JAPANESE FRUSTRATED WITH SRI LANKANS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000090

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2018
TAGS: PREL CE JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE FRUSTRATED WITH SRI LANKANS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Japan is concerned by Sri Lanka's decision to
withdraw from the cease-fire agreement it had with the LTTE,
and was surprised and miffed by this move, since President
Rajapaksa had only three weeks earlier personally assured
Prime Minister Fukuda that his government agreed a political
solution was necessary and that the conflict would not be
solved through violence. Rajapaksa's December 8-11 visit to
Japan had not gone as smoothly as the Japanese would have
liked. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Japan is "deeply concerned" and was surprised by the
decision of the government of Sri Lanka to withdraw from the
2002 cease-fire agreement with the LTTE, according to an
official MOFA press release and MOFA Southwest Asia Division
Principal Deputy Director Masaki Ishikawa. Ishikawa told an
Embassy Tokyo Political Officer Japan's displeasure with
Colombo's move was exacerbated by the fact that President
Mahinda Rajapaksa, during an official working visit to Japan
only a few weeks earlier, assured Prime Minister Fukuda and
members of the Diet that his government was committed to a
political solution and believed the use of force was not an
alternative. Japan continues to strongly believe that the
conflict in Sri Lanka cannot be solved by military means, and
calls on the parties to reach a solution by political means
through negotiation. Ishikawa said Japan will remain
committed to working on the peace process with the co-chairs
of the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development in
Sri Lanka and is thinking of dispatching its special envoy,
Yasushi Akashi, to Colombo next week to see what can be done
to encourage a restoration of the cease-fire agreement.


3. (C) Rajapaksa's visit to Tokyo took place December 8-11
and was the first visit by a Sri Lankan president to Japan
since 1996. Sri Lankan Embassy First Secretary Chandana
Weerasena reported his government had been trying for two
years to arrange the visit, which it considered very
important given Japan's status as Sri Lanka's leading
bilateral donor. Sri Lanka also attaches great importance to
the role Akashi has played in the peace process, he added.
Despite the importance attached to the visit, the Japanese
side was not pleased by what it considered to be haphazard
planning. Ishikawa complained that only one week before his
arrival, and after the Japanese thought the itinerary for the
visit was set, Rajapaksa announced that he also wanted to
visit Buddhist sites in Kyoto, which required a last minute
flurry of activity by the Japanese. In addition, the
Japanese were not pleased that a Joint Statement could not be
released following the summit because the Sri Lankan side
insisted on including reference to development assistance
packages that have not yet been fully negotiated, as well as
language about the LTTE that Tokyo considered too
provocative. Ishikawa related how, after midnight the night
following Rajapaksa's meeting with PM Fukuda, the Sri Lankans
finally said they would agree to Japan's language, but by
then it was too late. The Japanese had already briefed the
press on the meeting and it would have raised questions to
issue a Joint Statement after the fact.


4. (U) The main topics discussed by President Rajapaksa and
PM Fukuda during their meeting were the peace process and
human rights in Sri Lanka, bilateral relations (including
economic and cultural/human exchange relations),and
international issues, including climate change, North Korea,
and U.N. Security Council reform. On the peace process,
Fukuda stressed Japan's view that achieving peace in Sri
Lanka is essential for promoting further bilateral relations
and that it is important to achieve peace through
negotiations, rather than by using force. He also stressed
the importance of developing a devolution package to serve as
the basis for political dialogue. Rajapaksa responded that
work was moving forward on the devolution package and that
his government was committed to a political solution,
agreeing with Fukuda that the use of force was not an
alternative. He further stated that his government was ready
to hold talks with the LTTE if they would participate in a
faithful manner. Fukuda also pressed Rajapaksa for progress
on the human rights front, to which the president replied
efforts were under way to establish a human rights
investigation commission. Fukuda elicited Rajapaksa's
support for Japan's "Cool Earth 50" initiative, support for
Japan's position on the North Korea abductions issue, and
support for Japan's effort to obtain a permanent seat on the
U.N. Security Council.


5. (C) In addition to his meeting with Fukuda, the president
also was received by the Emperor and Empress and was called
on by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, and
Land, Infrastructure and Transport. According to Ishikawa
and an official MOFA press release, Foreign Minister Koumura
discussed the same topics touched upon by PM Fukuda, and that
Rajapaksa "said that he was confident that using force would
not settle the conflict..." in his country. In addition, Sri
Lankan Foreign Minister Chadrasekara Rohitha Bandara
Bogollagama, who accompanied Rajapaksa to Tokyo, told the
press that his country would "shortly" announce a political
proposal to settle the nation's ethnic conflict as
discussions by the committee dealing with the issue had
reached a final stage.


6. (C) COMMENT: Ishikawa told an Embassy Tokyo Political
Officer that following Sri Lanka's announcement of the end of
the cease-fire, he had carefully reviewed Rajapaksa's remarks
during his meetings and to the press in Tokyo, and had to
concede that perhaps the president had never "promised" or
"committed" to solely purse a political solution. However,
Ishikawa maintained that the tenor of all discussions had
certainly implied Rajapaksa was committed to a political
course of action and that his decision to abrogate the
cease-fire had therefore surprised and disappointed the
Japanese. Despite this, it is likely Japan will remain
engaged with Colombo, both through continued economic
assistance packages and the political involvement of Special
Representative Akashi.
DONOVAN