Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TOKYO991
2008-04-10 22:55:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

NAIG 7200: DEMARCHE DELIVERED FOR COOPERATION

Tags:  ETTC PARM PREL JA KNNP MNUC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9267
RR RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0991/01 1012255
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 102255Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3356
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2060
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 9592
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0884
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 7808
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000991 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

PASS TO ISN AND EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL JA KNNP MNUC
SUBJECT: NAIG 7200: DEMARCHE DELIVERED FOR COOPERATION
BETWEEN A PROBABLE JAPANESE NATIONAL AND IRANIAN AND
PAKISTANI ENTITIES IN AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONCERN (S)

REF: STATE 31852

Classified By: EMIN ROBERT F. CEKUTA, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000991

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

PASS TO ISN AND EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL JA KNNP MNUC
SUBJECT: NAIG 7200: DEMARCHE DELIVERED FOR COOPERATION
BETWEEN A PROBABLE JAPANESE NATIONAL AND IRANIAN AND
PAKISTANI ENTITIES IN AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONCERN (S)

REF: STATE 31852

Classified By: EMIN ROBERT F. CEKUTA, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (U) Please see action request in paragraphs 2 and 3.


2. (S/NF) ESToff delivered points in ref to METI Security
Export Control Policy Division Deputy Director Atsushi
Tanizawa and Security Export Licensing Division Deputy
Director Furui Ryoji. The GOJ officials appreciated
receiving the non-paper on a probable Japanese national
offering a dual-use item to Iranian and Pakistani entities.
Tanizawa said his office will lead the preliminary
investigation by conducting interviews with the National
Police Agency, Mitsuyo company, and other related entities.
He will pass along the results of the investigation to
Embassy Tokyo. Tanizawa would like to know when the offer
by a probable Japanese national was made.


3. (S/NF) ESToff also met with MOFA Non-Proliferation,
Science and Nuclear Energy Division officers Shingo Ito and
Shinichi Sato. The MOFA officials appreciated this new
information. Sato said his office will work closely with his
export control colleagues at METI. However, Sato would like
to know how information about this case was obtained; in
particular, about what sources were used.



4. (S/NF) On April 8, METI provided the following response,
in English, and requested Embassy forward it to Washington
agencies:

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER.

We are always grateful for your cooperation and sharing
information with us. Although we are now in the process of
investigating the case, we would like to share information we
have obtained through preliminary investigation and the
measures we have taken so far as following:

A) Information on this case:


1. Information about Kyouhei Shirase
--According to Japan Customs, there was no export from Japan
to Iran or Pakistan made by Kyouhei Shirase in 2007.
--According to Mitsutoyo, there is no employee whose name is
Kyouhei Shirase in the company or in its branches.
--According to Mitsutoyo, there is no registered customer
whose name is Kyouhei Shirase in Japan or in any foreign
countries.


2. Information on the machines Mitsutoyo is handling
--All three-dimensional computerized numerically controlled
measuring machines currently sold by Mitsutoyo are listed on
the control list.
--Mitsutoyo is not allowed to use the bulk license. It has
to apply for the individual license every time it
wants to export.
--All the machines can not be transferred without Mitsutoyo's
approval because the transfer sensor is built
in the machines sold after April 2007. If the machine is
transferred secretly, the sensor will kill the machine.

Considering above mentioned background, we assume it scarcely
possible Mitsutoyo machines can be exported directly from
Mitsutoyo to Iran or Pakistan unless the company exports them
deliberately.

B) Measures we have taken:

We asked Mitsutoyo to report (to) METI in case Kyouhei
Shirase makes any requests to buy the machine. Moreover we
asked Japan Customs to watch upon all the machines to Iran
and Pakistan to prevent the illegal export of used machines.

Outline cf. previous case of Mitsutoyo
Nov 2001-The machine was exported to Malaysia without license
Feb 2004-The machine was found in Libya
Jun 2007-The company and its vice-president were convicted by
the Tokyo District Court
Jun 2007-Administrative sanction was imposed by METI

We are willing to provide more information as our
investigation proceeds. Also, we would appreciate any
further information from your government.

TOKYO 00000991 002 OF 002



END TEXT.


5. (U) Action request. Post would appreciate guidance on
how to address the questions from GOJ officials contained in
paras 2 and 3.
MESERVE