IAEA/IRAN: BUSHEHR SAFETY ISSUES; POSSIBLE DELAY

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000274

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2023
TAGS: ENRG KNNP IAEA USOSCE UNVIE RS IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BUSHEHR SAFETY ISSUES; POSSIBLE DELAY
IN STARTUP; NORWAY WANTS TO PROVIDE SAFETY TRAINING

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons
1.4 b and d


1. (U) This cable contains recommendations and guidance
requests. See paras 15 and 16.

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Summary
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2. (S) IAEA safety officials have been reviewing the
Russian-drafted Safety Analysis Report (SAR) on Iran's
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP). Although they are being
very tight-lipped about the results, indications are that the
SAR and potentially the safety of the facility are
problematic. IAEA safety and technical cooperation staff
will continue to work with Iran and Russia on safety issues
and will hold a meeting in Vienna in September. Iran has not
accepted overtures by DDG Safety Taniguichi to join the
Convention on Nuclear Safety. Iran has agreed to a
pre-Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) review before fuel
is loaded in the reactor. Safety officials have stated that
this pre-OSART will not occur until spring of 2009 indicating
fuel will not be loaded this year.


3. (S) Norwegian Security Policy Director Aas told
Ambassador Schulte on May 1 that Norway is developing a
project to train Iranian regulators and BNPP operators in
safety and asked for U.S. views. Mission recommends
supporting Norway's proposal. We also recommend supporting
their efforts by discreetly making our concerns about BNPP
safety known to Russia, Czech Republic, China, and Finland.
End Summary.

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Flawed Safety Analysis
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4. (S) The Bushehr Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was written
by the Russians and has been reviewed and commented on
previously by both IAEA officials and the Iranian nuclear
safety regulator. The Department of Nuclear Safety and
Security (NSS) has been providing the technical experts to
perform the review, while the Department of Technical
Cooperation (TC) is the lead for the assistance project. The
revised SAR is currently being re-reviewed by IAEA officials.
This initial finding is that neither the IAEA nor the
Iranian regulator recommendations were addressed.


5. (S) IAEA safety staff indicated to Msnoff that they were
frustrated with the lack of quality of the report but would
not be specific about their concerns. A meeting is planned
for September, possibly in Vienna, with IAEA, Iran, and
Russia to discuss IAEA's concerns and the next steps.

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No to Convention on Nuclear Safety
--------------


6. (S) Deputy Director General (DDG) Safety Taniguchi had
planned to travel to Iran earlier this year to push Iran to
join the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Convention
stresses the importance of nuclear safety and requires
signatories to come to Vienna every three years to discuss
their safety programs in a peer-review forum. Sources in the
Secretariat say that Iranian officials, although not
objecting out right, are uncomfortable with the push to join
the Convention on the grounds that it is just another
non-proliferation tool. IAEA Director of the Nuclear
Installation Safety, Philippe Jamet, told Msnoff he believes
that Iran is not separating safety from safeguards because
the world is not separating the two and that sanctions are
preventing Iran from getting the safety support it needs
(because it could be misused). (Comment: while UNSCR 1737
exempts safety from sanctions, the IAEA has refused TC
projects related to more general nuclear power programs.)
This makes the Iranians suspicious of any purely safety
centered argument, according to Jamet. The DDG's trip has
been postponed several times and is not currently scheduled.

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Start-up in Summer 09?
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7. (S) Msnoff inquired about the status of possible start-up
date for the BNPP. IAEA officials indicated that Iran was
eager to start-up the facility this summer. However, TC
staff recently visited the facility to outline their concerns
with the SAR and found little progress in the completion of
the facility in the last few months. The pre-OSART mission
which had been scheduled for September has been delayed until
spring 2009. Pre-OSARTs are typically scheduled 3-6 months
before the fuel is to be loaded, indicating that fuel would

not be loaded until summer 2009. One IAEA safety official
believes that even if the facility is not ready to start,
Iran could feel pressure to go ahead and load the fuel;
however, Iran's agreement to a pre-OSART next spring is a
reasonable indication that fuel loading will not happen until
after that point.


8. (S) When asked about the quality of the staff running the
BNPP, the general impression among Nuclear Installation
Safety staff reviewing the SAR is that the Iranian workers
are knowledgeable and understand the concepts. However, they
are disorganized and are heavily reliant on Russian support.
The NSS officials continue to be concerned about the quality
of Iranian staff (at the regulator and at BNPP) and DDG
Taniguchi and several members of his staff stated to Msnoff
that training is the most valuable support that can be
provided.

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Norway Safety Training Project
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9. (S) Kare Aas, Director General for Security Policy at the
Norwegian MFA told Ambassador Schulte May 1 that Norway has
been working on an Iranian safety project with the IAEA.
(Note: Msnoffs discussed this project with NSS staff and
verified the specifics of the proposal.) Norway has been
providing funds to the Department of Safety and Security for
the past several years to support safety projects in various
countries. Norway has now approached the Secretariat to
develop a project for Iran using a Norwegian risk management
company, Det Norske Veritas (DNV),see http://www.dnv.com.
According to Christer Viktorsson from the Division of Nuclear
Installation Safety, DNV has offices all over the world
including Iran. The project would involve IAEA safety staff
working with DNV to train Iranian regulators and BNPP
operators in safety. Viktorsson also indicated that it is
difficult to find experts that are willing to travel to Iran
and this is a way to provide local experts year round.


10. (S) The Norwegian MFA and DNV have put together a
concept for a three-year project. A "fact finding" mission
to Iran organized by the Division of Nuclear Installation
Safety to discuss this project with the Iranians is planned
for late May or early June to determine the areas in which
Iran needs the most assistance and the best scope of the
project. The visit would include IAEA safety staff, and DNV
and Norwegian experts and would be led by Christer Viktorsson
who stated he will also use the opportunity to encourage Iran
to join the CNS since DDG Taniguchi's trips have been
postponed.


11. (S) The Director of Installation Safety, Philippe Jamet,
stated that it is important for the Iranians to receive
training from other regulatory bodies that have experience
with these types of reactors. Therefore, they are also
enlisting the help of the Czech Republic, China and Finland.


12. (S) Aas asked for U.S. comments on this proposed
project. He said Norway is likely to also ask France for
comments. Aas also asked the Ambassador to provide him U.S.
views directly or through Norway's mission here in Vienna.
That said, both Aas and the Nuclear Installation Safety
officials indicated that this is a very sensitive topic. Aas
asked that Mission not discuss the project with other
Vienna-based missions. He also indicated that this is a
safety issue for Norway, not a political one. However, DDG
Taniguchi and his staff have indicated that the U.S. can
help by having discrete discussions with Russia, Czech
Republic, China, Finland and Norway highlighting our concerns
with BNPP safety (without discussing safeguards) and the need
for these countries to work to create a strong safety
regulator, a strong safety culture, and ensure the facility
is safe before it is allowed to operate.


13. (S) Installation Safety informed Msnoff that this
project is not being run by the Technical Cooperation (TC)
Department. Instead, the Norwegians are giving the money
directly to the Department of Safety and Security; therefore,
it is a safety project and not a TC project. (Comment:
considering safety staff's reticence about the review of the
SAR, it is not clear if DDG Taniguchi will inform the Board
of his concerns about safety in Iran.)

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Comment
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14. (S) The Department of Safety and Security is clearly
concerned about the safety of BNPP, and is working with
several countries, including Russia, Czech Republic, Finland
and Norway to find ways to help increase the safety of the
facility and train the regulating and operating staff.

Mission agrees with IAEA safety staff, that it is vitally
important for BNPP to be operated safety because "an accident
anywhere is an accident everywhere." We also understand their
concern that providing information to the U.S., could
politicize the safety work and somehow connected to
non-proliferation concerns. Mission agrees with need to
maintain our distance from the safety aspects of Bushehr in
order to avoid further politicizing the issue. Working
through neutral entities like the IAEA and Norway we can
engage in some delicate diplomacy to prevent a premature
start-up of Bushehr.

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Recommendation and Guidance Requests
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15. (S) Mission recommends that the U.S. support the
Norwegian proposal. Mission requests guidance on
responding to Mr. Aas' request for U.S. views on the
Norwegian project.


16. (S) Mission also recommends that the U.S. discreetly
discuss U.S. safety concerns with the BNPP with Russia, Czech
Republic, China, Finland, and encourage to work with Iran to
improve safety at the reactor. These discussions should not
take place in Vienna.
PYATT