Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA140
2008-02-28 15:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/GC: ARAB LEAGUE SEEKS DIALOGUE ON ISRAELI

Tags:  IAEA KNPP AORC IS EG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0140/01 0591527
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281527Z FEB 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7613
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0605
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0146
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0536
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0042
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0902
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0043
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0509
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0752
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0190
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0523
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1123
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000140 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018
TAGS: IAEA KNPP AORC IS EG
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: ARAB LEAGUE SEEKS DIALOGUE ON ISRAELI
THREAT RESOLUTION

REF: 07 UNVIE 557 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for
reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000140

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018
TAGS: IAEA KNPP AORC IS EG
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: ARAB LEAGUE SEEKS DIALOGUE ON ISRAELI
THREAT RESOLUTION

REF: 07 UNVIE 557 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for
reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Arab League representative Wael Al-Assad met with
like-minded Missions (EU-3, U.S., Australia, Norway, Japan)
on February 21 to discuss the General Conference (GC)
resolution on the "Israeli Nuclear Threat" (INT). Al-Assad
appealed for dialogue with those Missions that had
successfully opposed the resolution in the last two IAEA
General Conferences (reftel). He confirmed that an AL
Ministerial in early March would take the final decision on
the INT resolution, and promised that the Arab Group in
Vienna would have a broad mandate to negotiate text. That
said, there was no indication the AL would withdraw the INT
resolution singling out Israel, which many of the like-minded
advised was unacceptable. The AL is frustrated with the old
compromise (two agenda items one resolution); blamed Israel
for the failure of the Middle East Forum and is not inclined
to engage Israel directly. Al-Assad took under advisement
suggestions for having one resolution on Middle East
Safeguards that included elements of the INT. Whether it is
in one resolution or two, and even if the language is less
truculent, it is clear that the AL seeks in some way to
highlight Israel's failure to accede to the NPT as a threat
to Middle East security. End Summary.

Arab League Appeals for Dialogue
--------------


2. (C) Canadian Mission invited like-minded Missions (EU-3,
U.S., Australia, Japan, and Norway) to unofficial,
working-level consultations February 21 with Arab League
representative Wael Al-Assad, Director, Department of
Multilateral Relations. His office has responsibility for
the IAEA General Conference (GC) resolution on the Israeli
Nuclear Threat (INT). Al-Assad came to Vienna to discuss
the issue in advance of an early March Arab League
Ministerial, which will hold a special session on the
proposed GC resolution. Vienna-based Arab League Ambassador
Wehbe accompanied Al-Assad, but the Arab Group in Vienna was
notably absent. Algerian Ambassador Feroukhi, Chair of the

Arab Group in Vienna, previously told Ambassador Schulte that
the AL is exerting tremendous pressure on the Group, which it
sees as ineffective, to do something substantive in the
General Conference on this issue.


3. (C) Al-Assad characterized this issue as a priority for
Middle East security and placed Arab League concerns in a
historical context, noting efforts dating back 33 years to
establish a Middle East WMD-free zone. He cited a 1995 AL
decision for Arab states to accede to the NPT in the hopes of
exerting international pressure on Israel to do the same, as
well as subsequent NPT Prepcom debates and more than 100
resolutions in various international fora. Al-Assad relayed
the frustration of AL states that felt taken for granted
since signing the NPT. He noted that they are now being
asked to undertake new commitments (i.e. the Additional
Protocol) while Israel got away scot-free. (Note: Pressed on
this point, Al-Assad said that Arab states were not "averse"
to the AP and denied it was a negotiating card. End Note.)
He observed that the last two General Conferences were a
disappointment to the AL. The no-action motion that cut off
debate on the INT at the 50th GC in 2006 was a surprise, and
the outcome of the 51st GC with no resolution and no
statement was "even worse." Arab League experts meeting last
month recommended that the AL Ministerial special session in
March give the Arab Group in Vienna a broad mandate to
negotiate the INT resolution.


4. (C) Invoking a "new spirit of Cairo," Al-Assad appealed
for dialogue and asked like-minded Ambassadors to negotiate
the substance of the INT resolution, with specific
objections, but not to rule out the resolution. There was
"no way," he said, the AL would not request the inclusion of
the INT on the GC agenda. He argued against direct linkage

of the Middle East Safeguards and INT agenda items and noted
that the GC in 1991 adopted both resolutions. Asked about
the Middle East Forum, Al-Assad blamed Israel for setting
impossible pre-conditions for discussing a WMD-free zone. He
also saw no point to engage Israel directly and argued that
international pressure must be brought to bear on Israel.


Like-minded Hold Firm
--------------


5. (C) Canadian DCM Wood underlined the desire of the
like-minded to move back to a consensus approach on Middle
East issues in the GC and urged direct negotiations among the
parties concerned. He also relayed concerns that there
should not be spillover of the Middle East debate in the
omnibus Safeguards and Technical Cooperation GC resolutions.
He and other like-minded Missions argued that Vienna is not
the place for political discussions more suited to the UNGA
First Committee or the NPT Prepcom. French DCM Gross
underscored the importance of the IAEA to France, and argued
that Middle East issues should not be allowed to detract from
the core technical work of the Agency. He also referred to
the Egyptian government's letter to 46 member states that had
"regrettably" abstained on the Middle East Safeguards
resolution, and noted that the GOF had approached Cairo about
reviving the Middle East Forum but had not received any
positive signals.


6. (C) Australia proposed a consensus approach based on the
old package coupling the Middle East and INT agenda items.
However, Al-Assad argued that the old consensus had been
unproductive; nothing had happened for so many years and it
was time to push for a resolution. He also pointed out that
the AL did not control the Middle East resolution, which
Egypt chose to de-couple. Germany further pressed for a
consensus approach, questioned whether two agenda items on
the Middle East were needed and noted that the Arab group
could not negotiate on the basis of fixed positions.
Germany, Canada, Australia and Missionoff opposed any
resolution that would negatively single out or "name and
blame" Israel. Wood further urged flexibility and more
constructive engagement. He clarified that the problems with
the INT language extended beyond just the title of the
resolution. Canada "did not want to see Israel backed into a
corner on security matters." Al-Assad promised that the Arab
group would be authorized to discuss the language of a
resolution. He insisted that the INT resolution does not
condemn Israel but simply calls upon Israel to join the NPT.


7. (C) Norwegian DCM Lundby noted that the vote on Middle
East Safeguards resolution last year was due to the AL's
insistence on the INT. He noted that the two rival
resolutions on the Middle East could "get in the way of one
another," and the Arab group is setting itself up for two
"flops." Lundby suggested that it would be tactically smart
to combine elements into a single resolution. The UK agreed
it was not inconceivable to do so, though Egypt has been
unwilling to negotiate the Middle East Safeguards resolution.
Canada and the UK observed that the Egyptian resolution had
less and less to do with safeguards but more with a WMD-free
zone. Al-Assad inquired whether a single resolution would be
more acceptable, the like-minded clarified that it depends on
what the resolution says.


8. (C) Asked whether the Arab League had taken a formal
decision to pursue the INT resolution, Al-Assad insisted that
no decision would be taken until the March Ministerial. He
assured Vienna Missions once again that the Arab Group would
have flexibility and broad parameters to negotiate. France
cautioned, however, that once the Arab Group requested a GC
agenda item with the same title, this triggered a "rapport de
force" that risked cutting off dialogue.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) This overture from the Arab League, though welcome, is
clearly motivated by the debacles of the last two General

Conferences. The Arab League is seeking a way to salvage the
INT and while Al-Assad did not say so directly, one obvious
way to negotiate the language of the INT resolution is to
drop the word "threat." Arab Group Chair Feroukhi recently
told Ambassador Schulte that she and other colleagues would
support such a proposal though the group remains divided on
this point. A similar resolution on "Israeli Nuclear
Capabilities" is adopted annually with EU support in the UNGA
First Committee. If this were proposed (whether in a
standalone resolution on Israel or a combined Middle East
resolution),it could split the EU in Vienna.


10. (C) However, given the last two victories in successive
GCs, the like-minded are holding firm and do not want
divisive Middle East debates once again to overshadow the
work of this year's General Conference. Certainly, we all
have an interest in averting another debacle and remain open
to dialogue, but the AL does not seem willing to compromise
on the key point of singling out Israel in some way. End
Comment.
SCHULTE