Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TOKYO3209
2008-11-19 23:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

NEW ASSURANCES FOR JAPAN'S FOOD SECURITY

Tags:  EAGR ETRD PREL ECON TBIO PTER JP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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R 192303Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8963
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6498
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2887
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8630
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2493
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RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 003209 

SIPDIS

FOR EAP/J AND AMBASSADOR HASLACH
STATE PASS USDA FOR DUS TERPSTRA, USDA/FAS DANIEL BERMAN
AND SUZANNE HALE
HHS/FDA/CFSAN FOR DAVID ACHESON
USTR FOR AUSTR CUTLER, MICHAEL BEEMAN, RON MEYER, ERIC
HOLLOWAY, AND JANE DOHERTY
NSC FOR JIM LOI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018
TAGS: EAGR ETRD PREL ECON TBIO PTER JP
SUBJECT: NEW ASSURANCES FOR JAPAN'S FOOD SECURITY

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; reasons 1.4 (b) (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 003209

SIPDIS

FOR EAP/J AND AMBASSADOR HASLACH
STATE PASS USDA FOR DUS TERPSTRA, USDA/FAS DANIEL BERMAN
AND SUZANNE HALE
HHS/FDA/CFSAN FOR DAVID ACHESON
USTR FOR AUSTR CUTLER, MICHAEL BEEMAN, RON MEYER, ERIC
HOLLOWAY, AND JANE DOHERTY
NSC FOR JIM LOI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018
TAGS: EAGR ETRD PREL ECON TBIO PTER JP
SUBJECT: NEW ASSURANCES FOR JAPAN'S FOOD SECURITY

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; reasons 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) Summary: Japan's current approach to food security
undermines its economic interests and is an irritant in
U.S.-Japan bilateral trade relations. Fears among the
Japanese public that foreign sources of food are by
definition unreliable and that foreign food, whether from
China or the U.S., can easily be tainted, has provided grist
for Japanese officials and politicians to advocate policies
calling for greater self sufficiency in agriculture. This
policy course, however, falls short of meeting Japan's food
security objectives. From the U.S. perspective, the GOJ's
ineffective and misguided food import policies could, in the
event of a sustained crisis, render Japan a weaker and less
effective strategic partner. At the very least, they
threaten to distort further Japan's agricultural trade the
way non-science based regulations have cut and kept limited
U.S. exports of beef. Japan's position on boosting
agricultural output and promoting its inefficient domestic
agricultural sector also limits its ability to engage fully
in the Doha Development Agenda or in regional and bilateral
trade liberalization agreements that include meaningful
commitments on agriculture. In order to move our bilateral
agricultural trade discussions forward and forestall new
regulatory or other barriers to our agricultural trade with
Japan, Post supports the proposal that the USG offer formal
assurances to Japan that the United States will remain a
reliable supplier of agricultural products, even in times of
shortage -- i.e., re-state long-standing U.S. policy in order
to redirect the GOJ's focus on food security away from
exacerbating poor domestic agricultural policies and impeding

imports of U.S. agricultural products. The upcoming
U.S.-Japan Sub-Cabinet talks, tentatively scheduled for
December in Washington, offer a good opportunity, perhaps in
the form of a joint statement, to raise Japan's food security
concerns and to offer assurances of this kind. As part of
this process, Japan should be encouraged to recognize imports
are an integral part of its food security needs. End summary.

The World's Most Important Agricultural Relationship
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Japan, while restricting imports of beef and other
products, is our largest agricultural customer outside NAFTA
and agricultural trade has been a key component of the
overall bilateral relationship since 1945. Japan imports 60
percent of its calories and the United States is Japan's
largest and most reliable food supplier. Almost 60 percent
of the wheat consumed in Japan came from the United States in
2007, as did 75 percent of the soybeans and 100 percent of
the corn. The effects of a disruption in U.S. commodity
sales would be devastating for Japan. Americans may have
forgotten, but Japanese often note President Nixon's 1973
announcement to suspend soybean exports and say the U.S.
might do so again.


3. (SBU) Were sources of feed for livestock disrupted, for
example, Japan's 4.4 million cattle, 10 million pigs, and
hundreds of millions chickens would begin to starve within
four to six weeks. It is unlikely other countries could
supply on short notice the 15 million tons of corn Japan
needs annually. American agricultural exports to Japan
totaled $11.6 billion last year. Japan is the largest market
for U.S. wheat, corn, pork, and potatoes, in addition to
several billion dollars worth of processed food products.
Prior to the 2003 discovery of BSE in the U.S., Japan was
also the largest market for U.S beef, with imports valued at
$1.3 billion.

A Renewed Commitment is Needed
--------------


4. (C) This issue is a national priority for Japan and the
government cites food security frequently to justify its
protectionist agricultural policies. In response to tight
commodity markets in 2007 and 2008, the GOJ stepped up its
rhetoric designed to denigrate food imports and extol the

TOKYO 00003209 002 OF 002


benefits of domestically produced (and much more expensive)
alternatives. Recent food scandals regarding frozen
dumplings and other foods from China, and tainted rice from
Japan's storehouses getting into the food supplies, have
raised public anxieties. The GOJ has tended to fold the food
safety question of tainted foreign food into the domestic
debate over food security, as well one result is to
exacerbate public perceptions of foreign food as generally
suspect rather than looking at specific problems from
particular countries, producers, shippers or even domestic
sources. The GOJ and Japanese media have overlooked the fact
that the U.S. continues to supply safe, high quality products
to Japan or that the U.S. kept its market open while many of
Japan's other key trading partners imposed export
restrictions and related taxes in response to recent global
food shortages and rising prices.


5. (C) Restating the USG's existing and long-standing policy
to not limit agricultural exports to Japan could help move
the GOJ away from its familiar refrain that food imports are
unreliable. We suggest using the language to press Japan to
recognize its food security-based need to promote greater
understanding and application of science-based trading rules
to enhance its sourcing options, something that would
directly benefit U.S. exporters, and potentially reduce
Japan's ingrained protectionist tendencies. A renewed
gesture by the USG to ensure a reliable source of
agricultural goods would also complement our efforts in APEC
to address, together with Japan and other economies, broader
food security concerns.


6. (C) The best food security measure for Japan is
unfettered access to U.S. supplies. The best way for Japan
to ensure the United States continues to be a reliable
supplier is for Japan to be a reliable buyer. To do so,
Japan must take concrete steps to eliminate technical
barriers to trade and enhance market access for U.S.
companies. The GOJ must also avoid, however politically
expedient it might seem, the tendency to conflate food safety
and food security concerns. USG assurances of continued
access to U.S. agricultural products will make it more
difficult for the GOJ to use food security concerns as an
excuse for protecting its domestic farmers and food
processors.
SCHIEFFER