JAPAN-DPRK REACH AGREEMENT ON ABDUCTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 002227

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV JA KN
SUBJECT: JAPAN-DPRK REACH AGREEMENT ON ABDUCTIONS

REF: A. TOKYO 1843 - ABDUCTEE PARENTS MEET WITH AMBASSADOR

B. TOKYO 1755 - ABE-YAMASAKI SPAR OVER DPRK POLICY

C. TOKYO 1778 - FUKUDA DAMAGE CONTROL ON DELISTING

D. TOKYO 1741 - FAMILIES SEEK CONTINUED ATTENTION

E. TOKYO 1737 - NO GAP WITH U.S. ON DELISTING

F. TOKYO 1675 - LDP YAMASAKI SAYS LIFT SANCTIONS

G. TOKYO 1641 - INITIAL REACTION TO DPRK DEAL

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Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4(b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. Japanese and North Korean negotiators have
agreed to the basic outlines of a plan to move forward on
resolution of the abduction issue and possible normalization
of diplomatic ties. The agreement spells out the DPRK's
commitment to conduct a full investigation into the fate of
Japan's abductees, preferably by the fall, and provides for
regular updates and access by Japanese investigators to
concerned parties, documents, and related sites. The stated
goal of the investigation is to "discover abductees who are
alive and return them to Japan." In exchange, Japan has
pledged to lift restrictions on personnel exchanges and
chartered flights, timed to the opening of the investigation.
The two sides also agreed to continue discussions on the
return of the four "Yodo-go" hijackers and port calls by
North Korean ships. Some abductee family members and support
groups acknowledge the agreement as a small measure of
progress, but remain concerned by the requirement that Japan
lift sanctions before the investigation is completed. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) North Korea has agreed to Japanese demands to
re-investigate the fate of Japanese abductees. The
agreement, as outlined by MOFA, sets the modalities for the
investigation as follows:
-- The DPRK will conduct a "full-scale" investigation to take
"concrete steps" towards the resolution of the abductions
issue. The objective should be to "discover live abductees
and return them to Japan." The agreement requires the DPRK
to address the fate of "all" Japanese abductees, not just the
core group of 17 recognized on Japan's official list.
-- The investigation is to be conducted by a DPRK
investigation committee constituted by the authorities in
Pyongyang. Ideally, the committee should strive to complete
its work by the fall.
-- The DPRK will update and consult with Japan, and provide
information on any live abductees discovered during the
course of the investigation.
-- The DPRK will also "cooperate" with efforts by Japanese
authorities to "directly confirm" the outcome of the
investigation, granting access to relevant personnel,
materials, and sites.


3. (SBU) In return, Japan has pledged to lift restrictions on
personnel exchanges and entry of North Korean charter flights
at the same time that the DPRK initiates the investigation.
The agreement leaves the exact timing to further coordination
between the parties. MOFA has told the Embassy that the date
could be set as early as next week. Both sides have also
agreed to hold consultations on two issues held over from
bilateral talks in June -- the return talks of the four
"Yodo-go" hijackers to Japan and entry of DPRK ships to
Japanese ports for the purpose of loading "humanitarian aid
and commodities." Lead Japanese negotiator Akitaka Saiki
conceded to the press that the two sides had been unable to
reach an agreement on those issues.


4. (C) Japan seems to have gotten much of what it wanted out
of the latest round of talks, including a relatively short
timeframe for the investigation and a commitment to allow
access to Japanese investigators for verification. At the
same time, Japan was able to obtain agreement that this be a
purely North Korean investigation, alleviating concerns that
direct participation could make the Japanese government
appear complicit in any unsatisfactory outcomes. Japan also
does not have to make the first move on lifting sanctions, a
point that raised an outcry among hard-liners when an initial
agreement was reached in Singapore back on June 13.


5. (C) The benefits for the DPRK are less clear. Port access
for North Korean ships is not only of symbolic importance,
but would potentially allow North Korea to reopen what had
previously been seen as a lucrative route for obtaining hard

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currency and other commodities. Most Japanese press reports
were quick to attribute the DPRK's willingness to make a deal
with Japan to its concern over the lack of progress in talks
with the United States, and stressed that the bilateral
agreement reached on the morning of August 13 is dependent on
what happens at the Six-Party Talks. A MOFA contact working
the talks from Tokyo told the Embassy that the DPRK appeared
ready to reach an agreement this time, and that the
atmospherics were more positive than in the past. He
speculated that the DPRK might believe it can use the
bilateral agreement with Japan to move the Six-Party Process
forward in advance of U.S. elections. An Embassy media
contact agreed that U.S. pressure was largely responsible for
bringing the DPRK to the table, but stressed the importance
of maintaining a hard-line on verification in the Six-Party
context. North Korean lead negotiator Song Il-ho was quick
to tell the press that any "betrayal" of the agreement would
lead to a breakdown in dialogue. Song allegedly fought to
include language obligating Japan to "take measures to create
an atmosphere to improve relations," as a way for the DPRK to
opt out of the agreement, according to Jiji Press.


6. (C) Foreign Minister Koumura described the agreement as
"progress" and said it would bring the two sides "closer to
the stage of action for action." Earlier in the week, he had
referred to the June 13 agreement as "promise for promise."
He described the ratio of importance between the abductions
issue and the return of the Japanese hijackers as "below 99
to one." New Minister for Abductions Kyoko Nakayama
indicated acceptance of a partial lifting of sanctions, and
expressed hope that relations with the DPRK are entering "a
new phase," now that an investigation will be conducted "from
the beginning, with the presumption that the abductees are
alive and not dead."


7. (C) Abductee support groups are less positive, with
several leaders quoted as saying that Japan has lost yet
another diplomatic card by agreeing to lift sanctions before
the investigation is concluded. Some family members,
asserting that the DPRK controls any remaining abductees and
already knows their whereabouts, have complained that the
time-line is too long. Shigeru Yokota, father of abductee
Megumi Yokota, was slightly more hopeful, acknowledging the
time-line itself as "half-step progress." His wife, Sakie,
told the Embassy she would wait to be briefed by DG Saiki on
August 15 before making a judgment. An Embassy media contact
noted that convincing the families will be key to the
government's efforts to resolve the issue. Coordination
between MOFA and Minister Nakayama will also be important, he
said, particularly given concerns among the abductee groups
that she had been excluded from the process in June.
Nakayama apparently insisted this time that the DPRK agree to
two specific terms -- an investigation that goes "back to the
drawing board" and appointment of investigators with direct
access to the DPRK leadership.


8. (C) The bilateral talks, originally scheduled for August
11-12, got off to a slow start the first day, as lead
Japanese negotiator Akitaka Saiki presented his demands and
settled in to await a response the following day.
Discussions heated up the second day, with the two sides
working straight through meal times and well into the morning
of the third day to hammer out an agreement. A major
sticking point was reportedly the wording on the objectives
of the investigation with regard to return of live abductees.
In its official press release, MOFA noted that Saiki pressed
for a "comprehensive resolution" of such issues as
abductions, nuclear weapons, missiles, Japan's "unfortunate
past" with the Korean Peninsula, ultimately leading to
normalization of diplomatic relations. The DPRK criticized
Japan for its "oppression" of the General Association of
Korean Residents in Japan ("Chosen Soren").
SCHIEFFER