Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TOKYO2110
2008-07-31 09:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPAN'S AGENDA ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Tags:  ECIN ETRD EINV PREL ASEAN APECO JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6231
INFO RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2127
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8557
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6211
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 0709
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RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1679
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RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1519
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RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 9728
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3382
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1033
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002110 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO USTR FOR CUTLER, BEEMAN
TREASURY FOR IA - DOHNER, WINSHIP, POGGI
COMMERCE FOR 4410/ITA/MAC/OJ
GENEVA PASS TO USTR
NSC FOR LOI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS: ECIN ETRD EINV PREL ASEAN APECO JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S AGENDA ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

TOKYO 00002110 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM James Zumwalt for Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002110

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO USTR FOR CUTLER, BEEMAN
TREASURY FOR IA - DOHNER, WINSHIP, POGGI
COMMERCE FOR 4410/ITA/MAC/OJ
GENEVA PASS TO USTR
NSC FOR LOI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS: ECIN ETRD EINV PREL ASEAN APECO JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S AGENDA ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

TOKYO 00002110 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM James Zumwalt for Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (SBU) Summary: The priority of trade liberalization in
the future economic architecture of Asia dominated debate
among the 16 country representatives preparing the
Japanese-sponsored "Track II" study on a possible ASEAN Plus
6 economic agreement. Japanese participants in the study
group indicated substantial progress on trade liberalization
would be difficult, even for Japan. As a result, other
issues -- energy and environment, economic cooperation, and
trade and investment facilitation -- enjoy equal treatment
with trade liberalization in the report which will be
submitted to ASEAN Economic Ministers in August. Despite
acknowledgement by participants in the study of the
importance of "open regionalism" in an ASEAN Plus 6
framework, the impression remains that Japan's aim is to
consolidate economic relations with its Asian neighbors
without opening sensitive sections such as services and
agriculture or diminishing its reliance on export-led growth.
End summary.

Background
--------------


2. (SBU) In the spring of 2006, Japan's then Minister of
Economy, Trade, and Industry Toshihiro Nikai floated a
proposal for a regional economic agreement that would include
the 10 ASEAN member states along with Japan, China, South
Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India. The main goal of
the proposal was to present an alternative to a new regional
architecture based on ASEAN Plus 3, a study for which was
underway with Chinese sponsorship. Japan's proposal to
establish a group of experts from the relevant countries to
study the feasibility of the ASEAN Plus 6 framework -- known
as the "Comprehensive Economic Partnership with East Asia"
(CEPEA) -- received the blessing of the ASEAN and other
related economic ministers in August 2006, with the formal

study beginning in May 2007. The study's conclusions will be
presented at the August 26-29 Singapore meetings between
ASEAN economic ministers and their dialogue partners.

CEPEA Debate Centers on Priority of Trade Liberalization
--------------


3. (SBU) Substantial debate had emerged in the CEPEA study
group over the elements to be included in the report,
according to CEPEA Study Group Chairman Risaburo Nezu. In a
recent meeting with emboffs, Nezu - - a former Ministry of
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and OECD official and now
senior managing director of the Fujitsu Economic Research
Institute - - indicated the scholars from the 16 countries
which would be part of CEPEA had agreed the arrangement would
need to be more than just a trade pact. China and Korea
argued emphasis on trade among the probable CEPEA
participants would be premature. Japan's insistence on
promoting trade liberalization, however, ensured the topic
remained a core element of the report, Nezu said. (Note:
Although the study group's formal members consisted of
scholars drawn from each of the 16 countries covered by the
initiative, Nezu acknowledged Japanese Foreign Ministry and
METI officials were present at all meetings. The
representatives of the other governments participated only
occasionally. End Note.)


4. (SBU) As chairman, Nezu delegated the drafting of
specific chapters on the report's main thematic elements to
particular country representatives. Themes and assignments
were: trade liberalization (Australia); trade and investment

TOKYO 00002110 002.2 OF 003


facilitation (New Zealand); economic cooperation (India);
energy and environment (China); and information technology
(Malaysia). Japan was charged with writing the roadmap
portion containing specific policy recommendations. Chinese
representative, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher
Zhang Yunling (who had led the previous study on a possible
ASEAN Plus 3-based FTA) prepared the chapter on energy and
environment because that topic was politically less
controversial for China. In addition, each participant
prepared an individual country paper. The country papers are
not a consensus product like the full report and are designed
to help participants gain a clearer understanding of each
country,s current preferential trade arrangements and goals
they would like to achieve via CEPEA. Nezu predicted the
ASEAN Economic Ministers' meeting would most likely call for
no more than an additional round of study on the CEPEA
proposal either on the ostensibly unofficial "Track II" basis
like the current report or potentially via a more official
study group composed of government officials.


5. (SBU) Nezu recounted disagreements over wording. For
example, the South Korean participant opposed the term "open
regionalism," labeling it self-contradictory. Nezu indicated
he had stressed the importance of the reference to open
architecture because of the political message it carried that
CEPEA would not aim at creating new trade barriers and could
be extended to other economies. It was particularly
important to communicate this point to the United States,
Nezu asserted. Nevertheless, he acknowledged while the
current report lacks a section analyzing how CEPEA would
interact with the U.S., EU, or APEC, it will be important to
assess how it will relate with these entities should it come
into being.


6. (SBU) Nezu also emphasized that Asia needs an
institution like the OECD to act as a secretariat that
facilitates, records, and disseminates research and policy
discussions. Japan, he observed, has supported establishment
of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia
(ERIA) in Jakarta, Indonesia, which could serve as the basis
for such an institution. (Note: ERIA also emerged from then
METI Minister Nikai's 2006 initiative. Its executive
director is Hidetoshi Nishimura, a retired METI official who
was previously an advisor to the Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO) and executive managing director of the
Japan-China Economic Association, both organizations with
close ties to METI. End note.)

METI, Industry Unwilling to Battle Opponents of Free Trade
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) Waseda University Professor Shujiro Urata, one of
the Japanese representatives on the CEPEA study group, noted
the debate over whether the ASEAN Plus 3-based East Asia FTA
(EAFTA) or the CEPEA is the optimal architecture. In a
meeting with emboffs, Urata expressed concern that open
acceptance among other Asian countries of CEPEA as the model
for future regional architecture could damage their relations
with China and even possibly South Korea, both of which
support the EAFTA model. He predicts, supporters of EAFTA
will come back with recommendations in 2009 to reinvigorate
interest in an ASEAN Plus 3-centered architecture.
Nevertheless, Urata had conducted a simulation comparing the
economic benefits of CEPEA and EAFTA. He found CEPEA
ultimately proved to deliver larger gains, although Urata
cautioned the results depended to a great extent on the
assumptions used in the model.


TOKYO 00002110 003.2 OF 003



8. (SBU) The Japanese bureaucracy, not business, is the
driving force behind Japan,s proposals for regional economic
architecture, Urata observed. Japanese multinationals, he
said, show little interest in supporting any particular model
of regional architecture. In this regard, METI has been
disappointed because Japanese business is hesitant to express
its ideas. Without clear support from Japanese industry,
METI is reluctant to take on the Agriculture and Health
Ministries where many oppose to trade liberalization.
Internationally, the GOJ also tends to let the U.S. take the
lead on promoting a global trade agreement to avoid frictions
with Japan's other major trading partners.

Fukao: Japan's Trade Agreements Reactive, Little Impact on
Domestic Economy
-------------- ---


9. (SBU) Hitotsubashi University Professor Kyoji Fukao, a
participant in the study group that laid the groundwork for
Japan's (stalled) economic partnership negotiations with
South Korea, observed Japan has approached trade agreements
primarily as a defensive measure. When Japan's trade
partners look set to conclude an agreement, the GOJ begins
negotiations with the relevant parties to minimize the
diversionary impact on Japanese trade. The focus, he notes,
is not an ambitious trade liberalization agenda. Without an
institution like USTR, each GOJ ministry, Fukao stressed, can
block possible concessions in any negotiation that might harm
its constituency among Japanese business or the public at
large.


10. (SBU) Fragmentation of overseas production and the
current situation where exports nurture most of Japan,s
economic growth, signals a need for domestic reform. Fukao
stressed that METI also recognizes the need to create
incentives for inward investment in order to remain
economically competitive. Fukao cited the example of Toyota,
which he estimated has half of its total employees overseas
and continues to invest most of its profits abroad, mainly to
avoid paying Japanese corporate income tax. Fukao also
suggested the need for Japan to diversify industries
receiving FDI. Japan's service sector, for example, has yet
to internationalize despite the dramatic growth in global
services trade. Hence, despite language barriers, there is a
great potential for globally competitive services firms to
invest in Japan.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Although our interlocutors -- two of them direct
participants in the CEPEA study -- spoke positively about the
benefits of CEPEA's "ASEAN Plus 6" architecture, none of them
indicated this proposal would spur economic reform within
Japan itself. Their comments tended to reinforce the
perception CEPEA would serve Japan as a medium to allow it to
consolidate economic relations with Asian neighbors without
opening sensitive sections such as services and agriculture
or diminishing its reliance on export-led growth. In
addition, Nezu and Urata clearly understood the importance of
references to "open regionalism" in order to mollify possible
U.S. opposition to further development of CEPEA.
Nevertheless, their account of the CEPEA discussions along
with Prof. Fukao's exposition of the bureaucratic dynamics
involved in Tokyo lead to suspicions that any references to
an open architecture in the August report will be largely
rhetorical.
SCHIEFFER