SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH LIBYA'S ALI TREIKI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000820

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO LY CD SU
SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH LIBYA'S ALI TREIKI

REF: TRIPOLI 719

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CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli,
Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary. Special Envoy Richard Williamson emphasized the
urgent need to stem the violence in Darfur in order to bring
relief to the millions of displaced persons and refugees during
his meeting in Tripoli with Libyan Secretary for African Affairs
Ali Treiki on October 6. SE Williamson said he appreciated
Libya's interest in securing peace in the region and welcomed
Libya's initiatives to broker an agreement between the
governments in Khartoum and N'Djamena. Treiki reiterated
Libya's tri-lateral peace plan that includes a joint
Chadian-Sudanese peacekeeping force. The first meeting of
Treiki and the Foreign Ministers of Chad and Sudan is scheduled
for October 23 in Tripoli. End Summary.

TREIKI REITERATES "TRI-LATERAL" PROPOSAL


2. (C) SE Richard Williamson met with U/S-equivalent for African
Affairs Ali Treiki October 6. Treiki thanked SE Williamson for
visiting Tripoli and highlighted the importance of the regular
consultations he enjoys with U.S. counterparts, especially A/S
Jendayi Frazer. Treiki told SE Williamson that his visit came
at an important time, as many initiatives have been proposed to
end the crisis in Sudan and that the time had come to choose
which vehicle would be most effective in ending violence and
providing relief in Darfur.


3. (C) Treiki presented SE Williamson with a detailed
explanation of Libya's "tri-lateral" peace initiative. The
first step is to ease tensions and renew diplomatic relations
between Chad and Sudan. After state-to-state hostility has been
reduced, Libya envisions a joint peacekeeping deployment
consisting of 1,000 troops from both Chad and Sudan at 10
locations on the border. He stressed that proximity to the
conflict gave Libya a unique position to bring the parties to
the negotiating table. He dismissed the recent Contact Group
meeting in Asmara as "unsuccessful," and said "nothing was done
there - we don't need meeting after meeting." He was equally
doubtful that a Qatari proposal to work through the Arab League
would net results, noting that African rebels would be
distrustful of Arab mediators and noted that even Egypt is not
happy with the Qatar initiative. He repeated his recommendation
that the "AU/UN framework" was the appropriate venue for other
countries to intervene.


4. (C) During the meeting, Treiki answered a call on his cell
phone from Sudanese Advisor to the President, Mustafa Osman
Ismail to coordinate a tri-lateral meeting in Tripoli for
mid-October. Ismail said he would be traveling but called back
a bit later to say October 23 would be fine. Treiki dispatched
aides to coordinate the date with the Chadian FM Moussa Faki.
(Note: As in previous meetings, Treiki had to ask - in Arabic -
for his aides to remind him of Faki's name. End note.)

WILLIAMSON WELCOMES LIBYA'S INITIATIVES, PRESSES FOR IMMEDIATE
RELIEF


5. (C) SE Williamson noted four rings of interest in Darfur:
First, the parties on the ground in Sudan; second, the neighbors
with a large stake in peace in Sudan, including Libya; third,
more distant countries with a deep interest in the region like
the U.S. and EU partners; and fourth, countries who want to
help, but are too far removed from the crisis to be effective.
He agreed that resolving tensions between the governments in
Khartoum and N'Djamena would be a positive step in stabilizing
the region. Williamson and Treiki shared their concerns on the
inevitable lack of implementation of the September 19 agreement
between Minni Minnawi and Ali Osman Taha. Treiki said GOS
treatment of Minnawi, and lack of implementation of the Darfur
Peace Agreement would prevent other rebel groups from
negotiating with Khartoum.


6. (C) The Special Envoy stressed the importance of immediate
relief for the millions suffering in Sudan. After providing
Treiki with USG efforts to bolster the UN/AU peacekeeping force
and our aid to the region, SE Williamson conveyed our concern
that new violence could erupt at the end of the rainy season or
with an ICC warrant for President Bashir. Treiki thought that
there were "no serious immediate threats except Khalil Ibrahim,"
and that he is in contact with the GOC to prevent an attack by
Ibrahim. Treiki belittled the role of rebel leaders in Europe,
especially Abdul Wahid al-Nur, who he derided as, "sitting
peacefully in Paris making propaganda."


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LIBYAN REACTION


7. (C) After initially agreeing to a low-key visit, Treiki
rolled out the red carpet and had both photos and video of the
hour-long meeting. State media reported the visit on the front
page and Treiki gave a five-minute interview on TV evening news.
However, neither report gave specifics of the meeting,
referring merely to friendly consultations, holding out the
prospect of further policy consultations with the USG.


8. (C) Comment. While the Special Envoy made clear that our
priorities were humanitarian relief and an immediate cessation
of violence, Treiki's focus continues to be a state-based
solution with a longer timeline. SE Williamson gave specific
detail of refugee camps of particular concern and recent
attacks, but Treiki preferred to talk about high-level
diplomatic solutions. The GOL's initiative may be complementary
to our goals, but Treiki seems more concerned about securing
diplomatic and security gains for Libya than immediately and
directly addressing the humanitarian crisis. End Comment.


9. (U) This cable has been cleared by SE Williamson.
GODFREY