Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ULAANBAATAR555
2008-12-23 07:40:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Cable title:
NUCLEAR ENERGY OVERVIEW FOR MONGOLIA
how-toR 230740Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2630 INFO CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY TOKYO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY CANBERRA AMEMBASSY ASTANA NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS ULAANBAATAR 000555
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR T/MARC HUMPHREY
COMMERCE FOR SARAH LOPP
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG TRGY BEXP BTIO PGOV MG
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR ENERGY OVERVIEW FOR MONGOLIA
Sensitive but Unclassified - Not for Internet distribution.
Contains proprietary and confidential business information.
REF: STATE 127423
UNCLAS ULAANBAATAR 000555
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR T/MARC HUMPHREY
COMMERCE FOR SARAH LOPP
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG TRGY BEXP BTIO PGOV MG
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR ENERGY OVERVIEW FOR MONGOLIA
Sensitive but Unclassified - Not for Internet distribution.
Contains proprietary and confidential business information.
REF: STATE 127423
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Mongolia's nuclear sector is at a primitive stage
of development, although GOM officials hope that as-yet unproven
reserves can spur rapid sector growth. An undeveloped legal and
regulatory framework makes it difficult for businesses interested in
Mongolia's uranium reserves, although several state-owned
enterprises (primarily from Canada, Russia, China, and Kazakhstan)
remain interested in the sector. To progress, however, the
government will have to clarify the roles and responsibilities of
various entities with responsibility for varied parts of the mining
and power sector. END SUMMARY.
OVERVIEW OF CIVIL NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM
--------------
2. (SBU) As requested reftel, this cable reviews civil nuclear
energy in Mongolia. Primary sources of information include Nuclear
Energy Agency of Mongolia (NRA) Vice Chair Prof. S. Enkhbat; Advisor
to the Minister of Fuel, Energy, and Minerals S. Otgonbat; Mineral
Resources Authority of Mongolia Cadastral Office Head Ts. Bat-Orgil;
and various lawyers and business representatives associated with
uranium exploration in Mongolia.
3. (SBU) Dr. Enkhbat of the NRA provided the most complete overview
of the sector. More specifically, he highlighted that the nuclear
sector is at a primitive state. Mongolia does not have a civilian
nuclear power program or related facilities; it absolutely lacks a
nuclear-related manufacturing base; and due to minimal nuclear
energy research activity in Mongolia, the nuclear-trained workforce
is small, consisting of at most a score of poorly trained
technicians and experts. Dr. Enkhbat, however, explained to Emboffs
that the GOM intends to develop facilities by leveraging what he and
others in the GOM hope are substantial uranium reserves. Assuming
that estimates of the size of Mongolia's uranium resources prove
out, the NRA, Ministry of Fuel, Energy, and Minerals, and other key
government entities intend to offer access to reserves in return for
the extractor assisting Mongolia's development of a civilian Nuclear
industry. This would likely include enrichment of uranium and power
generation. At the moment, the most likely extractors/partners
would be a state-owned enterprise (SOE) from Canada, China,
Kazakhstan, or Russia.
4. (SBU) Russia's state-owned Rosatom (an SOE) has explicitly
expressed an interest in assisting Mongolia achieve some of these
goals if it can obtain exclusive rights both to Mongolia's existing
uranium deposits and to explore and develop future resources.
Arrangements have not progressed beyond a memorandum of
understanding to simply explore these possibilities. Dr. Enkhbat
said that he believes Russia's request is a bit too ambitious, and
he hopes that France's SOE Areva or Canada's Cameco could be induced
to assist in the development of Mongolia's nuclear power industry
for less generous (for the SOE) terms than the Russians are
seeking.
5. (SBU) Attorneys and miners active in Mongolia's uranium
exploration sector have shared with us their doubts regarding the
GOM's nuclear ambitions, saying that their contacts from Russia,
France, and Canada do not echo GOM optimism regarding the sector's
development. While initial processing of uranium into "safe" yellow
cake (uranium oxide) is in the cards, sources tell us that none of
these foreign entities have serious plans to build nuclear plants
and associated nuclear-related facilities in Mongolia given the
current low estimates of Mongolia's uranium holdings, a shaky legal
and regulatory framework, and substandard infrastructure.
6. (U) The 2006 amendments to Mongolia's Minerals Law passed in 2006
dramatically altered the environment for extracting uranium. The
revised law specifically singled out uranium as a "strategic"
mineral, meaning the state holds the right to acquire up to 50
percent equity. Uranium exploration firms are not particularly
comfortable with this provision, but generally agree that if the GOM
compensates them for what share of equity it takes, they will comply
without too much struggle. (NOTE: The GOM's policy on uranium, much
like its policy on other mining activities, is intended to ensure
that Mongolia benefits from resource extraction. As a result, this
equity debate extends to mining of other mineral resources,
including but not limited to copper, gold, and coal. END NOTE.)
7. (SBU) One impediment to the development of uranium resources is
the GOM's disorganized approach to regulating the extraction and
production of nuclear products. For example, while the Ministry of
Minerals and Energy is responsible for mining, extraction, and
processing for power generation and production, some argue that the
NRA has the authority to administer all aspects of nuclear power in
Mongolia, from exploration to power production. Business and
government representatives note that this lack of clarity makes it
difficult to make firm, long-term decisions regarding the sector.
8. (SBU) Dr. Enkhbat lamented the sorry state of training among
those within the GOM that might be tasked with regulating uranium
mining and processing and, ultimately, power generation. The
Ministry of Nature and Environment and the State Special Inspection
Agency are formally charged with regulatory responsibility but are
just beginning consider their roles in this specific sector. On the
environmental side, the legal and regulatory framework has a long
way to go to be able to effectively administer this part of the
mining sector. Laws and rules remain obsolete or nonexistent, and
the Mongolians routinely ask for guidance on how they can regulate
this and other complex mining operations with their low resource
base. The Mongolian National Security Council (President, Prime
Minister, and Speaker of Parliament) have a say in the debate as
well. As a result, any potential miner and processor would have to
knock on many doors and undoubtedly need to mediate conflicts among
each GOM entity that wants to add a bit of uranium to its portfolio.
There seems no inherent impediment for untying this bureaucrat
tangle, just attention from senior GOM politicos to order it done.
9. (U) To post's knowledge Mongolia has not enacted specific nuclear
third party liability legislation.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. INDUSTRY
--------------
10.(U) Mongolia has no current or anticipated nuclear-related
tenders.
11.(U) There are no nuclear sector opportunities foreseen for U.S.
industry.
FOREIGN COMPETITORS
--------------
12.(U) There is no significant engagement by nuclear supplier
countries in Mongolia.
MINTON
NNNN
End Cable Text
Marc A Humphrey 02/02/2009 04:29:57 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR T/MARC HUMPHREY
COMMERCE FOR SARAH LOPP
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG TRGY BEXP BTIO PGOV MG
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR ENERGY OVERVIEW FOR MONGOLIA
Sensitive but Unclassified - Not for Internet distribution.
Contains proprietary and confidential business information.
REF: STATE 127423
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Mongolia's nuclear sector is at a primitive stage
of development, although GOM officials hope that as-yet unproven
reserves can spur rapid sector growth. An undeveloped legal and
regulatory framework makes it difficult for businesses interested in
Mongolia's uranium reserves, although several state-owned
enterprises (primarily from Canada, Russia, China, and Kazakhstan)
remain interested in the sector. To progress, however, the
government will have to clarify the roles and responsibilities of
various entities with responsibility for varied parts of the mining
and power sector. END SUMMARY.
OVERVIEW OF CIVIL NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM
--------------
2. (SBU) As requested reftel, this cable reviews civil nuclear
energy in Mongolia. Primary sources of information include Nuclear
Energy Agency of Mongolia (NRA) Vice Chair Prof. S. Enkhbat; Advisor
to the Minister of Fuel, Energy, and Minerals S. Otgonbat; Mineral
Resources Authority of Mongolia Cadastral Office Head Ts. Bat-Orgil;
and various lawyers and business representatives associated with
uranium exploration in Mongolia.
3. (SBU) Dr. Enkhbat of the NRA provided the most complete overview
of the sector. More specifically, he highlighted that the nuclear
sector is at a primitive state. Mongolia does not have a civilian
nuclear power program or related facilities; it absolutely lacks a
nuclear-related manufacturing base; and due to minimal nuclear
energy research activity in Mongolia, the nuclear-trained workforce
is small, consisting of at most a score of poorly trained
technicians and experts. Dr. Enkhbat, however, explained to Emboffs
that the GOM intends to develop facilities by leveraging what he and
others in the GOM hope are substantial uranium reserves. Assuming
that estimates of the size of Mongolia's uranium resources prove
out, the NRA, Ministry of Fuel, Energy, and Minerals, and other key
government entities intend to offer access to reserves in return for
the extractor assisting Mongolia's development of a civilian Nuclear
industry. This would likely include enrichment of uranium and power
generation. At the moment, the most likely extractors/partners
would be a state-owned enterprise (SOE) from Canada, China,
Kazakhstan, or Russia.
4. (SBU) Russia's state-owned Rosatom (an SOE) has explicitly
expressed an interest in assisting Mongolia achieve some of these
goals if it can obtain exclusive rights both to Mongolia's existing
uranium deposits and to explore and develop future resources.
Arrangements have not progressed beyond a memorandum of
understanding to simply explore these possibilities. Dr. Enkhbat
said that he believes Russia's request is a bit too ambitious, and
he hopes that France's SOE Areva or Canada's Cameco could be induced
to assist in the development of Mongolia's nuclear power industry
for less generous (for the SOE) terms than the Russians are
seeking.
5. (SBU) Attorneys and miners active in Mongolia's uranium
exploration sector have shared with us their doubts regarding the
GOM's nuclear ambitions, saying that their contacts from Russia,
France, and Canada do not echo GOM optimism regarding the sector's
development. While initial processing of uranium into "safe" yellow
cake (uranium oxide) is in the cards, sources tell us that none of
these foreign entities have serious plans to build nuclear plants
and associated nuclear-related facilities in Mongolia given the
current low estimates of Mongolia's uranium holdings, a shaky legal
and regulatory framework, and substandard infrastructure.
6. (U) The 2006 amendments to Mongolia's Minerals Law passed in 2006
dramatically altered the environment for extracting uranium. The
revised law specifically singled out uranium as a "strategic"
mineral, meaning the state holds the right to acquire up to 50
percent equity. Uranium exploration firms are not particularly
comfortable with this provision, but generally agree that if the GOM
compensates them for what share of equity it takes, they will comply
without too much struggle. (NOTE: The GOM's policy on uranium, much
like its policy on other mining activities, is intended to ensure
that Mongolia benefits from resource extraction. As a result, this
equity debate extends to mining of other mineral resources,
including but not limited to copper, gold, and coal. END NOTE.)
7. (SBU) One impediment to the development of uranium resources is
the GOM's disorganized approach to regulating the extraction and
production of nuclear products. For example, while the Ministry of
Minerals and Energy is responsible for mining, extraction, and
processing for power generation and production, some argue that the
NRA has the authority to administer all aspects of nuclear power in
Mongolia, from exploration to power production. Business and
government representatives note that this lack of clarity makes it
difficult to make firm, long-term decisions regarding the sector.
8. (SBU) Dr. Enkhbat lamented the sorry state of training among
those within the GOM that might be tasked with regulating uranium
mining and processing and, ultimately, power generation. The
Ministry of Nature and Environment and the State Special Inspection
Agency are formally charged with regulatory responsibility but are
just beginning consider their roles in this specific sector. On the
environmental side, the legal and regulatory framework has a long
way to go to be able to effectively administer this part of the
mining sector. Laws and rules remain obsolete or nonexistent, and
the Mongolians routinely ask for guidance on how they can regulate
this and other complex mining operations with their low resource
base. The Mongolian National Security Council (President, Prime
Minister, and Speaker of Parliament) have a say in the debate as
well. As a result, any potential miner and processor would have to
knock on many doors and undoubtedly need to mediate conflicts among
each GOM entity that wants to add a bit of uranium to its portfolio.
There seems no inherent impediment for untying this bureaucrat
tangle, just attention from senior GOM politicos to order it done.
9. (U) To post's knowledge Mongolia has not enacted specific nuclear
third party liability legislation.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. INDUSTRY
--------------
10.(U) Mongolia has no current or anticipated nuclear-related
tenders.
11.(U) There are no nuclear sector opportunities foreseen for U.S.
industry.
FOREIGN COMPETITORS
--------------
12.(U) There is no significant engagement by nuclear supplier
countries in Mongolia.
MINTON
NNNN
End Cable Text
Marc A Humphrey 02/02/2009 04:29:57 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results