Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TOKYO2317
2008-08-22 07:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: POST-SHIPMENT END-USE CHECK

Tags:  ETTC KOMC JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6299
PP RUEHFK RUEHGH RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2317/01 2350740
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220740Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6765
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 4484
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5015
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2743
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1005
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 7207
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 9512
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU PRIORITY 1386
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 6577
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 1874
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 3252
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0092
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI PRIORITY 0463
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY 0564
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 7119
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 002317 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DTCC - BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2018
TAGS: ETTC KOMC JA
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: POST-SHIPMENT END-USE CHECK
ON LICENSE 050050345

REF: SECSTATE 83174

Classified By: EMIN Robert F. Cekuta for reasons 1.4 b, d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 002317

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DTCC - BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2018
TAGS: ETTC KOMC JA
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: POST-SHIPMENT END-USE CHECK
ON LICENSE 050050345

REF: SECSTATE 83174

Classified By: EMIN Robert F. Cekuta for reasons 1.4 b, d.


1. (C) Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials informed
EconOff August 19 the U.S. exporter has terminated the
contract corresponding to this license. The Air Self Defense
Forces did not receive any of the contracted items, and so
have not conducted maintenance activities.


2. (C) The contract for this procurement was for Japanese
Fiscal Year 2006 and consisted of 126 night vision goggles
with a delivery deadline of February 26, 2008. Defense
Ministry officials said the contract was "closed" December
27, 2006. The delivery date was extended to March 31, 2008.
The agreement to terminate the contract was signed March 28,

2008.


3. (SBU) Defense Ministry officials report Fresco
International notified Science Technology Trading (STT),
MOD's contract partner, that it was not feasible to deliver
within the deadline. The reason given was that the
manufacturer of the goods, Aurora, had received a large order
from the USG and, as a result, had shifted its manufacturing
operations to meet the needs of the USG order. (NOTE: MOD
officials asked if USG could comment on the veracity of this
statement. End Note). As a result, Aurora reportedly could
not ship the goods ordered to Japan. In addition, the
optical amplifier tube for the NVD is no longer available.


4. (C) Post understands the National Police Agency is
currently investigating STT and, so we will need to
coordinate with local authorities before arranging a site
visit.


5. (U) Following is an MOD press release, dated November 15,
2007 and issued in English concerning STT.

Quote
MOD's action to an incident relating to the procurement of
night vision equipment for the Air Self Defense Forces.


1. In order to furnish Air Self Defense Forces bases with
136 units of Northrop Grumman's night vision equipment for
security purposes, MOD made a contract with Science
Technology Trading Co., Ltd (STT) in March 2006 (public/open
tender, contract amount: 41 million yen (approx. $370,000),
unit price approximately 300,000 yen (approx. $2,700).


2. In February this year, STT delivered 136 units of night
vision equipment based on the above contract. However, per
indication (advice) from outside, MOD made an inquiry to
Northrop Grumman and received response that the night
vision equipment supplied to MOD was not manufactured by
Northrop Grumman.


3. Based on the above fact, MOD will take procedures to
cancel the contract with STT, in accordance with MOD's
contract terms.


4. It is regrettable that such an incident occurred. MOD
will immediately inquire into the facts of the incident, find
out the cause, determine the final action and discuss
specific prevention measures.

End Text


6. (C) MOD officials informed EmbOff that while the
aforementioned contract was canceled, other STT contracts
remain in force. EmbOffs have examined documentation for the
transaction corresponding to the Fresco International/STT NVG
contract and determined that MOD received generic NVGs rather

TOKYO 00002317 002 OF 002


than the Northrop Grumman items specified in the MOD sales
contract. On November 5, 2007, the President of STT informed
MOD the NVGs were not manufactured by Northrop Grumman and
that STT would return all the money received plus a 10
percent penalty.


7. (C) Post does not know if the license number for the
fraud case under police investigation is the same as the
current Blue Lantern. We will continue to encourage MOD to
share information concerning STT activities.
SCHIEFFER