LIBYA: WE ARE AN EFFECTIVE MEDIATOR FOR SOMALIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000918

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/E, AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU SO DJ LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA: WE ARE AN EFFECTIVE MEDIATOR FOR SOMALIA

REF: A) STATE 123635, B) NET-CENTRIC DIPLOMACY EMAIL DATED 11/19/2008

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CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Libyan officials were evasive on whether the
GOL had agreed to offer financial support to Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) - they suggested that
Libya would not be in a position to deny "humanitarian
assistance" to its "Somali brothers" - during the recent visit
to Tripoli of TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. They argued
that Libya's strong cultural, religious, and historical ties to
Somalia enable it to play a uniquely effective role in mediating
Somali affairs, and that Yusuf's approach al-Qadhafi for
assistance, to include possibly shifting the venue for
negotiations from Djibouti to Tripoli, was consistent with the
latter's role as a proven negotiator and wise man on the African
continent. End summary.


2. (C) A/DCM delivered reftel demarche on November 25 to Asseid
Nuha, Deputy Director of the MFA's Arab Affairs Office, and
Idriss Abu Dib, Senior Adviser in the MFA's Arab Affairs Office.
(Note: Abu Dib was Libya's Ambassador to Mogadishu from
2003-2007. End note.) Defending Libya's role in negotiations
between Somalia's Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
(ARS) and the TFG, Nuha claimed Libya was the only country that
had maintained its embassy there throughout the violence.
Libya's special interest in Somalia stemmed from the two
countries' shared history of Italian colonial occupation and the
fact that Somalia is Arab, Islamic, African and a member of
CEN-SAD. Libya has "deep knowledge" of internal Somali affairs
by dint of historical ties and its robust official presence
there. (Note: We've heard reports that the Libyan mission in
Mogadishu numbers several hundred individuals, with various
organizational affiliations. End note.)

EVASIVE ON FINANCIAL SUPPORT


3. (C) Nuha was evasive in responding to A/DCM's conveyance of
reftel points urging the GOL to not/not extend financial support
to President Yusuf. He claimed no direct knowledge of such a
request from Yusuf to al-Qadhafi, but stressed that the meeting
between the two was at the head-of-state level and suggested
that if financial assistance had been provided, it would not
have been inappropriate given Libya's longstanding relationship
with Somalia and its efforts to promote political solutions to
ongoing violence there. At conversation's end, Nuha circled
back to the issue of finances, adding that Libya would not be in
a position to deny "humanitarian assistance" and funds for same
to the "Somali brothers."

IT IS NATURAL TO HELP OUR ARAB BROTHERS


4. (C) According to Nuha, Libya sees TFG President Yusuf as the
legally-elected president and legitimate representative of
Somalia. It was therefore entirely appropriate that he was
received in Tripoli and met with Muammar al-Qadhafi. Arab
affairs are tribal and familial and it is "natural" that Libya
would want to help its "Arab brothers" in Somalia. Many African
leaders have turned to al-Qadhafi for wisdom and counsel - in
Chad and Darfur, for example - and the Leader takes his
leadership role in Africa seriously. President Yusuf had
requested the Leader's help in moving Somali negotiations
forward, to include specifically asking that ARS-TFG
negotiations be moved from Djibouti to Tripoli. Yusuf extended
an invitation through al-Qadhafi for a senior Libyan delegation
to visit Mogadishu to assess the situation on the ground and the
feasibility of moving talks from Djibouti to Tripoli. (Note:
our interlocutors did not indicate whether Libya intended to
take Yusuf up on his offer. End note.)

LIBYA WANTS "STABILITY AND PEACE" IN SOMALIA


5. (C) The critical point, Nuha emphasized, was that Libya
endeavors to achieve "stability and peace" in Somalia. Libya is
willing to engage in dialogue with anyone who can help reach
that goal; the path by which such success was achieved was
inconsequential. Citing his experience in Mogadishu, Abu Dib
stressed that all parties had to participate in negotiations -
regardless of venue (i.e., Djibouti or Tripoli) - if they were
to have a chance of achieving a durable solution. He viewed
Yusuf as being relatively weak in Somali politics by dint of the

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fact that he is from Puntland's Darod clan and therefore lacks a
base in Mogadishu, where the Hawaye enjoy strong support. Abu
Dib and Nuha argued that Libya could be a credible mediator
between Hawaye and Darod.


6. (C) Comment: This meeting was our first with these
interlocutors. Former ambassador to Mogadishu Abu Dib, in
particular, was keen to show his extensive knowledge of the
problems facing Somalia. Talking at length in near professorial
tones, he recounted in impressive detail the history of tribal
alliances through the years, and attributed Somalia's persistent
political morass to tribal conflict, corruption, and power
relationships. He argued that a key problem was the inability
of Somalis to think beyond their own interests and those of
their clans, a necessary precondition for broader political
compromise that addressed national concerns. Their argument
that Libya's longstanding involvement in and knowledge of
sub-Saharan African affairs justify its mediation in Somalia
parallels the GOL's position regarding its efforts in Chad and
Darfur, where its track record has been mixed. End comment.
STEVENS