Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA129
2008-02-27 13:24:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: EU-3 PREPARED TO SPONSOR A BOARD

Tags:  KNPP PARM IAEA IR 
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DE RUEHUNV #0129/01 0581324
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FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7590
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0679
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0602
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0533
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0897
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0659
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0506
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0747
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0517
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1109
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000129 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: KNPP PARM IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: EU-3 PREPARED TO SPONSOR A BOARD
RESOLUTION

REF: SECSTATE 18857

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b, d and h

Summary
-------

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000129

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: KNPP PARM IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: EU-3 PREPARED TO SPONSOR A BOARD
RESOLUTION

REF: SECSTATE 18857

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b, d and h

Summary
--------------


1. (S) At a UK hosted-meeting on February 26, like-minded
COMs (P3 1, Canada, Australia and Japan) agreed to pursue a
Board of Governor's resolution on Iran assuming adoption of a
UNSCR on Friday, February 29. The EU-3 agreed to prepare a
draft. In order to mitigate any risk of interfering with the
New York process, the like-minded also agreed not to engage
Russia and China, or the EU, or table a Board resolution,
until early after a UNSCR resolution is approved. A Board
resolution would seek to reassert Board decisions on Iran,
including suspension, to support the Secretariat's
investigation of weaponization and to assert that outstanding
issues are not resolved. France, Canada and other
like-minded want to seize the momentum of the technical
briefing (reftel). As Canada has argued, the March Board
also presents a singular window of opportunity to demonstrate
both UNSC and Board involvement. Timely passage of a UNSCR
in New York will facilitate Board action. If a draft is
tabled Monday, March 3, on the first day of the Board,
consultations could to extend to the end of the week. End
Summary.

New York First, Vienna Second
--------------


2. (S) Opening the like-minded meeting, UK Ambassador Simon
Smith provided London's assessment of P5 1 PolDirs
consultations the day before. He said that the UNSCR on Iran
was on track for adoption February 29, despite the remaining
Chinese hurdle on the joint ministerial statement. Given the
dynamics in New York, Smith sensed reservations UKUN raised
last week that a Board resolution not interfere with the New
York process had been mitigated, though he had not spoken
with UKUN this week and had found their concerns a bit
overblown. He believed work on a Board resolution should
continue among the lines the like-minded had discussed, but
the timing of such a resolution was contingent on the UNSC
process. Like-minded COMs agreed that the UNSC process had
priority, but all were poised to move forward in the Board as
soon as a UNSCR was adopted. The U.S., Canada and Australia

encouraged the EU-3 to take the lead in sponsoring a Board
resolution. The EU-3 agreed to prepare a draft.


3. (S) The like-minded further agreed not to discuss a Board
resolution beyond this core group until a UNSCR is adopted.
Several Missions had heard that the Russians were not
supportive when the issue of a Board resolution was raised on
the margins of the P5 1 PolDirs meeting. While the Chinese
are focused on the P5 1 statement, the like-minded did not
want to give them another pretext for delay in New York by
raising the prospect of a resolution in Vienna. That said,
most Board members are aware of the potential for a
resolution on Iran, and the like-minded agreed to advise the
Board Chair as soon as it was practicable, but likely not
until early in the week of the Board.

More Reasons to Pursue a Board Resolution
--------------


4. (S) Ambassador Schulte advised that there were several
good reasons to pursue a Board resolution. In addition to
reasserting Board authority, a resolution would signal that
the Iran issue has turned a new page in light of the DG
report and the technical briefing on Iran. The like-minded
agreed that a resolution would accomplish three goals:
reinforce past Board decisions including suspension; support
the Secretariat's investigation of weaponization issues and
assert the Board's understanding that, contrary to Iran's
claims, the work plan was not "over" and outstanding issues
were not resolved, as the Secretariat had made clear. French
Ambassador Deniau reported that Iran planned to send a letter
to the UNSC President stating that the work plan was "over,"
thus putting the Secretariat in an awkward position. In his
opinion, a Board resolution would help shield DDG Heinonen
from NAM criticism. Ambassador Schulte agreed that the Board

should support Heinonen, who had put himself out on a limb by
deciding on his own initiative to present the information in
the technical briefing (reftel).


5. (S) Deniau also saw a Board resolution as means to
"publicize" the Secretariat's findings on weaponization. He
noted that the technical briefing was somewhat below the
radar and did not have the same standing as a discussion in
the Board. Although the room was packed at the briefing, a
number of Board Ambassadors did not attend, and out-of-town
Governors also did not have the opportunity to hear the
briefing. He suggested that any Board member without a
Permanent Mission in Vienna could ask the Secretariat to
repeat the briefing in the Board room. Others recalled that
the Secretariat had provided DPRK briefings during Board
meetings in the past, but were not sure if they would agree
to repeat this briefing.


6. (S) Canadian Ambassador Gervais-Vidricaire reiterated her
argument that the March Board presented a singular window of
opportunity for Board action. The momentum gained from the
technical briefing further reinforced this view. She
observed that the Secretariat had placed its credibility
behind the weaponization information, which was based on
multiple sources and its own investigations. French DCM
Gross also advised that if the Board did not seize this
moment when the Secretariat had so clearly laid out its
concerns on weaponization, the technical briefing would be
brushed aside. Canada strongly believed that the time for
action to demonstrate that the UNSC and Board were actively
involved was now. Ambassador Schulte further noted that the
June Board may not be as propitious an opportunity for a
Board resolution since the draft UNSCR requests the DG to
report within 90 days, which would be just before the June
Board, and thus work on a Board resolution then could
interfere with another possible UNSCR.


7. (S) Australian Charge Kruse observed that there was a more
positive dynamic in the Board now, with Iran pitted against
the Secretariat. However, he cautioned that a resolution
could risk a defensive reaction from the NAM. Australia
agreed the Board should support the Secretariat's prerogative
to undertake the investigation of weaponization. He noted
that UNSCR 1737 had asked the Secretariat to investigate
outstanding issues and that previous DG reports had included
the alleged studies. Iran had not opposed their inclusion
until it was confronted with damning evidence, he added. UK
Missionoff also noted that the 2005 Board resolution refers
to weaponization issues.

8.(S) German Charge Kimmerling likewise supported a simple
and straightforward resolution that stressed the authority of
the Secretariat, which had been put into question by some,
and needed to be clarified in a Board decision. He argued
that a consensus (or near consensus) resolution pitting the
Board against Iran would further isolate Iran. Kimmerling
also suggested that the like-minded could float a consensus
draft with Russia and China before Friday to lend support to
the UNSC process.


9. (S) However, other like-minded Missions preferred to wait
out the New York process before engaging Russia and China.
Gervais-Vidricaire expressed some concern if there is no
agreement in New York, UNSC deliberations could drag into
next week. She trusted that Missions in New York were aware
of the prospect of a Board resolution and that time was of
the essence.

Timing and Tactics
--------------


10. (S) Smith advised that the EU-3 will take on the lead
drafting role and sort out the content and timing of a
resolution. He noted that a resolution had to strike a
balance between being useful and attracting consensus and
that certain elements, such as asserting Board authority,
were non-negotiable. Smith acknowledged that it would be
risky for the Board to be seen as reinterpreting the DG
report, and Deniau believed it would be best to adhere as
closely as possible to the report and technical briefing.


11. (S) Deniau observed that a resolution should aim at
consensus, and that the current composition of the Board
would help in this regard. Venezuela, which had called for a
vote on two previous Board resolutions on Iran, was no longer
on the Board, and the NAM would risk splitting their votes if
a vote was called. Japan worried, however, that South Africa
may call for a vote. Ambassador Schulte agreed that the
resolution should aim for as broad a consensus as possible,
but the like-minded must also be prepared to call for a vote.
He advised that the text should build in some giveaways for
negotiating purposes, though Canada noted that the time for
negotiation would be short.


12. (S) The EU-3 will prepare a draft resolution. Pending
UNSC action, the UK believed that Russia and China and EU
members could be consulted early March 3, on the first day of
the Board. The Board Chair would also be consulted early.
Requests for instructions and consultations with various
groups could take another three days, bringing us to action
on the resolution by the end of the week.
SCHULTE