in order
to report to his counterparts at the anticipated Berlin
Ministerial next week.

Not Guilty Verdict?
--------------


6. (C) Canadian Ambassador Gervais-Vidricaire queried why
the DG had gone to Tehran in the first place? He could not
hold out any hope on suspension and heard nothing new, so it
was apparent that his sole focus was the work plan, she
surmised. The DG had put his credibility on the line, having
described the work plan as a "final chance" and a "litmus
test," and now faced a critical moment at the March Board.
He needed a conclusion to this, and if the work plan fails,
he's fresh out of ideas. Kemmerling shared this assessment,
noting that it would have been a "miracle" if the DG had made
any headway on suspension. In light of the Supreme Leader's
denial that Iran ever had a nuclear weapons program, he
doubted that lower levels of the Iranian bureaucracy would be
likely to proffer a "confession" under the work plan.


7. (C) Japanese Ambassador Amano agreed that the DG had
failed on all three of his objectives for the trip, and
seemed to place his hopes in a future "confession" within
four weeks. Amano considered the prospect that the DG could
pronounce Iran "confessed to being not guilty" at the
conclusion of the work plan. Ambassador Schulte observed
that the DG must be reminded of our expectations that Iran be
held to a high standard and that his credibility is at stake.
Regarding the key issue of weaponization studies, Iran must
admit and explain the genesis and purpose of the studies;
thus any pronouncement of "not guilty" cannot be adequate, he
opined.

Moving Beyond the Work Plan
--------------


8. (C) Shannon underscored the need to expand the rhetoric
beyond the work plan in order to reassert Chapter VII UNSCRs
and to restore the confidence of the international community
by addressing present, not just past, issues. He argued that
the usefulness of the work plan would soon run out. UK
Ambassador Smith agreed that the Board must re-shift the
focus to the wider context, including suspension and the AP.
He cautioned against loading too much on the work plan as the
"litmus test" given an inherent risk that the DG could
present the work plan as "done." It was not clear whether
the DG would report the same level of dissatisfaction with
Iranian cooperation as in previous reports. Smith recalled
the DG's tone and lack of conviction in his London meetings
last week (ref c); the DG lectured on how the P5 1 had gone
wrong and how we "must be kidding ourselves" on suspension.
Smith also suggested that we could leverage disgruntlement
within the Secretariat and express our unhappiness with
Iran's responses. Shannon suggested that we should encourage
the DG to repeat his admonition that the IAEA's knowledge of
Iran's nuclear program is diminishing.

Reasserting Board Authority
--------------


9. (C) French Charge Gross was even more skeptical of the
Secretariat's intentions. He recalled the P3 1 demarches on

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the DG in August warned that the work plan could not result
in the "normalization" of the Iran file. He saw a failure of
credibility and duplicity on the part of the Secretariat in
the letters sent to Iran after the November Board that so
diverged from the language in the DG report. Gross recounted
that Cserveny had warned him "you cannot challenge what we
say, or you will break the machine." He advised a demarche
in Board member capitals prior to the Board that
"normalization" via the work plan is not acceptable and
asserting the importance of suspension, Code 3.1, the AP and
the nine Board resolutions on Iran. Gross also suggest
coordinating public statements regarding our concerns and
offered to develop language. Smith expressed concern about
NAM activism on the Iran file and pressure for normalization.
UK Msnoff observed Iran could not be considered a "routine"
case because its implementation of Code 3.1. is a clear
breach of its safeguards obligations.


10. (C) Gross suggested that if developments in New York
allow it may be time for a Board resolution. Shannon noted
that "normalization" would mean no more special reports to
the Board and that a resolution should set a requirement for
DG reports. Amano responded that since the Board reported
the Iran file to the UNSC, the DG must report to the Board
and Iran must remain on the agenda so long as it remains
under a UNSCR. He advised that only the UNSC could return
Iran's file to the Board. Absent this, the Board cannot
declare Iran a "routine" matter.


11. (C) Gervais-Vidricaire advised that the Board will need
to pronounce itself on the results of the work plan and she
fully expected a nuanced report. Shannon questioned whether
it was time to pressure the DG to put an end to the work plan
process. DCM recalled that the work plan had been nothing
but trouble since August, buying Iran time, and it may well
be time to put an end to it. Ambassador Schulte agreed that
the Board must reassert its authority over the DG who needs
to be reminded that he represents the Board. He did not rule
out a resolution noting that in March it will be over two
years since the last Board resolution and that the
composition of the Board is more auspicious than in the past.


12. (S) Comment: Very clearly, none of our like minded
friends, not even the Germans, had any expectation that Iran
would comply with the terms on the UNSCRs or the work plan
before the March Board. There was also fear that ElBaradei
will report to the Board that there are no more outstanding
issues with little justification. We and the UK find it hard
to believe he could close the weaponization issues without a
confession, but do not discount it. Counterbalancing
ElBaradei's clear desire to "normalize" the Iranian issue,
his credibility is at stake, and he knows it, particularly if
inspectors are grumbling about his closing issues for
political reasons; therefore, neither can we discount a
statement from him that while the deadlines have not been
met, the work plan remains unfinished and open questions
remain on the list. Given Iranian statements that the new
deadline to finish the work plan is not "four weeks" but "40
days" or "March" sometime, another likely outcome is simply
another new deadline, sometime after the March 3-7 Board.
That would make it extremely difficult to garner broad
support for a BOG resolution declaring the work plan dead.
As further information emerges from the Secretariat on the
handling of the contamination issue and on the Iranian
responses to the weaponization issues, we will firm up our
coordinated activities with this group, while focusing on
steps to keep pressure on the DG, including to comply with
his self-imposed "four-week" deadline.

SCHULTE