CWC: DISCUSSION WITH LIBYA ON DESTRUCTION AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000896

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: DISCUSSION WITH LIBYA ON DESTRUCTION AND
CONVERSION

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-50-08

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SUMMARY
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1. (U) On October 16, Delreps met with Dr. Hesnawy
(from the Libyan National Authority) and Mr. Gheton
(Libyan Representative to the OPCW) to discuss the
status of and issues related to proliferation
sensitive equipment, progress on the Rabta CW
Destruction Facility progress on the Rabta CW
Production Facility conversion, and the Nuclear and
Chemical Defense School at Tajura. Jim McGilly and
Chris Rampling of the UK also participated.

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PROLIFERATION SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
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2. (C - Rel UK) Hesnawy said that all proliferation
sensitive equipment (e.g. AG export controlled
equipment such as glass lined reactors, graphite heat
exchangers, sealed valves, etc.) itemized by type,
name plate number, size, and materials of
construction on lists provided in 2004 through the
Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee (TSCC)
is in storage. He assured Delreps that all the
equipment is accounted for and none is missing. The
equipment is now designated for use in a new project
planned for the Rabta site, which will consist of one
or two "Medical Manufacturing Company" factories for
the production of active pharmaceutical ingredients
(API) with a combined production capacity of 250-300
MT per year. The Libyans prefer one rather than two
facilities, but what will be built will be decided by
negotiations now underway with three potential
partners: Pfizer International Ltd, an Omani API
manufacturer and an Indian API manufacturer. The
venture will be 67% Libyan owned. The possibility of
non-Libyan employees at the facility is still not
clear, although Hesnawy mentioned the fact that
Indian labor is often the cheapest (in reference to
the Omani company). Hesnawy also mentioned Egyptian
and Syrian involvement in the Omani company, although
not necessarily this project.


3. (C - Rel UK) Hesnawy expects that 100% of the
proliferation sensitive equipment will be used in the
facilities. Construction may begin in 2009. Timing of
the transfer of the equipment to the new facility is
uncertain, as building plans will require approval by
various agencies to ensure compliance with
pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices (GMP).
Hesnawy commented that even after construction is
complete and the facility is commissioned, a number
of permits will be required from within Libya and
from national and international agencies (e.g. U.S.
FDA, WHO, etc.). He also noted that the drivers for
Pfizer involvement were its desire to cease its
operations in China due to quality issues and
favorable energy costs afforded in Libya. Possible
products were mentioned including antihypertensive
agents and pain-killers. The Libyans do not intend
to inform their prospective partners about the
origins of the equipment, which was originally
procured as a part of the CW program.


4. (C - Rel UK) Hesnawy said the equipment would be
accounted for at two stages: when it is removed from
storage and when it is installed. Removals and
installation will be noted on spread sheets based on
the lists noted above, which Hesnawy committed to
provide periodically to the U.S. and the UK. He also

agreed that the U.S. and UK could visit at any stage
in the Medical Manufacturing Company construction and
operation.

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RABTA CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITY
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5. (SBU) The Rabta Chemical Weapons Destruction
Facility (CWDF) project is well underway. The project
is being managed by Hesnawy and responsibility is
divided between Libyan contractors and SIPSA
Engineering, an Italian firm. The latter entity is
producing the unit operation equipment which is
prefabricated in Italy. Hesnawy confirmed that SIPSA
has no project contract, but instead is being paid by
"letter of intent" for each component as it is
produced, which he feels gives Libya more leverage to
ensure the firm adheres to the agreed timeline. He
expressed disappointment and embarrassment at the
failure of the other Italian firm contracted to do
the Rabta conversion to meet the 29 July 2008
conversion deadline. Hesnawy said the destruction
project has completed the basic engineering stage and
is now in the detailed engineering phase.


6. (SBU) Some equipment is already available or under
construction in Italy. This includes the rotary kiln
which Hesnawy sees as the rate determining factor in
the project schedule. To this end the construction
of the kiln is a priority and already the special
high temperature (800 degrees C) HCl resistant
refractory bricks have been ordered from a firm in
Germany. The refractory is sensitive and will be
installed in the kiln in Libya to avoid damage in
shipment. The ongoing detailed engineering includes
the air monitoring alarm system which will use on-
line GC monitoring to constantly track H levels in
real time (Libya does not like S based sensing
systems that typically yield false positives) and the
redundant digital control system. Hesnawy referred to
the procurement of sensors/detection equipment from
OI Analyte, which he described as an American company
with plants in Alabama and Texas. He also noted that
issues of end user certification could complicate
this. It was not clear whether Hesnawy would
therefore focus on procuring from a different source,
or whether he would pursue purchase of OI Analyte
equipment.


7. (U) Hesnawy emphasized that the H feed from the
pump to the kiln would be via Swagelok connected
metal tubing to a removable porthole cover. This
will allow easy conversion of the kiln for
incineration of H contaminated dunnage, plastic,
containers with H heels, etc. Construction of the
incineration and the hydrolysis systems will occur
concurrently. He expects to commission the
incineration system in January 2010 and it will be in
full operation no later than April 2010. He expects
the category 1 H to be destroyed well ahead of the 31
December 2010 deadline. Hesnawy gave no indication
when the hydrolysis system for precursors would start
up, but he expressed the opinion that precursor
destruction would also be finished ahead of schedule
(December 31, 2011).
Q(December 31, 2011).

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CONVERSION OF THE FORMER CW PRODUCTION FACILITY AT
RABTA
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8. (SBU) Hesnawy said that the conversion schedule
presented during the October 13 informals was
conservative, and that he expected the last 20% of
the conversion and commissioning to occur ahead of

the published schedule. He expects all civil
engineering work (windows, floors, sanitary,
utilities, etc.) to be completed by the end of 2008,
but in any case no later than the end of January

2009. The mechanical installations in chemical
processing areas (buildings 17 and 25) should be done
by June-July 2009 with commissioning and permitting
completed by September 2009 allowing production to
begin.


9. (SBU) Hesnawy then turned to the Note by the
Director-General: The Status of Completion of
Conversion of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities
(EC-54/DG.17). Hesnawy noted his displeasure at what
he believed to be an inaccurate representation of the
remaining items to be converted, explaining that most
of the "2600" items reported were actually ordinary
containers unassociated with the original CW
production process. He also expressed Libya's
concern that it had not been consulted prior to the
Note's distribution, and that Libya was being singled
out by the Note's suggestion that the information was
provided to "facilitate the decision by States
Parties on the appropriate measures to be applied in
relation to the noted delays regarding this
conversion," particularly when no such note was
issued for Russian or Indian conversion delays.
Hesnawy reiterated Libya's view that its notification
of conversion delays to the Council in September 2007
(EC-50/NAT.5) demonstrated its transparency, and that
the Secretariat had advised no further action was
required. Delreps suggested that this was likely in
response to inquiries by other delegations; the
Libyan delegation said it had an appointment with the
Director-General on Monday, October 20.


10. (SBU) DEL COMMENT: Delrep inquired privately
with TS officials as to the reasoning behind and
timing of this Note, which also came as a surprise to
most delegations. CDB Branch Head Dominique Anelli
indicated that the DG had directed the drafting and
distribution of the Note (possibly against the advice
of his staff) in response to pressure from one or two
delegations. END COMMENT.

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NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE SCHOOL
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11. (U) Hesnawy said that he was unaware of the
status of completion of the school in Tajura, as this
was not something with which his department has been
involved. He said he would look into the matter and
let the Delegation know.


12. (U) Javits sends.





CULBERTSON