IAEA/IRAN: GETTING TO CONSENSUS ON A CHAIRMAN,S

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000309

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/RA, IO/T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018
TAGS: AORC PARM KNPP IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: GETTING TO CONSENSUS ON A CHAIRMAN,S
STATEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons
1.4 b, d, h

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) P5 1 Deputies/Counselors meeting May 29 agreed to seek
instructions on a Canadian draft Chairman's Statement (para
13) by Friday May 30. Russia did not have any readout from
the PolDir phone conference. China said it had instructions
to "explore" the possibility of a Chairman's Statement. The
EU-3 clearly preferred a resolution, which Russia and China
have ruled out, but Germany and France also see value in a
Chairman's Statement. The UK and France insisted that any
statement be "tough" and "substantial." Canada transformed
and updated its draft resolution into a draft Chairman's
Statement for the P5 1's consideration. In presenting the
draft, Canada stressed a balance between a "tough" statement
and something that could command consensus.


2. (C) The Canadian draft is not ideal, and could be
toughened further, but this would come at the expense of
Board consensus. Tactically, however, we can propose
stronger language to thwart efforts to dilute the Statement
further. In negotiating a Chairman's Statement, we would
also need to use the threat of a Board resolution as leverage
to secure consensus. In many ways, a Chairman's Summary is
more difficult to negotiate, given that any one country on
the 35-memebr Board can break consensus. Having P5 1 agreed
language and support from the Board Chair and, if possible,
the DG, would help build consensus. The Board Chair must be
consulted as soon as possible, though he is supportive in
principle. None of the NAM members currently on the Board
are likely to raise a priori objections, but we will need to
enlist support from South Africa, India and Brazil at the
earliest opportunity. South Africa and India's Governors have
both expressed concern to us about the polarizing impact of a
resolution. End Summary and Comment.


EU-3 Could Back a Strong Statement
--------------


3. (C) P5 1 Deputies/Counselors and Canada met informally May
29 on the margins of the Secretariat's technical briefing on
Iran to discuss the possibility of Chairman's Statement at
the June Board. Based on the readout of the May 28 PolDir
call, Nuclear Counselor noted that the U.S. had not
necessarily ruled out a resolution but had agreed to explore
the German proposal of a Chairman's Statement. The objective
would be for the Board to speak with one voice, something it
had not done since referring Iran to the Security Council in
February 2006. He reminded the P5 1 that in accordance with
the Statute, the Board, not just the Secretariat, speaks on
behalf of the Agency. While the Canadian draft resolution
was a bit weak, he said the U.S. was open to a formulation
that would support the Secretariat's efforts.


4. (C) German DCM Kimmerling explained that Germany likewise
preferred a resolution, if it were possible, and underlined
that Board consensus would signal strong support for the
Secretariat's verification efforts. A statement would be
another option to send a common, clear message, he observed.
The Canadian draft was a good starting point in communicating
the fact that outstanding issues had not been resolved, and
urging Iran to clarify these legitimate concerns. Based on
the 2003 precedent of a "Chairman's Conclusion," any
negotiation of a statement must involve the Chairman, he
noted, and the need for Board consensus further limited this
option. Nuclear Counselor reported that the DG had told
Ambassador Schulte that though he was concerned about
divisions on the Board, a unified Board message would help
the Secretariat's efforts.


5. (C) France understood that the suggestion of a Chairman's
Statement was an attempt to address Russia and China's
reservations about a Board resolution. French DCM Gross saw
value in a unified Board message, and agreed that the
Canadian draft resolution could provide the basis for a
statement. Since this would be the first message by the
Board in a long time, he cautioned that it should be a
substantial and updated reflection of the Secretariat's
concerns as expressed in the DG report and technical brief.
UK Msnoff said he could see value in a "tough statement" that
all six of the P5 1 could support and promote on the Board,
but would not accept a Board statement that had been "watered
down to irrelevance" under pressure from the NAM. Msnoff
reported that the NAM is divided, with many members
expressing frustration.

Russia and China Non-Committal

--------------


6. (C) Russian DCM Sergeev said he had not received a readout
of the PolDirs call but had heard broadly that his PolDir
agreed to the concept of sending a supportive "signal" to the
DG. Sergeev did not have instructions to support a
Chairman's Statement and reiterated that Russia was not in
favor of a resolution, which it viewed as counterproductive.
He noted there remained nuances among the P5 1 in their
assessments and approaches, but did not rule out a Chairman's
Statement.


7. (C) China emphasized the need to re-start negotiations
with Iran on the P5 1 package, and noted that anything we did
in the Board should be conducive to a peaceful resolution of
the Iran issue. Chinese DCM Liu had also heard that the
PolDirs touched on the idea of a Chairman's Statement. China
had no formal position but he had instructions to explore
this possibility consistent with PolDir discussions.


8. (C) Nuclear Counselor expressed support for the diplomatic
process and hoped negotiations with Iran would be
constructive. However, he reminded P5 1 counterparts that
our job in Vienna was safeguards and he underlined the need
for the Board to support the Secretariat's verification
process. A Chairman's Statement that was agreeable to the
P5 1 would likely garner broad support on the Board, he
observed. If there were P5 1 unity, he did not expect any a
priori objections from Board members, given that those likely
to object were not currently on the Board.

Canada Presents Draft Statement
--------------


9. (C) Canadian DCM Wood explained that Canada's initiative
on a Board resolution had been intended to be helpful to the
P5 1. In light of the P5 1 PolDir's telcon, Canada turned
its draft resolution into a proposed Chairman's Statement
(full text in para 13). Canada wholly agreed that the
language should be tough but able to achieve consensus, and
wished it could be tougher than the current draft. Para 4 of
the Statement was updated to reflect the strong language of
the DG report on the need for substantive explanations on
information related to "possible military dimensions." Any
reference to "alleged studies" had been dropped. The
bracketed language in Para 6 on Code 3.1 was not in the
initial Canadian draft resolution shared with the P5 1, but
Canada supports its inclusion as the DG report referred to
potential new violations of Code 3.1. (Note: This language
was a U.S. suggestion. End note.)


10. (C) Nuclear Counselor asked P5 1 counterparts to seek
instructions by Friday, May 30 and suggested that Ambassadors
meet that day to allow time to approach the Board Chair and
engage other Board members as soon as possible.

Reaching Out to Other Board Members
--------------


11. (C) During pre-Board consultations with Ambassador
Schulte May 28, Board members, including Italy, Switzerland,
Argentina, India, Brazil, Philippines, Mexico, and Nigeria
agreed that the May 26 DG report was tough on Iran and sought
to support the Director General. Board members were aware of
the prospect of a resolution and asked to be consulted early
to allow time for instructions (Note: This was prior to the
PolDir call the same day. End note). Italy was most
supportive of a resolution while India, Brazil and
Switzerland questioned the utility of pursuing one. However,
much depended on the content; Brazil and India (privately)
could countenance a non-controversial, simple resolution
making the basic point that Iran's nuclear file is not
closed. Separately, even the Egyptian DCM thought that a
Board resolution was unavoidable given the tenor of the DG's
report.


12. (C) Meanwhile, the NAM is divided. We were told that
during NAM Working Group deliberations on May 28, Iran and
Cuba pushed through a weak draft statement over several
objections. India managed to delete a reference to Iran's
"excellent" cooperation but Iran fought back any effort to
refer to the need for "continued" cooperation on the "alleged
studies." South Africa beat back language from Iran
insisting that weaponization is not within the IAEA's
mandate, though the draft statement retains a reference to
the fact that no nuclear material has been detected in this
connection. Singapore had a "swath" of deletions but was
unable to press its case as it lacks a mission in Vienna.
Indian Ambassador Kumar expressed frustration with the NAM to
Ambassador Schulte and gave up on reasoning with them. The

NAM statement will be finalized at a Plenary on June 2 before
the Board. Based on these reports, we expect that national
statements by NAM members to be much stronger. Mission will
continue to work on South Africa, India and Brazil (not a NAM
member),in particular, to build support for a Chairman's
Statement. South African Governor Minty advised us May 29
not to risk a potentially divisive resolution, even as he
endorsed the frank tone of DDG Heinonen's technical brief
(septel).

Canadian Draft Chairman's Statement
--------------


13. (SBU) Begin text of Canadian draft Chairman's Statement:

The Board reaffirms its continuing resolve to support a
diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and
commends, in this context, the diplomatic efforts by China,
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, with the support of the European
Union's High Representative.

The Board welcomes the latest report by the Director General
on the Iranian nuclear issue, contained in GOV/2008/15, and
recalls previous reports by the Director General and
resolutions of the Board, including the resolution adopted on
4 February 2006 (GOV/2006/14). The Board also recalls United
Nations Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006),1737
(2006),1747 (2007),and 1803 (2008).

The Board expresses its appreciation to the Director General
and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial
efforts to implement the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran and

in relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council
resolutions, and acknowledges the progress made in clarifying
many outstanding issues in the context of the work plan
agreed between Iran and the Secretariat in August 2007
(INFCIRC/711);

The Board stresses the need for Iran to provide without
further delay all information, clarifications and access
outlined in GOV/2008/15 and previous reports and resolutions,
including substantive explanations regarding information
related to possible military dimensions which remain a matter
of serious concern. The Board emphasizes that such
cooperation of Iran is critical to the Agency's verification
that Iran's declarations are both complete and correct.

The Board underscores the need for Iran to take the
confidence-building measures required of it by the Board and
Security Council, including the suspension of all uranium
enrichment-related, reprocessing, and heavy water research
reactor-related activities, and calls on Iran to ratify
without delay and implement fully the additional protocol and
to provide the additional transparency and access measures as
requested by the Director General.

(The Board asserts the Agency's continuing right to early
access to design information for new and modified nuclear
facilities, as specified in Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement
and in the Subsidiary Arrangements which were agreed between
Iran and the Agency pursuant to the Board Decision of 1992
contained in GOV/2554/Attachment2/Rev.2.)

The Board requests the Director General to continue to report
on his verification efforts in Iran until such time as the
Board deems that confidence in the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran's nuclear program has been established, and
remains seized of the matter.

End Text.

SCHULTE