Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08THEHAGUE898
2008-10-24 16:30:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CWC: WRAP-UP FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION,

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER)
NSC FOR FLY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION,
OCTOBER 14-17, 2008 (EC-54)

REF: A. THE HAGUE 569

B. STATE 108991

C. THE HAGUE 891

D. THE HAGUE 896

This is CWC-51-08

-------
SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000898

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER)
NSC FOR FLY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION,
OCTOBER 14-17, 2008 (EC-54)

REF: A. THE HAGUE 569

B. STATE 108991

C. THE HAGUE 891

D. THE HAGUE 896

This is CWC-51-08

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) Like the Dutch weather, the sunshine and
progress of Executive Council 53 in June (Ref A)
returned to more typical dark clouds and rain in
Executive Council 54, October 14-17. Despite daily
meetings, lobbying, and a small group of key
delegations meeting to try and find compromise, the
week ended with no agreement on the Budget and
Program of Work for 2009. The Iranian delegation,
still without an ambassador, held up a large number
of agenda items starting with the agenda itself, and
keeping the U.S. 90-day report hostage until midnight
on Friday evening. The Iranian obstructionist drama
reached a climax on Wednesday during the discussion
of the Director-General's Note on the Secretariat's
readiness for a challenge inspection, when the
tolerance of the rest of the Council for Iranian
tactics hit its limit. Delegation after delegation
spoke of the need to carry on the business of the EC,
backed by the Secretariat's pronouncements on
procedure. Several delegations called for a vote,
with only China and South Africa arguing for a "bit
more time" to resolve Iran's issues (and save its
face).


2. (SBU) While the Iranians eventually allowed
most agenda items to move forward, including the
challenge inspection report, they introduced or
insisted on report language on an unusually large
number of issues, most likely a sign of their
strategy ahead for the Conference of States Parties
when the Budget must be approved. The final item on
the agenda which the Iranians blocked until the very
end of the Council was the U.S. 90-day destruction
report, with Iran insisting on adding unacceptable
new reporting requirements for future facilities. The
U.S. delegation succeeded in gutting that proposal,
but only after other Council members objected to
discrimination against a single member state (the
U.S.) and the Director-General (DG) himself spoke to
the past nature and factual basis required for the
90-day destruction reports.



3. (U) In a surprising denouement, the Council
session concluded at midnight with a series of
accolades for Ambassador Javits, begun by the EC
Chairperson and echoed by regional group
representatives and other delegations around the
room, ending in applause for his last Council
session.


4. (SBU) The dynamic highlights of this EC are
detailed below, followed by a review of the actions
taken by the Council, and reports on sidebar meetings
held by the U.S delegation. A full listing of the
agenda items deferred and reports noted can be found
in the official OPCW Report for EC-54. The October
13 meeting of donors to the Russian destruction
program and the EC's destruction informals, as well
as Deputy Assistant Secretary Staley's meetings and a
meeting with the Libyan delegation are reported in
separate telegrams (refs C and D). End Summary.

--------------
NO DEAL ON THE BUDGET
--------------


5. (SBU) Budget facilitator Martin Strub
(Switzerland) patiently continued negotiations during
the EC lunch break throughout the week. By Friday
(October 17),most delegations were either supporting
or resigning themselves to the position led by the
U.S. delegation against raising member states'
assessed contributions for 2009. At week's end, the
original draft budget document from June was the only
one under discussion, with the income lost from
revised Article IV and V payments to become a
reduction of some 530,000 Euros from the 75 million
Euro total. By Strub's analysis, the single major
issue left on the table was the increase in the
number of inspections of Other Chemical Production
Facilities (OCPFs),with Western European and Others
Group (WEOG) members insisting on the minimum of ten
additional inspections the DG had put in the original
budget draft, and some Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
states insisting on no/no increase in inspections
over the 2008 level.


6. (SBU) Strub told WEOG that China and India opposed
the increase in OCPF inspections on principle; other
NAM members appeared to be more flexible, apparently
seeing what they might add to the International
Cooperation and Assistance programs following a
decrease in inspection funding. Others, most notably
South Africa, appeared to be jockeying for leverage
without a clear objective or national position. The
Cuban delegation had indicated to some WEOG delegates
that there was no agreed NAM position on the OCPF
issue.


7. (SBU) Strub invited a small group of the most
interested delegations (U.S., UK, China, India, Iran,
and others) to meet on October 17 as soon as the
council adjourned its morning session. While
Ambassador Javits proposed a possible compromise, it
did not gain traction. At an emergency WEOG meeting
later in the afternoon, Strub made a plea for
compromising on OCPF numbers to try and isolate Iran.
(Iranian attendance at budget meetings was spotty all
week with old issues raised as ongoing concerns, such
as the key performance indicators, and the required
cost of living increase that the TS had repeatedly
stated it could absorb.) U.S. Delrep and other WEOG
reps argued that isolating Iran would not work, as
Iran did not see the end of the EC as a real
deadline, having argued there was "no rush" to
conclude the budget before the CSP. There was broad
agreement in WEOG that any concessions made early in
an effort to compromise would just be pocketed by
Iran and other NAM members blocking any final
negotiations and agreement before the CSP.


8. (SBU) When the EC formally reconvened at 20:00
hours the evening of October 17, Strub informed the
Chairperson that no agreement had been reached on the
draft budget and it would have to be deferred to
another (special) EC session.

--------------
IRANIAN OBSTRUCTION/ COUNCIL CONFRONTATION
--------------


9. (U) In terms of Iranian behavior, EC-54 saw what
many WEOG colleagues later termed a "return to
normal". The Iranian delegation deferred almost
every agenda item on the first pass, although it
Qevery agenda item on the first pass, although it
later agreed to note or approve all except a few
documents that were then deferred to EC-55. At
times, however, it was difficult to discern whether
actions fell under the category of obstructionism or
confusion. Both were evident. With no Ambassador to
replace previous Iranian Ambassador Ziaran, the
delegation was noticeably lacking in leadership and
coherence. Iran often appeared to defer items simply

because of an inability to grapple with the substance
or lack of internal agreement among their nine-man
delegation. Internal dynamics aside, Iran returned
to center stage at this Council session.


10. (U) A noticeable change, however, was Iran's
increasing isolation and lack of support from
otherwise vocal members of the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM). On the Director General's Note on Challenge
Inspections, Iran made the tactical mistake of
clearly stating that it would be "unable to note this
item until appropriate report language had been
developed in order to retain its leverage." After a
number of interventions across the regional groups
that expressed outrage at this procedural game-
playing, Mexican Ambassador Lomonaco asked the Chair
whether any other delegation shared Iran's view, and
if not, whether the Council might consider a vote.
To avoid breaking from the long-established tradition
of consensus, South Africa and China finally
intervened to request more time, but exasperation
with Iran was unmistakable. Cuba also intervened,
but in a way that indicated Iran was acting without
the support and consensus of the NAM.


11. Even during Iran's final push to trap the U.S.
with unacceptable report language on
"operationalization" of destruction facilities, a
topic that would normally enjoy widespread NAM
engagement, interventions were entirely in support of
a more reasonable approach, further highlighting
Iran's isolation. In general, Iran was inconsistent
in its final position on various issues and report
language. If the Iranian delegation's only "must-
have" was a public confrontation with the U.S., they
met their goal, but at increasing cost to their
credibility.

--------------
END GAME - U.S./ IRAN
--------------


12. (U) Having hinted for weeks that a confrontation
on the U.S. destruction program was inevitable, Iran
did not disappoint. Beginning with questions and
insinuations at the destruction informals about the
"lack of transparency" the U.S. displayed by refusing
to provide start-up dates for its facilities at
Pueblo and Blue Grass, Iran carried on throughout the
week but, true to form, refused to come forward with
report language on the U.S. 90-Day Destruction Report
until Thursday evening. Despite Iranian requests to
solve the issue bilaterally (i.e. in a backroom
deal),the issue was aired, discussed, and eventually
resolved, on the Council floor on Friday at U.S.
insistence. Tactically, this served U.S. interests,
as it only increased the Council's already
significant exasperation with Iran. Support for the
U.S. came from more corners than usual, despite some
agreement with the substance of the Iranian
complaint. The Council ended at midnight Friday,
having devoted approximately six hours over two days
to this particular discussion.


13. (SBU) Del comment: Although eventual
incorporation of very general language in the chapeau
above all of the 90-Day reports may quiet the
Iranians for the next several sessions, Del expects
this line of questioning to continue. Although Iran
was isolated this time, it is likely only a matter of
Qwas isolated this time, it is likely only a matter of
time before others begin to press the U.S. for more
detailed information on the status of the two
facilities that will bear primary responsibility for
running the U.S. destruction program well past the
2012 deadline.

--------------

EC-54 OPENING SESSION AND GENERAL DEBATE
--------------


14. (U) Chairperson Oksana Tomova (Slovakia) formally
opened EC-54 on October 14 thirty minutes late after
the prior Bureau meeting discussed at length Iranian
insistence on deletion of the agenda item on OCPF
declarations. The Bureau's compromise solution was
to expand the original item to include the cluster of
industry issues. Iran proposed that change from the
floor, which the Council accepted as it adopted the
agenda, much too many delegations' relief after
several weeks of Iranian opposition to the draft
agenda.


15. (U) In his Statement, Director General (DG)
Rogelio Pfirter congratulated A State Party for the
complete destruction of its entire chemical weapon
stockpile, to which the EC broke into applause. Of
note in his long review of OPCW activities, Pfirter
expressed optimism that Lebanon would accede to the
treaty in short order. He indicated that he had sent
a letter to the Secretary General (SG) of the Arab
League recently asking the SG for his full support in
helping to bring the remaining Arab states outside of
the convention in as members. He also announced the
appointment of Marc Vogelaar, former Dutch Ambassador
to the OPCW, as a special consultant on universality
matters at no cost to OPCW (courtesy of the Dutch
government). Pfirter concluded his remarks with an
announcement that he had tasked the Technical
Secretariat (TS) to prepare two papers on the
Scientific Advisory Board following the
recommendations of the Second Review Conference, and
a paper on incapacitating chemicals for law
enforcement purposes.


16. (U) The General Debate included group statements
from French Ambassador Jean-Francois Blarel on behalf
of the European Union, Cuban Ambassador Oscar de los
Reyes Ramos on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and
China, and South African delegate Marthinus van
Schalkwyk on behalf of the African Group. Japan,
China, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the U.S.,
Spain, Iran, India, Korea, Brazil, Tunisia and Libya
gave national statements. A key theme in nearly all
the speeches was praise for A State Party's
completion of destruction on time, along with the
importance of CW destruction to the treaty. Several
statements included support for the OPCW as a forum
to help prevent the spread of chemical terrorism,
most notably the NAM statement -- for the first time.


17. (U) Several of the NAM statements called for
the full implementation of Article XI, and for the
improved sharing of technology and equipment. Russia
strongly linked implementation of Article XI with
full implementation of Article VII as a precursor.
Most statements voiced approval for the zero nominal
growth budget before the Council. South Africa, in
contrast, argued that a lack of budget increase
hampered the activities of the OPCW. The only strong
difference in the national statements was on OCPF
inspections. The EU and U.S. called for an increase
in these inspections, while NAM delegates urged
improvement in site selection for the inspections
first.


18. (U) Iran used its statement to highlight a "grey
Q18. (U) Iran used its statement to highlight a "grey
area" in how States Parties were addressing
destruction, namely that the two major possessors--
the U.S. and Russia -- did not have a detailed
timeline to complete their destruction efforts. It
also called for intensified consultations regarding
Article XI and for additional efforts to assist
States Parties under Article X, including the need
for help regarding terrorist threats or other

threatened use of CW. Iran concluded by stating that
the number of OCPF inspections must be treated as a
policy issue and be intricately linked to overall
Industry Cluster policies. India echoed that view.
Brazil took a middle road, stating that the OPCW
should not move away from a zero-growth budget and
that the OCPF methodology should be improved, but not
just by increasing the number of inspections.


19. (SBU) India reiterated that it had destroyed more
than 97% of its stockpile and that it was on target
to complete destruction by the April 2009 deadline.
Libya reported that it has established a national
committee to oversee implementation and that it has
passed national legislation. It also highlighted
that it had held a national conference to education
stakeholders regarding the Convention.


--------------
VERIFICATION PLANS AND FACILITY AGREEMENTS
--------------


20. (U) After evident confusion on the part of the
Iranian delegation, Libya's Facility Agreement and
Verification Plan were approved, as were changes to
the U.S. Verification Plan and Facility Agreement for
the Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility.
Del met bilaterally with Iran to answer questions on
the new U.S. Schedule 1 Facility Agreement, which
initially stemmed from a lack of Iranian
understanding of the purpose of several accompanying
documents (comparison with Model Facility Agreement
and corrigendum),but then turned to more pointed
questions about a paragraph on sampling and analysis
drafting to take into account the requirements of
Condition 18. Despite U.S. explanations and the fact
that this language was consistent with the U.S.
Schedule 2 Facility Agreement, Iran deferred
consideration of the agreement to EC-55.


21. (U) A number of questions also arose on Iran's
Schedule 1 Facility Agreement, changes to which were
distributed during the EC week. Several delegations
asked for legal clarification as to the difference
between "agreement" (title of the previously approved
document) and "arrangement" (title of the revised
version),as well as between "shall" and "will" in
FARSI. The Legal Advisor offered assurances that the
document's legal standing had not been diminished.
The U.S., supported by Germany, requested additional
information from the Iranian government and deferred
the item to EC-55.

--------------
CONVERSION -- LIBYA'S DEADLINE
--------------


22. (U) Despite concerns that Libya's missed
conversion deadline could attract attention, this
subject escaped with little discussion. Germany
expressed concern, noting that missing deadlines was
not good for the integrity of the Convention, and
urging Libya to speed up the conversion of Rabta.


23. (SBU) A rather confusing DG Note issued without
warning just prior to the EC added nothing to the
dialogue and caught the Libyans themselves by
surprise, a fact that Libyan rep Hesnawy intended to
discuss personally with the DG. The Note, EC-
54/DG.17, is titled to refer to the Completion of
Conversion of Production Facilities in general, but
QConversion of Production Facilities in general, but
the content deals only with Libya. The Note lays out
Libyan progress and steps taken and states in the
final paragraph that the Note has been provided to
"facilitate the decision of States Parties on
appropriate measures to be applied." A similar paper

was not issued for India or Russia, both of whom have
long since passed the deadline for conversion of
their chemical weapons production facilities. Delrep
heard later from a member of the TS that this was a
political step taken to satisfy "one or two"
delegations.

--------------
DESTRUCTION - 90 DAY AND SHCHUCHYE REPORTS
--------------


24. (U) Although Iran briefly deferred the Libyan 90-
day report without explanation, their delegation
eventually agreed to note this document and shifted
its considerable attention to the U.S. report, as
described above. The Secretariat and States Parties
alike vocally resisted the discriminatory treatment
of one State Party's factual report. Of note, the DG
himself, in an attempt to separate Iranian concerns
about the U.S. program from the noting of a factual
report, suggested that a more appropriate forum for
such discussions would be the discussion of the next
EC visit to the U.S. (Del comment: While helpful in
the context of EC-54, this philosophy is likely to
come back to haunt the U.S. and the Council when it
comes time to prepare for and discuss the results of
the visit next year to Pueblo and Umatilla.)


25. (U) Earlier in the week, South Africa requested a
consultation to discuss the report of the Shchuchye
visit. In a brief meeting on October 16, South
Africa thanked the Russian delegation for their
cooperation and the patience of all and proposed
acceptable report language. The report was noted in
the afternoon session with far less controversy than
the analogous report of the EC visit to Anniston in

2007.

--------------
ARTICLE VII IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


26. (U) Said Moussi (Algeria),facilitator for this
topic, made a brief report on the three consultations
held since the previous EC meeting. Luxembourg
reported that their government had forwarded a "pre-
draft" of their legislation to the TS on October 13
for comments. After the EC noted the DG's Note, Iran
stated that they felt that the DG's Note expressed
some "views" of the TS that may go beyond strict
facts, and requested that consultations on that point
be held.

--------------
ARTICLE X ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION
--------------


27. (U) Iran continued its efforts to keep this issue
on the agenda and push for a primary focus on the
needs and care of victims of CW use. Russian
facilitator Victor Smirnovsky reported to the
Council; his list of consultations and activities
illustrated the work that has been done on Article X
since the agreement of the CSP-12 mandate for the
Council to "conduct intensive deliberations to
develop measures for emergency assistance, including
with regard to the victims of chemical weapons."
Iran proposed report language that veered far too
close to establishing a mandate for care of current
(Iranian) CW victims, but agreed fairly easily to
more acceptable language. On the Council floor, as
the result of confusion over an edited version, Iran
Qthe result of confusion over an edited version, Iran
surprisingly agreed to the deletion of a key
paragraph referring to their victims' proposal. (DEL
COMMENT: As Iran has been discussing the concept of
a victims' network since CSP-12 with virtually no
progress, it is still not entirely clear what the

Iranian delegation hopes to achieve on the issue this
year. Bargaining at CSP-13 is likely. END COMMENT.)

-------------- --------------
ARTICLE XI ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
-------------- --------------


28. (U) Facilitator Li Hong (China) reported on
recent consultations. Cuba presented its earlier
proposal, now a national paper, for a workshop to
develop ideas on concrete proposals toward the full
implementation of Article XI. Of note, the paper
states that due allocations within the 2009 budget,
along with additional voluntary funding, would be
needed. This proposal received broad support during
the consultations. Iran, in turn, presented a
competing proposal during the EC for the workshop,
including measures to promote free trade in chemicals
and identification of measures "to avoid hampering
the economic development of States Parties."


29. (SBU) Del Comment: In WEOG meetings on the
margins of the Council, several delegations expressed
concern about funding the workshop if it might turn
into an "Australia Group bashing." Funding for the
workshop remains one of the issues to be negotiated
in the draft budget before its final approval.

--------------
UNIVERSALITY
--------------


30. (U) Facilitator Lee Litman (UK) gave a report
early in the week on the consultation held in
September. Iran initially moved to defer the annual
report to the next session of the Council, but later
permitted it to be noted. Iran insisted that
language be included in the Council report on
continuing consultations on universality. The UK
subsequently drafted language that was accepted by
the EC for the report.

--------------
INDUSTRY ISSUES AND OCPF PAPERS
--------------


31. (U) After Iran changed the agenda item to reflect
all industry issues, the EC discussion centered more
on what should be addressed than anything substantive
on industry. Iran stated that more time was needed
and that all industry issues should be treated
equally; their delegate also referred to a "package"
without further detail. The Mexican Ambassador
questioned Iran on what it expected on the new agenda
item. The UK and others noted the opportunity for
the Council to discuss the two TS papers on OCPF
declarations. U.S. Delrep welcomed the two new
facilitators for industry issues and suggested that
report language reflect their appointment and the
need for other facilitators to volunteer to lead
consultations on frequency and site selection.
The Chairperson requested that the Algerian
Ambassador, as Vice Chair for the industry issues,
coordinate report language; the Algerian delegate
agreed to do so on behalf of her ambassador.


32. (SBU) Negotiation of industry report language
moved to the corridors but failed to progress in
Ambassador Dani's absence. On Thursday when Algerian
delegate Said Moussi returned to The Hague, he began
working with interested delegations privately to
construct suitable language. The Iranians worked to
remove references to OCPFs and the two TS papers;
Qremove references to OCPFs and the two TS papers;
WEOG delegations insisted on welcoming the new
facilitators by name for Schedule 2a/2a* low
concentrations and OCPF declarations by name and
urging the appointment of facilitators for other

industry issues. In the end, the report language
reflected western views on the facilitations but had
no mention of the two TS papers that initiated the
original agenda item.

--------------
CHALLENGE INSPECTION
--------------


33. (U) As described above, Iran seized upon the DG's
annual report on TS readiness to conduct a challenge
inspection to make it painfully clear that it
intended to hold virtually all documents hostage
until it was guaranteed "appropriate" report
language. While isolated on process, Iran did
receive support from several NAM delegations on the
substance of calling for the resolution of the
"unresolved issues" from the Preparatory Commission
days. Report language, while toned down from Iran's
original proposal, eventually supported this. Del
anticipates few delegates will want to volunteer for
a facilitation that is doomed to political stalemate
and has been dormant since the previous facilitator
left over a year ago.

--------------
ABAF ACTION
--------------


34. (U) After the Council noted the reports of the
Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial
matters, U.S. Delrep, supported by UK and Germany,
requested the deferral of the entire slate of
nominations for the ABAF to the next session. Delrep
noted the late letters of appointment and the need
for independent financial experts, and requested
resumes for all of the candidates.


35. (SBU) Del comment. In a private conversation
later with OPCW Administrative Director Ron Nelson,
he welcomed the move toward ABAF reform.


36. (U) Currency exchange risk report: Iran asked
about the basis for the TS calculations included in
this Note, to which the TS responded. Iran then
asked that this item be deferred to the EC meeting
following the next ABAF meeting, a highly unusual
intervention for a routine report. Mexico asked what
the practical consequences would be to this deferral,
to which the DG said there would be no consequence as
this is a report only and does not affect their
current practices. The item was then deferred to EC-

57.

--------------
MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS OF THE EC:
QUAD LUNCH -- DG SEARCH
--------------


37. (SBU) During Amb. Javits' lunch in honor of DAS
Ken Staley on October 15, the question of the
succession of the Director General was raised. The
new French Ambassador asked when his term was done
(July 2010) and agreed that it would be important to
start a systematic search early. UK Ambassador Lyn
Parker agreed with U.S. Delreps that Amb. Tomova as
current EC chair should become engaged early, and
that it would be better for her to propose a process
than to open it up for discussion. Amb. Burkart, the
German Vice Chair in the EC, agreed, and discussion
turned to who might raise the issue with Tomova and
when. The group generally agreed that it would be
ideal for Tomova to announce to the Conference of
States Parties that she would be outlining steps
early next year for nomination of candidates, to be
followed by a letter as Chairperson setting out the
process.



38. (SBU) Representatives at the luncheon also
discussed the election of the leadership for the CSP,
with the Asian Group to hold the new chair, and the
African group to chair the Committee of the Whole.
All agreed that some careful diplomatic maneuvering
would be needed to avoid the Algerian Ambassador
repeating his dismal performance as COW Chairman in
the Review Conference and the unfortunate procedural
vote in the CSP last year when Morocco disputed the
election of the Sudanese Ambassador as Chairman of
the Conference. No one had news of an Asian candidate
for the Chairmanship but delegates will pursue
discreet inquiries with Asian contacts.

-------------- --------------
MEETING WITH OPCW CHIEF OF CABINET RICHARD EKWALL
-------------- --------------


39. (U) ISN/CB Director Bob Mikulak met Richard
Ekwall for lunch on Friday, October 17. Following up
on Deputy Assistant Secretary Ken Staley's meeting
with the Director General, Mikulak and Ekwall
discussed terrorism and the evolution of the U.S.
position. Ekwall responded positively to the idea of
the OPCW being a forum for exchange of information
and experience relative to chemical safety and
security.


40. (U) Ekwall confirmed that during the Director
General's trip to New York on October 15, the DG met
with representatives from non-States Party Egypt,
Somalia and Israel, and Myanmar though not North
Korea. According to Ekwall, the tone was positive
though it was apparent that there was no real change
in attitude or the states' general positions.


41. (U) A Seminar on Universality will take place in
Istanbul, April 16-17, 2009. Ekwall and Mikulak
discussed the necessity of having separate side
meetings there with Israel, Egypt and Syria.


42. (SBU) Finally, Mikulak raised the issue of the
choice of the new Director General and Ekwall
confirmed that he would be working on it. Mikulak
gave the U.S. view of how the process might best be
accomplished.

-------------- ---
U.S./TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS
-------------- ---


43. (U) A DOD technical expert from Washington met
with representatives from the Secretariat to discuss
ongoing implementation issues. Discussions resulted
in resolution on the following: verification
approach for short term destruction operations at
Blue Grass; verification during the processing of ton
containers with high heels; an agreed approach for
the analysis of HT; and modalities for upcoming
quality review visits.

-------------- ---
INCLUSION OF NON-SCHEDULED CHEMICALS IN THE OPCW
CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE
-------------- ---


44. (U) Two weeks prior to EC-54, OPCW Laboratory
Head Gary Mallard (U.S.) requested U.S. feedback on a
draft TS note on inclusion of non-scheduled chemicals
in the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD). The
note distinguishes between data on analytical
derivatives, degradation products, and riot control
agents. Its goes on to recommend that only data for
Qagents. Its goes on to recommend that only data for
scheduled chemicals and their analytical derivatives
be used on Article VI inspections, which is a concern
for future verification as it essentially excludes

the possibility of checking for degradation products
on an industry inspection. Delrep worked with senior
TS officials to ensure the draft was not distributed
prior to EC-54, a move that was supported by the UK,
which shares U.S. concerns on the draft. On the
margins of EC-54, ISN/CB Office Director Mikulak and
Delrep met with Mallard to discuss the reasoning
behind the TS approach.


45. (U) Mallard explained that India has
categorically refused the addition of any non-
scheduled chemicals, including necessary analytical
derivatives, to the OCAD and that the TS had
attempted to separate the issues in order to have
important degradation product data available for use
in the event of a challenge inspection or
investigation of alleged use. The U.S. reiterated
its concerns about the paper, and Mallard recommended
that concerned delegations approach India to better
understand its concerns and work toward a more
acceptable solution.

-------------- --
DISCUSSION WITH THE TS ON SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS
-------------- --


46. (U) On the margins of the Council sessions
Delreps Mikulak, Clagett and Denyer met with the TS
to discuss sampling and analysis at Schedule 2 sites,
drawing on guidance (Ref B). Representing the TS
were H. Reeps (Director, Verification Division),W.
Kane (Head, Industry Verification Branch),P. Runn
(Head, Planning Review Branch),V. Artos and A. Dolea
(Senior Industry Officers) and B. Whelan,
(inspector/analytical chemist who had been involved
in a substantial fraction of the Schedule 2
inspections in which sampling was carried out). Kane
led the discussion from the TS side.


47. (U) Delreps opened the discussions by indicating
they were seeking to understand the reasons for the
differences in views between the U.S. and the TS.
Kane presented the TS view that sampling and analysis
is one of the verification tools, provides assurance
about the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals,
is a unique tool and was intended to be used on all
Schedule 2 inspections (per para 27 of Part VII of
the CWC Verification Annex). Runn added that
sampling and analysis is strongly supported by the
Director-General. Delrep explained that the U.S.
expects a rationale before sampling and analysis is
undertaken, that it should be used only if it adds
value since it is highly intrusive, and that the U.S.
questions the necessity and practicality to use it on
every Schedule 2 inspection. Further, the U.S. view
is that decisions to use sampling and analysis should
also take into account paragraph 20 of Part VII of
the Verification Annex, which specifies that a
variety of other factors are also relevant, and the
Confidentiality Annex, which provides that the least
intrusive methods should be used.


48. (U) Kane and Runn countered that paragraph 27 is
sufficient unto itself as a reason for doing sampling
and analysis. Del asked about TS plans for doing
sampling and analysis on every Schedule 2 inspection.
Kane said the TS would approach this goal gradually.
Reeps added that sampling and analysis would be
QReeps added that sampling and analysis would be
limited by budget, equipment and personnel restraints
so that sites would be selected according to
perceived risk; it would be unrealistic to plan to do
sampling and analysis during every Schedule 2
inspection. Delreps also pointed out that
confidentiality and safety concerns might limit an
inspection team's ability to employ sampling and
analysis and that decisions to employ this tool
should address technical credibility. Runn expressed

concern that the host might conclude that the
rationale provided by the inspection team might be
judged inadequate, leading the host to refuse to
allow sampling. Delreps said that they did not
envision such an outcome.


49. (U) The TS also presented its preparations to
cope with false positives and made clear that in 2009
it should be possible to use an expanded database of
reference spectra while still operating in a "closed"
mode. This would facilitate prompt resolution of
unexpected results that might look like "false
positives." Delreps gave the TS an overview of U.S.
regulations as they pertain to sampling and analysis.


50. (SBU) Comment: Perhaps the most important things
to come out of the consultation was a clear
indication that the TS is concerned that the U.S.
would refuse to allow a sample to be taken if it
judged that the "rationale" was inadequate. Delreps
explained the difference between rationale and
justification in this context. It was also apparent
that differing views exist within the Verification
Division on whether or not the goal should be to take
samples during every Schedule 2 inspection. Del
recommends that the USG assure the TS that the U.S.
does not intend to refuse to allow samples to be
taken, while stressing that the TS needs to more
clearly articulate under what circumstances sampling
and analysis add value. End Comment.



51. (U) JAVITS SENDS.
CULBERTSON