Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA154
2008-03-07 07:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN/BOG: CUBA AND IRAN VS. THE REST OF THE

Tags:  KNPP IAEA AORC PARM IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0107
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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000154 

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DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: KNPP IAEA AORC PARM IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN/BOG: CUBA AND IRAN VS. THE REST OF THE
WORLD AT MARCH BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING

REF: REF A) UNVIE 129 B) HALL-NEPHEW UNCLASS EMAIL
MARCH 4 2008

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000154

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DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: KNPP IAEA AORC PARM IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN/BOG: CUBA AND IRAN VS. THE REST OF THE
WORLD AT MARCH BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING

REF: REF A) UNVIE 129 B) HALL-NEPHEW UNCLASS EMAIL
MARCH 4 2008

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The March 5 Board of Governors deliberations on Iran's
nuclear program stepped up pressure on Iran to comply with
UNSC and Board requirements, and to address weaponization
activities cited by the Director General. The DG delivered a
typically balanced opening statement, regretting that Iran
had not suspend its proliferation sensitive activities and
adding that consistent implementation of the AP -- as well as
resolution of concerns associated with "alleged studies" --
is necessary in order for Iran to begin to restore
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature
of Iran's nuclear program. Although Russia and China
rejected a Board resolution, the P5 1 agreed to officially
circulate the March 3 Ministerial statement on the adoption
of UNSCR 1803.


2. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte delivered the U.S. statement in
para 27. The EU-3, EU and other like-minded delegations
(Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Norway, Argentina)
delivered strong statements emphasizing continuing concerns
with Iran's weaponization-related activities and the need for
concrete assurances from the Secretariat on the exclusively
peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. More than 22
Board members cited Iran's failure to abide by UN Security
Council resolutions, and called on Iran to implement the AP.
Eighteen members referenced the adoption of UNSCR 1803 as
evidence of continued international concern over Iran's
nuclear program. Most Board members acknowledged Iran's
progress on the work plan but more than 24 interventions,
including those of Russia, China, South Africa and several
other NAM states, also cited the need for clarification of
Iran's weaponization efforts. Cuba delivered an Iranian
drafted NAM statement which touted completion of the work
plan and return to routine inspections. South Africa in
essence apologized for its vote on UNSCR 1803 while Venezuela

rejected the resolution and Cuba called for return of the
Iran file to Vienna. Several Arab states and Malaysia called
for the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ and for a
"balance" in dealing with Israel.


3. (SBU) Twenty eight of 35 Board members spoke as well as
nine others, including Iran; among the Board, only Nigeria,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Bolivia
declined to give statements. Iran delivered its expected
diatribe against the U.S. and EU-3 and presented a list of
U.S. allegations which turned out to be "baseless." Iran
said the work plan was finished and safeguards now routine.
The Chair's summary reflected all Board member comments. End
Summary.

DG Opening Remarks
--------------


4. (C) In his opening statement, Director General ElBaradei
took pains to make clear that Iran had provided some
cooperation in addressing the issues on the IAEA-Iran work
plan, such that the majority of issues are "no longer
outstanding" and said this was "obviously encouraging."
However, he stressed that there remains one major issue --
that of Iran's past "possible weaponization activities." The
DG also made clear, contrary to Iranian and NAM assertions,
that the Agency has been presenting Iran with information
associated with the "alleged studies" since 2005 and that
Iran had been confronted with some of these documents,
starting in early 2006; some were available as recently as
February 2008. The DG's narrow focus on the more public
elements of the "alleged studies," without citing information
that DDG Heinonen says the IAEA acquired on its own, was
unhelpful, as was his statement that the Agency would
continue to investigate the "authenticity" and substance of
the "alleged studies."


5. (SBU) ElBaradei characterized as "regrettable" the fact

that Iran has not suspended its proliferation-sensitive
nuclear activities, as required by the UN Security Council
and called for in IAEA Board of Governors' resolutions, and
began testing of a new centrifuge design (the IR-2) with
UF-6. Finally, the DG noted that Iran was not yet
implementing the Additional Protocol (AP),and that full and
consistent implementation of the AP -- as well as resolution
of concerns associated with "alleged studies" -- is necessary
in order for Iran to begin to restore international
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's
nuclear program.

Russia and China Kill Board Resolution
--------------


6. (C) The EU-3's efforts to sponsor a draft Board resolution
met with Russian opposition, seconded by China. The EU-3
resolution (ref a) circulated to the other like-minded (U.S.,
Canada, Australia, Japan) on March 3 would have reasserted
Board authority and supported the Secretariat's continued
investigation of weaponization. The self-described "modest"
draft hewed closely to the language of the DG report on
"alleged studies." Speaking under instructions on March 4,
Russian Governor Berdenenkov opposed a Board resolution at
this juncture, arguing that the P5 1 PolDirs package (UNSCR
1803 plus the Ministerial Statement) should be given a chance
to work. China agreed that a Board resolution would be
unnecessarily confrontational. The EU-3 pushed back and left
open the possibility of a Board resolution in June, which the
Russians did not rule out. The P5 1 agreed to circulate the
March 3 Ministerial statement, which includes references to
Board requirements and serious concerns about "alleged
studies," as an information document on the part of P5 1
Governors to the Board.

--------------
EU-3 Pull out All Stops
--------------


7. (C) The strong EU-3 statement was the product of
behind-the-scenes wrangling to get Germany on board. The UK
and France reportedly negotiated over night with Berlin,
until an exasperated UK Ambassador Smith threatened to
deliver the text as a national statement on the part of the
United Kingdom if Germany did not concur. The final EU-3
statement asserted robustly that Iran's record in complying
with UNSC and Board requirements remains "abysmal." The EU-3
affirmed that if Iran's choice remains one of non-cooperation
with the IAEA, they would "remain determined to demonstrate
the costs and consequences of that choice."


8. (SBU) The EU-3 statement struck all the right chords,
underlining that UNSCR 1803 reaffirmed strong support for the
role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and the Secretariat in
clarifying all outstanding issues; noting that the
weaponization material came from a variety of sources, and
that the IAEA has been seeking substantive responses on this
issue for years; asserting the prerogative of the UNSC and
the Board to deem if confidence in the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran's nuclear program has been established;
casting Iran's dismissive responses to the alleged studies as
"wholly unsatisfactory;" and calling on Iran to suspend
nuclear activities as noted in UNSC and Board resolutions,
and implement the AP and Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary
Arrangement. The UK called attention to the use of
"consistent" and "not inconsistent" in the DG's report and
stated that "not inconsistent" also meant that Iran's answers
were "not necessarily implausible but not necessarily the
truth" and that the IAEA needs to continue to verify the
correctness and completeness of all answers provided. It
noted that the EU-3 and China, Russia, and the U.S. has asked
the DG to circulate the March 3 P5 1 Ministerial Statement as
an INFCIRC.


9. (SBU) The EU statement, read by Slovenia, highlighted
concerns with Iran's disregard for the mandatory demands of
the UNSC and IAEA Board of Governors, and called on Iran to
suspend nuclear-related activities, and implement the AP and
all provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. It
welcomed the progress on the work plan issues, but affirmed

the continued need for the IAEA to seek corroboration and
verification of the completeness of Iran's declarations. The
EU remained seriously concerned that despite more than four
years of intense efforts by the IAEA, it still was not in a
position to determine the full nature of Iran's nuclear
program, and the major remaining issue relevant to the nature
of Iran's program was the alleged studies. The EU maintained
this issue was critical to the assessment of a possible
military dimension to Iran's nuclear program and urged Iran
to engage actively with the IAEA with this regard. Both the
EU and EU-3 statements recalled the conclusions adopted by
the European Council in December 2007, whereby the EU
reaffirmed its deep concern at Iran's nuclear program and
underlined that "acquisition by Iran of a nuclear military
capability would be unacceptable."

Russia and China Seek Clarification of Studies
-------------- --------------


10. (SBU) Both Russia and China delivered measured statements
that welcomed progress but noted the remaining issue of the
"studies." Russia cited Iran's intensified cooperation with
the IAEA as exemplified by the beyond AP-like access and the
clarification of almost all outstanding work plan issues.
The statement underlined that the DG's report pointed to a
number of problems, particularly the nature of Iran's nuclear
program given the questions remaining about the alleged
studies. Russia explained that the Secretariat has not yet
undertaken a full-scale investigation of these studies, and
that it should, as the DG stated, continue to clarify the
authenticity of the information to the extent possible as
well as the substantive portions. Russia encouraged Iran to
carry out both IAEA Board of Governors and UNSC resolutions,
suspend enrichment-related activities and implement the AP.
Russia believed that UNSCR 1803 will help promote resolution
of the Iran issue and recalled that the P5 1 Ministerial
Statement showed a readiness of all countries to work with
Iran for political and economic benefits.


11. (SBU) China's statement was stronger in specifically
mentioning that Iran has not yet clarified outstanding
military-related issues. China also noted that Iran has not
suspended enrichment and heavy water-related activities
required by UNSCRs, and is developing new generation
centrifuges. China welcomed the fact that Iran had clarified
a number of outstanding issues and provided additional
information similar to what it had done previously pursuant
to the AP. However, China encouraged Iran to implement fully
the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and
the UNSC, strengthen cooperation with the IAEA, and implement
the AP. The statement noted UNSCR 1803 and the P5 1
Ministerial Statement, which reflected both the concern of
the international community and commitment to a diplomatic
solution.

Like-minded Weigh In
--------------


12. (SBU) Like-minded delegations (Canada, Australia, Japan,
New Zealand and Norway) also gave strong statements, largely
focusing on Iran's failure to make a full disclosure to the
IAEA of its past weaponization-related activities, the need
for suspension, and the importance of Iranian implementation
of the Additional Protocol and all required/requested
transparency measures. Australia's statement was
particularly helpful in underlining that the IAEA had been
confronting Iran with its concerns on weaponization for
years; that the UN Security Council had requested the Agency
to pursue this investigation; and that Iran's failure to
suspend absent any "apparent civilian purpose" further
diminishes international confidence. Australia said it was
"totally unacceptable for Iran to adopt a dismissive attitude
about a matter of such grave concern." Canada observed that
even though many issues have been deemed "no longer
outstanding" by the Secretariat, the Director General's
report stipulates that these issues also have linkages to the
issue of weaponization. To that end, Canada called for a
complete resolution of all the Agency's questions regarding
these possible linkages to verify the nature of Iran's
nuclear program.



13. (SBU) Though not necessarily like-minded, Switzerland's
statement was an improvement over its November Board
performance. Switzerland noted that Iran has not suspended
enrichment and is developing a new generation centrifuges,
and should reinstate AP measures, but did not cite UNSCRs and
Board decisions. The Swiss statement referred to the IAEA's
satisfaction with a substantial portion of the work plan,
though it took longer than expected and Iran's cooperation
was insufficient. Switzerland underlined that the Agency has
yet to receive satisfactory answers on the "alleged studies,"
and called upon Iran to address them as soon as possible.
The Swiss statement observed that the IAEA's use of member
state information should be as transparent as possible, but
also noted that Iran had not replied to information made
available to it since 2005. Concluding that after five
years, "this is a never ending soap opera," Switzerland
called for a diplomatic solution.


GRULAC and Others Also Supportive
--------------


14. (SBU) Argentina, Mexico, and Chile underlined the need
for Iranian compliance with UNSCRs and Board decisions as
well as AP implementation. Argentina was particularly strong
in calling this noncompliance "fundamental" and underscoring
Iran's "duty" to build confidence in light of many years of
undeclared activities. Argentina also called for
clarification of studies on green salt, high explosives
testing and missile reentry vehicles to assess a military
dimension to Iran's program. Notably, Argentina avoided the
term "alleged studies" and took positive note of the
Secretariat's technical briefing. Chile called for Iran's

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cooperation on the "alleged studies" and endorsed the DG's
assertion that the documents be reviewed in detail. While
acknowledging progress on the work plan, Mexico expressed
concern with Iran's ad hoc cooperation and noted that
"sensitive issues" were still outstanding. Mexico urged
further Iran's active cooperation. While not denying NPT
rights, Mexico affirmed states must ensure non-military use
and objectively demonstrate their non-bellicose intent.


15. (SBU) Brazil's statement was weaker than its GRULAC
counterparts. Brazil was more welcoming of the resolution of
outstanding issues, though it still urged Iran to provide
information on the "alleged studies." The statement did not
mention UNSCRs, suspension or the AP but called upon Iran to
provide regular and systematic access to build confidence.
As during the November Board, Ecuador notably diverged from
the NAM and made a measured intervention. Ecuador shared
optimism on work plan progress but urged Iran to address
fundamentally important questions on the military nature of
its nuclear program. Ecuador explicitly thanked DDG Heinonen
for the technical briefing and agreed with the DG that the
Agency must shed light on the authenticity and substance of
"alleged studies." As in November, Ecuador also underscored
compliance with binding UNSCRs as well as Board resolutions.


16. (SBU) Although they associated themselves with the NAM,
Philippines and Thailand called for compliance with UNSCRs
and for Iran to address the "alleged studies," which Thailand
cited as a "matter of serious concern" in the DG's report.
Philippines also thanked DDG Heinonen for the technical
briefing and called for implementation of the AP. However,
Thailand was more tepid in agreeing with the NAM that all
work plan issues were no longer outstanding and hoped that
safeguards could be implemented in a routine manner.

South Africa Complains About UNSCR 1803
--------------


17. (SBU) South Africa also referred to significant progress
on the work plan with the exception of the alleged studies.
South African Governor Minty underscored that it was
"imperative for" Iran to work with the Agency to clarify the
"serious allegations" that remain. South Africa further
expressed concern that the Secretariat was unable to give
assurances as to undeclared nuclear activities. The rest of
South Africa's statement was an apology to the NAM for its

vote on UNSCR 1803, and apparently a reprise of its
explanation of vote in New York. Characterizing 1803 as "a
punitive resolution," Minty underlined reservations that the
Security Council could undermine the IAEA process and had not
postponed the vote to take account of DG's statement to the
Board, arguing that the Security Council should reflect IAEA
developments. Minty said that South Africa only voted in
favor of UNSCR 1803 to preserve the previous decisions of the
Council. South Africa called on Iran to implement the AP but
cautioned that suspension of proliferation sensitive
activities was a confidence building measure, not "a goal in
itself" or a cover for indefinite suspension that would
unravel the NPT. Minty also criticized unnecessary rhetoric
on the part of some Board members that could further inflame
the Middle East and concluded with a plea to "give peace a
chance."


18. (SBU) Indonesia's intervention was much more tepid and
made no mention of its abstention on UNSCR 1803. In line
with other NAM delegations, Indonesia welcomed Iran's
cooperation and the conclusion of all six outstanding issues
but also called for states to support the DG on "remaining
issues."

NAM Seeks to Exonerate Iran
--------------


19. (C) The NAM statement delivered by Cuba was clearly
written by Iran. The Cuban PR began by noting that during
the DG's January trip to Tehran, the Iranian leadership
denied ever having a nuclear weapons program. After
repeating 2006 Havana Summit language, the statement praised
Iran's "proactive cooperation" with the IAEA and noted with
satisfaction the resolution of all six work plan issues ahead
of schedule. The NAM expected safeguards in Iran would be
conducted in a "routine manner." The NAM also criticized the
Secretariat's technical brief emphasizing the work of the

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Board should only be based on "official, credible,
verifiable, factual, and timely information." The only
mention of "alleged studies," inserted at the insistence of
South Africa, is a quote from the DG's report that "the
Agency has not detected use of nuclear material in connection
with the studies or had any credible information in this
regard." Several NAM delegations, including Malaysia, Egypt
and Algeria also cited this quote in their national
statements. During reportedly contentious NAM deliberations
on the statement, South Africa objected to the statement's
inattention to weaponization, while Pakistan and others
sought to exclude this issue.


20. (C) In its national statement, Cuba was even more
laudatory of Iran's cooperation on the work plan and the
"heartening" progress in meeting the international
community's expectations. Cuba called upon the Board to
adopt an unequivocal resolution reverting the Iran issue to
Vienna, and questioned the motivations of those who had
attempted to pursue a Board resolution that would undercut
Iran's cooperation with the Secretariat. Venezuela focused
its ire in rejecting UNSCR 1803, which it dismissed as a
media show and "war mongering," and also called for general
disarmament by nuclear weapons states that are demanding
Iranian compliance.


21. (C) A number of NAM delegations cast doubt on the
"alleged studies" information. Cuba condemned the "boastful
hullabaloo" of some Board members after the Secretariat's
technical briefing and reminded the Board of the spurious
intelligence that had led to the Iraq war. Without citing
the briefing, Malaysia underlined the need for verifiable and
credible information and criticized undue interference with
the work of the Secretariat. Venezuela observed that the
"alleged plans" had not been authenticated by the Board.
Algeria noted that the IAEA had not been authorized to share
"alleged studies" documentation with Iran until the eve of
the Board.


22. (C) Seven NAM Board members, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Pakistan, did not speak. India's
short statement focused on the IAEA's investigation of the AQ
Khan network in providing the U-metal hemispheres document.

India called for further inquiry on the "supply side" of
proliferation, not just the end use of nuclear technology.
The statement made little mention of the Iran issue beyond
welcoming work plan progress and calling on states to abide
by their obligations.


Arab Delegations
--------------


23. (SBU) Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Iraq)
similarly highlighted the resolution of outstanding issues
though Egypt and Iraq urged Iran's continued cooperation in
clarifying the "alleged studies." Iraq's statement was
particularly forward-leaning in exhorting Iran to "respond
positively" to Agency requests and to implement the AP, "in
conformity with resolutions of the Board and international
community." Iraq was also the only Arab delegation to call
for suspension. All the Arab delegations, as well as

Malaysia, made their usual pitch for a Middle East WMD-free
zone. Egypt, Syria and Malaysia drew direct parallels with
the "unbalanced approach" toward Iran versus Israel;
Venezuela also condemned the double standard.

Iran's Rejoinder
--------------


24. (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh began his statement in
a much more calm tone than in his intervention at the
technical briefing, although he became worked up by the end
of the soliloquy. His statement repeated now familiar
Iranian positions since the release of the February Director
General's report, that the DG has declared all work plan
issues resolved, that Iran's cooperation is consistent with
what it had done previously pursuant to the AP, and that the
IAEA's understanding of Iran's program has become "clearer."
He also argued that the "alleged studies" were not part of
the work plan and thus are not an outstanding issue. Iran
said it answered questions on this issue as a sign of good
will and cooperation, but that the IAEA now had its "final
assessment." He also argued that a "certain country" had not
delivered documents until February 15 because that country
was trying to prolong the "process." Soltanieh again called
this "additional material" "new," and noted that it did not
matter anyway since the work plan had already concluded when
this "new" information was made available.


25. (SBU) Several of Soltanieh's arguments were especially
stale, including that the reporting of Iran's file to the
Security Council was politically-motivated, that the IAEA can
certify Iran has not diverted any nuclear material, and that
the EU-3 had failed to fulfill the promise to normalize
Iran's file with the IAEA in exchange for cooperation. A
significant part of the statement mirrored the theme of a
press briefing Soltanieh gave on March 4 (ref b),in which he
listed U.S. statements since 2003 that he qualified as
"allegations" and then pulled quotes from DG reports that
found Iran's explanations "consistent" with their information
-- presumably trying to establish a pattern of "baseless
allegations." (Comment: Soltanieh was quite belligerent
with the journalists in the press briefing, which probably
won him no friends or converts. End Comment.) Although he
did not reiterate the entire list of "allegations," he
mentioned the fabricated "Niger" documents from before the
Iraq War. Soltanieh chose to respond to member-state
comments about Iran's heavy water-related activities by
arguing that Iran had chosen a heavy water reactor because
this type works with natural uranium in contrast to light
water reactors that require at least 20% enriched uranium.
(Comment: This was an odd approach and seems to support the
U.S. argument that Iran does not need an enrichment
capability. End Comment)

Chair's Summary
--------------


26. (C) The Chair took a kitchen sink approach in compiling
member state comments. His overly long summation put NAM
statements on an equal footing with those of the like-minded
on key points of compliance with UNSCR and Board decisions,

and further investigation of "alleged studies." The Chair
even included Minty's comment on suspension not being a goal
in itself, though South Africa was the only country to
express this view. As a result, the Chair's Summary was not
particularly useful or productive. (Note: Full text emailed
to Department and available on govatom website. End note.)


U.S. Statement
--------------


27. (U) Begin text of U.S. statement:

Mr. Chairman,

Two days ago, the United Nations Security Council adopted a
fourth resolution on Iran's nuclear program, the third
imposing Chapter VII sanctions. This was not the action of
one or two countries, as Iranian authorities assert. This
was a resolution adopted by fourteen yes votes and one
abstention. This was action taken by the world's principal
body for maintaining international peace and security.

In Resolution 1803, the Security Council reinforced the
authority of the IAEA and the role of this Board.

-- The resolution reaffirms that Iran shall without further
delay take the steps required by the Board of Governors in
February 2006, steps deemed essential to build confidence in
the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.

-- The resolution underscores the importance of the
Additional Protocol and reiterates Iran's obligation to
implement Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to its
Safeguards Agreement.

-- The resolution emphasizes the need for Iran to answer all
the questions that the IAEA asks so that the Agency, through
implementation of required transparency measures, can verify
correctness and completeness of Iran's declaration.

Mr. Chairman,

Resolution 1803 commends the IAEA for its efforts to resolve
outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear program. The
IAEA Board can join the Security Council in thanking the
Director General and the Secretariat for their professional
investigation and reports. The Director General's latest
report is thorough and instructive. But on the core issue of
whether Iran's program is exclusively peaceful, the report is
quite troubling.

The report describes some progress in clarifying Iran's
declarations. This is encouraging, though the information
provided by Iran is long overdue and still to be verified.
It is hard to be fully assured when some of the information
provided by Iran is merely "not inconsistent with the data
currently available to the Agency."

While Dr. ElBaradei has declared some issues "no longer
outstanding at this stage," he has also reported that one
major issue remains outstanding: indications that Iran has
engaged in weapons-related activities. It is not surprising
that Iranian authorities pushed this issue to the end of the
work plan. It is not surprising that Iranian authorities now
try to claim that this issue is not even part of the work
plan.

It is not surprising because the information gathered by the
Agency suggests the existence, not long ago, of a significant
state-sponsored effort to develop nuclear weapons. This is
an effort that would have further violated Iran's treaty
obligations. This is an effort that Agency inspectors must
fully verify has halted. This is an effort that Iran's
leaders could choose to restart at any moment -- or hold in
abeyance until their uranium enrichment capabilities are
sufficiently advanced.

Mr. Chairman,

In January 2006, the Deputy Director General first told us of
the Secretariat's concerns about Iranian activities with a
"military nuclear dimension." In the Director General's
latest report and last week's supporting technical briefing,
the IAEA's very competent inspectors presented a troubling
mosaic of weapon-related activities. These involve:

-- flow sheets for a uranium conversion process different
from Iran's declared activities;

-- a document, whose origins are yet to be fully explained,
describing the procedures for casting and machining of
uranium metal into hemispheres;

-- testing of high voltage detonator firing equipment;

-- development of an exploding bridgewire detonator and the
capability to fire multiple detonators simultaneously;

-- procurement of spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron
sources, special steel parts, and radiation measurement
equipment;

-- training courses on neutron calculations, the effect of
shock waves on metal, enrichment/isotope separation, and
ballistic missiles;

-- schematics describing a Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle
modified in a way that, in the judgment of the Agency, is
"quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device;" and

-- an explosive testing arrangement involving a 400-meter
shaft and a firing capability 10 kilometers away.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am not an engineer. But I suspect that
technicians don't need to shelter themselves ten kilometers
away to test conventional weapons . . . or automotive air
bags. Instead, as the Director General reports, these
various activities are "relevant to nuclear weapon research
and development" and uranium metal hemispheres are
"components of nuclear weapons."

The overall effort described by the Secretariat -- involving
personnel and institutes throughout Iran -- strongly suggests
an organized program conducted at the direction of Iran's
leadership. This is consistent with our own National
Intelligence Estimate, in which the U.S. Intelligence
Community judged with high confidence that Iran was until
late 2003 pursuing covert weapons-related activities
including weapon design, weaponization, and secret uranium
conversion and enrichment. Iran's refusal to disclose these
activities is also consistent with the NIE's conclusion that,
at a minimum, Iran is keeping open the option of developing a
nuclear weapon.

Iran has dismissed much of this information as "baseless
allegations" since the Agency first confronted Iran in
December 2005. In some cases, as we were briefed, Iran
admitted the activities, claiming that they were for
non-nuclear purposes, but then refused to let the Secretariat
verify these claims.

At last week's technical briefing, the Deputy Director
General for Safeguards carefully explained how the
information had been assembled over a period of years from
multiple member states and the Agency's own investigation.
He carefully explained the administrative connections between
the activities and the possible nexus to nuclear material.
His elaboration on the details provided in the Director
General's report graphically illustrates why the Board cannot
accept Iran's claim of "baseless allegations" as Iran's final
answer.

The Deputy Director General for Safeguards was very careful
not to draw conclusions on the basis of this information.
However, he made two important points. First, the
Secretariat was NOT prepared to conclude that these were

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"baseless allegations." Second, the Secretariat cannot make
progress in verifying the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
activities until Iran clarifies these indications of

weapons-related work.

The IAEA's investigations must continue. The IAEA needs to
understand Iran's past weapons-related work to have
confidence in verifying its current declarations. And, the
IAEA needs to understand Iran's past weapons-related work so
it can better detect - and thereby, we hope, deter - a
resumption of those activities.

Mr. Chairman,

We all want to see progress. Unfortunately, the main
progress reported by Dr. ElBaradei relates to Iran's uranium
enrichment program. Suspension of these activities, as well
as work on a heavy water reactor, is a legally binding
requirement of the UN Security Council, reaffirmed on Monday
by Resolution 1803. And, as we know, producing fissile
material -- whether highly enriched uranium or weapons-usable
plutonium -- is the most difficult and time-consuming aspect
of a nuclear weapons program. Iran's continued operation of
existing centrifuges and its development and testing of
advanced centrifuges constitute a continuing and deepening
violation of UN Security Council resolutions and the calls of
this Board.

These violations are yet another reason for international
mistrust in the nature of Iran's nuclear activities and the
intentions of its leadership, particularly since there is no
technical need for Iran to have an enrichment capability -
or, for that matter, a heavy water reactor - in order to
enjoy the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran's
insistence on developing an enrichment capability and
building a heavy water reactor, despite any obvious civil
requirement, is particularly worrisome combined with
indications of past weapons-related work.

Mr. Chairman,

In September 2005, this Board found Iran in noncompliance
with its safeguards obligations under the Nonproliferation
Treaty. In February 2006, the Board reported Iran to the
Security Council, first for its noncompliance, and second,
because the absence of confidence about the nature of Iran's
nuclear program gave rise to questions within the competence
of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main
responsibility for maintenance of international peace and
security.

Despite some progress in clarifying outstanding issues, the
troubling questions that remain about weapons-related work --
combined with Iran's failure to take confidence-building
measures required by the Board and Security Council -- show
the continued validity of the Board's decisions. These
troubling questions and continued violations explain why
Iran's nuclear program must remain on the agenda of both the
Security Council and this Board.

Mr. Chairman,

The United Nations has shown its justified concern about
Iran's nuclear activities through four resolutions by the UN
Security Council, three imposing sanctions. Monday's
resolution, like those before it, shows the world's continued
desire to achieve a diplomatic solution through a dual-track
strategy. This dual-track strategy of backing diplomacy with
sanctions while offering negotiations was reaffirmed in the
Statement by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States released on
Monday in conjunction with Resolution 1803.

The dual-track strategy presents Iran's leaders with a path
forward that would provide the people of Iran with the
international respect, civil nuclear technology, and economic
benefits that they deserve.

This path is not hard to find. Iran's leaders can start down
this path by fully disclosing Iran's weapons-related work and
allowing the IAEA inspectors to verify it has ceased. Iran's
leaders can start down the path by taking the
confidence-building measures set out by the Board and the

Security Council.

Other countries have gone down this path. Iran can too.

Mr. Chairman,

Resolution 1803 reaffirms the Board's responsibility to
confirm when Iran has fully met the requirements we
established two years ago for Iran to regain international
confidence in the peaceful nature of its program. The
Director General's report shows why we cannot make this
determination today.

Iran's leaders say that they do not have a nuclear weapons
program. To give the world confidence that this is true, we
call on them to fully disclose past and present activities
and to suspend those that are not necessary for a civil
program but that are necessary to build a nuclear weapon.
Only then can the Board exercise its responsibility. Only
then can verification of Iran's nuclear activities be
considered routine.

Until then, Iran's nuclear file remains open, and IAEA
inspectors must continue their investigation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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