Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TOKYO3002
2008-10-28 02:33:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:
JAPANESE QUESTIONS REGARDING IRANIAN NUCLEAR
how-toVZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHKO #3002 3020233 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 280233Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8325 INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2295 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0495
UNCLAS TOKYO 003002
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/J, ISN/RA, NEA/IR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC IR MNUC TRGY JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE QUESTIONS REGARDING IRANIAN NUCLEAR
CONFERENCE DEMARCHE
REF: SECSTATE 112229
Sensitive but unclassified. Please handle accordingly.
UNCLAS TOKYO 003002
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/J, ISN/RA, NEA/IR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC IR MNUC TRGY JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE QUESTIONS REGARDING IRANIAN NUCLEAR
CONFERENCE DEMARCHE
REF: SECSTATE 112229
Sensitive but unclassified. Please handle accordingly.
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 5.
2. (SBU) Econ officer delivered demarche and non-paper in
ref to officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Non-proliferation, Science, and Nuclear Energy Department on
October 23. Similarly, Pol officer delivered the demarche
and non-paper to officials of MOFA's Second Middle East
Division.
3. (SBU) Officials in MOFA's Non-proliferation office noted
they would coordinate Japan's handling of the conference.
They made no commitments to take action, but agreed the
conference seemed problematic and noted they would work with
the U.S. on how to best respond. Second Middle East Division
officials reported they have not received any communications
yet from the Iranians about this conference, and that when
they called the Iranian Embassy in Tokyo to inquire it was
evident that the Embassy was also unaware of the details of
the conference.
4. (SBU) Foreign Ministry Non-proliferation officials came
back with a series of questions not covered in the initial
demarche. Their questions about U.S. actions and on the
details of NSG guidelines suggest MOFA officials are looking
more deeply into the conference.
5. (SBU) Action requested: Post would appreciate further
points to use in responding to the following questions from
MOFA:
A. What measures is the U.S. taking to discourage
attendance by U.S. institutions or citizens?
B. Is the U.S. informing the IAEA, and what, if
anything, is the USG asking of the IAEA?
C. Does the U.S. expect Iran's neighbors to send
representatives? If so, does the USG have any plans to
approach them regarding the conference?
D. MOFA's understanding of the NSG guidelines is that
controls on technology transfer do not apply to information
in the public domain. Given this understanding, would it be
appropriate to invoke the guidelines as legal support for NSG
participating governments to stop their nationals from taking
part in the conference?
6. (SBU) MOFA officials made no promises regarding reftel
request for host governments to discourage other countries
from attending the conference. However, they asked if they
could use the information we provided to make such demarches.
Officials further requested that we contact them before
raising the issue with any other government organizations.
They noted they would begin considering how to respond to the
conference but would await further information in response to
their questions.
SCHIEFFER
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/J, ISN/RA, NEA/IR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC IR MNUC TRGY JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE QUESTIONS REGARDING IRANIAN NUCLEAR
CONFERENCE DEMARCHE
REF: SECSTATE 112229
Sensitive but unclassified. Please handle accordingly.
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 5.
2. (SBU) Econ officer delivered demarche and non-paper in
ref to officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Non-proliferation, Science, and Nuclear Energy Department on
October 23. Similarly, Pol officer delivered the demarche
and non-paper to officials of MOFA's Second Middle East
Division.
3. (SBU) Officials in MOFA's Non-proliferation office noted
they would coordinate Japan's handling of the conference.
They made no commitments to take action, but agreed the
conference seemed problematic and noted they would work with
the U.S. on how to best respond. Second Middle East Division
officials reported they have not received any communications
yet from the Iranians about this conference, and that when
they called the Iranian Embassy in Tokyo to inquire it was
evident that the Embassy was also unaware of the details of
the conference.
4. (SBU) Foreign Ministry Non-proliferation officials came
back with a series of questions not covered in the initial
demarche. Their questions about U.S. actions and on the
details of NSG guidelines suggest MOFA officials are looking
more deeply into the conference.
5. (SBU) Action requested: Post would appreciate further
points to use in responding to the following questions from
MOFA:
A. What measures is the U.S. taking to discourage
attendance by U.S. institutions or citizens?
B. Is the U.S. informing the IAEA, and what, if
anything, is the USG asking of the IAEA?
C. Does the U.S. expect Iran's neighbors to send
representatives? If so, does the USG have any plans to
approach them regarding the conference?
D. MOFA's understanding of the NSG guidelines is that
controls on technology transfer do not apply to information
in the public domain. Given this understanding, would it be
appropriate to invoke the guidelines as legal support for NSG
participating governments to stop their nationals from taking
part in the conference?
6. (SBU) MOFA officials made no promises regarding reftel
request for host governments to discourage other countries
from attending the conference. However, they asked if they
could use the information we provided to make such demarches.
Officials further requested that we contact them before
raising the issue with any other government organizations.
They noted they would begin considering how to respond to the
conference but would await further information in response to
their questions.
SCHIEFFER