Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TOKYO3114
2008-11-10 06:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

U.S. - JAPAN - KOREA TRILATERAL POLICY PLANNING

Tags:  PREL ECON EFIN EAID SENV KGHG KSCA KDEM XE 
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1288
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 003114 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/P, EAP/J, AND EAP/K

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2018
TAGS: PREL ECON EFIN EAID SENV KGHG KSCA KDEM XE
PK, AF, CH, BM, KS, JA
SUBJECT: U.S. - JAPAN - KOREA TRILATERAL POLICY PLANNING
TALKS

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 003114

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/P, EAP/J, AND EAP/K

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2018
TAGS: PREL ECON EFIN EAID SENV KGHG KSCA KDEM XE
PK, AF, CH, BM, KS, JA
SUBJECT: U.S. - JAPAN - KOREA TRILATERAL POLICY PLANNING
TALKS

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Trilateral Policy Planning talks were held
in Tokyo October 28-29 by S/P Director David Gordon and his
Japanese and South Korean counterparts, Deputy Vice Foreign
Minister for Foreign Policy Koro Bessho, and Deputy Minister
for Planning and Coordination Lim Dae-Hong. Main topics
covered included the outlook for Japanese foreign policy,
China, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Asia-Pacific Strategic
Environment and regional architecture, the global financial
crisis, climate change, and global governance. Burma was
also briefly touched upon. Trilateral discussions concerning
North Korea are reported septel, as are S/P Gordon's
discussions with several prominent former Japanese government
officials. END SUMMARY.

--------------
OUTLOOK FOR JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY
--------------


2. (C) During a dinner focused on long-term foreign policy
goals, Deputy Vice Minister Bessho spoke briefly about the
impact of domestic politics on Japan's international
relations. Praising PM Aso for his "outward-looking"
approach, he cited Aso's "unusual" mention of the U.S.-Japan
Alliance, relations with China and Korea, and the Corridor of
Peace and Prosperity initiative during his recent UNGA speech
to illustrate the current administration's ambitious
diplomatic agenda. Laying out the historical development of
the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral framework, Bessho assured his
counterparts that there will be no big changes to these
relationships if the opposition Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) takes a majority in the next Lower House election.
Describing the current DPJ insistence on a UN mandate as a

prerequisite for Japanese involvement in international
operations as "extremist" and "untenable," he intimated that
the opposition would change its views when faced with the
reality of governance.

--------------
CHINA
--------------


3. (C) With regard to China, for Japan, it is not a question
of "engaging" China, explained Bessho. China is there and
getting stronger, and the government is not changing. Japan
hopes that China will remain a "benevolent" power, but it
will always be a big and powerful neighbor, even if relations
with Japan improve. Bessho affirmed Japan's need to rely on
the United States and other allies in engaging with China in
a way that helps to shape its future.


4. (C) From Korea's perspective, Deputy Minister Lim observed
that China is still regarded as an unequal partner as well.
Citing surveys that rank China's "soft power" as very low in
Asia, he underscored that recent food safety scares showed
just how fragile that power can be. While everything
involving the United States and Japan is exploited for
political purposes, less is expected of China.

--------------
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
--------------


TOKYO 00003114 002 OF 007


Japan: ODA Cornerstone of Policy
--------------


5. (C) Japan has broadened its focus on Pakistan away from
just counter-terrorism to include more straightforward types
of development assistance, reported DVM Bessho. Earlier this
year, in an announcement timed for just before the Pakistani
elections, Japan indicated that it is doubling the level of
its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Pakistan.
However, Bessho noted, internal security remains a major
issue and it appears an increase in domestic extremist
attacks has dampened the enthusiasm of the Pakistanis to
fight terrorism. In addition to Pakistan's security problems,
Japan is concerned about the effect the current global
economic crisis will have on Pakistan, said Bessho, including
a potentially harsh agreement with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF).


6. (C) With regard to Afghanistan, DVM Bessho recalled that
as Director General for International Cooperation he had been
in charge of ODA and visited Afghanistan. The experience
made him understand just how difficult the situation is.
While there are 40 to 50 Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) people on the ground in Afghanistan, it is very
hard to insure their safety. Bessho said the lack of a
strong leader is also part of the problem, noting that based
on his discussions with many Afghans he has concluded that
President Karzai does not enjoy popular support. However,
there seems in the short term to be no solution other than to
support him. Bessho reiterated PM Aso's strong support for
passing the refueling bill.


7. (C) Bessho emphasized that Japan is working to help people
understand that development and security are linked, and that
security means support for the Afghan army and police. While
Japan has a contingent of development people on the ground,
sending troops is not easy as this would require the passage
of a new law. This is unlikely given Japan's current
domestic political situation. Japan will, accordingly, seek
to support priorities set by existing Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) by calibrating its ODA to
projects selected by them.

U.S. View: International Support for Democratically Elected
Governments
-------------- --------------


8. (C) S/P Director Gordon asserted that the issue of
Afghanistan and Pakistan will be a focal point for whomever
is elected president in the U.S. The overall approach will
continue to be to engage as wide a coalition as possible,
including NATO, alliance partners, China and Russia. The
surprisingly strong resurgence of the Taliban has made it
necessary for the international community to enhance its
commitment, with priority given to standing up Afghan
security forces. More assistance in particular must be given
to the Afghan police.


9. (C) There have recently been some improvements in
Pakistan's counter-terrorism efforts, reported Gordon. In
addition, the three leaders of Pakistan, India, and
Afghanistan now have decent personal relationships, and it is
important to understand that Pakistan cannot re-orient its
security forces to internal problems without an improved
Indian-Pakistani relationship. Hopefully once the IMF

TOKYO 00003114 003 OF 007


becomes engaged in helping to address Pakistan's serious
financial problems, Saudi Arabia, China, and perhaps other G7
partners will help, as well.

Korea: Afghanistan Very Far Away
--------------


10. (C) Deputy Minister Lim stated that from the Korean
perspective, Afghanistan is very far away. Taijin Kim,
Counselor at the Korean Embassy in Tokyo, who served at his
country's embassy in Kabul from 2004 through 2005, stated
there are two main problems in Afghanistan. First, he agreed
that the Afghan army and police needed to be improved.
However, this is an expensive proposition, and the current
financial crisis may make it difficult for Seoul to act.
Secondly, if U.S. support for Afghan President Karzai is
conditional, then international support should not be
unconditional. Kim also stated that Japanese refueling is
not just a symbol of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, but also a
symbol of Japanese commitment to the international community.

--------------
ASIA-PACIFIC STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
--------------

Japan: East Asia Summit Model Preferred
--------------


11. (C) Japan supports the development of an East Asian
community, DVM Bessho said, while noting the difficulty in
identifying the most appropriate institution to make this a
reality. ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, Korea, China) plus
Australia and New Zealand, or the East Asia Summit (EAS),
which wraps in India and Russia, have potential but the lack
of U.S. participation in both is a problem. ASEAN plays a
critical role in the region and must continue to do so,
although not as a "balancer" or by sitting in the driver's
seat. Japan is watching carefully how ASEAN deals with its
current challenges, including the Thailand and Cambodia
border dispute and the growing wealth gap among members.
Japan prefers EAS over an ASEAN Plus Three-centric grouping
because membership is by individual nation rather than by
blocks of nations. The Asia-Europe Meeting grouping (ASEM)
brings in India, Pakistan and Mongolia but the wide
geographic area covered by the group makes it hard to focus
discussions. "Block voting" by the EU and ASEAN is also
problematic. APEC's membership is large and unwieldy, while
the inclusion of Taiwan and Hong Kong are sources of
continual friction with China.


12. (C) Given that none of the current institutions
represents a perfect paradigm, it is necessary to continue to
build up small groupings, trilateral initiatives and
specific-purpose bilateral agreements, despite the inevitable
overlaps, DVM Bessho continued. Hence, Japan is increasingly
focused on bilateral free trade agreements and economic
partnership agreements as a means to building up a sense of
economic community in the region. Military and security
issues have been even more difficult to deal with in regional
institutions, and so bilateral alliances, trilateral
initiatives and the ASEAN Regional Forum will continue to be
relevant venues, DVM Bessho offered. He also noted that East
Asia, Southeast Asia and increasingly China see the United
States military presence as a "public force" that stabilizes
the region.

TOKYO 00003114 004 OF 007



Korea: Focus on ASEAN Plus Three
--------------


13. (C) Deputy Minister Lim said that while Japan favors the
EAS over the ASEAN Plus Three-centered groupings, the ROK,
which does not strongly support one or the other, believes
the focus should be on ASEAN Plus Three. The ROK opposes
parallel development of the EAS and the ASEAN Plus
Three-centered groupings and instead would like to see the
realization of entities that complement one another,
according to Lim. Lee Dong-Gy echoed that small groupings of
countries with shared values, geographic proximity and common
strategic interests make the most sense.

U.S.: APEC Central but not Dominant
--------------


14. (C) S/P Gordon told his counterparts that the United
States does not see a single, coherent and ideal model for an
Asian community but considers APEC as the central, but not
dominant, institution in the region. Turning to the
strategic context of the region, S/P Gordon described it as
positive. Tensions are decreasing on the Korean Peninsula
and in the Taiwan Strait. Regional integration is increasing
and the Asia-Pacific region in general is no longer seen as
full of conflict zones or a zero-sum area. The United
States is deepening its historical alliances in the region
and ties with other non-ally nations in the region are also
expanding. U.S. engagement with China is intensifying. At
the same time, China's military modernization, coupled with
the lack of transparency and rising Chinese nationalism, is
the key challenge for the region.

Burma
--------------


15. (C) Turning the discussion to Burma, MOFA Senior Foreign
Policy Coordinator Takehiro Kano said the Burmese leaders,
who in the past had looked at Indonesia's strong central
government control as a model, now look at Indonesia's
continued progress down the democratic path as troublesome.
Japan is not overly pessimistic or optimistic regarding how
the 2010 national elections will go, but does want to discuss
"red and green lines." DVM Bessho added that the key
question is how to encourage and influence the adamant and
stubborn Burmese leaders.

--------------
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
--------------


16. (C) Framing his remarks with a broad examination of the
conditions of the global financial crisis and the
administration's commensurate "extraordinary" and
"unprecedented" responses, S/P Gordon led off by emphasizing
three themes pertinent to the crisis. First, the U.S.
remains committed to open markets, free trade, and the
successful close of the Doha Round. Next, Gordon enunciated
the need for a continued commitment from established and
emerging markets alike to ensure that the development agenda
"does not become a victim of the crisis." Finally, Gordon
affirmed that countries should reject protectionism as a
response to financial market distress, evoking lessons of the
Great Depression.

TOKYO 00003114 005 OF 007




17. (C) Korea's DFM Lim thanked Gordon for the U.S. show of
initiative in convening the November 15 G-20 meeting, wryly
noting that as the problem stemmed from the U.S., so, too,
perhaps the solution would also come from the United States.


18. (C) Bessho said his views were so similar to Gordon's, he
thought that they had been given the same briefing book.
Noting that "we're not that badly off yet," but admitting the
possibility of "catastrophe" if the crisis were unchecked,
Bessho called the November 15 meeting vital. Echoing Prime
Minister Aso's comments at UNGA, Bessho pledged that the
Japanese economy would stand firm. At the same time, Bessho
downplayed China's role, saying "they have their own problems
and are preoccupied with their regions and agriculture."
Nevertheless, he hoped that China would be able to contribute.

--------------
CLIMATE CHANGE
--------------


19. (C) DFM Lim reiterated South Korea's commitment to
voluntary action to improve energy efficiency and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and described Korea's proposal to
host a world summit on climate change and sustainable
development in 2012 to showcase Korea's commitment to
"low-carbon green growth."


20. (C) For Japan, Bessho emphasized the need for realism,
commenting that certain countries' lofty but unfeasible
commitments are unhelpful. He said Japan seeks widespread
recognition of developing countries' varied interests, and
suggested the Japan-Africa Cool Earth Partnership unveiled
this spring at the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on
African Development (TICAD IV) is significant because it
represents a public articulation by low-emitting developing
countries of the ways their interests differ from those of
the major emerging economies. Policy Planning Division
Director Hikariko Ono added that the pursuit of green
technology represents a strategic opportunity for all three
countries.


21. (C) All three participants agreed next year's
negotiations will be critical, and Gordon explained he views
the U.S., Japan, and Korea as the core of a group of
like-minded nations whose leadership will be required to
bridge the gap between European and the developing world's
views.

--------------
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
--------------


22. (C) S/P Gordon highlighted the challenges of
strengthening multilateral policy frameworks and creating
sound governance systems amid an increasingly multipolar
global decisionmaking environment. He underscored the
important role of multilateralism in addressing several
issues raised in the draft National Intelligence Council 2025
report, including climate change, the financial crisis, North
Korea, and Iran. Political will and leadership were critical
factors toward effective governance.


23. (C) ROK MOFA Deputy Minister Lim and his colleague,
Director Park, agreed that multilateralism was a difficult

TOKYO 00003114 006 OF 007


goal, particularly as the number of influential global actors
increased. Park stressed that existing institutions, such as
APEC and the IMF, were bound internally by widespread
concerns about fragmentation. The key challenge was to
strengthen the cohesion of these global and regional
institutions.


24. (C) Adequate representation was an additional challenge
to effective multilateralism. The perfect organization does
not exist, according to DVM Bessho. The G-20, for example,
addresses pressing issues such as the current global
financial crisis, but key players from the Middle East region
are conspicuously absent. Bessho opined that the global
community had to tolerate such mechanisms. Gordon added that
using existing venues, such as the G-20, was the logical
alternative to constructing new entities that risked
excluding some countries. Bessho concluded by noting the
importance of stewardship and noted that world demand for
U.S. leadership remains strong, despite negative perceptions
some countries might harbor toward the United States.

--------------
PARTICIPANTS
--------------


25. (U) United States:

-- S/P Director David F. Gordon;

-- Mr. James Green, S/P Staff;

-- Mr. Mike Meserve, Embassy Tokyo Political Minister
Counselor;

-- Mr. Joseph Yun, Embassy Seoul Political Minister Counselor;

-- Mr. Evan Reade, Embassy Tokyo First Secretary;

-- Mr. Daniel Garrett, Embassy Tokyo Second Secretary
(notetaker);

-- Mr. Dan Cintron, Embassy Tokyo Second Secretary
(notetaker);

-- Mr. Mateo Ayala, Embassy Tokyo Deputy Financial Attache
(notetaker);

-- Ms. Heather Dress, Embassy Tokyo Second Secretary
(notetaker);

-- Mr. Jamie Roane, Embassy Tokyo Second Secretary
(notetaker).


26. (U) Japan:

-- Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Policy Koro Bessho;

-- Mr. Kazuyoshi Umemoto, Deputy Director General for Foreign
Policy;

-- Ms. Hikariko Ono, Director, Policy Planning Division;

-- Mr. Takehiro Kano, Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator;

-- Ms. Mayu Higiwara, Deputy Director, Policy Planning

TOKYO 00003114 007 OF 007


Division;

-- Mr. Kensuke Nagase, Deputy Director, Policy Planning
Division.


27. (U) Republic of Korea:

-- Deputy Foreign Minister for Planning and Coordination Lim
Dae-Hong;

-- Mr. Park Jong-Dae, Director, Policy Planning and
Coordination Division:

-- Mr. Kim Tae-Jin, Counselor, ROK Embassy Tokyo;

-- Mr. Lee Choong-Myon, Assistant Secretary to the President
for National Security Strategy, Office of the President;

-- Mr. Lee Dong-Gy, First Secretary, Japan Division;

-- Mr. Kim Yeon-Sik, Second Secretary, North America Division;

-- Mr. Yun Young-Ki, Second Secretary, Policy Planning and
Coordination Division.


28. (U) S/P Director Gordon cleared this cable.



SCHIEFFER