IAEA/IRAN: P5+1 CONSIDER "WHAT NEXT?"

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000185

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018
TAGS: PARM AROC IAEA KNNP IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: P5+1 CONSIDER "WHAT NEXT?"

REF: UNVIE 175

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b,
d and h

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Summary
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1. (C) At a U.S. hosted meeting of P5 1 Ambassadors on March
26, the EU-3 shared their assessments of the March Board and
considered next steps on Iran in the lead up to the June
Board. Ambassador Schulte underlined the need to support the
Secretariat's investigation of past weaponization activities

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and verification of information provided by Iran on "issues
no longer outstanding at this stage" (reftel). France agreed
that this was a "new phase" with the focus now on
weaponization. A less sanguine UK cautioned that there was
significant risk of a stalemate between the Secretariat and
Iran causing several months of drift. Germany stressed the
need for a more coordinated P5 1 approach in Vienna while the
UK and France asked that P5 1 counterparts not rule out a
Board resolution in June. Russia and China had little to
contribute to Vienna P5 1 deliberations but hoped that new
and innovative approaches would emerge from the PolDirs
meeting in Shanghai. In a follow-on discussion, Ambassador
Schulte and French Ambassador Deniau considered ways to keep
the Iran issue at the forefront in Vienna, including the
suggestion of an unclassified briefing on why the information
reported by the IAEA is relevant to nuclear weapons R&D or a
P5 1 technical experts meeting after Shanghai. A U.S.
priority for Shanghai should be agreement on the
unacceptability of Iran's claim that the work plan issues can
be considered "closed." End Summary.

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Looking Ahead to the June Board
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2. (C) Ambassador Schulte invited P5 1 counterparts to take
stock of the March Board outcome on Iran and exchange ideas
on the way forward in the lead up to the June Board. He
noted that PolDirs would next meet on April 16 in Shanghai.
Almost all Board interventions during the March Board, he
observed, urged continued cooperation by Iran in two key
areas, AP implementation and weaponization. Ambassador
Schulte underlined that passage of UNSCR 1803 reinforced the
Board's authority and the role of the IAEA. He also noted
that the DG's 90-day report to the Security Council under
UNSCR 1803 would coincide with the June Board. Over the next
two months, Ambassador Schulte suggested that Board members
focus on providing support to the Secretariat's investigation
of weaponization, verification of Iran's answers on formerly
outstanding issues and implementation of the AP/additional
transparency measures (reftel).


3. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald encouraged the P5 1 to work
together in Vienna toward common objectives. He assessed
that the DG's report to the March Board had been positive and
the Secretariat's technical briefing added important new
elements that need further explanation. Although there
seemed to be momentum on the Iran dossier at the beginning of
the Board meeting, some Board statements, notably that of the
NAM, glossed over the still outstanding issues and declared
the work plan finalized. He emphasized that the P5 1 work
together to promote a realistic and balanced assessment at
the next Board to ensure states do not "fall into this trap."
In contrast to Gottwald's pessimistic view of the NAM
interventions, French Ambassador Deniau was encouraged that
NAM members such as South Africa, Egypt and Iraq cited the
"alleged studies" in their national statements and seemed to
take seriously DDG Heinonen's technical briefing.


4. (C) UK Ambassador Smith opined that the Board needed to
pronounce itself as a whole, and asked that P5 1 counterparts
keep an open mind about a Board resolution in June to clarify
where the Board stands and that Iran's answers have been
"unsatisfactory." Deniau agreed and observed that the next
Board would present a new situation with a fresh report from
the DG and no prospect of UNSC action to complicate debate in
Vienna. He suggested that a Board resolution should be part
of the overall dual-track strategy on Iran.

Risk of Drift in this "New Phase"
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5. (C) Between now and the June Board, however, Smith feared
there was a significant risk that "nothing much would
happen," which could lead to a general perception that no
additional progress could be made on the Iran file. He
warned that the Secretariat had no detailed vision and no
clear plan on next steps regarding outstanding issues. At a
minimum, Board members needed to support the resumption of
the Secretariat's work with Iran. For its part, however,
Iran had not signaled any willingness to re-engage with
Solana and had sent an inflammatory letter to the UNSC
President on UNSCR 1803. P5 1 partners would work on
improving the June 2006 offer in Shanghai but there was no
evidence that Iran was prepared to address that offer.


6. (C) While he acknowledged the risk of "drift," Deniau
seconded the words of an unnamed diplomat (himself),quoted
in the press, following the Secretariat's technical briefing,
that the Iran file had "entered a new phase." The
Secretariat, he noted, had attached enough significance and

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credibility to the information presented on "alleged studies"
to show it to the Board. In entering this "new phase" the
key objective would be to support the Secretariat's
investigation of that issue and verification of other issues.
To counter the perception in parts of the Secretariat that
not much will change, DCM suggested that the P5 1 help shape
expectations for the DG report. DCM noted divisions among
the Secretariat as to how activist it should be and a lack of
clarity on the DG's plans for June.

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Russia and China Want "New Ideas"
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7. (C) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky referred to the dual
track logic of the March 3 P5 1 Ministerial statement, which
acknowledged work plan progress while expressing serious
concern about the "alleged studies." He called for
innovative approaches and fresh ideas, and underlined the
importance of the Solana-Jalili channel as a place where such
ideas could be raised. Zmeyevsky also supported the
continuation of Iran-IAEA discussions, which had produced
results.


8. (C) Chinese Ambassador Tang cited Iran-Agency cooperation
since last August on all outstanding issues except for the
"alleged studies." He unhelpfully noted the DG's opening
remarks to the March Board on the need for "due process" in
verifying the "authenticity" and substance of the "alleged
studies". Tang stressed the need to encourage the
Secretariat and Iran to continue efforts to clarify this

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issue so as to strengthen international confidence. A
long-term comprehensive solution based on the March 3rd
Ministerial statement is needed, Tang said, and he hoped that
the Shanghai meeting would produce new ideas for the
resumption of negotiations.


9. (C) Ambassador Schulte advised against use of the term
"alleged studies," as according to the Secretariat, the
information it has collected comes from multiple sources
including procurement data. He also cited P5 1 Ministers
statements that refer to activities with a "military-nuclear
dimension." Deniau noted, moreover, that Iran has
acknowledged some of the studies while claiming that they
were for non-nuclear purposes.

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Moving Ahead in Vienna
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10. (C) Russia and China had nothing to add on next steps in
Vienna or the role of Vienna in the broader P5 1 strategy.
Gottwald suggested that the P5 1 in Vienna could contribute
new ideas and feed into the overall P5 1 framework. He
encouraged the P5 1 here to move forward in a more
coordinated manner than in the past and consider how we
position ourselves in the June Board. Ambassador Schulte
noted that the P5 1 need a common understanding in the Board
given that UNSCR 1803 reinforces the Board's responsibility.
P5 1 Missions agreed to regroup after the P5 1 PolDirs
meeting in Shanghai. Ambassador Schulte suggested to Tang
that he host the next meeting but Tang preferred that the
EU-3 do so.


11. (S) In a follow-on discussion, Ambassadors Schulte and
Deniau brainstormed on ways to keep the Iran nuclear issue at
the forefront in Vienna. Deniau suggested that PolDirs in
Shanghai consider convening a meeting of P5 1 technical
experts in Vienna to conduct a joint analysis of
weaponization or centrifuge work (the topic was less
important than the optic of a joint approach). He further
suggested intensifying our involvement in verification of
formerly outstanding issues, such as polonium, by feeding the
Secretariat additional information. Deniau liked Ambassador

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Schulte's idea of an unclassified briefing for Board members
on the ABCs of nuclear weapons work as it relates the Iran
file, thus helping to explain why the activities reported by
the Secretariat are relevant to nuclear weapons R&D. Deniau
also proposed that the EU-3 could provide Board members an
assessment of the information presented in the Secretariat's
technical briefing.

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Comment
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12. (S) We share UK Ambassador Smith's concern that little
public and private discussion of Iran in Vienna will mean no
progress on the Iran file by the June Board. That would both
feed the perception that we are at a stalemate and fuel
pressure by ElBaradei and others that the P5 1 -- and
specifically the U.S. -- need to make a concession to revive
negotiations. The IAEA Secretariat, meanwhile, appears
divided between those, like Heinonen, who want to press ahead
on the weaponization investigation, and others who want to
use passage of 1803 as an excuse to slow-roll the Iran
account for the rest of 2008. The perception of a stalemate
would feed into Iran's strategy to delay and divide the
international community and make it more difficult to get
support if we decided to pursue a June Board resolution that
reaffirmed the role of the Board. In the wake of the Majles
elections and Iran's declarations that the work plan is
closed, this drift could also give additional fuel to Iranian
hard-line arguments that non-cooperation and aggressive
diplomacy will be successful on the nuclear issue and thus
make Tehran's cooperation even less likely.


13. (S) The Vienna-based process needs to be better
integrated into the broader P5 1 framework to pressure Iran
to come clean and, if it does not, convince the international
community to take action. While our EU-3 counterparts in
Vienna continue to do their part, Russian and Chinese
counterparts are not engaged on issues such as weaponization
and seemed content to let the Iran discussion rest elsewhere.
During the March IAEA Board, Russia objected to the EU-3
resolution on Iran, in part, because it claimed
disingenuously that a Board resolution had not been discussed
by PolDirs as part of the broader P5 1 framework. To bring
the P5 1 on board, it may help to clarify Vienna's role in
the broader dual-track strategy on Iran, given the role
ascribed to the Board in UNSCR 1803. The French suggestion
of a P5 1 technical experts meeting in Vienna could be a good
first step in this direction.


14. (S) PolDirs could consider setting expectations for the
next DG report to the Security Council and the June Board
that would emphasize Iran's continued and repeated refusal to
address seriously questions on its past weaponization
program. It might also be useful to seek a consensus in
Shanghai on the unacceptability of Iran's claim that the work
plan issues should be considered closed. Given the
possibility -- and perhaps the likelihood -- that Iran will
proffer some cooperation prior to the June Board, we should
encourage the P5 1 to maintain the standard that Iran needs
to explain the weaponization information and pressure the
Secretariat to describe in detail in its next report Iran's

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failure to do so (e.g. how many times the IAEA has asked and
how many times Iran has refused to engage). This could
reduce the weight any "new" Iranian cooperation would have in
the report and keep the focus on Iran's need to answer the
Secretariat's questions as well as reducing the voices

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arguing that Iran has not had enough time to provide answers
(despite the fallacy of this argument). Noting early both
publicly and privately that we expect such "just-in-time"
cooperation, which distracts from the core issues of IAEA
verification, could undercut Iran's ability to exploit any
small steps deployed just before the Board. End Comment.
SCHULTE