GERDEC AFTERMATH - GOA INDECISIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TIRANA 000328

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, ISN, PM/WRA
DOD FOR OSD/WPOPOVICH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018
TAGS: MASS PARM PREL NATO AL
SUBJECT: GERDEC AFTERMATH - GOA INDECISIVE

REF: A) TIRANA 200 B) TIRANA 219

Classified By: Charge S.A. Cristina, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

Summary
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1. (C) In response to the March 15 Gerdec tragedy, the
international community has mobilized efforts to provide
humanitarian relief and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance
and stepped up plans to rid Albania of over 100,000 tons of
decaying munitions before another catastrophe happens. The
GOA has claimed to be eager for assistance in dealing with
the remediation of the Gerdec site as well as with
demilitarization of the stockpiles of aging weapons and
munitions disbursed throughout the country. Unfortunately, a
combination of lack of experience, lack of coordination, and
bureaucratic confusion on the part of GOA officials is
delaying both. End Summary.


2. (U) The March 15 munitions explosion in Gerdec (Ref A)
scattered dirt, scrap metal, thousands of fused and unfused
munitions, propellant and explosive material across a 30
hectare valley leaving seven craters where a munitions
dismantling factory once stood. It left unexploded ordnance
(UXO) buried under meters of dirt and debris. Torrential
rains helped to drive the heavier pieces further underground
while camouflaging the entire area with mud.


3. (C) The tragedy, which has claimed 26 lives so far,
focused public attention on what could happen at the
significant number of MOD munitions storage facilities near
populated areas and appeared to create a sense of urgency in
the government to deal with this ticking time bomb.

GOA Asks for Assistance
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4. (C) Immediately after the accident, State's Office of
Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) dispatched its SALW
program manager and senior adviser, Mark Adams, to assess the
situation. Adams came up with a proposal to use ArmorGroup
North America (AGNA),already under contract with WRA to
destroy rifles, handguns, and 82 mm mortars, to clear the
core area of UXO and directed the International Trust Fund
(ITF) to provide a further $2 million in USG funds to AGNA
under a separate contract.


5. (C) Director of PM/WRA, Richard Kidd, came to Albania
April 7-9 to discuss with Minister of Defense Oketa and Prime
Minister Berisha further plans to clear Gerdec's "core area"
of UXOs as well as longer range plans to eliminate Albania's
stockpile of aging munitions and its MANPADS. Oketa made an
official request asking the USG for help to clear the core
area of UXOs, to destroy Albania's MANPADS arsenal, and to
accelerate Albania's timetable for the destruction of its
obsolete munitions (Ref B). He also committed to Kidd that
the ministerial order would be signed as soon as possible,
promised the MOD would turn over the MANPADS for destruction
by May 1, and agreed to develop a long-term munitions
reduction plan.

But is Making it Difficult for U.S. Help to Begin
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6. (C) AGNA cannot start working without a ministerial order
(MO) instructing MOD personnel to work with and provide
access to AGNA. Previously, MOs have gotten bogged down in
bureaucracy, taking months to sign. Oketa has said he is
trying to expedite it this time, but we still have not
received it. In subsequent April 15 meetings with Embassy
personnel and the EUCOM Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team
(HAST),Oketa confirmed his decision to dispose of the
MANPADS. While final approval must come from the Council of
Ministers, Oketa said he was ready to receive a U.S. team
immediately to inspect and make preparations for shipment of
the MANPADS. On April 19, however, Oketa said that he had
received advice from his Joint Forces Commander that they
were still a viable system of air defense and should be

TIRANA 00000328 002 OF 002


maintained. Since he is new to the portfolio, he is
reluctant to move forward without expert opinion to counter
the JFC. He has asked for U.S. information that could help
disprove that assertion.


7. (C) Even with the ministerial order, AGNA will not be able
to begin operations at the Gerdec explosion core area until
the GOA commits to provide a secure work area. Prime
Minister Berisha assured Director Kidd and the DCM that his
government was ready to implement whatever conditions the USG
required to clean up Gerdec and to deal with the larger
munitions problem facing the country. Director Kidd
stressed the importance of site security, both within the
blast zone as well as in a wider radius where citizens could
face danger from planned detonations of damaged UXOs. He and
Colonel Chad Sparks, who leads the HAST team evaluating
environmental and structural risks, also highlighted
potential dangers to the civilian population of moving back
into their homes before soil and water analyses are finished
and homes have been carefully screened for structural stress.
The Prime Minister said the GOA would clear whatever area
the USG recommends.

Reality
--------------


8. (C) Post, the EUCOM team, and WRA have stressed to the GOA
at all levels the importance of clear lines of responsibility
and authority in dealing with the Gerdec crisis. While the
PM and Oketa concurred during our meetings, word has yet to
get to the people on the ground. In an April 8 letter to the
PM, Ambassador Withers expressed concern that the Gerdec
Emergency Management Committee, headed by Minister of
Interior Nishani, is off to a slow start. Nishani's choice
of Alfred Olli, the MOI's Emergency Management Coordinator,
to lead the Gerdec working group was also a disappointment.
The site commander, General Bahja, who is supposed to play a
support role to Olli, clearly does not get along with Olli
and has been making site security decisions on his own --
most of them efforts to reduce the area of security. Bahja
has insisted that he is responsible only for controlling the
core area, but claims he does not have authority to control
access to the larger unsafe zone around the blast site.
While the MOI is theoretically responsible for that area,
police officers stand by while villagers move in to their
houses, light fires to clear brush, and generally act as if
the area is safe.

Comment
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9. (C) The GOA needs to pull out all the stops to begin
removal and demilitarization of the remaining UXO at Gerdec.
Each day of delay increases risks. Absent the Ministerial
order and adequate safety assurances, we will not be able to
assist with clearance of the core area. Post, including the
Ambassador, continues to press the Government at the highest
levels to sign the order and provide the requisite
assurances. We are also pressing Oketa to give the ok for
removal of the MANPADS.


10. (U) This cable has been cleared by WRA Director Kidd.
CRISTINA