SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF S/CT AMBASSADOR DAILEY

S E C R E T TUNIS 000104

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT (DAILEY, INGALLS, WORMAN),NEA/FO (GRAY) AND
NEA/MAG (HOPKINS AND HARRIS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL TS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF S/CT AMBASSADOR DAILEY

REF: A. TUNIS 79

B. TUNIS 78

C. TUNIS 75 AND PREVIOUS

D. TUNIS 9

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (S/NF) Embassy Tunis warmly welcomes S/CT Ambassador Dell
Dailey, NEA DAS Gordon Gray and accompanying delegation to
Tunis from February 10-12, 2008. Your visit takes place in
the context of a generally positive bilateral relationship.
While cooperation with military and intelligence services is
growing, the Government of Tunisia (GOT) can and should do
more to improve counter-terrorism cooperation. GOT officials
will tell you that Tunisia shares USG concerns about Islamic
extremism and is committed to addressing the root causes of
terrorism. However, the regime is inherently controlling and
officials are generally reticent about information sharing.
Your visit presents an opportunity to press the GOT for
greater cooperation and discuss opportunities for USG
assistance. End Summary.

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Overview
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2. (C) Tunisia proudly -- and justifiably -- calls itself a
"country that works." Despite Tunisia's relatively small
economy (2006 real GDP was about $25.5 billion) and lack of
natural resources, the Tunisian government has proven itself
capable of providing basic education, health care, housing
and a workable infrastructure to its population. Tunisia has
the most diversified economy in the region and enjoys one of
the highest standards of living on the continent. However,
the political system is dominated by a single party, the
Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD),and political
liberties -- specifically freedom of expression and
association -- remain tightly controlled.


3. (C) Internationally, Tunisia plays a moderating role on
regional issues (including Iraq, Iran and the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict). Although the GOT is not a
major player on these issues, it is generally supportive of
US goals. For example, the GOT publicly praised President
Bush's recent visit to the region and US efforts to promote
Middle East peace. Tunisia participates in a variety of
regional fora, such as the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue
Initiative, and has no concerns about Israeli participation
in the same. To its credit, the GOT still maintains quiet
backchannel relations with Israeli officials and hosts a
number of Israeli visitors to an annual Jewish pilgrimage to
southern Tunisia. Further afield, Tunisia's military has
participated to a limited extent in a number of UN-led
peacekeeping operations, including in the Congo, Ethiopia and
Eritrea.

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CT Success on the Wane?
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4. (C) Tunisia, led by President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali
since his 1987 palace coup, has long stressed the dangers of
terrorism, including in international fora. The GOT strongly
shares our concern about the spread of terrorism, although we
sometimes differ on its definition, whom to label a
terrorist, and how to combat it. Unlike other countries in
the region, Tunisia has applied a holistic approach to
combating terrorism. The GOT has invested heavily in
education, social programs and economic development in order
to combat the ignorance and despair that may lead some to
terrorism. GOT security forces also actively combat
terrorism by monitoring citizens closely, controlling all
mosques and imams, maintaining strict financial controls and
banning religious political parties -- to the extent of being
a police state. The GOT has successfully prevented the
execution of any terrorist acts in Tunisia since the April
2002 al-Qaeda truck bombing at a Jewish synagogue on the
southern island of Djerba, in which 20 victims were killed.


5. (S) However, support for extremist ideologies is spreading
in Tunisia, and the GOT does not appear to have a workable
long-term plan for success (Refs A and B). In December
2006/January 2007, the GOT announced the disruption of a
domestic terrorist cell, whose targets allegedly included the
US and UK Embassies and personnel in Tunisia (Ref C). In
December 2007, thirty were convicted of involvement in this
cell (sentences ranged from the death penalty to five years);
their appeal is scheduled to be heard on February 8.
Additionally, hundreds and perhaps thousands of Tunisians,
particularly young men, have been detained since late 2006
under the 2003 anti-terrorism law. Many were planning to
join the Iraq foreign fighter pipeline or detained in and
extradited by countries along the way (e.g. Algeria, Syria).
The GOT tried more than 100 individuals in 2007 and convicted
the vast majority of crimes such as belonging to a terrorist
or illegal organization, gathering money for terrorist
activities, attempting to engage in "jihad" in Iraq and other
terrorist actions.

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Regional -- and Internal -- Cooperation
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6. (S) Although it tends to dismiss the domestic causes of
terrorism, the GOT is rightly concerned about the regional
nature of the terrorist threat. It has taken real steps to
disrupt the foreign fighter pipeline, including by improving
air and land border control measures. Tunisian officials
will stress their concern about effectively controlling
Tunisia's borders with Algeria and Libya. The terrain
presents many difficulties, from patrolling the forested
northwest mountain regions to effectively controlling the
remote desert regions in the south. The GOT does complain
about cross-border CT cooperation with its neighbors,
although it remains unclear how much coordination occurs,
both at the tactical and official level. For example, GOT
officials have shared no details about recent reports that
the Arab Maghreb Union plans to expand CT cooperation.


7. (S) The internal relationship between various GOT CT
elements is more troubling. Unsurprisingly, the Ministry of
Interior (MOI) has primary responsibility for Tunisia's CT
efforts and is the least transparent about its activities.
Even inside the MOI information appears to be strictly
compartmentalized. The more forthcoming Ministry of Defense
(MOD) plays a secondary role in support of MOI efforts and
lacks much of the critical intelligence information that
drives MOI CT activities. This disconnect between the two
agencies prevents the GOT from applying an interagency
approach that would make better use of all of its CT
resources. While there are indications the two ministries
may have worked more closely together over the past year,
there is little evidence that a truly integrated CT approach
will be applied.

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The Role of the US
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8. (S/NF) The GOT participates in a handful of active
counter-terrorism training/exercise programs with a variety
of US agencies and expresses interest in greater cooperation.
Officials were disappointed that the Administration's FY2008
and FY2009 foreign assistance request for Tunisia
(particularly Foreign Military Financing) declined
significantly at a time when the military needed to
strengthen their CT abilities. Conversely, the GOT at times
refuses or does not respond to our offers of assistance (e.g.
in 2006, the GOT effectively declined to participate in
State's ATA program). GOT interlocutors sometimes complain
that USG programs are not appropriate for Tunisia's needs or
resources.


9. (S/NF) The USG tries to tailor our offers to specific GOT
needs, but in exchange we expect better cooperation from the
GOT. For example, the GOT should have been more forthcming
about the Dec. 2006/Jan. 2007 thwarted terrrist plot and
subsequent investigations and arress. In 2007, several
senior USG officials engage the highest levels of the GOT,
including Ben Al, on this point and the general need for
improve cooperation. At year's end, there was some
indcation that information exchange was improving (RefD).
However, to ensure this is a long-term improement, it is
essential to continue to urge the GT to continue responding
to specific US requests. The USG is not the only country
concerned about its intelligence relationship with Tunisia;
foreign government counterparts, including from France and
Great Britain, have told USG officials they have similar
concerns.

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Key Themes
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10. (S/NF) You may wish to stress the following themes with
GOT officials:

-- Recognize Tunisia's stability in face of growing regional
threat. (All GOT)

-- Inquire about the regional threat and level and quality of
CT cooperation with Algeria and Libya. (All GOT)

-- (Drawing implied linkage to above point) Stress USG is
ready to provide greater CT assistance, training and
cooperation. (All GOT)

-- Request improved intelligence sharing and information
exchange on domestic threats, specifically threat information
and individuals of mutual interest. (All GOT, but for MOI
action)

-- Express concern that lack of political space can have
adverse consequences, i.e., contributing to the perception
that violent extremism is the only way to express opposition
to government policies. (All GOT)

-- Urge immediate assistance with specific cases to be
briefed at Post. (MOI Only)

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GOT Interlocutors
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11. (S/NF) The Embassy has requested meetings with several
GOT officials and provides the following insight on each:

-- Minister of Interior Rafik Belhaj Kacem tends to be
reticent and brusque. He is quick to cite the importance of
Tunisian sovereignty and may reject the suggestion that the
MOI could or should improve information sharing. Providing
the context behind specific USG requests and stressing our
similar views on fighting terrorism may help make the
conversation fruitful.

-- Minister of National Defense Kamel Morjane has years of
experience as a UN and Tunisian diplomat and is generally
gregarious and open. Morjane can be expected to express his
concern about the domestic terrorist threat, his perceptions
about increased public support for extremism, and some of the
factors behind these trends. He will also outline the MOD's
CT role and ask for USG assistance in improving Tunisia's
defense capabilities, specifically increased Foreign Military
Financing (FMF),which has declined in recent years.

-- Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdelwaheb Abdallah, whom you
met on the margins of the meeting between Under Secretary
Burns and representatives of the Arab Maghreb Union at the
UNGA, is a political animal, who has a penchant for long
monologues. He is quite close to President Ben Ali. While
not personally involved in Tunisia's CT efforts, he can
convey the message that the USG is concerned about our CT
relationship. Although Abdallah tends to claim that all
aspects of our bilateral relationship is "excellent," it is
worth stressing the specific actions the USG expects.
Abdallah can be expected to expound on the GOT,s efforts in
various international fora to promote a Counter-terrorism
Code of Conduct.

Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm
GODEC