Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TIRANA878
2008-12-12 13:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tirana
Cable title:  

RFG: ADDRESSING ALBANIAN DEFMIN CONCERNS OVER

Tags:  PREL PGOV MASS PARM AL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTI #0878/01 3471345
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121345Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TIRANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7682
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSES STUTTGART GE
RUFNPKB/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TIRANA 000878 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM/WRA:DAVE DIAZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS PARM AL
SUBJECT: RFG: ADDRESSING ALBANIAN DEFMIN CONCERNS OVER
DEMIL PROGRESS

REF: A) TIRANA 830 B) SECSTATE 128582

Classified By: Ambassador John Withers for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TIRANA 000878

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM/WRA:DAVE DIAZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS PARM AL
SUBJECT: RFG: ADDRESSING ALBANIAN DEFMIN CONCERNS OVER
DEMIL PROGRESS

REF: A) TIRANA 830 B) SECSTATE 128582

Classified By: Ambassador John Withers for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request. See Paragraph 9.


2. (C) Summary: During Defense Minister Oketa's Dec 5 visit
to Washington, he expressed concern at the lack of progress
at the demilitarization site of Polican and laid part of the
blame on the US contractor. This concern was based on
Oketa's comparison of Polican to the demil facility of
Mjekes, where the US contractor is not involved, and which is
far more modernized. Oketa's perception stems from a
misunderstanding of role of U.S. funding and of the history
of these facilities. Mjekes is a profit-earning enterprise
and has had the resources to pay for its own modernization.
Polican all but ceased to function after the fall of
communism and has very little resources of its own; it is
thus in a serious state of disrepair. Realizing the
disparity between these two facilities and newly aware of the
USD 8.4 million allotted by the Department of State for demil
work in Albania, Oketa became baffled that Polican, where US
contractors are present, is so far behind Mjekes, which is
completely self-funded. More worrisome, MoD staff traveling
with Oketa later expressed to DATT their frustration with the
constant tension between his MoD staff and the US contractor.
Besides the source of tension stated in reftel a, Post has
observed growing tension between MoD's J-4 munitions
department and other actors involved in demil and believes
Oketa's concerns should be seen in this context. The
Ambassador has scheduled a meeting with the Defense Minister
to deliver talking points in reftel b and to address Oketa's
concerns. End Summary.

THE HISTORY OF POLICAN AND MJEKES
--------------


3. (C) During communist times, Polican and Mjekes were the
major military industry facilities in Albania. Mjekes
produced all of Albania's explosives, while Polican produced
all of Albania's munitions. During the 1980s (after the
death of dictator Enver Hoxha) production decreased at both

facilities. However, in 1985, a private Swedish firm signed
a contract with Mjekes to renovate and re-equip the facility.
Production at Mjekes recovered and until the 1990s, the
factory exported explosives (TNT, Amatol, RDX) throughout the
Balkans. Since the 1990s, Mjekes has focused on civilian
explosives for sale within Albania, and has consequently
continued to turn a substantial profit. This was apparent
during a recent trip by Poloff, DATT and ODC to Mjekes. All
buildings had been freshly painted. All equipment was modern.
Management staff drove new Mercedes. Employees were
well-dressed and appeared well-off.


4. (C) Polican, however, has not recovered from the fall of
communism. It completely ceased production of high-caliber
ammunition and has since only produced small quantities of
low-caliber ammunition. Its only client is the state. In
2006, it tried to negotiate a sale to Hungary, but
negotiations fell through. Polican's only current production
is small amounts of 9mm practice rounds for local police
units. During a recent visit by Poloff and DATT to Polican,
the neglect was evident. Buildings were crumbling, equipment
was rusted and obsolete, and employees appeared to struggle
with poverty.

NAMSA
--------------


5. (C) In 2001, NATO's NAMSA signed an agreement to assist
Albania in its demilitarization efforts. Its work was
largely focused on Mjekes, where it financed further
upgrades, such as an incinerator to destroy small-arms
ammunition. As a result, from 2003 to 2007, the NAMSA-funded
project eliminated 7,234 tons of munitions at Mjekes.
Meanwhile, in 2006 NAMSA included a much smaller project at
Polican in its demil assistance. NAMSA did not provide
upgrades to Polican, but simply approved Polican's own plans
to destroy 1,683 tons of 107mm mortar rounds, and helped
finance and supervise Polican's project.

CURRENT NATIONAL DEMIL PLAN
--------------


6. (C) The current National Demil Plan developed by the
Minister designates Polican and Mjekes as the major
industrial demil sites. A crucial factor is that Mjekes and
Polican are quasi-private enterprises that receive no money
from the MoD budget, but must survive on their own financing.
Furthermore, for Mjekes, demil is seen as a profit-making
activity, since it will be allowed to keep part of the
removed explosives (usually TNT) to process for sale for
civilian use (Amatol). Hence, since 2007, Mjekes has used
its own finances to further modernize and upgrade its
facilities. Meanwhile, Polican has complained to the MoD
that it has no resources to modernize or equip its facility.
The MoD has responded, however, that since Polican is a
non-state entity, it is not the MoD's responsibility to equip
or upgrade Polican.


7. (C) While the Defense Minister knew of the extensive US
assistance to demil in Albania, he first heard the sum of USD
8.4 million in his December 5 meetings in Washington and was
surprised. It is unclear to him how this money is used, and
is thus confused by the lack of modernization efforts at
Polican, where the US contractor intends to help finance and
supervise the destruction of 82mm rounds. See action request
in para 8.

CONTINUING TENSIONS
--------------


8. (C) During his visit in Washington on December 6, Oketa,s
staff shared with DATT a larger concern over continuing
tensions between MoD staff and the US contractor described in
reftel a. These tensions have been focused mainly within the
relationship between the General Staff J-4 munitions office
(LTCs Viktor Pershqefa, Shkelqim Sena and Zenun Ferro) and
the contractor Armor Group. However, Post has recently
noticed an increase in tensions between the J-4 munitions
office and several other offices, including the ODC
contractor Cubic, leadership at Mjekes and Polican, as well
as the DefMin's appointed demilitarization coordinator Fatmir
Bozdo. J-4 munitions staff have told Poloff that they
actively ignore and sidestep Bozdo as they consider him an
"artificial creation" with no authority. They expressed
their angry disapproval upon learning that the visiting EUCOM
EOD officers had scheduled a meeting with Bozdo.
Additionally, in the presence of the director of Mjekes, J-4
munitions director LTC Pershqefa claimed to Poloff, DATT and
ODC that because of the lack of necessary laws, all demil
activity at Mjekes are illegal. J-4 staff have also stated
stated that they do not consider the DefMin's National Demil
Plan binding because it does not contain his signature. They
claimed to Poloff that they will not be able to follow orders
from the Minister to release munitions for destruction
because such an order would be illegal unless the DefMin
first gets approval through a Council of Ministers Decision
(the executive body controlled by the Prime Minister).
Recently, there have been several such instances where the
J-4 munitions department has weighed in on legal issues that
are outside its competency. This may be due to a lack of
involvement by the MoD's legal department, but it has been
counter-productive as the J-4 staff seem to exert more energy
finding legal obstacles rather than solutions.

REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE
--------------


9. (U) The Ambassador has scheduled an appointment to address
these concerns and to deliver reftel on December 16 date.
Post requests Washington provide a brief summary and
explanation of DOS weapons removal and abatement funding and
what it goes toward that Post can share with the Minister and
his staff either at the December 16 meeting or after.


WITHERS