DAS MARCIEL ENGAGES JAPANESE INTERLOCUTORS ON SE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 000217

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2018
TAGS: PREL EAID JA
SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL ENGAGES JAPANESE INTERLOCUTORS ON SE
ASIA

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: Japanese government officials and Diet
members discussed Japan's relations with Southeast Asia and
told DAS Marciel that Japan and the United States need to
continue to work closely together to coordinate on aid and
other projects; Cambodia needs to take more of an "ownership
role" when it comes to the Khmer Rouge trials and that it
will be difficult for Japan to provide additional financial
support for the trials since no one can say with any
certainty when they will be completed; and, Japan is
increasingly looking to Vietnam as a major partner in the
region. On Burma, Japan has no plans to initiate new
development projects, with the exception of humanitarian aid
such as polio vaccines. MOFA agreed on the need to
"encourage" Burma to let UN Special Envoy Gambari return to
Burma at an earlier date but said Japan lacks the influence
to persuade the regime. Pro-Burmese democracy members from
the Japanese Diet told Marciel that they were frustrated with
some Diet members who did not want to risk upsetting "stable
Japan Burma relations" by sounding to critical of the regime,
but said they are committed to maintaining momentum on
passing a resolution on Burma in the Diet. End Summary.

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PHILIPPINES
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2. (C) MOFA Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Deputy
Director-General Junichi Ihara told DAS Marciel January 15
that the most recent coup attempt in Manila was a poorly
planned "joke," and that President Arroyo's desire and
willingness to maintain herself in power is very strong. One
of Japan's major interests in the Philippines is the Mindanao
peace process. During his most recent visit to Manila, Ihara
met with a ministerial-level official who, while optimistic
about the progress being made, left Ihara with many questions
about just how this process will work. It seems to depend on
a plebiscite, but if the people don't vote in favor of the
proposed agreement, the government won't be able to force it.
In addition, the Islamist elements seem to have their own
ideas about the areas to be granted autonomy and also don't
recognize the Philippines constitution. Ihara thinks it may
be very difficult to overcome some of these differences and
reach a compromise acceptable to all parties. The
government's plan seems rather fragile, he concluded.


3. (C) Nevertheless, Japan supports the Filipino people and
would like to see an agreement reached, Ihara continued. In
Japan's view, the biggest problem is the lack of
infrastructure and capacity in the areas to become self
governed. As a result, said Ihara, nearly three-quarters of
Japanese ODA to the Philippines goes to those areas and is
focused on projects that will create jobs and provide
services. Pointing to East Timor as a cautionary example,
Ihara predicted it would be a disaster if the government of
the Philippines were to grant autonomy before the people in
the areas develop the capacity to adequately govern
themselves. Ihara said he understands the U.S. and Japanese
embassies in Manila are in close contact about these
developments and expressed hope that we would coordinate our
aid efforts to achieve the maximum benefit.

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VIETNAM
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4. (C) Ihara described Japan's growing relationship with
Vietnam, highlighting recent high-level visits in both
directions. He said the recent agreement to embark upon a
"strategic relationship" is really more of a general theme,
rather than a well-defined way forward, but noted that the
Japanese business community and influential politicians are
very interested in expanding ties. On the commercial side,
Japanese business concerns are worried about the
sustainability of economic growth in China and have decided
to embark upon a "China plus one" strategy. The "one" is
Vietnam, and as a result, Japanese direct investment in
Vietnam is increasing. At the same time, influential
politicians are also very interested in Vietnam and are
likely to support both political and economic initiatives to
increase contacts.

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5. (C) The Vietnamese have asked Japan for help on three
"huge" projects, said Ihara: a modern North-South highway, a
2,000-plus km high-speed rail system spanning the country,
and a high-technology park. Ihara expressed skepticism about
whether Vietnam needs or is ready for high-speed rail, noting
that at present the country only has a single track diesel
line. To make the leap to bullet-trains seems a bit much, he
opined. However, Japan is studying the feasibility of such a
system. In addition, Japan has already assisted Vietnam with
the development of modern, basic commercial legislation.


6. (C) Ihara said he had been very impressed by how open and
frank the Vietnamese were about concerns with China during
recent political-military talks he attended. Noting that
they seemed to hold nothing back, the Vietnamese were eager
to compare notes with the Japanese on territorial claims
China has been making in the South China Sea, which are
similar to the ones China is pressing against Japan in the
East China Sea. Ihara said Japan and Vietnam are not
planning on ganging up on China, but pointed out these are
issues they have in common and, accordingly, it is good to
coordinate responses. Japan has suggested to Vietnam that it
raise their concerns at the ASEAN Regional Forum to make it
less of a bilateral issue.


7. (C) DAS Marciel told Ihara the Vietnamese have also come
to us with their concerns about Chinese claims in the South
China Sea, as have some of our own private companies which
have been threatened by China with exclusion from Chinese
markets if they engage in business with the Vietnamese in
disputed areas. He noted how far our relations with the
Vietnamese have come and observed that the Vietnamese take
our assistance projects very seriously and implement them
very effectively.

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CAMBODIA
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8. (C) Ihara noted that he had just returned from Cambodia,
and said that his focus had been on the Khmer Rouge
tribunals. Although the slow start had been worrisome, after
the tribunal had agreed upon its internal rules, things had
moved quickly, with judicial proceedings beginning last
summer and the first five arrests proceeding peacefully
shortly thereafter. The main problem now is money, he
reported, with funding scheduled to dry up this summer. This
is a major issue because, optimistically, the work of the
tribunal will not be completed until at least until the first
quarter of 2011.


9. (C) A second concern, said Ihara, is the government of
Cambodia's attitude about the tribunal. While the government
seems to have the strong political will to make the trials
successful, it seems a bit complacent about how things are
going and does not appear to accept responsibility for
funding issues. Ihara termed this type of mentality as
troubling, and said he was disappointed by his meetings with
Deputy Prime Minister Sok An.


10. (C) In addition to having the government of Cambodia take
on a greater sense of responsibility, Ihara said it is also
necessary for the U.N. to exercise more appropriate
stewardship of the process as well. While the U.N. staff is
hard-working and conscientious, they are not adequately
supported by U.N. headquarters. Japan believes the idea of
appointing a Special Advisor is a good one, but Ihara noted
that Sok An is reluctant to support this, fearing that such
an individual would control or manage the entire process,
somehow infringing upon Cambodian sovereignty. Ihara said he
has suggested that the terms of reference for the position
therefore make clear that the Special Advisor's mandate is to
better coordinate between the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and headquarters so that the ECCC's
interests are better represented in New York.


11. (C) DAS Marciel agreed with Ihara on this subject and
said he would raise it during his visit to Phnom Penh.
However, he also pointed out that one of our major concerns
is the level of corruption associated with the tribunal,
explaining that until this is resolved it will be very

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difficult to convince Congress to appropriate funding to
supports the tribunal's operations. We support the
appointment of a Special Advisor but believe part of his/her
role should be to help clean up the management of the court
and address the corruption issue.


12. (C) By September, MOFA will need to go to the Ministry of
Finance to explain why it is necessary to come up with
additional funds for the tribunal, said Ihara, who lamented
that it is difficult for him to be optimistic about his
ability to get the needed money. Nevertheless, it is
important, he said, for Japan, the U.N., and the government
of Cambodia to all do their parts to keep the tribunal
functioning. Japan would like very much to see the United
States contribute funds as well, he concluded. DAS Marciel
reiterated that addressing the corruption problem was
critical.

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INDONESIA
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13. (C) MOFA International Cooperation Division Deputy
Director General Masato Watanabe told Marciel that Japan is
particularly pleased by Indonesia's slow but steady economic
development. Indonesia is the second largest recipient of
Japanese ODA in the region, followed by the Philippines and
Vietnam. Most of the monies are concessional loans that fund
projects on health, infrastructure, and education, Watanabe
explained.

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BURMA
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14. (C) Ihara said that during his just-completed visit to
Burma, he had been "haunted" by a sense of unease in the new
capital Nay Pyi Taw. Ihara drove by the location where the
Japanese journalist was slain and said everything seems
totally peaceful and "normal" - traffic is flowing and people
are going about their lives - but he had the feeling that it
was all artificial and that beneath the surface something is
very wrong. Ihara explained that the purpose of his visit
was to attend an ASEAN Plus Three meeting on arts and culture
and noted during a courtesy call with the Prime Minister, the
PM delivered a 30-minute monologue on why the capital had
been moved. There was no mention of culture or the arts, and
Japan did not have a chance to say anything during the
meeting, Ihara asserted.


15. (C) DAS Marciel replied it is evident the Burmese regime
is not interested in talking either to its own people or to
outsiders. It is very troublesome that the U.N. Secretary
General's Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari has yet to be
admitted and that current speculation is he may not get in
until April. Progress must be made, and while we recognize
it may be difficult to obtain UNSC action, it might be needed
to move things along.


16. (C) Ihara confirmed that Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan
Win is currently in Tokyo to attend the Mekong Country
meetings (septel),but said that he feels isolated as all the
important projects being discussed involve other countries,
and that the very limited amount of ODA going to Burma is
restricted to purely humanitarian projects. In a separate
meeting, MOFA International Cooperation Division Deputy
Director General Masato Watanabe also emphasized that Japan
has reduced its ODA to Burma, and stressed its aid helps the
Burmese people, but does not benefit the ruling junta.


17. (C) Responding to a question about the East-West
Corridor project, Ihara said that while it theoretically
includes Burma, in reality none of the project goes through
Burmese territory. Ihara described FM Nyan Win as a good
person, noting it is possible to frankly discuss contentious
issues with him. By and large, this is also the case with
many of the working-level Burmese diplomats the Japanese come
into contact with. However, it is meaningless to have
conversations with them or the FM if they have no power, or
access, to communicate with the highest levels of their
government.


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18. (C) Marciel explained to Ihara and Watanabe that it is
our view that pressure must be applied on the Burmese
government to encourage positive steps. He highlighted the
recent editorial written by U/S Burns, in which the United
States calls for dialogue and recognizes that the military
has a role to play. However, the military must reach out to
other political forces and ethnic minorities in the country
and include them in the political process. If it does so,
Burma should be welcomed back into the community of nations.
Ihara concurred, noting that despite the fact the Burmese
regime says it is preparing for democracy - and is
constructing a new parliament building and presidential
residence for when that day comes - it must take into account
the existing opposition forces, a position that their own
legal analysis says can't be done. It is important to find
some way to work around this hurdle to bring those opposition
forces into the process. He said Japan is working with the
Burmese leadership to convince the military government to
work more closely with the democratic forces, and believes
that if the regime were to work with Gambari this would be a
step showing its willingness to do so. Ihara concluded "this
is the last chance for them; they must take it."


19. (C) Ihara wished to know whether the United States plans
to continue to have a dialogue with the Burmese in Beijing.
Marciel replied there are no plans to do so at this time, but
noted that if we were to see progress in Burma and felt that
such a course of action would produce positive results, such
talks might be reconsidered.


20. (C) In a separate meeting, three Diet members from the
nonpartisan Parliamentary League for the Democratization of
Burma voiced their continued dissatisfaction with Burma's
regime and called for increased international pressure during
a dinner at the Charge's Residence on January 15. Ruling
Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) Lower House member
Mayumi Moriyama and opposition Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) Upper and Lower members Shinkun Haku and Masaharu
Nakagawa agreed that the killing of a Japanese journalist had
heightened public interest in the Burma issue within Japan,
as had subsequent efforts to publicize the issue by the
journalist's former assistant, an ethnic Kachin. Haku urged
the United States to issue a strong statement condemning the
killing, in order to keep the Japanese public focused on the
issue. Nakagawa noted that he and other Diet members had
been denied visas to travel to Burma to seek the return of
video equipment belonging to the journalist.


21. (C) While it is important for the entire international
community to weigh in against the junta, Moriyama noted,
neighbors such as China and India, along with regional
partners in ASEAN, must play a greater role in both
"encouraging" and "pressuring" the regime. Statements from
those neighbors are probably more effective than those from
more distant countries, such as the United States and Japan,
she stressed. Seizing on DAS Marciel's point that the
situation inside Burma has wider ramifications, they
acknowledged the threat posed to other countries by refugee
flows, narcotics, human trafficking, and rampant disease.
China, in particular, needs to move away from its focus on
political stability and energy policy and recognize that
economic instability in Burma can filter across the border
just as easily as refugees and disease, Moriyama posited.
Indonesia also tends to be too soft on Burma's military
dictators, Nakagawa noted, probably as a result of its own
historical experiences. He said he is working to include
lawmakers from Burma's neighbors in a wider parliamentary
league.


22. (C) Opposition from Japanese lawmakers in the pro-Burma
Diet league continues to stall efforts on a Diet resolution
calling for democratic change, Haku lamented. Most pro-Burma
Diet members date their ties with the country to pre-1988,
Nakagawa added, and have been active on parliamentary
exchanges and development assistance for some time. As a
result, they tend to see the current regime as a temporary
phenomenon.


23. (C) In addition to the continued focus on human rights
and the treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi, the three Diet members
urged greater attention to the plight of Burma's ethnic
minorities, both within the country and in refugee camps in

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Thailand. Nakagawa stressed a particularly urgent need to
respond to refugee issues in Thailand, where he described
camps for Burma's ethnic minority groups as more like forced
labor camps. Up until now, he said, Japan has helped Burma's
refugees through support for UNHCR. He and Moriyama hoped
Japan could work more directly to assist refugees in the
future, describing the current situation as "hopeless."
Nakagawa also expressed concern that Japan is being left
behind by China in developing relations with Burma's people.
In trips to the border, he noted, China's influence is much
more evident than is Japan's.


24. (C) Burma-related human rights and ethnic minority
support organizations are planning to organize a conference
in Tokyo in February, according to Nakagawa. He expressed
hope that representatives from the conference might be able
to testify at the Diet, or participate in some other Diet
event. Several Diet members and Japanese journalists are
also contemplating joining a trip organized by Human Rights
Watch and other NGO's to interview ethnic minority groups on
the Thai-Burma border, she said.


25. (U) This cable was cleared by EAP/DAS Scot Marciel.
SCHIEFFER