Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TOKYO2416
2008-09-03 09:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

LDP SETS DATE FOR PARTY ELECTION, AS ATTENTION

Tags:  PGOV ECON PREL JA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002416 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV ECON PREL JA
SUBJECT: LDP SETS DATE FOR PARTY ELECTION, AS ATTENTION
TURNS TO SCENARIOS FOR GENERAL ELECTION

REF: A. TOKYO 2400

B. TOKYO 2393

Classified By: CDA James P. Zumwalt, reasons 1.4(b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002416

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV ECON PREL JA
SUBJECT: LDP SETS DATE FOR PARTY ELECTION, AS ATTENTION
TURNS TO SCENARIOS FOR GENERAL ELECTION

REF: A. TOKYO 2400

B. TOKYO 2393

Classified By: CDA James P. Zumwalt, reasons 1.4(b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. One full business day after Prime Minister
Fukuda's surprise announcement that he will step down, his
ruling LDP worked quickly to stem the damage and galvanize
both party members and the public behind his eventual
successor. LDP executives have decided to hold elections for
a new LDP President to succeed Fukuda on September 22. Taro
Aso and Yuriko Koike continue to draw mention in the press as
the most likely contenders, in what is fast becoming a major
policy debate over the preferred approach to dealing with
pressing economic and fiscal issues. At the same time,
various scenarios for the timing of a general election,
ranging from October to February, are beginning to come more
sharply into focus. For now, at least, recent developments
appear to have put the opposition DPJ on the defensive. End
Summary.

-------------- --------------
LDP Sets Date for Presidential Election; Aso, Koike
Early Favorites
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders have
moved quickly in the 48 hours since Prime Minister Yasuo
Fukuda announced suddenly that he would resign (Ref A),
hoping to mitigate any negative consequences and take
advantage of the opportunity to win broader public support in
the next general election. Party executives will hold an
election on September 22 to elect a new LDP President to
succeed Fukuda. The campaign will open on September 10, the
last day for registration of candidates. Each LDP Diet
member will cast one vote, while each of the 47 LDP
prefectural chapters will have three, for a total of 529
votes.


3. (C) Over the course of the past two days, speculation over
the identities of the likely LDP contenders continues to
focus on LDP Secretary General Taro Aso and former Defense
Minister Yuriko Koike, although other names are beginning to
emerge, such as Consumer Affairs Minister Seiko Noda and
former LDP policy chief Nobuteru Ishihara. Aso has publicly
indicated his willingness to run, and Koike has hinted at

similar intentions. At this point, press reports suggest
that the contest is likely to come down to a policy battle
over Japan's future economic course, with Aso on the side of
aggressive public spending to boost the economy and fiscally
hawkish Koike representing a continuation of former Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi's growth-oriented reform agenda.
The resulting debate has the potential to exacerbate existing
divisions within the LDP over the nature of a recently
announced fiscal stimulus package (Ref B) to be included in
any supplementary budget request.


4. (C) A Kyodo survey published on September 3 showed 22
prefectural chapters supporting Aso for LDP President at this
point, with the remainder undecided. Answers among the 22,
however, indicate that these are very preliminary responses,
and could easily change as candidates are announced. A
significant number of LDP lawmakers are reportedly eager to
see a real contest, in part to deflect the almost certain
criticism that a back-room deal based on factional
affiliation would attract. An Asahi poll published the same
day registered similar numbers in support of Aso, but found
26 chapters in favor of holding elections no earlier than
next spring.

--------------
DPJ Suddenly on the Defensive
--------------


5. (C) The LDP election will take place one day after the
opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) holds a party

TOKYO 00002416 002 OF 003


convention to introduce its own new leadership slate. DPJ
leader Ichiro Ozawa is widely expected to run unopposed, and
will likely be re-seated later this week, if no candidates
register to challenge him for the post by the September 8
deadline. Embassy DPJ contacts have expressed concern over
the past several days that the party is missing an important
opportunity to debate party policies and raise public
interest in the party's overall message.


6. (C) Those concerns have become more focused since Fukuda's
announcement, and the press has begun to question whether the
LDP might actually succeed in overshadowing the DPJ with what
could be an animated debate on the direction of the ruling
party during the LDP presidential campaign. Significantly,
current LDP front-runner Taro Aso will reportedly declare his
candidacy and outline his campaign pledges on September 8, a
day on which Ozawa and the DPJ would otherwise have been
expected to dominate headlines.


7. (C) DPJ fears of being upstaged by the LDP election and
losing momentum in the Diet are receiving prominent media
play, and have been echoed in Embassy discussions with DPJ
Diet members and staff. Fukuda's sudden resignation, whether
it is perceived positively or negatively by the public, has
monopolized the front pages. In addition, speculation over
possible contenders in the run-up to the LDP presidential
election is almost certain to keep press coverage on the
ruling party during the exact period that Ozawa had hoped to
draw attention to his own "re-election" on September 21. An
earlier than anticipated general election would also rob the
DPJ of opportunities to criticize the ruling coalition in the
Diet and demonstrate its effectiveness as a political party.
That sort of momentum could potentially work in favor of the
LDP in the event of an early general election.


8. (C) An additional concern for some DPJ lawmakers is the
party's manifesto for the next general election. Ozawa has
stated publicly that there will be no substantive changes
from the manifesto issued in advance of the July 2007 Upper
House elections in which the DPJ seized a plurality of seats.
Some DPJ members have expressed a desire to come up with a
more realistic set of promises, particularly with regard to
financing projected spending. Embassy DPJ contacts stress
the importance of a contested leadership election, or at
least a clearer explanation of policies by Ozawa.

-------------- ---
General Election Scenarios More Clearly in Focus
-------------- ---


9. (C) Speculation is rife that a Diet session could be
called as early as September 24 to elect the new LDP
President to the post of Prime Minister. The most likely
scenarios being floated for the next general election are:
dissolution of the Lower House shortly after the opening of
the Diet session in early October; dissolution after passage
of a supplementary budget in late October or early November;
or dissolution in January, shortly after the new ordinary
Diet session is convoked, and shortly after the commissioning
of individual tax cuts alluded to in the fiscal stimulus
package. In each case, the Lower House election would be
held approximately 30 days later. LDP leaders have already
informed their counterparts in the opposition parties that
the opening of the fall extraordinary Diet session will be
delayed beyond the originally scheduled date of September 12.
A new date will be set after the LDP presidential election.


10. (C) The first scenario would allow the LDP to take
advantage of any positive momentum gained from public
attention on the LDP presidential election, before the
opposition has a chance to launch a new series of attacks in
the Diet. The second scenario gives the ruling coalition an
opportunity to win public support through old-style LDP
pork-barrel politics and popularity enhancing personal tax
cuts. (Note: The budget, unlike most other legislation, is
considered passed into law automatically 30 days after

TOKYO 00002416 003 OF 003


passage in the Lower House, without regard to action taken by
the Upper House.) Komeito leader Akihiro Ota told the press
recently that this is the preferable option for Komeito,
although some Embassy LDP contacts have noted concern that
this could be perceived as a return to the politics of the
past. The third scenario would allow the ruling parties more
time to try to raise their support ratings with the public,
but would also up them up to more aggressive attacks by the
DPJ. It would, however, give the new Prime Minister a chance
to prove his or her abilities by pursuing at least a limited
legislative agenda in the fall session, before standing for
re-election.

-------------- --
Fukuda to Avoid "Making Noises," as Diplomatic,
Legislative Agenda Fades
-------------- --


11. (C) Fukuda, for his part, has made clear his intention to
maintain a low profile for the remainder of his term. Not
only did he not attend an annual gathering of senior
Self-Defense Forces officers on September 3; he failed to
even send a replacement. His senior officials, meanwhile,
are left wondering whether they will be reappointed to their
posts by his successor. One LDP lawmaker holding a Vice
Minister position told the Charge that he thought Aso would
probably be more inclined to keep Fukuda's ministers largely
in place than would Koike. As a result, he expected Koike to
take slightly longer to announce her picks, in the event that
she becomes Prime Minister.


12. (C) Embassy contacts echoed press reports that the change
in the legislative calendar sounds the death knell for
Fukuda's stated priorities of extending Japan's refueling
support for Operation Enduring Freedom and establishing a
consumer affairs agency, at least for the foreseeable future.
Media continue to focus on a growing rift between the LDP
and junior coalition partner Komeito over a range of issues,
including the starting date and length of the upcoming Diet
session, use of the two-thirds majority in the Lower House to
override an expected Upper House rejection of the OEF bill,
and the timing for the next general election.


13. (C) Press reports also focused on the likely impact of
Fukuda's resignation on Japan's diplomatic agenda, including
postponement of trilateral talks with Korea and China, a
slowdown in bilateral cooperation with North Korea on the
abductions issue, possible absence of the Prime Minister at
UNGA, and diminished influence on discussions over a
Post-Kyoto framework for dealing with climate change. An LDP
Diet member told the Charge on September 2 that it is still
technically possible that a new Prime Minister could be sworn
in on September 24 and make it to UNGA in time to make a
speech, along with his or her new Foreign Minister, but he
was not optimistic.
ZUMWALT