IAEA/IRAN: ACTING U/S ROOD DISCUSSES A POSSIBLE

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000271

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2018
TAGS: PARM AORC KNPP IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: ACTING U/S ROOD DISCUSSES A POSSIBLE
BOARD RESOLUTION WITH P5+1 AMBASSADORS

REF: UNVIE 240 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for
reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------------


1. (S) Over lunch with P5 1 Ambassadors May 6, Acting U/S
Rood pressed for a Board resolution on Iran in June. The
EU-3 agreed that Board and UNSC actions were complimentary
and not mutually exclusive; the UK was particularly
frustrated by the lack of Board action. EU-3 members joined
the Acting Undersecretary in seeking to convince Russia and
China of the value of a Board resolution which would support
DDG Heinonen's investigation and send a strong signal to Iran
to cooperate. Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky saw no need for
such a resolution, pointing out that much progress has been
made and counseling patience. China had no position, though
it shared Russia's view of positive progress on Iran. Russia
insisted that any Board resolution be coordinated at the
Ministerial level as part of the broader P5 1 strategy.
Meanwhile, the French are moving forward with plans to host
P5 1 experts on May 26-27. Rood encouraged this as a means
of demonstrating P5 1 unity in Vienna.


2. (S) It was clear from the P5 1 discussion that Russia (and
probably China) would not contemplate any action in the Board
without explicit instructions. Russia, in particular, does
not see the value of doing much of anything in the Board.
Absent PolDir agreement, prospects of a P5 1-sponsored Board
resolution are slim. We could work with the EU-3 and other
like-minded Missions who may be willing to sponsor a
resolution, but that would be a more difficult course. End
Summary.


A/Undersecretary Rood calls for Board Resolution
-------------- ---


3. (C) P5 1 Ambassadors (China was represented at by DCM
Minister Counselor) exchanged views over lunch with Acting
U/S Rood on a June Board resolution on Iran and discussed a
P5 1 experts meeting in Vienna, now slated for May 26-27.
Rood noted the May 2 Ministerial agreement on an updated P5 1
"package" offer to Iran and underlined ongoing concerns about
the direction of the Iranian nuclear program. He observed
that the NIE had expressed greater confidence than before as
to the existence of a nuclear weapons program until 2003 and
that other countries had also provided information to the
IAEA. These concerns needed to be addressed and accounted
for so that the Secretariat can conduct its verification
work. Along with incentives, the dual track approach
presumed pressure; UNSC sanctions were one means, but the
IAEA also had a central role to play. Just because the issue
was before the UN Security Council, this did not preclude the
Board being seized of the matter, he argued, and asked for
thoughts on a Board resolution in June. Charge added that
the P5 1 should consider how to best use the month before the
upcoming Board to support DDG Heinonen's continuing
investigation.

Germany: Time to Send a Message
--------------


4. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald offered that the Iranians
would "eat their words" concerning "baseless fabrications" if
the DG reported no engagement on their part. The mid-May
timetable for Iran's answers was ambitious and he expected no
breakthroughs. Most likely the DG would report that Iran had
promised answers but that the investigation was not complete,
he said. Germany believed it would thus be useful for the
Board to send a message to the Tehran leadership to cooperate
with the IAEA investigation. Gottwald regretted the built-in
resistance of some groups on the Board to a prospect of a
resolution.

UK: Need to Change the Dynamic
--------------


5. (C) UK Ambassador Smith also shared doubts about Iran
providing answers in May. He noted a broad spectrum of views
on the Board from those who desperately wanted to believe in
progress, to those skeptics who believed progress was
impossible. He was disappointed by the procedural way in
which the Board has been handling the Iran issue. Since his
arrival in Vienna almost a year ago, it seemed to be always
the same story: the DG report would come out a few days
before the Board meeting and there was little time to do
anything beyond national statements. As a result the Board
had not delivered much. He agreed that it was not a choice
between action in either New York or Vienna. Rood concurred
that the Board had devolved into little more than a venue for
the DG to report. There was a basis for agreement, even
among Board members who took a more optimistic view of the
Iran file, he believed, on the value of upholding safeguards
and the AP. Building from this core, the Board should be
poised to play its established role. The Board would not
displace the UNSC or P5 1 but could play a constructive
supplementary role, Rood argued.

Russia: Patience Please
--------------


6. (C) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky took exception to any
argument (though none had been made) that there had not been
positive progress on the Iran file. He said he had also been
in Vienna and had seen remarkable progress on the Iran file.
He maintained that the dual track approach had yielded
results. "Sometimes no action is not bad," he noted,
especially since New York had already taken action. The
Iranians were cooperating, he asserted, and he urged support
and patience for the Iran-IAEA track. Zmeyevsky also
questioned whether Ministers had discussed the prospect of a
Board resolution and insisted on coordination at the
Ministerial level in the context of the broader Iran
strategy. Vienna could not be the spoiler, he reflected, and
we must ensure the Board's contribution had a positive impact
on the general picture. He counseled that Vienna should wait
for the strategic moves on the part of the P5 1 with regard
to the updated package to play out and also noted that Tehran
was preparing its own proposal. He had no information on the
latter proposal but saw it as a good sign that Iran was
prepared to cooperate with the P5 1.

China: IAEA has a technical mandate
--------------


7. (C) Unsurprisingly, Chinese Counselor Liu shared the
Russian view of IAEA-Iran cooperation, noting that all issues
had been resolved with the exception of the "alleged
studies," on which Iran's responses were expected before the
June Board. He stressed the technical mandate of the IAEA
and the fact that the issue was now before the UNSC. China
had no position on how to deal with the Iran file in the June
Board.

France: Progress? What progress?
--------------


8. (C) French Ambassador Deniau countered that the facts on
the ground were not encouraging as Iran continued to add
cascades, develop new generation centrifuges and make rapid
progress in its ballistic missile program. Iran had
addressed next to nothing on weaponization and its
declarations were not sufficient. Deniau enjoined the P5 1
to demonstrate unity including in Vienna. He argued
forcefully that a resolution by the Board as the technical
body in charge of the Iran file would help the broader P5 1
strategy. Charge also pointed out that a Board resolution
would counter Iran's claims that the IAEA had given it a
clean bill of health when several issues were unresolved and
more information from governments is prompting more questions
for Iran. In the wider context, he argued, a strong signal
from the Board to Iran that the Vienna file was not closed
would be useful as the Iranian body politic digests the
updated P5 1 offer.


9. (C) Rood reminded the P5 1 that they should not lose sight
of the fact that Iran remains out of compliance with its
Safeguards agreement and weaponization was of the utmost
concern. The common denominator, Gottwald noted, was that
Board members do not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.
Vienna had a role to play on the technical side in helping to
clean up these issues. He saw a division of labor with New
York that did not preclude a Board resolution. Rood agreed
that unless there was a significant change in the nature of
Iran's cooperation on weaponization, it would be useful for
the Board to weigh in to reinforce the Secretariat's
investigation. The DG has said several times he needs
Iranian cooperation, Rood noted, so the goal is to get Iran
to cooperate and give the Secretariat credible information.
Smith added that Iran must provide more than superficial
cooperation and the next DG report must demonstrate
cooperation in substance not just form. Otherwise, the
Agency could not fulfill its technical mandate, he observed.
Smith reminded the P5 1 that the Board has required such
cooperation and compliance of Iran in the past.

P5 1 Experts Meeting in Vienna
--------------


10. (C) Deniau reported that PolDirs had agreed to the idea
of a French-hosted P5 1 experts meeting in Vienna, and
suggested May 26-27, which would coincide with the expected
release of the DG's report on May 23. (Note: The French
Mission has since sent invitations. End Note.) Rood
observed that expert consultations in Vienna would reinforce
the perception that the P5 1 were working together. Experts
should focus in particular on weaponization, which goes to
the heart of the matter, and support the Secretariat.


11. (C) China flagged practical issues with getting Austrian
visas in time for the meeting. More constructively, Liu
suggested that calling the expert consultations the "Second
Experts Meeting on the Iran Nuclear Issue," following up on a
similar meeting in June 2007, would help Beijing grasp the
format and expectations of the meeting. Deniau clarified
that the purpose of the meeting would be to take stock of
developments since last year. Charge suggested that the
Secretariat could also be brought into the discussion on the
sidelines of the experts' meeting. Deniau further advised
P5 1 counterparts to not discount Iran's technical capacity
and the sense of urgency associated with the Iran file. Rood
agreed that we should not take this for granted and allow
Iran time to master enrichment.

Comment: Prospects for a Resolution
--------------


12. (S) The Russian position has not changed since the P5 1
meeting in Vienna (reftel). Absent agreement at the PolDir
level, we see little prospect for a P5 1-sponsored Board
resolution in June. We also have seen no enthusiasm on the
part of the EU3 to sponsor a resolution on their own.


13. (S) A P5 1 sponsored resolution would have the best
prospect for passage on the Board, and may command consensus.
NAM and Arab resistance could be overcome given the current
composition of the Board, particularly if we can bring South
Africa and the Arab states along. South Africa is the only
NAM standard bearer on the Board and could call for a vote.
South Africa shares our concerns on weaponization (and said
so in the March Board),but in a recent discussion, Governor
Minty was unenthusiastic about a resolution, telling Charge
that calls for cooperation from the likes of South Africa and
Egypt are a better way to maintain pressure on Iran.


14. (S) A non-P5 1-sponsored resolution would clearly have a
tougher road. It could take the form of an EU-3 sponsored
(as in the past) or other like-minded-sponsored resolution,
in the hopes of eventually dragging along Russia and China.
Abstentions by Russia and China, however, would open the
spigot for other Board members to follow suit. If we are
concerned about P5 1 unity, a like-minded country such as
Canada could front a resolution in lieu of the EU-3.
Canadian Ambassador Gervais-Vidricaire is willing to do so,
if the EU-3 raise no objections. Australia would also likely
be disposed to take a leadership role.


20. (S) Absent consensus, a Board resolution would have to
garner a majority of those present and voting (abstentions
don't count) in the 35-member Board to secure passage. Of

course, much will depend on the content of the resolution;
the closer it hews to the DG report and supports the
Secretariat, the more support it will get on the Board. In
the "yes" column, we can count the EU-3 and like-minded and
the EU members/associated states: Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Japan, U.S., UK, Austria, Croatia, Finland, Ireland,
Italy, Lithuania and Albania, totaling 14 votes. Among those
who could be readily persuaded, we would include most of
GRULAC (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Ecuador) along
with Thailand, the Philippines, and less engaged African
states: Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria (assuming they show up for a
vote),for a total of another 10 votes. We could include
Switzerland in this column but they may well abstain. The
hardest sells will be: Russia, China, South Africa, India,
Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and possibly Iraq,
totaling 9 votes. Bolivia must pay arrears to regain its
voting rights and is hardly engaged on the Board.
PYATT