ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO JAPAN: FIRST IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 000611

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018
TAGS: PREL ETRD PINR KPAL KWBG IR NK IS JA
SUBJECT: ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO JAPAN: FIRST IN
ELEVEN YEARS

REF: TOKYO 492

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Israeli Prime Minister Olmert's February
25-28 visit to Tokyo focused on expanding the bilateral
relationship, particularly trade, but also addressed regional
issues including the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP),Iran,
North Korea, and China. On the peace process, Olmert thanked
Japan for its Corridor for Peace and Prosperity (CPP)
initiative, while Prime Minister Fukuda urged him to exercise
more leadership toward implementing the roadmap and to
addressing the situation in Gaza. On Iran and North Korea,
Olmert and Fukuda agreed that nuclear proliferation was a
major concern and discussed the possibility of sharing
intelligence, with Israel sharing what it knows about Iran in
return for Japan's intelligence on North Korea. Concerning
China, Fukuda urged Olmert to be careful in dealings with
Beijing, and Olmert replied that Israel's policy is to
improve economic ties with China and to avoid political or
military dealings. The Joint Statement issued in conjunction
with the visit was much pared down from what the Japanese
normally prefer and, at Israel's insistence, only focused on
the economic and peace process issues. Japan rebuffed an
Israeli attempt to specifically mention their desire to
establish an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, accompanied by his
wife, senior staff members, and a 24-member private sector
business delegation visited Tokyo on a four-day official
working visit February 25-28. This was the first visit to
Japan by a sitting Israeli Prime Minister in eleven years.

--------------
BILATERAL ECONOMIC TIES
--------------


3. (C) The first full day of PM Olmert's visit, February 26,
was dedicated mainly to economic issues. He and his business
delegation met with Keidanran (Japan Federation of Economic
Organizations) President Fujio Miterai and some of his
colleagues, and attended an afternoon business forum, which
was also attended by Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(METI) Senior Vice Minister Masashi Nakano and MOFA Vice
Minister Yasuhide Nakayama. METI Minister Akira Amari was
invited to attend, but did not want to be seen in a public
forum with Olmert and opted instead to call on him privately
in his hotel. According to MOFA First Middle East Division
Principal Deputy Director Akihiro Tsuji, Amari believed that
meeting with Olmert publicly or participating in a forum with
him would offend or alienate Amari's Gulf Arab counterparts
or otherwise negatively affect Japan's relationships with the
Gulf Arab countries whose oil is so critical to Japan's
economic survival. MOFA's official summary of Olmert's visit
listed all of his meetings except the one with Amari.


4. (C) The economic relationship was also the first topic
discussed when Olmert met with Fukuda on February 27 in a
fifty minute meeting, followed by a twenty minute one-on-one,
according to Tsuji. Olmert expressed his hope that the two

TOKYO 00000611 002 OF 005


countries could collaborate more on research and development
issues and said that his ultimate hope is to conclude an EPA
with the Japanese. Fukuda replied that talk of an EPA was
premature, but agreed to the establishment of a
director-level working group to discuss how the two countries
can work together in the financial, investment, agricultural,
and technology realms. Tsuji believes the Israelis are very
serious about an EPA, given the fact Olmert raised it twice
during the meeting and also because they made a tough but
ultimately unsuccessful pitch to get it into the joint
statement.


5. (C) The other major economic promotion activity that took
place during the visit was a trip on February 28 to a nearby
Nissan plant. Nissan announced in January its intention to
establish a plant in Israel by 2011 to produce its "Ecocar,"
and Olmert had expressed an interest in learning more about
this initiative.

--------------
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
--------------


6. (C) PM Olmert thanked Fukuda for Japan's CPP initiative,
noting it is a project that can help to improve the MEPP
atmosphere, and thus is meriting support from Israel,
reported Tsuji. Fukuda thanked him and also offered Tokyo as
a venue for peace talks, if the parties believed it would be
useful to meet here. Fukuda then pressed on the MEPP,
expressing hope that Olmert will exercise more leadership
toward the implementation of the roadmap measures. He also
urged Olmert to exert his utmost efforts to avoid further
deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Olmert
replied that the situation for the Palestinians in Gaza is
"inconvenient," but so too is it inconvenient for Israelis
who must live under the constant threat of rocket attacks.
The inevitable result, he said, would be a clash. And while
Israel is aware of Japan's concerns, it cannot let the crisis
continue. Fukuda again asked Olmert to take action to ease
the restrictions on movement of people and goods in Gaza,
but, according to Tsuji, Olmert did not reply.


7. (C) COMMENT: Following the escalation of violence in Gaza
after Olmert's return to Israel, Japan on March 3 issued a
press statement expressing "deep concern" about the situation
and "deploring" the fact that Israeli and Palestinian
civilians, including children, are falling victim to the
violence. Japan "strongly condemned" the rocket attacks
launched by the Palestinian side and also the Israeli
response, calling on the Israeli government to exercise the
"utmost restraint" to avoid injuring civilians or
exacerbating the humanitarian situation further. The
Representative of the Palestinian Authority in Tokyo told
Political Officer the Japanese were quite upset by the
Israeli actions so soon after Olmert's visit to Japan. END
COMMENT.


8. (C) The MEPP was also a major topic discussed in PM
Olmert's separate meeting on Feburary 27 with Foreign
Minister Masahiko Koumura, reported Tsuji. Koumura raised
with Olmert Japan's concerns about the continued construction
of housing by Israelis in the West Bank and East Jerusalem,

TOKYO 00000611 003 OF 005


and said Japan looks to Olmert's leadership to tackle this
problem. Olmert replied he will see to it no new settlements
are built, and that the Israeli side would fully implement
its no new settlements promise.

--------------
IRAN - NORTH KOREA
--------------


9. (C) PM Fukuda raised Iran first, said Tsuji, noting the
high priority Japan places on nonproliferation both in the
Middle East and elsewhere. United action is required of the
international community to deal with this serious problem, he
told Olmert. Accordingly, Japan is steadily implementing the
UN Security Council Resolution provisions concerning Iran and
will continue to urge Tehran to fully comply with the will of
the international community, as clearly expressed by the
Security Council.


10. (C) PM Olmert replied that Israel has good reason to be
alarmed by the rapid development of a nuclear capability by
Iran. He argued that Iran is clearly trying to strengthen
both its conventional and non-conventional arms capabilities,
and this is simply not acceptable to Israel. He emphasized
that this is the key year to end Iranian nuclear enrichment,
warning that next year will be too late. PM Olmert offered
to share Israeli intelligence on Iran with Japan, and said he
wants to work closely with Japan to join an international
effort to persuade IAEA Director General ElBaradei to take a
tougher approach on Iranian nuclear enrichment. Fukuda
replied that, personally, he agrees it is imperative for the
IAEA to take a tougher approach, and that he thinks it
necessary for the UN to provide the IAEA with a stronger
mandate to investigate Iranian behavior. Tsuji was careful
to point out to Political Officer that this last comment was
made in Fukuda's "personal capacity" and was not part of his
prepared and cleared talking points for the meeting. Olmert
concluded by noting that economic sanctions on Iran have been
effective and are appropriate, and must be maintained.


11. (C) COMMENT: The subject of Iran did not come up in
Olmert's meeting with FM Koumura, said Tsuji. However, if it
had, Tsuji said Koumura had been given a talking point urging
Israel to join the NonProliferation Treaty and the
Conventional Test Ban Treaty. Apparently, Koumura was
content not to raise the issue of Iran if Olmert didn't. END
COMMENT.


12. (C) On North Korea, Fukuda raised Japan's concerns
regarding nuclear developments and the abductions issue, and
asked for Israeli support to address both, said Tsuji.
Olmert replied that North Korea, Iran, and Syria are part of
the "evil network" and that Israel shares Japan's concerns
about the DPRK's proliferation activities. Israel is also
concerned by the North's provision of weapons and missile
technology to Iran. Olmert again mentioned the possibility of
exchanging intelligence; Japan's knowledge of what North
Korea is up to, and Israel's intelligence on Iranian
activities. Fukuda agreed to this in principle, but
according to Tsuji, no specific mechanism to do so was
established or discussed.


TOKYO 00000611 004 OF 005


--------------
CHINA
--------------


13. (C) The good news on China, Fukuda told Olmert, is an
improving relationship which presents many economic
opportunities. However, he warned that the question of
China's rapid and non-transparent military build up requires
attention to the impact this is having on regional stability.
Olmert replied that Israel has good relations with China as
far as business and trade are concerned, and would like to
see these relations improve. China is a big country and a
big market, he said. But, at the same time, Israel will
remain cautious not to move to improve relations in other
than the economic field.

--------------
JOINT STATEMENT
--------------


14. (C) The joint statement issued in conjunction with the
visit was much more limited than is normally the case for
Japan. Tokyo usually insists on mentioning climate change,
North Korean proliferation, the abduction issue, and its
desire to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council.
All of these were left off. According to Tsuji, the Israelis
wanted the statement to focus only on bilateral issues, and
would not agree to the inclusion of Japan's boilerplate
entries, or even to language concerning Iran, which has also
been fairly standard in Japanese joint statements with other
countries in the Middle East. The statement accordingly was
limited to highlighting the steady progress of bilateral
relations, both economic and political, noting the decision
to establish a joint working group to explore improved
bilateral relations (Japan would not agree to Israel's
"premature" desire to mention an EPA, noting there has been
no previous discussion of such an issue). In addition, the
statement reaffirmed the commitment of both sides to enhance
cooperation in the science and technology field and looked
forward to this years fourth meeting of the Japan-Israel
Joint Committee for Cooperation in Science and Technology.
On the MEPP, the statement noted that PM Fukuda expressed
strong support for ongoing bilateral negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinians, and said that PM Olmert had
reiterated his commitment to make every effort to reach an
agreement with the Palestinian side before the end of 2008.
The CPP initiative was also favorably mentioned.

--------------
OTHER MEETINGS
--------------


15. (C) In addition to his meetings with Fukuda and Koumura,
Olmert was also received by the Emperor and was the guest of
honor at a social dinner hosted by Fukuda. He also had
meetings with former Prime Minister Koizumi, former Foreign
Minister Aso, Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba, and Japan
International Cooperation Agency President Sadako Ogata.
According to Tsuji, the Koizumi and Aso meetings were
courtesy calls to reciprocate for meetings held with Olmert
in Israel. Both men remain very interested in the Middle
East and Koizumi, in particular, was impressed by the fact

TOKYO 00000611 005 OF 005


that Olmert had met him in July 2006, the same day Israeli
soldiers were attacked on the Lebanese border instead of
canceling their meeting. The meeting with Ogata was to
discuss her upcoming trip to the region. Olmert's meeting
with Minister of Defense Ishiba lasted approximately thirty
minutes, according to an MOD contact, who reported Ishiba had
reminded Olmert of Japan's restrictions on the export of
military equipment, but also expressed an interest in sharing
information about military technologies, particularly
mentioning unmanned aerial vehicles. Olmert also briefed
Ishiba on the situation in Gaza and emphasized how important
it is for Israel to work closely with the United States, its
European friends, and Japan.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) Tsuji reported the Japanese were pleased with
Olmert's visit and considered it a success. Both sides
clearly wanted to maintain the public focus on an improving
bilateral relationship. Japan's relations with Israel have
been warm, but never close given Japan's traditional support
for the Palestinian people. Both sides opted to focus on
"good news" issues, rather than to emphasize Iran, a
politically and economically sensitive issue for the
Japanese, or other international issues. The Israelis also
wanted to push for closer economic relations and also raised
the issue of landing rights for El Al flights at Narita, a
subject of previous unsatisfactory discussions. The notion
of intelligence sharing on Iran and North Korea will be taken
up in other channels.
SCHIEFFER